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Reforming The Cold War State: Economic Thought, Internationalization,
And The Politics Of Soviet Reform, 1955-1985.
Abstract
This dissertation explains how, as the USSR’s narrative of the Cold War shifted from the military-industrial
competition envisioned by Stalin to Khrushchev’s “peaceful socioeconomic competition of the two systems,”
economics began to tackle the challenge of transforming the Soviet economy from one focused on
mobilization and production to one that could deliver well-being and abundance. Soviet economics changed
from a field that only justified the state’s actions to a “science” whose practitioners could use their “expertise”
to propose and critique domestic government policy. This opening allowed Soviet theorists to engage with the
emerging issues of global economic interdependence and post-industrialism, which also challenged the post-
war economic consensus in the West in the 1970s and the 1980s. Economists and scientists from East, West,
and South created a transnational community gathered around institutions such as the United Nations, the
Club of Rome, and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) to adapt the institutions
of the postwar state to the conditions of nascent globalization. By documenting these engagements, I
challenge the prevailing historiographical narrative that so-called Soviet “liberals” “learned from the West”
and instead show that reform-minded economists became equal partners in trans-European intellectual
communities that hoped to reconcile the institutions of national economic planning to the conditions of
globalization. I argue that to understand the politics of the post-Stalin USSR, one must understand the “Cold
War Paradigm” in Soviet economic thought and policy making and how it allowed for the consolidation of a
conservative hegemony under Brezhnev. Further, I suggest that despite fraying between 1985 and 1993, the
conservative direction in economic thought continues to structure contemporary Russian and Post-Soviet
politics. This work is based on primary research in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Archive of
the Russian Academy of Science, the Russian State Archive of the Economy, the Russian State Archive of
Contemporary History, the Central Archive of the City of Moscow, the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library,
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This dissertation explains how, as the USSR’s narrative of the Cold War shifted from the 
military-industrial competition envisioned by Stalin to Khrushchev’s “peaceful 
socioeconomic competition of the two systems,” economics began to tackle the challenge 
of transforming the Soviet economy from one focused on mobilization and production to 
one that could deliver well-being and abundance. Soviet economics changed from a field 
that only justified the state’s actions to a “science” whose practitioners could use their 
“expertise” to propose and critique domestic government policy. This opening allowed 
Soviet theorists to engage with the emerging issues of global economic interdependence 
and post-industrialism, which also challenged the post-war economic consensus in the 
West in the 1970s and the 1980s. Economists and scientists from East, West, and South 
created a transnational community gathered around institutions such as the United Nations, 
the Club of Rome, and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) to 
adapt the institutions of the postwar state to the conditions of nascent globalization. By 
documenting these engagements, I challenge the prevailing historiographical narrative that 
so-called Soviet “liberals” “learned from the West” and instead show that reform-minded 
economists became equal partners in trans-European intellectual communities that hoped 
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to reconcile the institutions of national economic planning to the conditions of 
globalization. I argue that to understand the politics of the post-Stalin USSR, one must 
understand the “Cold War Paradigm” in Soviet economic thought and policy making and 
how it allowed for the consolidation of a conservative hegemony under Brezhnev. Further, 
I suggest that despite fraying between 1985 and 1993, the conservative direction in 
economic thought continues to structure contemporary Russian and Post-Soviet politics. 
This work is based on primary research in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the 
Archive of the Russian Academy of Science, the Russian State Archive of the Economy, 
the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the Central Archive of the City of 
Moscow, the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, the Rockefeller Archive Center and the 
MIT Institute Archives and the Harvard University Archives. 
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Persistent Factors in Russian Economic Policy?  
 
Lenin and his Politburo are riding in a train. The train breaks down. Lenin says: 
“let’s organize a voluntary labor day, go to the woods and chop down some wood for the 
train.” They do so and the train begins to run. 
 
Stalin and his Politburo are riding in a train. The train breaks down. Stalin says:  
“shoot the engineer, promote the coal shoveler to engineer.” They do so and the train 
begins to run. 
 
Khrushchev and his Politburo are riding in a train. The train breaks down. Khrushchev 
says: “These steam engines are obsolete comrades! Let us build an atomic train that is 
faster and more reliable than any cutting-edge capitalist diesel and let us do it before it 
gets dark!”  
One atomic train is built, it is indeed faster than, but not as reliable as, the capitalist trains 
and there is only one built. It arrives two days late but, eventually, the train begins to run. 
 
Brezhnev and his Politburo are riding on a train. The train breaks down. Brezhnev says: 
“close the blinds, rock the carriage, and make train noises.” 
 
Gorbachev and his Politburo are riding a train. The train breaks down. Gorbachev says: 
“comrades, let’s just walk.”  
 
                                                             -Russian Joke  
 
 
In 1930, Andrei Platonov finished writing his novel, The Foundation Pit. His biting critique 
of Stalinist industrialization followed a group of workers digging a massive foundation pit 
for a workers’ housing project. As the novel goes on, the pit grows as peasants turn into 
workers and this, in turn, means they need to make the pit larger. Finally, facing a giant pit 
with no structure, one of the main characters leaves, exclaiming “Communism is just 
something for the kids.”1 
 Platonov’s metaphor of Stalinist industrialization as a foundation pit being dug but 
never filled in is a convenient way of introducing the subject of this dissertation: the attempt 
                                                
1 Andrei Platonov, The Foundation Pit (New York: New York Review of Books Classics, 2009) 
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of Soviet economic reformers in the state, Communist Party, and academic establishment 
to build a structure on the foundation pit that Stalinist industrialization had dug. This is a 
story of how the Soviet state, or at least some elements of it, tried to “build communism” 
but wound up flooding the foundations of the Soviet order.   
This dissertation traces how the emergence of Soviet economics as a field and the 
ensuing discussion of fundamental reform of the Soviet system were deeply intertwined 
with the way the USSR’s intellectuals and leaders understood the country’s role in the 
world. The Soviet Union, which, by virtue of its economic order, was supposed to 
supersede capitalism, explicitly tied its domestic economic doctrines to its international 
position as the ostensible leader of a global revolutionary movement. Yet, the revolution 
did not come as Lenin and the leaders of the USSR expected—German workers did not 
successfully seizer power after WWI and with the defeat in the Soviet-Polish war of 1921, 
revolutionary socialism was confined to one country. Stalinist industrialization overcame 
these setbacks by interpreting “socialism in one country” as the period in which the USSR 
could industrialize and form its social base to prepare for an inevitable war that would 
destroy the European state system and spread socialism. This world view, shaped by a mix 
of Marxism and traditional Russian realism, was deeply rooted in the imperial political 
order that was aggressively being reconstructed by the European great powers in the 
interwar period. The Soviet institutions created in the interwar cauldron were designed to 
mobilize the population to prepare for industrialization and war. This system worked—it 
helped the USSR survive the Second World War and to become the second superpower, 
punching far above its economic weight. However, things were changing.  The increasingly 
educated and urbanized Soviet population was expecting rewards for their sacrifices which 
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meant abandoning the engine of shock industrialization—the diversion of the populations 
savings from consumption to investment into producer goods—what economists call 
“financial repression.” Moreover, the international conditions which underpinned the 
institutions created by Stalinism were different. The postwar period saw the emergence of 
something that had not existed before 1945: a liberal hegemon which controlled both 
military and financial resources. The world competing imperial rivalries in which the 
Soviet system was born, and which Stalin so brilliantly exploited, was replaced by the 
American led order in which great power status would be measured not only through 
military power and industrial prestige but also through consumption and prosperity. To 
continue the USSR’s challenge to the capitalist system in a new world with new demands 
and a weapon that made superpower war too destructive to wage, the Soviet Union’s 
project shifted to trying to use the institutions of Soviet socialism to beat postwar capitalism 
at its own game—mass prosperity.  
I argue that Soviet reformist economic thought and the emergence of economics as 
a “policy science” interested in making recommendations on state actions, were deeply 
related to how Soviet elites tried to square the circle of simultaneously being a 
revolutionary state fighting against the imperialist world order, being a superpower with a 
stake in the maintenance of peace, and pursuing normality and prosperity at home. The 
Post-Stalin Soviet leadership solved this dilemma by tying the performance of the Soviet 
economy vis-à-vis its main adversary, the United States, to the USSR’s revolutionary 
mission. Successfully outperforming the United States would prove the superiority of the 
Socialist order and thus create a space in international politics for the emergence of “anti-
imperialist forces” that would pave the way to a transition away from capitalism. This new 
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approach to interpreting the political economy of socialism was formally announced by 
Khrushchev at the XXth Party Congress in his declaration of “the peaceful socio-economic 
competition of the two systems.” The new doctrine immediately raised the question of how 
the USSR would gain information about its competitor and tailor its own domestic 
economy to winning this competition. The new battlefield between Soviet socialism and 
American capitalism necessitated the establishment of a corps of experts who would not 
only understand the economies of capitalist countries and their industrial policies but also 
to determine what the USSR could borrow from contemporary capitalism to improve its 
own domestic practices.   
The economists and economic reformers of the late 1950s and the 1960s became 
conduits between the USSR’s international ideological commitments and its domestic 
politics. Thus, I label the economics that emerged in the wake of the XXth Party Congress, 
and especially its mathematical variant, a “Cold War Science.” I argue that the agencies 
and institutes that these actors embedded themselves in—most prominently research 
institutes in the Soviet Academy of Sciences but also the State Commission on Science and 
Technology (GKNT)—became “Cold War institutions” whose existence was predicated 
on the ambition to “catch up and overtake” the United States in explicit, measurable terms. 
They were designed to use the cutting edge of both domestic and global social science—
which these Soviet elites viewed as just another kind of normatively neutral technology to 
be imported—to improve the system of central planning to adapt it to the conditions of the 
Cold War.  
These groups and their political allies almost immediately clashed with more 
established “Stalinist Institutions” such as the central planning agencies, most prominently 
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The State Planning Commission (Gosplan), and the production ministries which ran the 
day-to-day operations of the Soviet economy. For these powerful interest groups, any 
change to the organization of the Soviet economy would challenge their pre-eminent status 
as arbiters of resources and power. Many of those associated with these conservative 
factions believed that a radical reorganization of central planning would not only pose 
technical and operational issues in factory floor production that the academics had no idea 
about, but also posed dangerous questions of whether abandoning Stalinist institutional 
arrangements also meant the end of socialism or if socialism could exist without these 
practices in an alternate form? For these more conservative figures, it was, in fact, the 
institutional practices of the Soviet economy which defined the state’s socialist nature vis-
à-vis the capitalist economies of the West.  
I argue that these tensions are critical to understanding the domestic politics of 
economic reform and the emergence of a debate on the future of the Soviet planning system 
in the mid-1960s that was held not only in Communist Party and government committees 
but also on the pages of academic journals and official newspapers. These clashes reached 
their zenith during the “Kosygin Reforms” of 1965-1969, which attempted to decentralize 
industrial production by increasing the independence of individual enterprises and 
introducing a higher level of fiscal responsibility and profitability through more strictly 
enforced Khozraschet—roughly analogous to enterprise cost accounting in Western 
business parlance. The failure of these reforms to take root showed the fundamental 
weakness of the Post-Stalin Soviet state. Without a strong ruler at the center, any attempt 
to legislate was doomed to failure since the Soviet state did not operate under law, or even 
through law. The practices of democratic centralism caused the USSR to be caught in a 
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loop in which the lack of strong state institutions meant that the government could neither 
formally legislate the positive economic rights of enterprises, nor enforce negative rights 
through administrative law due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms—most importantly 
bankruptcy.  The failure of the Kosygin Reforms is critical to understanding the political 
life of the Brezhnev-era. By ending the radical phase of economic reform, Brezhnev strived 
to build a consensus amongst the USSR’s political factions and to use this stability to 
implement a conservative economic reform—a gradual improvement of technical elements 
of Soviet planning practice without fundamentally challenging its institutional 
arrangements. This approach, which proponents called “the improvement of the 
mechanism of the national economy” rather than the earlier more provocative term 
“economic reform,” was part and parcel of a larger attempt to enforce norms through 
procedure and administrative law rather than ad-hoc mobilization, or a legislative 
rethinking of economic rights.  
 The central ideological constructs of this era— “developed socialism” and “the 
global scientific-technical revolution” (STR)— promised that Communism would 
eventually be built when the USSR’s planned system would integrate the fruits of new 
scientific advances such as automated production and computer-based management. 
Instead of Khrushchev’s promises of Communism by 1980, Brezhnev’s interpretation of 
the STR put these advancements into the distant future, encouraging a focus on the present 
and Soviet life as it was. The fact that the Soviet economy was planned and thus had no 
contradictions between capital and labor was officially deemed enough to guarantee that 
the USSR would eventually reap the fruits of global scientific advancement more 
successfully than the capitalist economies, thereby paving the way for socialism’s global 
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triumph. This new discourse did the ideological work of sustaining Brezhnev’s 
conservative turn but it also had unintended consequences. By placing the USSR into the 
context of “global processes,” it allowed economists and allied social scientists to begin 
expanding their contacts with their counterparts from the West. Connections that had been 
built up on a bilateral basis in the context of the “peaceful competition of the two 
systems”—fought most actively in the development of newly decolonized states— 
gradually became multilateral. Soviet economic science began to adapt the “systems 
approach” propagated by proponents of the “new planning”—the idea of introducing non-
hierarchical corporate planning practices into the public sphere—developed in institutions 
such as MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the RAND Corporation. Social scientists, 
engineers, and political figures from East and West clustered around international 
institutions such as the United Nations, The Club of Rome, and The International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) to try to bring this theory to life on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. As we shall see, Soviet actors were key to establishing these institutions 
and advocating for a non-hierarchical approach to planning both on a national and a global 
level. This embeddedness in international networks of expertise helped turn scholarly 
discussions about the impact of the “scientific-technical revolution” into a Soviet version 
of the debates about “post-industrialism” and “interdependence” that were challenging the 
post-war international liberal order.  
By the late 1970s, many Soviet social scientists and economists close to the state 
had abandoned the strict division between the two systems that had dominated Cold War 
social science and instead understood each as a set of nested socio-economic systems that 
often-crossed borders. This was a fundamental change in how the USSR’s elite saw the 
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world. Following the failure of the conservative reform agenda with the collapse of “the 
Second Kosygin Reform” of 1979, this shift led to an unexpected alliance between young 
regional Party bosses interested in bypassing the rigid practices and corruption of the 
Brezhnev era and the academic economic reformers who both saw Soviet institutions as 
the impediment to an efficient economy.  
The Historiography of Economic Reform and Economics in the USSR 
Much ink has been spilled on ideas and practices of economic reform in the USSR. 
Moshe Lewin wrote a short book on the subject in 1974, arguing that contemporary 
discussions in the USSR spoke to an underground current of Bukharinism.2 Lewin was 
overestimating—there is no evidence that the Soviet mathematical-economists he was 
writing about had any interest or hidden identification with figures from the 1920s. 
Sovietologists including Richard Judy, Thane Gustafson, and Mark Beissinger all 
documented, often extremely accurately, the existence of economists and economic 
reformers as a distinct interest group in Soviet politics, as well as their clashes with more 
established factions.3  After the USSR’s collapse, political scientists like Robert English 
and Archie Brown began to study particular reformist groups embedded within the Central 
Committee apparatus during the 1970s to explain the sudden emergence of Perestroika and 
its consequences. These factions often included economists and supporters of economic 
reforms who worked in what Brown referred to as “amphibious institutions” whose staffers 
were making a quasi-liberal critique of Communism within the discourses and structures 
                                                
2 Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates: From Bukharin to the Modern 
Reformers. (London: Pluto Press, 1975). 
3 Richard Judy, “The Economists,” in Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, ed. Harold Gordon Skilling and 
Franklyn Griffiths, New edition edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), 209–52; Mark 
R. Beissinger, Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1988); Thane Gustafson, Reform in Soviet Politics: The Lessons of Recent Policies on 
Land and Water (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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of the Party itself.4 Mark Sandle extended this argument to the entire period Brezhnev as a 
whole arguing that it represented of remarkable intellectual and political diversity cloaked 
by a discourse of conformism.5 In fact, as we shall see, the actors whom these authors write 
about were not closet liberals. Rather, many were dedicated Soviet patriots and 
Communists who were trying to deal with problems of the modern territorial state that 
thinkers west of the Iron Curtain were grappling with at the exact same time.  
While these works were extremely important for opening the conversation, they do 
not address the political mechanics of economic reform and say little about structures in 
which these actors operated in. Indeed, this is why Brown emphasizes “the Gorbachev 
factor” in explaining how these seemingly isolated groupings with little direct power 
gained as much influence as they did during the 1980s. This project will attempt to rectify 
this narrative by discussing the institutional and ideological contexts of Soviet economic 
debates occurred and reveal the longer story of how the Soviet economy was, in theory, in 
a state of almost constant reinvention from the 1960s forward. With this extended timeline 
of reform, it becomes harder to conceptualize the origins of Perestroika as driven by a few 
individuals in important institutions the who found their leader in Gorbachev. Rather, what 
emerges is a longer story of deep institutional transformation spurred by the intersection of 
international and national politics, into which economic discourses were embedded.  
Another set of works that touch on the history of economic thought and reform in 
the Soviet Union are intellectual and cultural histories of “the Thaw.” Two outstanding 
                                                
4 Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (New 
York: Ecco, 2009). 
5 Mark Sandle, “A Triumph of Ideological Hairdressing: Intellectual Life in the Brezhnev Era 




examples are Vladislav Zubok’s Zhivago’s Children and Slava Gerovitch’s From 
Newspeak to Cyberspeak.6 Both make serious advances over their predecessors by 
demonstrating that the emergence of reformist discourse was linked to the opening of the 
Soviet Union associated with the post-XXth Party Congress thaw and the transformation 
of the terms of the Cold War from a purely military-industrial conflict to a socio-economic 
one. However, these authors conflate economics with the more general trends in 
cybernetics, thus overshadowing the economic critique of incentives in the Soviet system 
of the former with the larger “cyberspeak” of the latter. While the history of economics in 
the USSR is deeply intertwined with the popularity of cybernetics, economic critiques of 
central planning presaged the rise of cybernetics as a leading paradigm for social science 
in the USSR and, in fact, many Soviet economists actively distanced themselves from 
cybernetics, viewing it as a tool rather than a discipline. Conflating the two approaches 
marginalizes the powerful economic critique that developed in the “Thaw” both amongst 
economists influenced by cybernetics and those who based their work in more traditional 
Marxism or, often subtly, pre-cybernetic marginalist economics.   
Other scholars interested in the history of economic thought in the USSR come 
from sociology, and particularly the history and sociology of science. Currently, cutting-
edge work is being done by Olessia Kirtchik and Ivan Boldylov at Moscow’s Higher 
School of Economics, who have conducted in depth, interview-based research to map the 
methodological contours of Moscow-based mathematical economics and to ask whether it 
                                                
6 Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2009); Slava Gerovich, From 
New Speak to Cyber Speak: A History of Cybernetics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002). 
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could be understood as a coherent scientific approach.7 Adam Leeds engaged in an 
anthropological study of these same figures using similar methods, attempting to show how 
the cultural practices of the Soviet intelligentsia intersected with economic methodology 
to form a political identity.8 Benjamin Peters’ recent book on “the Soviet internet” makes 
the useful distinction between economists and supporters of cybernetics, using memoirs to 
note that the two communities had diverging political interests.9 Aleksander Bikbov’s 
Gramitka poriiadka, has made contributions to the study of the study of Soviet social 
science by deploying Pierre Bourdieu’s understandings of habitus to explain how various 
social groupings of elites, often defined by their institutional contexts, established differing 
definitions of concepts overtime from the nineteenth century to present day Russia.10 
The most famous of these works is Johanna Bockman’s Markets in the Name of 
Socialism.11 Bockman points out that the neo-classical economics of the Swiss father of 
neo-classical analysis, Leon Walras—the development of supply and demand and early 
general equilibrium—was not initially associated with markets but rather was ideologically 
neutral. The mechanism at the heart of the first neo-classical model, the auctioneer setting 
the price, could just as easily be a state planner as a self-organizing market. In the eyes of 
many neo-classical economists both East and West (or moving between the two) during 
                                                
7 Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik, “The Cultures of Mathematical Economics in the Postwar Soviet 
Union: More than a Method, Less than a Discipline,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 
corrected proof, [accessed April 16, 2017]  
8 Adam E. Leeds, “Dreams in Cybernetic Fugue,” HIST STUD NAT SCI 46, no. 5 (November 1, 2016): 
633–68; Adam Leeds, Spectral Liberalism: On the Subject of Political Economy in Moscow (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, the University of Pennsylvania, 2016).   
9 Benjamin Peters, How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2016). 
10 Aleksander Bikbov, Gramatika Poriiadka: istoriia sociologiia poniatii kotoriie menaiout nashu realnost 
(Moscow: HSE, 2014).  
11 Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism (Stanford 
University Press, 2011). 
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the height of the Cold War, the state had far more information to make these calls than a 
market which was, after all, not always efficient. Bockman also goes further than all these 
works in attempting to connect economic theory with the practice of politics. However, 
despite a short chapter on the USSR, the bulk of her work is on Hungarian and Yugoslav 
economists who were outliers in the socialist world. Such omissions testify to a larger 
problem within this literature, namely that it lacks both research in the Russian archives, 
and it reduces politics to a cultural or methodological practice rather than the nitty-gritty 
of policy making and interest group battles. While perhaps useful for historians of science, 
this approach perpetuates a view of the USSR as somehow apolitical, with politics 
practiced in private places and the public and state dominated by a monolithic ideology.  
One standout intellectual history of Soviet economic thought is Pekka Sutela’s 
Soviet Economic Thought and Economic Reform.12 Despite a lack of access to archives, 
Sutela, himself a first-class economist who later served as the director of the economic 
research department of the Finnish Central Bank, painstakingly reconstructs the theoretical 
and methodological assumptions of various reformist economic schools in the USSR. What 
makes Sutella so useful is that he never denies the connection of economics to legislation 
and public discourse on planning. Another standout intellectual history of Soviet 
economics was written by Vladimir Mau in 1990 documenting the connections between 
the emergence of mathematical economics and various strains of reformist thoughts with 
earlier debates in the 1930s involving engineering and material balances in central 
planning.13 These works are so impressive I will not attempt to revise or improve its 
                                                
12 Pekka Sutella, Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
13 V.A. Mau, V poeskah planomernosti: iz istorii razvitiia sovetskii ekonomicheskii mysle 30-60kh godov 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1990).  
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characterization of the evolution of Soviet economic thought, and particularly its 
categorization of the major works of Soviet mathematical economics by their influence, 
but rather contextualize it within Soviet institutional politics and state-building in a way 
that only archival research can do. 
Beyond intellectual history, there has been quite a bit of ink spilled on the role of 
economic factors in the collapse of the USSR and late-Soviet political history in general. 
Perhaps the most extensive survey of the period is a series of works by Russian historian 
R.G. Pikhoia who has produced a variety of volumes documenting Soviet high politics in 
the post-Stalin period. With access to documents that unavailable to many other historians, 
Pikhoia has given us insights into Kremlin politics that are invaluable for scholars of the 
period. His latest edition written with sociologist A.K. Sokolov is a convenient one volume 
work on the history of the Soviet Union from 1970-1991.14 The central role of economic 
politics and reform in this period has not escaped his analysis. It also features strongly in 
the later works of Mau who written several pieces on the history of the USSR’s economic 
policy and those who devised it. In his writings, Mau has successfully shown that 
economists and intellectuals were deeply engaged in policy making and that this work 
informed not only their theory but also their political opinions.15 The impact of economic 
problems on the political failures of Perestroika and the collapse of the USSR has featured 
in the literature. Vladimir Kantorovich has been critical of many of the arguments 
connecting the end of the USSR with its economic problems, noting most of them don’t 
                                                
14 R.G. Pikhoia and A.K. Sokolov, Istoriia sovermennoi Rossii: krisis kommunisticheskoi vlasti v SSSR I 
rozhdeniia novoi Rossii 1970-1991 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008).  
15 Vladimir Mau, “Perestroika: Theoretical and Political Problems of Economic Reforms in the USSR,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 3 (May 1, 1995): 387–411; V.A. Mau et. al. Istoriia ekonomiki SSSR i Rossii v 
konche XX veka, 1985-1999 (Moscow: Fond Sovremennoi Istorii, 2011), 38-49. 
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make the link between economic policy failure and political collapse. Rather, Kantorovich 
suggests that historians and political scientists need to look at the politics of economic 
reforms and ask if they led to larger political crises.16 Some works have taken this to heart. 
As early as the late 1980s, Moshe Lewin studied the relationship between more radicalized 
economic discourses, larger social changes in the USSR driven by urbanization, and the 
sudden emergence of Gorbachev’s politics.17 However, Lewin skirts actual political events 
both because of the lack of archival material and because his approach to history prioritizes 
the primacy of social structure over political developments. A recent set of writings by 
Stephen Kotkin has addressed the last years of the Soviet Union as a long-term process, 
framing it through the lens of geopolitics and structural economic change. Kotkin’s 
proximate cause for the collapse of the Soviet project in the USSR and Eastern Europe, 
and therefore the failure of reform, was that these structural changes incentivized 
Communist Party elites to “handover” power to a constructed “civil society” which 
functioned as a useful way of transitioning between two socio-economic systems once 
socialism’s usefulness had exhausted itself for this elite.18 Kotkin’s approach to studying 
the elite and its incentives also informs Chris Miller’s recent work on the economic politics 
of the Gorbachev era. To Miller’s credit, his work is unique in that it is the first published 
work to extensively uses the widely available archival evidence to unpack the policy 
debates of the period. However, it’s focus on the question of “why the Soviet Union did 
not take the Chinese path” hamstrings both its economic interpretation and its 
                                                
16 Vladimir Kontorovich, “The Economic Fallacy,” The National Interest, no. 31 (1993): 35–45. 
17 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1991). 
18 Stephen Kotkin, Armagedon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970- 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008); Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New 
York: Modern Library, 2009). 
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understandings of the longer arch of economic reform in the post-Stalin era.19 This 
dissertation will thus be the first intervention into the economic politics of the late-Soviet 
period that is both based on archival sources and that traces the arch of Soviet economic 
reform over the entire post-Stalin period.  
Writing a Political Economy  
 Instead of skirting politics, or treating it as the function of scientific culture, this 
dissertation will engage in writing the history of economic thought in the post-Stalin USSR 
through the lens of political economy. This means sacrificing some of the deeper, more 
nuanced discussions of individual motivations, scientific culture, or of a deep dive into the 
methodological differences within major schools of economics. Instead, I will use 
economics and its socio-political positions as a cipher through which we can observe the 
transformation of the Soviet state and its industrial and fiscal institutions. This will mean 
dealing with the fact that the USSR was a state driven by ideology and that ideological 
debates did, in fact, influence decision-making and institutional competition. This is not to 
say that ideology was the sole factor determining of Soviet actions but, as Nigel Gould-
Davis has pointed out in his discussion of Soviet diplomacy, for a set of actors who believed 
that the future of Communism was intrinsically tied to the survival of the Soviet state, any 
action that furthered the latter goal furthered the former.20 However, while the division 
between ideology and realpolitik was an artificial one for Soviet leaders, economic 
efficiency was always loaded with meaning as it struck to the core of what made USSR, 
and those that “adopted” its system, unique: the state-owned, centrally planned economy 
                                                
19 Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the 
USSR (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 2016). 
20 Nigel Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War,” 
Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 90–109. 
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that, theoretically, resolved the contradiction between capital and labor and thus would not 
suffer from the same inefficiencies as private property-based economies. Therefore, 
economic thought and its conceptualization of the relationship between the USSR’s 
domestic economy, the greater socialist world, and most importantly “global imperialism” 
provides us with a unique insight into the relationship between ideology, geopolitics, and 
institutional change in the late-USSR.  
Studying the connection between ideas and politics presents the historian with a set 
of methodological challenges. Should ideas be understood driving actors and thus of policy 
outcomes, or does politics drive ideas and thus the intentions of actors? One way to evaluate 
these issues is suggested by Charles Maier, who argues that historical political economy 
must treat ideas as “contingent and problematic; that is, they might have been different and 
need to be explained in particular political and social contexts.” Maier’s historical approach 
to political economy abandons some aspects of the “hermeneutic” explanation at the heart 
of many other histories—especially histories of science—and instead treats ideas as a 
“revealed preference” of certain socio-political groups. Instead of relying on the idea that 
“to explain action is to recreate the intentions of the actors, historical political economy 
presupposes that societies in some sense wanted what turned out to be.” This does not 
mean, for example, that society chooses inflationary policies that would cause 
hyperinflation but rather that for some reason, “some groups in society were willing to 
countenance that outcome and prevailed over those who resisted it.”21 In other words, an 
actor can be presented with a menu of options which each carry an attached set of risks and 
benefits. The choice of the actor—especially the elite policy maker—gives the historian 
                                                
21 Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 6–7. 
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insight into the risks that the subject is willing to countenance and can thus shed light onto 
the biases of political culture. I do not want to reduce this analysis to a simple rational 
choice problem. Rather, the study of economic ideas as political rallying points for elite 
groups which articulate the risk preferences of said actors allow us to peel back the layers 
of cultural, political, and material biases that make up the motivations of the subjects of 
our history to choose under conditions of not only simple lack of information that the 
rational choice problem presents us with but the more serious matter of existential 
uncertainty about the future.  
 In addition to these contingent factors, one needs to understand choice within the 
larger institutional history of state organization—the field upon which interest groups 
battle. Maier provides this framework for politics with his conception of the rise of the 
“territorial-industrial state,” a political entity whose sovereignty is defined by borders and 
whose economic structure was dominated by vertically integrated, industrial enterprises. 
This industrial economic structure served to reinforced this “bordered” state power as it 
produced technologies of movement such as the steam engine and the telegraph that helped 
create national political coherence. Maier’s payoff in this analysis is to displace various 
“long” and “short” chronologies of the Twentieth Century and instead challenge historians 
to focus on the rise and fall of this particular political construct which he dates roughly 
1870, with the consolidation of national states in Europe and North America, and 1970 
when international supply chains and financial flows disrupted the congruence of economic 
organization and sovereign power.22 In European Nation States 1648-1990, Charles Tilly 
created a very useful and complimentary schema for understanding the transitions between 
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the various forms that the European State system took—coercion, or the ability to deploy 
direct violence and “capital” or the ability to mobilize financial resources.23 For Tilly, a 
successful state needed both, as capital was needed to fund coercion and coercion to control 
and extract capital. Successful powers eventually began to shift toward capital intensive 
governance due to the growing need to administer large armies (creating a kind of civilian 
creep into once militarized state affairs) and the increasing importance of industrial power 
and internal consolidation (Maier’s “Territorial-Industrial” form of the state). 
Where does the USSR, which only lasted 70 years by the most generous measures, 
fit into this longer history of state power? To answer this question, and connect it with the 
central issues of this dissertation, we need to understand the institutional and geopolitical 
heritage of the Soviet Union’s early leaders. Unlike most great powers that moved toward 
a capital-intensive form of political organization and a territorial-industrial organization, 
Imperial Russia took another course: with a large frontier often exposing it to non-state, 
nomadic in addition to traditional European great power threats, it continued to prioritize 
direct state power—coercion—with systems of economic organization tied to the need to 
deploy military might in large numbers at all times. Initially, the system of serfdom served 
an important purpose of first providing revenues for military elites and then supplying state 
revenue and recruits for a mass army after Peter the Great’s reforms.24 Indeed, internal 
economic reform was intimately tied to the need to rebuild and reconstruct military 
structures toward a more efficient use of coercive power. Alfred Rieber has shown that it 
was not industrialization that was the goal of the “Great Reforms” of Alexander II, but 
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rather the need to create a social structure for a modern army based on fewer mobilized 
and a smaller share of the state budget with the ability to mobilize an active reserve during 
war. Rieber concludes that viewed from this perspective, the “Great Reforms” were 
successful as they did the minimum work necessary to change social structure in the 
interests of maintaining Russian coercive state power and the groups that benefited from 
it.25 This is not to say that the Russian Empire stood out from the great powers: the long 
nineteenth century was anything but a period of stability and cooperation. At the colonial 
periphery, where the Russian Empire sat, it was a violent, militarist, imperial world.  
The Soviet state faced a similar problem but with the added ideological fear of 
foreign intervention to crush an upstart revolution. The experience of the Civil War and 
intervention by the entente only strengthened the insecurity inherent in the Leninist 
worldview, as evidenced by a series of war scares that helped end the NEP and usher in 
shock industrialization. The question that Stalin and his comrades faced was what 
industrialization should look like. They found their answer in what Stephen Kotkin called 
“The Interwar Conjuncture” of institutions that imagined themselves “modern” through 
mass production, mass politics, and vertical integration.26 This was the vision that the 
Bolsheviks followed to imagine what a strong state was. This shaped what Kotkin labeled 
“the grand strategy of the state.”  
The study of institutions and their logics is vital to understanding how ideas derived 
from “the interwar conjuncture” informed the “grand strategy of the state.” Indeed, this is 
why this dissertation will use Maier’s methods of studying how political interest groups 
                                                
25 Alfred Rieber, “Raison D’Etat: Military,” in Emancipation of the Russian Serfs, ed. Terence Emmons 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 72–80. 
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rallied around certain ideas to look at conflicting perceptions of state strategies by different 
generations of Soviet elites. Through the late 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet state ran a 
breakneck campaign to copy the governmental systems of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century industrial production to establish high industrial capitalist production 
methods without capitalist institutional, legal, or financial practices.27 The fact is that they 
succeeded.  Robert Allan has shown that when the USSR began its journey into “high 
industrial modernity” in the early Twentieth Century, its GDP per annum could be 
compared to that of contemporary Indonesia while by 1945, it was the world’s second 
superpower. Yet Allen’s brilliant manipulation of data and improvisation of measurement 
techniques does not explain the motivation of Soviet leaders and what they maximized.28 
In other words, GDP does not reveal the organization of production and its priorities. The 
Soviet Union industrialized but it industrialized in a very particular way: steel and fighting 
power, or production goods, were prioritized over consumption goods. Allen, like early 
theorists of Soviet industrialization, assumes that this initial base would have rolled over 
into a consumption-led economy. Indeed, he argues that the failure of Soviet economic 
growth was the mal-allocation of resources in the 1960s and 1970s.29 This, of course, 
means that the decision to invest resources was a political one which means that it is 
sensitive to the kind of analysis that Maier suggests historical political economy 
undertakes.  
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Sociologist Daniel Chirot argues that the founding of the USSR as a reaction to 
late-nineteenth century capitalism led to it building “the world’s most advanced nineteenth-
century economy, complete with its greatest, most inflexible rust-belt.”30  Chirot’s brilliant 
analogy is based on a deeper recognition that the Soviet leadership that would build the 
Stalinist system (most importantly Stalin and Lenin themselves) were not only good 
Marxists but also individuals who had grown up admiring the achievements of late-
nineteenth century capitalism from afar, in a “backward state.” Thus, Marxism in the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was more than an ideology of liberation. Rather, it 
was what Alexander Gerschenkron would call an ideology of modernization: one that had 
existed across the European continent as each European state rushed to modernize quicker 
than its neighbor bad. Each iteration of liberalism and later socialism was tied up with a 
vision state-building and economic institutions based on the accelerated adoption of the 
practices of a more advanced neighbor.31 Thus ideology and its history is important to 
understanding economic outcomes. While the Longue Duree of Russian history and geo-
economics are factors, they are not sufficient to explain why the Soviet Union took the 
steps that it took. For example, while some scholars have argued that diminishing terms of 
trade for primary goods contributed to “the great break,” therefore eliminating outside 
sources of capital for industrialization, this misses the point.32 The USSR was not the only 
commodity exporter to lose access to international capital in the 1930s, but it was the only 
one that proceeded to brutally collectivize its peasantry.  
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This concern with ideology was reflected in how state institutions operated and 
understood their missions. Scholars like Paul Gregory are correct to argue that the system 
built by Stalin was not truly a planned system but rather a system designed for mobilization 
that was more arbitrary than truly planned—a fact that future Soviet scholars, including 
most of the subjects of this dissertation, readily agreed with, noting that good planning was 
more their aspiration than the reality of the USSR.33 As I will argue further in the first 
chapter of the dissertation, the system created by Stalin valued arbitrary, non-“economic” 
decisions because they were, in fact, a means to project the  “dictatorship of the 
proletariat’s’” will, which ipso facto was part of the revolutionary process. The defense of 
the state and its goals of mobilizing society was the promulgation of the revolution. 
Ideology formed not just a Weltanschauung but also a transmission mechanism between 
elite perceptions of the world, the institutional arrangements of the Soviet state, and the 
behavior of the population.  
Ideology has been a messy subject for historians. While the totalitarian theorists 
made it the sine qua non of their reading of the Soviet experience, the revisionist wave of 
the 1980s rejected it for narrating the birth of the Soviet state through group interests and 
social relations. Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain brought ideology back but in a strange way. 
For Kotkin ideology came a priori to the Soviet state’s project and individuals reacted to 
it, learning to “speak Bolshevik” and thereby recasting themselves in the regime’s terms.34 
Kotkin’s critics are right to point out that Kotkin’s approach to Bolshevik language and 
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behavior is rigid and reduces ideological fervor to a “liberal” politics of choice.35 However, 
none of these critiques have been able to address Kotkin’s ability to explain the relationship 
between ideology and state-building. Magnetic Mountain is a much larger project about 
the ways in which the state’s economic policies interacted with popular mobilization than 
discussions of “speaking Bolshevik” let on.  
What Kotkin’s work doesn’t do is go far enough in historicizing the relationship 
between ideology and the construction of specific institutional arrangements. A gesture 
toward such a history can be found in the work of David Priestland, who has argued that 
Soviet Marxism, and Marxism as a whole, has three aspects which split it into a “romantic 
Marxism” that is characterized by an emphasis on solidarity, a “technocratic Marxism” 
which is more interested in modernization and rationalization, and a “radical Marxism” 
which emphasized action, violence, and mobilization.36 I wish to expand Priestland’s 
framework to argue that the same holds for both formal and informal institutions and 
political groupings in Marxist systems by showing the relationship between ideology and 
state-building in the USSR. This dissertation will show that the various schools of thought 
it documents, and the institutions that they built, were deeply concerned with understanding 
how particular state practices could be understood within Marxist-Leninist thought. In 
other words, I argue that Soviet economic interest groups needed economic ideas to argue 
for and against reform and that those ideas necessarily reflected institutional differences 
about the future of Soviet socialism.  
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The post-Stalin period provides us with a special challenge since by the time of his 
death Stalin had become something of an arbiter of not only institutional interests but 
ideological truth in all areas. Alexei Yurchak argues that the removal of Stalin as “master 
editor” created a de-tethered ideology that on a discursive level became performativity 
rather than properly political.37 While he is right that Stalin’s death and later symbolic 
displacement was very significant, it did not depoliticize ideology.  The heated debates 
among technocrats, government officials, and party leaders over the future of the Soviet 
state were prima facie political Indeed, this dissertation argues that it was not de-
Stalinization alone that led to a reinvention of Soviet statehood and its ideological 
foundation but also that the geo-political environment of the Cold War changed the 
conditions in which the structures of the Stalinist state were supposed to work. A hegemon, 
guiding both the security and economic frameworks of Eurasia, had emerged.38 Traditional 
Soviet ideas of the “national economy” as regulation of heavy industrial production,  
inspired by WWI-era German planning, could no longer respond to the new challenges of 
prosperity brought on by the Americanization of the European state system.39 A set of 
institutions and practices that were good at steel and other heavy industrial production had 
to become efficient providers of other types of goods.  For economic reformers, this new 
era required a change not only in the ideological self-definition of the state but in the total 
reconstruction of its institutions of governance along capital intensive lines. Thus, the 
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debates over economic reform become a microcosm of the politics generated by divergent 
readings of old ideological positions by new political groupings and old political 
institutions. At its core this was about questions of the Soviet Union’s role in the world as 
a revolutionary state and what that meant for the essence of the Soviet project inherited 
from Stalinism: the state-owned economy. It is difficult to imagine a topic or period shot 
through with more ideological and political meaning.  
Sources, Data, and Methods 
 The bulk of this dissertation is based on sources found in Russian state archives in 
Moscow. This reflects the fact that most its subjects were both elite and Moscow-based 
and the fact that matters of high economic policy, even those that concerned local issues, 
were centralized. Indeed, what I found stunning in the course of conducting this research 
is how closely the organization and composition of the archives track the establishment 
and behavior of Soviet institutions themselves. For example, as Soviet policymaking 
became more regularized in the 1970s, the organization and composition of individual 
archival folders, or “dela” in Soviet and Post-Soviet archival parlance, also became more 
uniform across institutions and issues.  
The archives I used for this dissertation reflect how institutional divisions have 
guided the organization of sources. The State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), 
was mostly used for research into the deliberations of the “Council of Ministers”—the 
Soviet government’s highest administrative organ which not only was responsible for the 
implementation of state laws and Party priorities but, given the prevalence of 
administrative law in the Soviet system, drafted most policies under consideration in this 
period. As such, its holdings give us insight into how various interest groups deployed 
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ideas for influencing Soviet policymaking. The Russian State Archive for the Economy’s 
(RGAE) holdings of the archives of major economic agencies including the State Planning 
Agency (Gosplan), The State Bank (Gosbank), and the State Committee on Science and 
Technology (GKNT), let us examine the operations of those groups and the intellectual 
loyalties of their personnel.  
In addition to these state archives, which are relatively straight forward and 
bureaucratic, I made extensive use of Communist Party and academic archives. First, the 
Russian State Archive for Recent History (RGANI), which holds the papers of the Central 
Committee was important for several kinds of sources. First, I used its collection of 
unedited Central Committee Plenum stenographs to examine uncensored versions of Soviet 
elites’ perceptions of pressing economic and political issues. Second, its holdings of 
various Central Committee “departments”—though often incomplete and still classified—
offer a glimpse into the highest-level debates over science and economic activity in the 
USSR. To supplement these sources, I also conducted work in the Archives of the 
Gorbachev Foundation—a private archive that contains the former General Secretary’s 
personal papers. I also did work in academic archives—primarily the Archive of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (ARAN). ARAN’s sources served several purposes and its 
rich collection of political documents is only now being discovered by historians of the 
USSR whose work is not explicitly concerned with the history of science. ARAN’s 
holdings of research institutes’ and sections’ archives gives us a look at the internal 
workings and debates of Soviet economic science. However, and perhaps more 
importantly, ARAN provides us with a backdoor into the politics of the Central Committee 
as these institutes took on more direct roles in policy making and in advising Party leaders 
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overtime. ARAN’s records contains reams of communications between the institutes and 
sections and officials in agencies, state bodies, and the Party apparat on the most pressing 
issues in economic politics, giving the researcher not only an idea of the positions taken by 
individual researchers and their supporters but also the priorities of government actors. To 
supplement some gaps in the ARAN’s holdings that are still classified, I used the holding 
of certain institute’s Communist Party organizations held in the Central Archives of the 
City of Moscow (TsGA).  
 In addition to these Russian language archival sources, I also used several kinds of 
published primary sources. First, I have made extensive use of officially published Party 
Congress manuscripts. Rather than discounting these gatherings as symbolic, the 
Congresses of the Post-Stalin Soviet Communist Party can give us valuable insight into the 
“big picture” thinking of the USSR’s highest elites—especially when we look at how they 
change overtime. Second, I have used several document collections of inaccessible RGANI 
and Presidential Archives documents published by the ROSSPEN publishing house as part 
of their work with these archives (some holdings of the Presidential Archives have been 
moved into RGANI in the past year and whatever holdings the author was able to see in 
person in the archives will be marked as such in the footnotes). Given my focus on 
academic economics, I have used a variety of printed sources, including academic journal 
articles and monographs and mass circulation publications. Finally, the recollections of the 
actors themselves are vital to understanding the often-opaque workings of the Soviet elite 
so autobiographies, published collections of personal notes, and several in person 
interviews were of great help. 
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 In addition to Russian archives, I have also worked in repositories on the United 
States and Europe to track the interaction of Russian academics and policy makers with 
their Western Counterparts. This dissertation uses sources from the MIT’s Institute 
Archives and Special Collections, the Harvard University Archives, the Lyndon Johnson 
Presidential Library, and the Rockefeller Archive sector to tell the story of East-West 
interaction on issues related to improving the “science” of economic planning. During my 
dissertation research, I was also able to work in the archives of the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxemburg, Austria though, for reasons of length 
and focus, this work will mostly be represented in a stand-alone article on the Institute’s 
role in the history of economic planning. 
 In addition to the use of traditional primary sources, this dissertation uses some 
quantitative data. This warrants some discussion due to the infamous unreliability of Soviet 
statistics. Thus, a small discussion of how to treat Soviet data is in order. The three major 
sets of data that are available to researchers are the official Soviet sources, the CIA 
estimates of Soviet GDP growth, and those of Soviet economist Gregorii Khanin who 
began a project of recalculating Soviet growth statistics in 1987. While the first two of 
these sets has been criticized by experts, a survey of them by Mark Harrison finds that they 
are generally consistent with one another on the matter of general trends differing only in 
relative magnitudes.40 Thus, I have tried to use the official data—published and 
unpublished—knowing that it is probably the source most of my actors had access to, when 
I try to describe very general trends in Soviet growth and investment. Second, I have used 
balance sheet data published by the Central Bank of Russia including the volume of cash 
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in circulation, loans outstanding, and the holdings and expenses of households. My 
impression is that because of the lack of a private sector, the government balance sheet was 
an actual consolidated accounting of state expenses and thus presents us a picture of the 
governments assets as well as its liabilities to the population.  
 Finally, a methodological note on some of the theoretical assumptions implicit in 
this dissertation. I have drawn on several, very basic approaches to economics to help 
illustrate the dilemmas that faced the actors of this dissertation. I believe it is important to 
disclose to the reader that I have a background in so-called “Post-Keynesian” and 
“American Institutionalist” economic traditions. This means that I am extremely concerned 
about the structural features of institutions’ balance sheets and how these fit together over 
periods of time. I believe that such inductive methods are appropriate for the study of a 
state-led, planned economy as they force the researcher to start with the particular features 
of institutional fiscal behavior rather than general theories of behavior. Even Soviet 
institutions had a balance sheet of assets and liabilities and, as research by Yulia 
Vymyatnina and Mikhail Pakhanin shows, this meant that they were subjects to cycles of 
investment and overinvestment.41 
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters that span the years between 1955 and 
1985—a period I argue is appropriate to understanding the rise and fall of the “Cold War 
Paradigm” in Soviet economic thinking and policymaking. The period between 1985 and 
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1993, which should be treated as distinct, will be briefly discussed in the conclusion and 
requires further research to fully document.  
The first chapter of this dissertation discusses the emergence of Soviet economic 
debates in the final years of the Stalin-era and explains how Khrushchev’s recasting of the 
Cold War into the “peaceful socio-economic co-existence of the two systems” allowed a 
set of largely disconnected, technical debates on accounting standards and inferential 
statistical techniques to become articulated in a new, more directly political ways. It argues 
that Khrushchev’s articulation of “the peaceful competition of the two socio-economic 
systems” was influenced by the need to rectify competing imperatives between satisfying 
powerful interest groups and adopting the USSR to a system of international relations 
dominated by the nuclear bomb and America’s “shadow empire.” The Soviet Premier 
consciously took on the risk of creating a new kind of economic politics based on tying 
Soviet political international and domestic legitimacy to the creation of prosperity. This 
politics framed the emergence of different theoretical schools in Soviet economics which 
split on questions of how to measure value in a planned, socialist economy, and therefore 
how to best arrange the relationship between state institutions and production. I will focus 
on the clash between the mathematical-economists, the most Western-influenced and pro-
planning camp of economics, and the Tovarniks, who remained orthodox Marxists but 
turned Marxism against central planning and toward a market socialist critique of state 
institutions.  
The second chapter focuses on the policies of mobilization and investment that 
Khrushchev used to try to “win” his competition with the United States. I argue that his 
attempt to modify the USSR’s vertical system of industrial management and replace it with 
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Party-directed local administration created a vacuum of authority which meant that the 
massive investment boost introduced in the same period was misspent, even by Soviet 
standards. The ensuing budgetary crisis led to the politicization of reformist economics, as 
formerly academic debates over value turned into political debates about concrete project 
of economic reform. These arguments moved from the pages of technical journals to the 
front page of dailies such as Pravda and Izvestiia setting the stage for a crisis of power that 
ended in Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964.  
The third chapter of this project will outline the political context of the 1965-1969 
“Kosygin Reforms,” an attempt to apply some of the period’s reformist economic thought 
to the decentralization of the Soviet economy—to make enterprises more independent and 
fiscally disciplined. It shows that the realization that the USSR was losing “the competition 
of the two systems” in the wake of Khrushchev’s removal opened the possibility for radical 
economic reform. It traces how the various camps of Soviet academic economists and their 
rivals in the more conservative planning agencies and production ministries attempted to 
draft the reforms and promote or subvert various aspects of their implementation. 
Ultimately, the Leninist “democratic-centralist model” limited the ability of the USSR’s 
leadership to legislate and led to the creation of a self-contradictory administrative reform 
process. This meant that a program with radical pretentions eventually became half-hearted 
and was often not introduced at all.   
The following chapter asks how Brezhnev and his allies in Gosplan successfully 
navigated the tensions opened by the Kosygin reforms by implementing a conservative 
program that allowed for the unification of many interest groups while foreclosing radical 
change. It examines how “developed socialism” and “the scientific-technical revolution” 
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became new ideological constructs used to postpone the triumph of Communism and to 
justify extreme incrementalism in economic policy. It also documents how these shifts 
ultimately led to a consolidation of reformist economics, with the mathematical school 
attempting to establish full hegemony and the radical Tovarniks, represented by the anti-
Soviet Marxist Yakov Kronrod, purged from academia for their increasingly strident 
attacks on the practices of “existing socialism.”  
The penultimate chapter begins to shift the project toward its conclusion by looking 
at how international engagement in development institutions between the 1960s and 1980s 
transformed Soviet views of global economic relationships from bi-polar to multipolar 
connections. This change the critique presented by mathematical economics and related 
social sciences related to it from one of specific planning practices to larger socio-economic 
trends in Soviet society. A newer generation of theorists was emerging that feared that the 
USSR’s society would not be ready for the massive changes implied by the Scientific 
Technical Revolution. The spread of “systems theory” to the USSR, initially meant to 
create a more flexible form of central planning that could respond to the “global scientific 
technical revolution,” instead led reformist Soviet elites to see the world in terms of nested 
socio-economic systems that were often global in nature. The Scientific Technical 
Revolution thus gradually transformed from a conservative ideological trope to the Soviet 
analogue of the “post-industrialism” and “interdependence” debates that were 
contemporaneously challenging embedded liberalism. Thus, Soviet social scientists 
formed alliances with their Western counterparts who were trying to invent a new theory 
of state planning that could face these challenges.   
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 Finally, this dissertation concludes by tracing the attempt of Brezhnev and his 
cohort of Soviet leaders to legislate conservative economic reform, thereby building a state 
that could work on the basis of law as procedure, though not bound by law.  It traces how 
the Khrushchev generation of economists who were initially open to working in this 
paradigm gradually began to become disillusioned with it as legislation after legislation 
failed. It culminates with the drafting and rapid collapse of the “Second Kosygin Reform” 
from 1977-1980 (adapted into law in 1979), which broke down the conservative consensus 
of the early 1970s and brought about the reintroduction of mobilization into Soviet 
economic politics. This was the moment when the new generation of economists entered 
politics, leveraging a fully socio-economic critique of the USSR based on systems theory.  
 I close this study by suggesting how the arguments developed in this dissertation 
could be used to understand the USSR’s ultimate end and how the legacies of the 
institutional and ideological struggles documented above can be useful for contextualizing 
contemporary post-Soviet politics. I engage with Neil Robinson’s work on the Soviet 
Union as a “neo-patrimonial state” by arguing that the period from 1988-1993 saw the 
embrace of liberal economic doctrines by illiberal political forces. The destruction of the 
Soviet fiscal state in the late 1980s led to a fundamental re-evaluation by even the most 
conservative wings of the Soviet power structure about the efficiency and desirability of 
markets. However, while adapting the rhetoric of Soviet and later Post-Soviet economic 
reformers, they explicitly maintained the goals of the conservative agenda of the 1970s—
the stability of elite power. Instead of using Soviet planning institutions, Post-Soviet elites 
began to use informal control of firms to assert political control over the economy while 
taking advantage of efficiencies created by markets. As such, my dissertation helps set the 
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stage for a questioning of the neat division between so-called “neo-liberal” capitalism and 
state-led economies. This has resonance not only for the study of Russia and the former-






Making a Cold War Science: Khrushchev’s Peaceful Co-Existence and the Creation 
of a Soviet Reformist Economics 
 
In January 1941, Stalin gathered his economists. While the Second World War engulfed 
the Eurasian landmass and the USSR was positioning itself in a dangerous and 
indeterminate geo-political game, Stalin’s mind had turned to academic economics. In 
1938, on the heels of the issuance of the new official history of the USSR— The Short 
Course—the Central Committee commissioned a second textbook on economics. The task 
was vital: after all, it was the USSR’s socio-economic system, its “scientific” planned 
economy, which would overcome the “anarchy of the market,” and establish its claim to 
historical supersession vis-à-vis all other states. Surely then, with this radical new system, 
the USSR would no longer have use for the conventional categories of economic value that 
had arisen in capitalist economies. For Marxists, value has a specific meaning. In his 
critiques of political economy, Marx had expounded that in “commodity production,” or 
the exchange of goods for money, the “exchange value” of a good or its money price is 
directly proportional to its cost in terms of labor hours (both in the production of the good 
itself and in the production of its inputs). Under capitalism, the profit motive caused a 
divergence between the real value of goods in terms of labor and their money price; this 
divergence defined the cycle of crises and drove the exploitation of workers. Under 
Communism, commodity production would be abolished and all goods would be defined 
by their “use values,” or their fundamental usefulness to a certain task.42 Yet Marx did not 
explain how value or commodity production would operate under Socialism, the 
                                                




intermediate step toward Communism that the USSR was in the process of building.43 
Indeed, in the early 1930s, a debate had broken out amongst the “Political Economists,” 
the high priests of economic dogma, about how an economy planned by human decisions 
could co-exist with the “objective” historical processes that supposedly guided history.44   
In 1941, Stalin dismissed these all these positions as academic nonsense. The “law 
of value,” what Marx had explained as the fact that the relative exchange values of goods—
expressed in prices—and their labor values were not one in the same to operate in the 
USSR. Commodity continued even as the money prices of goods diverged from their labor 
values. “In order to be in control of prices you need tremendous reserves, an abundance of 
goods, and only then can we dictate our prices,” the dictator opined. Furthermore, as 
kolkhoz markets and underground markets still existed in the USSR, clearly the socialist 
sector of the economy was still not dominant enough to set prices in terms of labor values 
and the underlying productive relationships that they represented.45  
If the elimination of commodity production was not yet possible, what objective 
did planning serve? Stalin’s answer revealed not only his thoughts about political economy 
but its relationship to the larger problems of power in the Soviet state that he had built. 
“The planned economy is not our wish; it is unavoidable or else everything will collapse. 
We destroyed such bourgeois barometers as the market and trade, which help the 
bourgeoisie to correct disproportions,” he explained to his academics. “What is the main 
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task of planning?” he asked. “The main task of planning is to ensure the independence of 
the socialist economy from capitalist encirclement. This is absolutely the most important 
task. It is a type of battle with world capitalism. The basis of planning is to reach the point 
where metal and machines are in our hands and we are not dependent on the capitalist 
economy.”46 Stalin’s statement reveals much about the logic of the Soviet state and its 
institutions: for the Stalinist system, the struggle with capitalism was violent, operating 
within the logic of the long nineteenth century’s world of constantly expanding and 
competing empires. In such a violent world, the economy must serve as an arsenal for a 
Socialist state that could compete and survive.47  
In 1956, Khrushchev mounted the podium of the XXth Party Congress. By then, 
the world looked very different: the USSR had won the Second World War and had 
emerged as the world’s second superpower, standing at the head of a bloc of like-minded 
governments. Khrushchev declared, “[Socialism] has spilled over the borders of one 
country and is now a world system. The existence of two global economic systems— 
socialism and capitalism—each with its own logic of development is now a fact.” The 
establishment of this “socialist world system,” with its rapidly growing economic might, 
had allowed for the creation of a “zone of peace” in world politics that included both 
socialist states and other countries opposed to imperialism. “A great mobilization of the 
masses against the threat of war” had blunted the threat of imperialist aggression. In such 
conditions, the USSR would fight its battle with imperialism through a policy of “peaceful 
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co-existence.”48 Thus, the collective might of the USSR and its socialist allies would serve 
to keep the world’s peace while the superiority of the socialist system would be achieved 
through “economic and social competition of the two systems.”  
This chapter will argue that this shift helped turn academic economics into a “Cold 
War science.” It made its practitioners see themselves as not only re-enforcing and 
explaining official ideology, but also transforming domestic institutions to better fight the 
Cold War. Debates among academic economists from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s thus 
serve as a lens through which we can observe how the USSR adapted itself to a change in 
international order from Stalin’s world of empires to “the liberal hegemony” associated 
with American power. As Adam Tooze has suggested, America’s rise as a “liberal 
hegemon” fundamentally changed the way sovereigns presented themselves by tying state 
power to economic performance.49 Thus the economics profession, its organizations, and 
other closely related technical, political and scientific groups became a new cluster of 
“Cold War Institutions” whose raison d'être differed fundamentally from that of other 
centers of power in the Soviet hierarchy, such as the central planning agencies and 
production ministries, which remained, in many ways, Stalinist.  
The more the USSR’s economists became embedded in the Cold War, the more 
their understanding of the ways in which the Soviet economy operated became liminal. 
The imperative to “catch up and overtake” the capitalist – and, more specifically, the 
American –economies led to the introduction of econometric techniques that would push 
the limits of doctrine on the “law of value” and the “labor theory of value” as a whole. By 
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the mid-1960s, these encounters and engagements with “the international sphere” would 
splinter ideas about reforming the Soviet economy, often in contradictory ways that blurred 
the lines between liberalism and Leninism, between markets and planning.   
The Postwar Origins of Reformist Economics 
Stalin’s 1941 thoughts betrayed a remarkably consistent worldview about the 
relationship between the Soviet state, the Soviet economy, and the larger world. As early 
as 1925, Stalin had told the Moscow Party Committee that  
At the present we have about 4 million industrial proletarians. This is of course a 
small number, but nevertheless it is a start toward building socialism and completing 
the build-up of the defense of our country to the regrets of the enemies of the 
proletariat. But we cannot and must not stop at this point. We need 15-20 million 
industrial proletarians, the electrification of the main regions of our country, 
cooperative agriculture and highly developed metal industry. Then we shall not be 
afraid of any dangers. Then we shall conquer on an international scale. 
 
Stalin’s “Socialism in one country” thus meant that the Soviet state had to use the economy 
as a basis to defend the USSR from inevitable challenges that would be fought in the 
international arena between great powers. Value and the price mechanism could still exist 
out of historical necessity, but they had to be regulated for the common good of arming the 
state with fighting steel and mobilizing the population.50  
 What did this mean in practice? By 1938, when Nikolai Voznesensky came to head 
Gosplan, the Soviet planning agency had just seven departments, which he expanded to 
one hundred and thirty-three, while hiring a slew of new cadres, trained in finance and 
economics, recently graduated from newly-expanded institutions of higher education. 
Already in 1939, a discussion on the management of enterprises had been launched in 
Pravda, with several managers from Leningrad, Voznesensky’s power base, calling for a 
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more decentralized planning system.51 Despite some green shoots in the late 1930s, it was 
the war that spurred the growth of new  academic and administrative approaches to the 
Soviet economy which post-war Stalinism would struggle to address.  
As Elena Zubkova has argued, wartime necessities led to a kind of “liberalization 
at the front.” This was true of economic management as much as it was of other aspects of 
Soviet life. Even though labor was completely militarized, the financial chaos and inflation 
that the war unleashed led to looser controls on industrial production and allowing 
individual enterprises to better control their individual balance sheets without the 
intervention of government agencies.52 Further, as with all other warring powers, the 
USSR’s scientists contributed to the cause of fighting the war. Economists were no 
exception. The most famous example of economics’ wartime applications was the case of 
a young Leningrad mathematician named Leonid Kantorovich, who in 1939 had developed 
a technique for maximizing the amount of output per expenditure in a wood-processing 
plant near the city. During the war, he applied his relatively unknown technique—later 
called linear programming—to find the optimal gap between trucks crossing the frozen 
Lake Ladoga, reportedly walking the dangerous route with a ruler to gather data. 
Kantorovich’s technique offered a powerful potential tool for planners. Using his case 
study of the plywood trust, Kantorovich showed that it was possible to calculate optimum 
levels for economizing on resources based on set financial or output target rather than 
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through direct orders, thereby simplifying the planning process.53  
Thus, after the war, the nascent economics profession faced the same tensions that 
all Soviet society did as the war’s opening liberalization began to clash with the state’s 
desire to restore “normality.” Shortly after the war, a wide-ranging discussion on the use 
of economic techniques in planning began under tacit endorsement of Voznesensky, whose 
1948 book, The Soviet Economy during the Second World War, devoted considerable 
attention to the objective operation of the law of value in the Soviet economy and its effects 
on pricing. The most consequential of the ideas developed in this period was presented in 
a 1947 paper by Leningrad State University (LGU) professor Nikolai Novozhilov called 
“Ways of Determining the Maximum Effectiveness of Capital Investments in the Socialist 
Economy,” which posited the need to calculate the efficiency of an individual state-directed 
capital investment against a moving index of total capital investment effectiveness. Thus, 
Novozhilov, who had been trained in pre-revolutionary Kiev under the likes of ex-Imperial 
Finance Minister Nikolai Bunge, had tacitly introduced the concept of opportunity costs to 
capital into Soviet economic theory. His approach postulated that a calculation system 
similar to, or perhaps even derived from, Kantorovich’s optimization problem could be 
used to establish this discount rate (or interest rate i.e. the cost of capital) not only for 
individual investments, but as a common comparative rate across the whole of the 
economy. Novozhilov’s work earned praise from economists actually involved in planning, 
such as Nikolai Strumilin, the dean of Soviet applied economics, who believed that his 
work could be used to save the Soviet economy 1-2 billion rubles a year by giving planners 
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a way of evaluating the cost of investments against other, cheaper options.54 
 However, Novozhilov met resistance from the “Political Economists” at the 
Institute of Economics, whose purview dealt with the economic theory of Marxism-
Leninism, rather than theoretical issues of planning. Konstantine Ostrovitianov, who 
believed that economic theory could only be derived from the experience of the socialist 
state rather than from a priori calculation, led their response. In the pages of Questions of 
Economics, the USSR’s leading economics journal, he charged Novozhilov and his 
supporters with revisionism, explaining that their approach mirrored bourgeoisie 
“mathematical economics” in valuing the cost of capital. Because of this critique, 
Novozhilov temporarily lost his academic appointment at LGU.55  
Independently of the Novozhilov controversy, Voznesensky launched a study into 
the proper use of applied statistics in economic research in 1948. The report of the 
commission charged with the investigation, authored by economic statistician Vasily 
Nemchinov, echoed Voznesensky’s initial concerns. Nemchinov had come to fame earlier 
for publishing a paper, which used inferential statistics to argue for the existence of class 
struggle in the countryside in the late 1920s that Stalin had supposedly used in his debate 
with Bukharin and the “Right Opposition.” Stalin’s support meant that Nemchinov was 
allowed to remain one of the USSR’s few practitioners of inferential economic statistics 
while the founders of the approach, many of whom had been associated with the Moscow 
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statistical school of the 1920s, found themselves out of a career, or worse.56 In his 1948 
report to Voznesensky, Nemchinov not only criticized Soviet economists, but also noted 
that the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) simply gathered data without analyzing 
it. Nemchinov’s critiques met with resistance from theoretical Political Economists like the 
young Yakov Kronrod and the famous Eugene Varga, who believed inferential statistics 
replaced “social relations” with mathematical inference as the basis for economic 
analysis.57  
In a fascinating parallel, and despite the late Stalinist isolation of Soviet science, 
the Soviet controversy took place contemporaneously with the “Measurement Without 
Theory” controversy in American academia which many scholars point to as the start of 
modern “neo-classical” hegemony. In his famous 1947 article, Dutch-American 
econometrician Tjalling Koopmans —who would later win a Nobel Prize with his Soviet 
friend, Kantorovich—critiqued the followers of Wesley Claire Mitchell and other 
“American Institutionalists” on the same ground that Nemchinov critiqued TsSU. It should 
not come as a surprise, then, that Varga and other traditional Soviet economists admired 
Mitchell and his colleagues for their historically grounded research and long-run, 
descriptive statistical analysis.58  This Soviet “Measurement Without Theory Debate” was 
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independent of its Western counterpart. The simultaneous changing of the guard in 
economics, East and West, testifies to the impact of the Second World War on cultivating 
a new kind of economist with a background in “operations research”—a kind of 
investigative technique that used statistical inference to simplify such complex technical 
problems as aiming of anti-aircraft guns into a probabilistic “operation” whose outcomes 
could be easily optimized without reference to the actual workings of said gun.59  
 In addition to the problems of mathematics, statistics, and efficiency, another strain 
in reform economics arose in the wake of the war within the work of some Political 
Economists interested in financial flow (what Marxists call “reproduction”), including 
some of the same figures opposed to mathematical methods. The relative financial 
independence of enterprises that arose as a consequence of the war contributed to the 
increased use of khozraschet, or cost accounting and financial independence, in Soviet 
industrial management as factories, farms, and other organizations became more cognizant 
of wasted resources. Economic theorists like Z.V. Atlas, A.M. Birman, and Yakov Kronrod 
all touted cost accounting’s potential to improve the efficiency of the Soviet economic 
system.60 In his 1952 book, The Basis of Cost Accounting: In the Context of Socialist 
Industry, Kronrod argued that accurate cost accounting constituted a unique “category” of 
socialism, as only a socialist society could properly align price with the value of labor time 
thereby allowing for the calculation of losses and profits. Thus, socialist enterprise could 
be profitable within the context of the entire national economy by allowing each enterprise 
to devise and understand its production costs in current and past labor within the context 
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of the plan’s overall goals.61 
The subterranean and largely academic fractures in Soviet economics came to light 
in November 1951. Following Stalin’s 1950 meeting with the editors of the 1941 textbook 
(whose publication had been delayed by the war), an all-Union meeting of economists was 
called to discuss the draft. The meeting included a series of debates among economists 
about the practice of pricing, planning, and the content of economic value in the USSR. 
Strumilin, for example, proposed that prices in the USSR be more strictly tied to the cost 
of production, or sebestoimost’, by aligning the price of a commodity to the cost of the 
wages paid while producing it. Nemchinov opposed this scheme, fearing it would 
financially disadvantage advanced and resource-intensive sectors of the economy with low 
labor costs. This opposition revealed Nemchinov’s preoccupation with the costs associated 
with capital and the need for technological advancement which would become critical to 
the later development of his “mathematical” approach.62  
 Against this background, the political ground was shifting. Voznesensky had 
already been executed in 1950, one of the victims of Stalin’s deadly Leningrad Affair. 
Afterwards, Gregory Malenkov—one of the instigators of the affair—directed his efforts 
towards purging the economics profession. With so much discord over an ideologically 
vital area in science, Stalin decided to intervene. Upon reviewing the 1951 discussion, he 
issued a pronouncement that would be published as Economic Problems of Socialism in 
the USSR later that year.63 Stalin foreclosed many of the debates at the conference by 
arguing for a “transformed law of value” under socialism due to the continued existence of 
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commodity production. However, he explained, this law did not fully regulate production 
in the USSR, as the state sector did not yet hold a monopoly over all forms of exchange.64 
Categories such as profit and production costs continued to function due to the existence 
of kolkhozes and “cooperative production,” but were neither the sole nor most important 
regulators of the economy. Stalin’s final word on the matter precluded discussions in 
economics to such an extent that one economist described economics seminars in his 
graduate training as a discussion of the placement of commas in Stalin’s text.65  
Reform as Management: The Roots of Khrushchev’s Political Economy 
Stalin’s death in 1953 left the USSR in flux, not only in political leadership, but 
also in questions of doctrine. The growing militarization of the Cold War following the 
Korean stalemate led to the formation of a set of alliances that spanned the globe; the advent 
of nuclear weapons fundamentally challenged the imperial vision of world order under 
which Stalin had operated. Could socialism expand through the contradictions unleashed 
by imperialist military conflict if the result would be the end of all life on earth? For a 
fundamentally revolutionary state like the USSR, any shift to a new policy required a 
rereading of ideology that could meet these challenges while preserving the legitimacy of 
the institutions and interest groups that had emerged under Stalin and held power in the 
hierarchy. Following the elimination of Lavrentiy Beria, the competition between the two 
leading politicians in the Kremlin—Khrushchev and Malenkov—meant each would try to 
create a doctrine that would hold together a governing coalition based on these two 
requirements. Khrushchev’s successful formula tied domestic economic mobilization to 
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the resolution of the Cold War through “the socio-economic competition of the two 
systems.” This new framework laid the groundwork for the establishment of economics as 
a science of the state dedicated to fighting the Cold War.66 
 On January 1, 1955, an article by Khrushchev’s ally Dmitri Shepilov, entitled “The 
General Line of the Party and the Vulgarization of Marxism,” appeared in Pravda. 
Shepilov, who held a Kandidat degree in Political Economy and served as a leading 
ideologue, attacked the work of the Institute of Economics, singling out A. Palchev, who 
had argued that the Soviet industrialization process was complete and investment now 
needed to shift to light industry to expand consumption. Shepilov accused this position of 
reviving the logic of capitalism by positing that the productive and non-productive sectors 
competed for profits. Marx had postulated that capitalist development created a zero-sum 
game for profits between consumption and the “means of production,” or heavy industry. 
Palchev, Shepilov argued, had unjustly transferred this logic to socialist production, which, 
through planning, had overcome such contradictions. Furthermore, Shepilov argued that 
such a path to development would cause the USSR to disarm itself before hostile 
imperialist states, denying itself the fruits of modern science (inherently a knock-on effect 
of the development of the means of production), such as atomic bombs and jets, by shifting 
investment from heavy industry to consumer goods.67  
 Shepilov’s article was not just a matter of academic debate; it represented a pointed 
ideological thrust that signaled Khrushchev’s attack on Malenkov’s industrial politics. At 
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the September 1953 Party Plenum, Malenkov suggested that the USSR had finished its 
heavy industrialization and that state investments should move toward sector II of the 
economy (light industry) rather than sector I (heavy industry) to pave the way for the next 
phase of development. The precise influences on Malenkov’s thinking remain unclear, but 
the memoirs of Khrushchev’s son, Sergei Khrushchev, suggest that Malenkov’s wife, 
Valeriya Golubstova, was a major inspiration. Golubstova was in a natural position to make 
this suggestion, since she served as Dean of the Moscow Energy Institute. Since the 1930s 
electrical engineers began to think about the problem of capital costs, which are an obvious 
problem when dealing with hydroelectric power. Hydropower has a very low production 
cost (the main criterion of economic efficiency in Soviet planning) but huge initial capital 
outlays. This brought the existence of the cost of capital, or interest rate— and thus the 
“opportunity cost”—into sharp relief.68 The importance of opportunity costs—the cost of 
capital itself—had important implications for the larger economy. If, as Soviet practice 
dictated, the source of capital investments for heavy industry was the light industrial and 
household sector, the former was making losses while the latter was making the profits that 
funded those losses.  
Thus, what Malenkov was proposing represented more than just a change in the 
allocation of state investments: it implied a wholesale overhaul of the Soviet growth model, 
shifting power to light industries and consumers.69 The concern with what we would today 
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call “rebalancing” away from a production- to a consumption-driven economy had 
implications for foreign affairs. To achieve an efficient distribution of capital, the USSR 
had to back away from confronting the United States and its allies and settle for a negotiated 
peace to save on scarce capital resources. Thus, Malenkov proposed a “great power” 
solution to the conflict with the United States by making concessions. At the February 1955 
Party Plenum, Khrushchev hammered Malenkov for being soft on imperialism; this 
resulted in the latter resigning from his position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.70 
 Khrushchev and his surrogates’ assault on Malenkov had consequences for 
academic economics. A letter from a party member named Grigory Filipov, sent to Mikhail 
Suslov’s office, initiated a campaign to cleanse Soviet economics of Malenkov’s heresy. 
Filipov insisted that the writers of the Stalin-era textbook did not emphasize that “the 
expansion of heavy industrial production did not exclude greater investment in sector II.” 
Filipov claimed that its authors had used their academic connections to avoid owning up 
to their “grave theoretical mistakes” in this matter. For his efforts, Filipov was invited to 
Suslov’s office for further conversation and added to a guest list of future gatherings to 
discuss the contents of a new edition of the book.71 In a series of meetings across the USSR 
in 1955, attended by an estimated 1,800 economists, propagandists, and educators, the first 
edition of the textbook (published in 1954) met with criticism for failing to emphasize that 
“the general law of socialism is continual growth generated from the improvement of the 
means of production and the use of the most advanced technology” and for not clarifying 
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that the process of expanding heavy industry would lead to a consequent increase in 
consumer goods.72 
 Individual economists felt the impact of the criticisms leveled against Malenkov. 
Yakov Kronrod found himself caught up in the campaign. Kronrod followed up his work 
on the political economy of cost accounting with a 1954 book titled Socialist Reproduction 
in which he attempted to create a descriptive theory of financial flows between the various 
sectors of the Soviet economy. Its central claim was that there were financial “elasticities” 
between sector I and sector II and thus they could not be understood as separate categories 
for planning. Kronrod justified this by showing that the circulation of financial instruments 
between sectors formed the basis of inter-sectoral proportions and that these were not 
planned but rather “determined by the objective laws of economic development” that could 
be derived from the classics of Marxism through the dialectical analysis of society. This 
meant that the plan would only be successful if it corresponded with the proportions that 
already existed, a priori, in the flows of the socialist economy. Therefore, society, rather 
than the state, determined the plan’s ultimate goals.73   
Kronrod’s draft was attacked in an issue of Partiinaia zhizn’ (Party Life), which 
noted that Palchev had used Kronrod’s work to justify his (and, by implication, 
Malenkov’s) deviations. Kronrod refused to take this attack lying down. In a letter to the 
Central Committee that March, he argued that he had been slandered and that he had 
distinguished himself from Palchev in a variety of debates, including at the 1954 meeting 
of the scientific council that discussed his draft. However, a review of Kronrod’s work by 
L.M. Gatovosky, A. Kursky, N. Vasiliev, and A. Bechin agreed with the assessment that 
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Kronrod had indeed committed ideological mistakes in his work by arguing for the 
existence of “objective factors for the slowdown in the development of the first sector of 
the economy” and of “reserves in the economy that from time to time had to be transferred 
to consumer goods production.” Despite Kronrod’s further protests, the Central Committee 
concluded that the book should be pulled from publication, even though most of its copies 
were already in circulation.74  
 The 1955 assault on Malenkov and his supporters established the firm boundaries 
that economic thinking in the USSR could not cross. It also garnered Khrushchev support 
from Party hawks, such as Gregory Zhukov, who reportedly feared that Malenkov’s 
investment priorities would leave the USSR vulnerable to a catastrophic invasion like that 
in 1941 by inadequately marshalling new technology. Khrushchev’s attacks on Malenkov’s 
positions also drew support from the powerful heavy industrial ministries.75  However, 
Khrushchev still had to solve the next half of the problem of building a doctrine: how to 
adapt to the challenges of the post-Stalin USSR. 
Khrushchev hinted at his solution in his report to the September 1953 Central 
Committee Plenum on Agriculture. Under Stalin, the reference for Soviet achievements 
was imperial Russia in 1913. Yet, in an unpublished section of his speech to the plenum, 
Khrushchev broke a Soviet taboo by publically acknowledging that workers in the USSR 
were consuming less food than those of the United States. In Khrushchev’s assessment, 
despite increased investment in the agricultural sector in the form of Malenkov’s higher 
procurement prices, food production was not catching up to the ever-growing needs of the 
urban population. While he acknowledged Malenkov’s assessment that industrialization in 
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the USSR was complete, he did not think the expansion of consumer investment was 
enough to increase output. The problem, in his view, was not economic, but rather a matter 
of mismanagement. The other side of Malenkov’s procurement price increases had to be 
the “lowering of costs of production and increases in output” of agricultural goods. This 
would depend not only “on increasing prices, but on the improved management of 
production.” What Khrushchev meant was not just greater emphasis on efficiency but 
instilling an ethos in Party cadres to actively lead production by applying the lessons of 
Marxism-Leninism to the tasks at hand. While he did not yet say it out loud, the implied 
task was to beat the United States at agricultural output.76   
 While the campaign to “catch up and overtake” still loomed ahead, Khrushchev’s 
instinct to understand the Cold War as a competition over economic performance lined up 
with the ideas of a group of economic theorists in the Institute of Economics’ section on 
Capitalist Economies led by Anoushavan Arzoumanian. Arzoumanian had come to 
Moscow from Baku in the mid-1940s under the patronage of his father-in-law, Anastas 
Mikoyan—the USSR’s trade minister, Politburo member, and close Khrushchev ally. In 
the mid-1950s, Arzoumanian formulated the idea that the international situation was far 
more fluid than the orthodox “two camps” view of international relations, which argued 
that all politics was either socialist or opposed to it. At the October 1955 Plenary meeting 
of the Academy of Sciences, Arzoumanian argued that the Soviet research system needed 
to create a new institute for the study of global international relations and political 
economy. He explained that since the 1940s, the world had changed; the United Nations 
system and the emergence of “young” post-colonial states had created a certain fluidity in 
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world politics. Indeed, the political economy of capitalism had become increasingly 
multilateral. A new institute for international political economy would have to study not 
only individual capitalist states but also “the function of the United Nations and its many 
organs, especially economic, as well as those organizations unrelated to it that contribute 
to economic and technical growth in highly developed states.”77  
 This fluid conception of international politics informed a memorandum to 
Khrushchev on the politics of the United States that was compiled by Arzoumanian’s team. 
The note argued that instead of viewing capitalist states as ruled by a unitary cabal of 
monopolists, the USSR had to see them as politically heterogeneous. It explained that 
American political groups ranged from the mainstream, which wished to dictate terms to 
the socialist bloc from “a position of power” without resorting to war, to a fringe hyper-
militarist group that wished to fight the USSR now rather than later, when it became too 
strong, to a potentially influential group of “isolationists,” who were determined to 
withdraw from international alliances. Critiquing many Soviet studies of American 
politics, the note explained, “it is taboo to even mention the word ‘isolationism’ in the press 
when discussing the politics of the United States.” Arzoumanian’s team contended that this 
omission reflected the primitive state of Soviet research on foreign politics. The Soviet 
Union, the memo argued, could exploit economic slowdowns inherent to capitalism, its 
own economic successes, and inter-alliance conflicts within NATO to influence the course 
of American policy toward a more isolationist direction. Closing with a plea for further 
research on the politics and economics of the United States and other foreign states, the 
note had an unstated but obvious implication that would become extremely important for 
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Soviet political-economic strategy in the coming years. It implicitly argued that the 
domestic economic success of the Soviet Union could be used as a tool in international 
politics by convincing anti-Soviet elements in the United States that their position of 
“strength” did not exist and to convince post-colonial states to move toward neutrality or 
outright alliance with the USSR, thereby encouraging American isolationism.78 
Arzoumanian’s thinking appealed to Khrushchev’s belief that the core problem the 
Soviet economy faced was a lack of “technical progress” as compared to the leading 
capitalist states. According to Sergei Khrushchev’s memoirs, the notion that “[the USSR] 
still chasing the West’s tail” after having spent so much time and money on the purchase 
of licenses and equipment in the 1930s had deeply bothered his father ever since his tenure 
as a party official in the Donbas. The problem, the elder Khrushchev believed, lay in the 
lack of proper management and in the “overcentralization” that had restrained the initiative 
of individual Soviet enterprises to introduce new techniques and technologies. Indeed, 
Khrushchev’s first initiative in industrial policy was a May 1955 mobilization campaign in 
favor of innovation featuring boisterous meetings of engineers across the country and in 
the Kremlin.79 
 This focus on technical problems allowed for the reinstatement of broad economic 
questions into the more restricted language of management and industrial practice. For 
example, a note from the chair of the Central Committee’s Department for Science and 
Culture, Nikolai Rumiiantsev (a reform-minded economist and the future father of Soviet 
sociology), pointed out that one of the main problems facing the USSR’s enterprises was a 
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complete lack of conception of what Marx called “the moral depreciation of technology.” 
For Marx, moral depreciation describes the moment when the exchange-value (money 
price) of a piece of machinery is lost, due to it no longer being the best on the market. Marx 
warned that this occurs irrespective of the actual use-value and age of equipment, and 
pointed out that this might constitute an inefficiency in capitalist production.80 Rumiantsev, 
however, warned that the introduction of new technologies required enterprises to be able 
to amortize the cost of obsolescence for machinery. In the USSR, the rules of enterprise 
accounting only allowed for the “physical depreciation” of fixed assets rather than their 
“moral depreciation,” or purely technical obsolescence. As a result, Soviet factories and 
enterprises had no incentive to replace obsolete equipment and thus would often run older 
and newer technologies in parallel. Soviet economic sciences had no answer for how to 
achieve these standards as “no research on moral depreciation had been conducted in the 
last 10-15 years.” Worse still, Soviet economists had (in line with Stalin’s teachings), 
denied the importance of technical obsolescence by arguing that because the state 
controlled the operation of the law of value within the socialist industrial sector, the 
discount rate that allowed for the replacement of old technology under capitalism did not 
exist. Rumiantsev assailed this thinking as “both false and harmful to practice” and claimed 
that while it may have made sense “when industry was in its infancy,” it now held back 
technical development. Gosplan and the Academy of Sciences had to change their position 
on the matter and begin to take the problem of obsolescence seriously. Rumiantsev had 
reintroduced some concerns about the effective use of capital through the back door. To 
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understand how two pieces of equipment compared in their efficiency, an implicit discount 
rate on capital had to be introduced.81  
 Another important reworking of economic thinking into the realm of management 
was a 1955 article by Evsei Liberman in Questions of Economics entitled “Cost Accounting 
and the Rewarding of Workers in Industry.” Liberman argued that because Kronrod’s 1953 
conception of socialist cost accounting was restricted to a single enterprise, it was too 
narrow. Instead, Liberman proposed that cost accounting should operate from the point of 
view of managing the relationship between enterprises and the state’s contributions to its 
various investment funds through capital expenditures (also termed “capital investments”). 
Effectively, this meant that cost accounting could be used as a means of managing the 
entire economy as one large accounting system by tying savings costs related to production 
with individual workers’ “material self-interest” through additional deposits into an 
enterprise’s wage fund. This would incentivize more effective uses of resources through 
the introduction of advanced technology at the plant level and would simplify planning by 
allowing central planners to “focus on more key areas of the plan while leaving the details 
to the enterprises.”82 
Another important development in the wake of Stalin’s death was the restarting of 
the mathematical debate in Soviet economics. Prompted by complaints from academic 
groups and individual members of the TsSU that Soviet statistics had stagnated under what 
one agency staffer, I. Pisarov, called “a liquidationalist tendency” that restricted statistics 
only to measurement, the Institute of Economics began planning a conference on revisiting 
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statistical education in March 1954.83 At the conference, the majority of participants, led 
by legendary Soviet mathematician Andrei Kolmogorov, argued for the restoration of 
statistics as a freestanding discipline. In his report, Rumiantsev noted that the future of 
Soviet economic statistics lay not only in pointing out the achievements of the Soviet 
economy “but also its shortcomings” and that statistics “should be used to find new 
reserves within the socialist economy.”84  
Thus, advocates of a mathematical economics began to petition the Soviet 
government again. On July 9, 1954, S.M. Valander, the prorector (equivalent of a deputy 
rector in the English-speaking world) of Leningrad State University (LGU), wrote to 
Malenkov to address a “matter of the highest importance to the state” which could only be 
resolved “at the level of the Council of Ministers.” The problem, that state agencies “had 
no method of evaluating the vast number of tasks needed for production, planning and 
distribution,” could be solved using the “latest advances of applied mathematics.” State 
planning agencies and many economists often rejected the use of these advanced 
mathematical methods. Valander pointed to the work of LGU professor Leonid 
Kantorovich as immediately useful for planners. The agencies were less enthusiastic. G. 
Sorkin, a member of Gosplan’s staff, responded to Valandar’s letter by accusing 
Kantorovich of “rejecting the labor theory of value” and adopting “the subjective,” 
“marginalist” methodology found in Western economics, a charge that representatives 
from state agencies would continue to make for decades.85 Kantorovich’s work explicitly 
did what Rumiantsev was only proposing: it placed the scarcity of resources, including 
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capital, as the major criterion for making economic decisions, and thus implicitly of 
economic value. On January 8, 1956, Vasily Nemchinov wrote to Khrushchev on the state 
of economic statistics in the USSR. In his letter, he lamented that young economists were 
“totally isolated from practical work” due to their lack of access to up-to-date published 
data. This presented a problem not just for economic science, but for the economy: without 
statistical inference, planning could not be rationalized, and the rate of technical progress 
would remain low.86  
 Thus, by early 1956, the major intellectual camps of reformist economic thought 
had passed through the crucible of 1953-1955 by couching their proposals in the language 
of “management.” Yet they lacked a means of applying these technocratic ideas to the 
policy of a Party-State still largely dedicated to mobilization as the main tool of economic 
policy. Soviet economics was not yet “Cold War Science”—its vision remained domestic, 
without linkages to a larger international Communist project. Khrushchev’s next move 
would provide the opportunity to link the issue of domestic management with mobilization 
both at home and abroad and cast economics into the Cold War mold.  
 
Mobilization as Management: Peaceful Co-Existence and the Making of a Cold War 
Economics  
When Khrushchev took the speaker’s podium to report to the XXth Party Congress 
in February 1956, many battle lines within Soviet economics were already drawn. 
However, it would take the events of 1956 to turn them into the “Cold War” form that they 
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took in the mid-1960s, by blending the economic development of the USSR with its 
international commitments as a Communist superpower.  
The XXth Party Congress is most often associated with Khrushchev’s famous 
“Secret Speech,” in which he assailed Stalin’s “cult of personality.” That speech had 
profound long-term and short-term policy effects: one can understand neither the 
revolutions of 1956 nor the Sino-Soviet split without it.87 As Polly Jones has shown, de-
Stalinization had profound mobilizing and personal effects on wide segments of society 
both high and low. 88 However, recent literature has very little to say about the other key 
innovation of the XXth Party Congress: “peaceful co-existence.” 89 Khrushchev’s new 
doctrine emphasized that the Soviet Union would face imperialist powers not through a 
purely geo-political confrontation, but rather through “a competition of the two systems,” 
in which the domestic achievements of socialism would neutralize the advantages held by 
the imperialist center, the United States, thereby bringing to power progressive forces 
around the world. Khrushchev argued that as the might of the socialist world increased, the 
ability of the United States to “negotiate from a position of strength” would fade away. 
This would allow for the creation of larger “anti-imperialist” coalitions in what Khrushchev 
termed the “zone of peace,” made up of newly de-colonized states (the so called “national 
liberation movements”) and with “forces that have different ideas about the transition from 
capitalism to socialism from us.” Explaining that “socialism cannot be brought at the point 
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of a bayonet,” Khrushchev’s new formulation of international politics made the domestic 
achievements of the Soviet economy inherently revolutionary on the international stage.90  
At the head of a socialist camp, or “socialist world system,” the USSR could prevent 
imperialist war instead of accepting its eventuality, a pleasant thought in the age of nuclear 
weapons. Effectively, the new doctrine did away with Stalin’s conception of planning as 
defending the USSR from “capitalist encirclement,” and instead positioned “superiority of 
the socialist economy, with its higher rates of productive growth,” at the heart of the 
“competition of the two systems.”91   
For all his optimism, Khrushchev acknowledged that many problems plagued the 
Soviet economy. He zeroed in on the problem of “capital investments,” or central 
budgetary outlays to enterprises for new construction and technology. His new Five-Year 
plan allocated 200 billion rubles in capital investment a year which meant that the party 
“had to carefully monitor that they were being used effectively.” Improper management of 
state funds meant that planning “was not yet firmly using the laws of planned, proportional 
development,” leading to “temporary disproportions and bottlenecks in production.” A 
blend of mobilization and management could answer this problem. “The party must not 
shy away from admitting to the people the problems we encounter on our way forward,” 
he exclaimed. Honesty would “encourage the people to struggle against these problems.”92 
Yet Khrushchev also acknowledged problems in identifying the very laws that needed to 
be followed. In the section of his report on ideology, Khrushchev observed “poor 
conditions in our economic sciences.” Economists “were not producing works on many 
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critical questions of the Soviet economy and not participating in the discussion of important 
questions related to the development of industry and agriculture.” This reflected poorly on 
the party’s managerial and propagandistic role, as activists in turn “believed that by simply 
reading some lectures on Communism, they would be doing their duty to the party.” It was 
not enough to read the classics of Marxism: communist agitators had to “explain how they 
[the core ideas of Marxism-Leninism] applied to real practices.” 93  In his speech, Mikoyan 
admitted that Stalin’s thesis on the transformed law of value “was in all likelihood 
incorrect.” He also lamented that while in the United States, “more than a dozen and a half 
institutes [were] devoted to studying the Soviet economy,” the Soviet Union lacked any 
analogous organization.94  
 The XXth Party Congress played a critical role in the reorganization of Soviet 
economics. After a year of planning, Arzoumanian’s Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO) was founded to serve as a clearing house for the study 
of international economics.95 This led the director of the Institute of Economics, V. 
Diachenko, to suggest that a similar central institution be created to study the domestic 
economy of the USSR and other socialist states. Just as IMEMO’s goal would be to provide 
information to party cadres on international political and economic developments, the other 
institute would focus on producing solutions for the Soviet economy.96 By the end of 1956, 
party intellectuals began conversations on organizing Soviet economic science in a more 
pragmatic fashion. A letter from the editorial board of Kommunist noted the lack of an 
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institute that would study the productivity of labor, to which the committee responded that 
the newly-planned Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences would house an institute 
designed to study the economics of industrial production; this would later become the 
Institute for the Study of Economic and Industrial Organization (IEOPP) led by Abel 
Aganbegian.97 That same year, the Scientific Institute of Gosplan (NII), an economic 
research body established in 1955, called for an all-Union conference of economic 
institutions from the local and all-Union levels in order to clarify the division of labor 
within the Soviet economics community and improve the process that would turn theory 
into practice.98  
Nemchinov took the idea of economics as a tool of state policy to its most radical 
conclusion. In a letter to Shepilov, who was now the head of the Central Committee’s 
Department of Science, Education and Culture, Nemchinov argued that “even in capitalist 
states governments are actively engaging with scientists, through parliamentary 
committees which exploit the knowledge of universities and research centers.” He 
suggested that the state give direct instructions to Soviet researchers so that “the problems 
brought up at the XXth Party Congress” could be solved through social science and 
“government policy [could] operate on a scientific basis.” Nemchinov contended that the 
USSR’s inherently more scientific social order already provided significant advantages 
over the chaos of a market economy and held all the prerequisites for bringing together 
science and policy making.99 
Soldiers of the State: “Catch Up and Overtake” and the Internationalization of Soviet 
Economic Thought  
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  The mobilization of economics as a “Cold War Science” in line with the “doctrine 
of peaceful co-existence” implied a rethinking of the place of the Soviet state and its 
economy vis-à-vis the West and other socialist states. While the Soviet Union was always 
supposed to “catch up and overtake” the West, political figures considered the economy 
as, fundamentally, an arsenal for the new society. Khrushchev’s revision of the Soviet 
project meant that the USSR accepted a new approach to international legitimacy 
associated with American global dominance: the economy would be the instrument through 
which great power status was projected rather than an auxiliary to military might.100  
On May 22, 1957, Khrushchev proclaimed that the USSR would catch up to the 
United States in meat and milk production by 1960, breaking the Stalinist taboo against 
comparing the USSR to its capitalist rivals.101  While some experts at the time believed that 
the USSR could accomplish this by 1975 at the earliest, Khrushchev dismissed these 
numbers as meaningless in the context of the USSR’s ability to mobilize its population and 
thus expand the productivity of labor. Mikoyan recalled that Khrushchev had always 
doubted data and instead believed that output could be changed through heroic acts of 
production.102 Indeed, Fedor Burlatsky recalled that during the drafting of the “Third Party 
Program,” professional economists had cautioned Khrushchev’s representative, Petr 
Pomerantsev, that it was inadvisable to promise to overtake the United States in agricultural 
and per capita industrial output by a fixed date; however, he rejected their advice. What 
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was more important in creating these goals was not actually reaching them but that they 
helped mobilize the population.103  
Yet, if Khrushchev regarded the new goals as purely political tools, the structure of 
the Marxist-Leninist state, which attempted to implement the Party’s announced goals, 
meant that state policy reflected ideological goals, as did the actions and priorities of 
economic research and planning bodies. If the USSR was to beat the United States at its 
own game, it not only had to figure out the rules of the game but also how the other side 
played it. In a September 1956 note to Bulganin, the Institute of Economics explained that 
to fulfill “the main economic task” set by the party at the XXth Party Congress, to win the 
competition of the two systems, studies needed to be conducted “comparing the levels and 
prospects of the production of the most important types of goods per capita” in the USSR 
and the leading capitalist economies. This work had “the highest level of importance in 
light of the competition of the two systems.” To fulfill these goals, institutes of the 
Academy of Sciences engaged in economic and social scientific research needed not only 
more literature on “both capitalist economies and the economies of the People’s 
Democracies” but also accurate data with which to compare Soviet and Western 
performance.104  
In 1956, Gosplan’s Intitute for Scientific Research (NII) established a “sector for 
the competition of the two systems” to develop tools to measure the progress of the 
socioeconomic contest with the capitalist economies. The main problem this new team 
encountered was that despite a wealth of data on national incomes coming from the United 
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States and Western Europe, none of these could be adapted to the conventions of Soviet 
accounting. National Income and Product Accounting, the basis of Gross Domestic 
Product, assumed services as value-added sectors whereas Soviet accounts did not.105 By 
1958, the institute acknowledged that despite the fact that overtaking the United States in 
“aggregate and later in per capita production” was vital to accomplishing the goals of the 
XXth Party Congress, the differing social structures and climatic conditions of the two 
countries made direct comparison of the economies impossible. Instead they suggested that 
planners pick one or two areas in which the USSR could conceivably compete with the 
United States and base their measurements on those.106  
 Similar discussions were happening in IMEMO. Despite having a great number of 
statistics, economists had not produced a consensus on how to use them to predict the 
course of capitalism toward the “crisis” that would surely come. In 1958, A.I. Bechin, the 
institute’s deputy director and head of the section on “Imperialist Economies” (as well as 
a former student of Arzoumanian at the Institute of Economics), proposed a radical 
rereading of how the USSR should deal with this trove of information. While dismissing 
claims that Keynesian policy had eliminated the inevitability of capitalist crises, Bechin 
admitted that technological change had indeed transformed the capitalist system: the rate 
of mechanization meant that aggregate investment theories developed from the business 
cycle research so beloved by older generations of Soviet economists could no longer 
reliably predict future moments of overproduction associated with the Marxist theory of 
crisis.107 Bechin drew on a potential solution to this problem of aggregate dates using what 
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he called “bourgeois econometrics.” Instead of measuring gross investments, he suggested 
paying more attention to “the relationship between the yearly return of a unit of production 
and the cost of capital needed to build it,” as was common in Western practice. While 
dismissing most of econometrics as “something we don’t often study and something that, 
for the most part, has little to offer,” Bechin admitted that “from the point of view of a 
Marxist-Leninist there is indeed something there” in this particular approach.108 What 
Bechin was describing was the aforementioned “opportunity cost of capital.”  
Tethering the Soviet revolutionary project to catching up and overtaking the West, 
and the United States in particular, thus allowed the USSR’s economic cadres to begin 
thinking about using the practical aspects of Western economics. At the XXth Party 
Congress, Khrushchev explicitly called for expanded cultural-scientific exchanges to 
improve relations with the United States and other Western powers and to increase the 
prestige of socialism. This shift formalized the end of the Stalinist “two camps” doctrine 
and ushered the USSR into political and scientific multilateral bodies.109 In 1959, the 
Institute of Economics sent its first official institutional delegation to the United States. 
The mission approvingly noted that most American businessmen seemed to be interested 
in peace, but was disappointed that the majority of them believed that the USSR offered 
few opportunities for trade. The delegation was impressed by the rapid introduction of 
computers into economic research and the American graduate training system: the single 
PhD degree, they argued, offered a much more efficient and shorter form of training than 
the Soviet Kandidat and Doktor degrees.110  
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 Multilateral contacts through the UN system offered a much more promising and 
interesting area of cooperation. In June 1956, in Geneva, UNESCO hosted a meeting 
between a small group of economists from both East and West; Aboltin and the director of 
the Institute of Economics, Diachenko, represented the USSR as they met with 
representatives from the United States, United Kingdom and Poland. There they agreed to 
hold a larger session in April 1957 in Vienna, as part of the World Economics Association 
conference. They agreed upon a theme, “The Level and Structure of National/Social 
Production and its Determining Factors,” and decided that all papers would be exchanged 
between representatives of the “capitalist” and “socialist” groups. Diachenko would 
organize contributing papers from the socialist bloc and the British economist Eric 
Robinson would organize contributions from capitalist economies.111 This immediately 
produced both complications and opportunities. Neither the GDR nor the PRC could be 
invited officially through UNESCO channels because they were not recognized by the 
United Nations and thus were not UNESCO members. However, representatives of those 
countries could join the World Economics Association, which would then invite them as 
participants to the larger conference in Austria in 1957, which would host the East-West 
forum. Both UNESCO and the World Economics Association supported this solution as a 
means of incorporating the two states into the global scientific community.112  
The negotiations with UNESCO testified to the role that East Europeans were 
rapidly taking on as go-betweens in bringing Soviet economists into international 
organizations. The Poles’ leading role in this effort was showcased when the conference of 
socialist economists that would prepare materials for the Vienna forum took place in 
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Warsaw in October 1956. In its report, the department of Science, Culture, and Higher 
Education hinted that the organization of the conference was the initiative of the Polish 
representative, Tadeusz Lychowski.113 Lychowski was an ideal intermediary, as he was not 
a Communist, nor did he ever become one. In fact, he had started his career as a loyalist 
for the London government working in the early wartime United Nations system as the 
Polish representative to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). From there, he 
made his way into the Communist Polish bureaucracy, where he became an advisor to the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of International Affairs. In 1957, he entered 
academia, becoming Poland’s preeminent expert on East-West trade, penning tracts on 
possible areas of economic collaboration between different types of social systems.114  
Though the role Soviet economists played in the United Nations system and their 
relationship to their East European colleagues is the subject of Chapter V, the events 
described above demonstrate that Khrushchev’s  opening facilitated new opportunities and 
networks for the dissemination of knowledge and economic norms throughout the Eastern 
Bloc.  
Value: Soviet, Economic and Otherwise 
If the new imperative for Soviet economics was to bring theory into practice in 
order to prove the superiority of socialism, no consensus on what the theory of economic 
value entailed yet existed. The rejection of Stalin’s “transformed law of value” in the USSR 
had left a hole in the central question of economic sciences: what determines the value of 
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a given thing. What would fill the void? Marx had left a general formula for understanding 
the components of commodity value under capitalism, which was generally interpreted in 
the formula “C+V+M,” where C represented constant capital (or past labor embodied in 
machinery, land, and raw materials), V represented variable capital (as represented in the 
wage bill), and M represented surplus value (or the markup taken by the capitalist). Under 
conditions of socialism, M was understood to be a price markup that reflected the “social 
cost” of production. The devil in the details was that, in practice, the social cost was, by 
default, a decision of the state. Thus, when discussing the formation of prices that were 
supposed to align with value and reflect the social cost (rather than the exploitative markup 
of the capitalist in a market system), the “M” term was taken as given by the Soviet Union’s 
economists. Because the USSR was seen to be moving toward Communism, thus gradually 
erasing the line between use value and price, discussing the best way to evaluate M was 
inherently a political act as it would mean using a scientific theory to determine the course 
of state action.115  
The debate over value had kicked into gear in the late forties and early fifties when 
Nemchinov, Strumilin, and Novozhilov sparred over the role of mathematical calculation, 
statistics, and numeraires (a good or currency that is used as a unit of account) in 
understanding value. With the official rejection of Stalin’s Economic Problems in 1956, 
the debate began again in earnest. However, unlike in the 1940s, the couching of the Cold 
War in direct, socio-economic terms led to a gradual shift in which the debate not only 
addressed the function of the Soviet state in the planning process, but extended to the Soviet 
Union’s position in both the “Socialist World System” and the world at large. Following 
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the XXth Party Congress and the Hungarian and Polish uprisings, a debate emerged across 
the Eastern Bloc about the state’s proper role in determining prices and directing planning. 
The East German and Polish debates of 1956, in particular, began to flow back into the 
USSR, prompting anxieties in conservative economic cadres and providing new 
challengers with ammunition to rethink economics.116  
In June 1956, the Party organization of the Institute of Economics sent a report to 
the Central Committee describing its discussions in response to the criticism it had received 
at the XXth Party Congress. It highlighted the lack of a proper theoretical basis in economic 
discussions, which it blamed on the cult of Stalin, noting that after the publication of The 
Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, the institute only engaged in “highly abstract 
discussions” which “forced economic theory to be completely disassociated from reality.”  
It also complained that The Problems of Economics would not publish anything that did 
not simply regurgitate dogma, and especially ignored writing about the lack of access to 
statistics. The report attacked the weak connections between the state and social sciences 
and the lack of information provided to the institute, explaining that “it is not normal that 
economists must find out about the important questions of economics from the Central 
Committee’s press.” The party collective asked that “economists be granted expert 
information and data on the decisions and development of the national economy,” and 
urged the party’s policy makers to engage with economists for their specialist knowledge. 
Finally, it suggested that to improve the situation, Soviet economics should be more open 
to new ideas, including foreign research both from capitalist and socialist states that would 
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be published in a special journal. 117 
The discussion in June did not quiet complaints against Problems of Economics. In 
November of that year, M.V. Breev, the chairman of the department of economic planning 
at MGU, wrote to Suslov, complaining that both Kommunist and Problems of Economics 
had rejected his article on the problem of “Commodity Production and the Question of 
Value,” which he admitted “strayed from the accepted point of view.” Kommunist had 
suggested that the work was too technical and speculative for the journal’s general 
readership and proposed that it be sent to Questions. Yet the article remained unpublished 
for reasons Breev suspected had to do with the unorthodox and innovative nature of his 
work. Breev invoked Suslov’s own speech at the XXth Party Congress, which had 
castigated economists for “not understanding the role of value in production.” Breev argued 
that economists needed “to ask questions in new ways.” Suslov’s office responded 
positively to the request, noting that Breev’s work was both “interesting” and “deserved 
greater attention” from the field. Breev and the editorial staff of Questions of Economics 
were called in for “consultation” with the Central Committee, after which all parties agreed 
that Breev’s article would enter review at Questions and be published.118 As Breev’s 
experience encapsulates, after 1956, the great defender of Soviet ideological orthodoxy 
would actively support heterodox economic thought in the USSR due to its potential for 
addressing the problems of economic research highlighted at the XXth Party Congress.  
Breev’s work, though in hindsight not innovative in its own right, was one of many 
attempts to break the mold of Soviet economics. Breev’s department at MGU became a 
breeding ground for many of the younger, more radical economic thinkers who emerged in 
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the 1960s. Indeed, Aron Katsenelinboigen, a founding member of the cohort of economists 
who would develop a mathematical approach to socialist planning that will be discussed 
below (and subsequently a professor at the University of Pennsylvania), remembered that 
Breev was instrumental in establishing a small, elite group at Moscow State University to 
study mathematical methods in economics. Like Breev, Nemchinov began to lobby 
Khrushchev to release mathematical economic literature dating to the 1920s that had been 
banned “for right deviationism.” 119  
The debate over value in a socialist society began in earnest in the fall of 1956. In 
November, the long-silent Strumilin published his article “On the Question of Accounting 
for Cost under Socialism” in Problems of Economics, which postulated the existence of 
profit and excess value under socialism as a separate category from capitalist profit, since 
the elimination of class contradictions meant that true labor values could be deduced as a 
central element of price formation and thus profitability.120 Strumilin in essence restated 
his 1951 position, but now found it safe to publish in the pages of Problems. One month 
later, Problems of Economics featured a discussion of Yakov Kronrod’s paper “The Role 
of Prices and Price Formation under Socialism,” which recast his earlier—then heretical—
remarks on the relationship of heavy and light industry into the more neutral language of 
price setting. If heavy industry had less profitability—defined by the ratio of C+V to the 
state-determined M—than light industry, then one sector was subsidizing the other. 
Kronrod argued that this created problems for the ruble as an accurate unit of account since 
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it purchased more “labor hours” in one industry than another.121 Kronrod had effectively 
translated his earlier concept of elasticity between sectors, which implied that financial 
flows, and thus, institutions, needed to be reorganized, into the abstract language of value. 
He could now claim to be making a more politically neutral intervention into the question 
of properly aligning purchasing power with the value of commodities.  
Kronrod’s article reflected the positon of the economists who would become known 
as the Tovarniks: literally, the commodity school. These theorists—including Kronrod, 
finance theorist A.A. Belkin, and possibly Strumilin—believed that the economy should 
be organized on the basis of commodity exchange to the largest extent possible. This meant 
the introduction of a theory of money as a mediator for commodity exchange under 
socialism, a task to which Kronrod would dedicate his career. Extending his elasticity 
analysis from 1955, Kronrod argued that the Soviet economy’s problem was that the ruble 
was not acting as a socialist “universal equivalent,” since the implicit subsidy to heavy 
industry meant that labor hours did not have equivalence across different sectors. The 
fundamental belief belying this analysis held that socialism existed because of the state 
ownership of property and as a result, commodity production, if aligned with labor value, 
would automatically correspond to the “laws of socialist development.” For many 
contemporary observers, this circular reasoning obfuscated the Tovarnik’s true conclusion: 
that a developed socialist society would move beyond planning toward a socialist market 
economy like Yugoslavia’s.122  
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The contrast between the Tovarniki and other camps of reformism was already 
evident in 1957. Responding to Kronrod’s article, his once and future rival, Nemchinov, 
praised Kronrod for tackling the question of the relationship between price and value. 
However, he lamented that Kronrod had not taken the next step by postulating a correct 
proportion that would allow for the use of price as a lever for planning.123 For Nemchinov, 
this question was vital, concerned as he was with making sure development was 
proportional and goal-directed. Kronrod, on the other hand, believed that development 
need not be directed so long as the financial flows of the economy were aligned with the a 
priori laws of socialism. Despite, or perhaps because of his more orthodox Marxism, he 
was far more skeptical of the state’s ability to direct society, even with better economic 
modelling techniques.  
Leonid Gatovsky moderated the exchange between the two reformist theorists. He 
warned that the papers expressed just one position and would start a much more wide-
ranging discussion in the Institute on the matter of prices and value.124 Gatovsky became 
the flag-bearer of Soviet conservative economic thinking. As he explained in a 1957 
Kommunist article, the law of value was part of socialist planning, yet “could not play the 
role it plays under capitalism, as collectively owned property means that management has 
other priorities than to maintain monopoly prices.” The state could manipulate the law of 
value to its needs to build socialism by giving preference to some industries over others 
despite their unprofitability, if they corresponded to other necessities, such as technical 
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progress.125 Gatovsky’s article was a rearguard maneuver against the increasingly loud 
voices that were beginning to call for an open discussion on the role of value and pricing 
in a socialist economy. In March 1957, the Institute of Economics proposed a conference 
to study problems of value that would deal with issues involving “commodity production 
and circulation, the setting of prices, and the use of price mechanisms to improve the 
construction of socialism.” The conference would focus on “strengthening cost accounting, 
lowering the cost of production, and increasing the profitability of enterprises.”126 The 
conference materials, which were printed as a volume in 1959, featured the most heated 
combat between Soviet economists since 1951. In his introduction, Ostrovitianov, on one 
hand, attacked Stalin’s “cult of personality for stifling the discussion of value,” but on the 
other, condemned “excesses” that some had taken in the wake of the XXth Party Congress. 
Value could not be separated from its roots in property relations and, because of this, the 
“law of value” could not operate in the USSR or in any other socialist state in the same 
unconstrained manner that it did in a market economy.127  
Conservatives were also anxious about the influence of reform debates in the 
“People’s Republics” on Soviet researchers. In his paper at the aforementioned conference, 
Gatovsky expressed horror that, at a similar conference in the GDR, “Profs. Berenz and 
Benary attacked central planning by arguing that only the law of value should regulate the 
economy,” and that “instead of the state planning [Berenz and Benary] proposed a 
‘decentralized’ system that worked through an investment bank regulated by the 
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speculative laws of supply and demand.” Another foreign economist who came under 
attack was Wlodzimierz Brus, a Polish economist who, Gatovsky argued, “while not 
eliminating central planning, would reduce it to a passive system” by forcing prices to be 
regulated by supply and demand conditions. Gatovsky proclaimed these ideas anti-
socialist: “planning and the fluctuations of the market are incompatible.”128 However, 
while the old guard tried to adapt orthodoxy to the new environment, they found themselves 
challenged at the 1957 conference. L.A. Vaag of the Moscow Energy Institute attacked the 
economics profession for using abstract theoretical language to cover up concrete pricing 
inefficiencies that drove down returns on capital investment.129 Kantorovich critiqued the 
papers presented for ignoring the work being done in mathematics to set more effective 
price incentives for Soviet industry.130 The economic debates of 1947 had reignited, but the 
proponents of alternative Soviet economics were no longer alone: they now formed part of 
a larger network across the socialist world that was actively debating the applicability of 
new economic theories to planned economies.  
 The growing dominance of new economic thinking in Soviet academia became 
evident by 1958. That year, a second conference on the law of value completely rejected 
Stalin’s theory that commodity production only existed in socialism by virtue of the fact 
that that the state sector did not encompass the kolkhoz or cooperative sector. Rather, the 
participants concluded that commodity production continued to exist even within the state 
sector itself because of the existence of “economic relationships between the branches of 
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the state economy.” This meant that value judgment, and thus price relationships, still 
governed the “commanding heights” of state-owned industry. One paper at that conference 
called Stalinist theories of “pure socialism” an “unfounded abstract conception which only 
leads to confusion” because they ignored “the division of labor” that existed even within 
the socialist state sector of the economy. A socialist theory of value needed to strive to 
create a means by which to compare various kinds of labor hours across sectors with one 
numeraire that would then guide the formation of prices, leading to a rationalized 
distribution of resources.131  
But how to achieve such a goal? Many of the conference participants argued that 
the system of pricing in the USSR had to be reorganized on the basis of an average cost of 
production across various branches of the economy. Under this conception of “even 
prices,” all goods would be priced based an average cost of production. Having such a 
reference point would allow the identification of the best-run farms and enterprises due to 
their above-average profitability. Z.V. Atlas of the Moscow Financial Academy and L.A. 
Vaag of the Moscow Energy Institute made the most argument for profitability’s role in 
comparing Socialist value most directly. Atlas approached this question historically. The 
problem of economic analysis in the USSR was that practitioners did not distinguish 
between the “law of value’s function in early capitalism, dominated by its small firms, and 
advanced capitalism characterized by complex divisions of labor and centralized, 
monopoly, production which is closer to socialism.” This analysis implied that the socialist 
order must eliminate such profit-maximizing practices as monopoly pricing and financial 
speculation but that it should not destroy other, legitimate forms of profitability associated 
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with large, hierarchical production. This confusion of categories created a system of 
planning that did not weigh profitability sufficiently vis-à-vis other performance indicators. 
Initially, Atlas argued, the USSR successfully overcame the resulting inefficiencies, due to 
“socialist enthusiasm” and the relatively primitive state of the early Soviet economy which 
meant any improvement would yield results. However, the government did not undertake 
long-term measures that would establish the “stimulation of labor through financial 
resources,” leading to a situation in which “the budget did not play a role in constraining 
enterprises.” This resulted not only in the over-accumulation and hoarding of both material 
and financial resources, but also losses to the state budget. Thus, the further the USSR’s 
economy advanced, the more it would have to rely on profit as the central and sole measure 
of industrial performance.132  
Vaag echoed these opinions, suggesting that economists consider the work done in 
engineering on returns on capital investment. In practice, engineers not only looked at the 
cheapest option (defined by cost of production), but also at returns on investments over a 
given period versus other potential uses of capital: in other words, setting a net present 
value with an opportunity cost of capital in mind. Vaag translated this idea into the language 
of Marxism by arguing that the opportunity cost implied in his analysis measured the labor 
costs of a project in a way that was not limited to the individual enterprise or branch, but 
rather to society as a whole. Vaag meant that any investment in a specific project needed 
to be compared to the return of an equivalent outlay in the entire economy. Thus, he argued 
that “it [was] time to abandon the idea that ‘the cost of production’ was only a category of 
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Vaag’s ideas flowed naturally from his specialization in the economics of 
hydroelectric dams which, as discussed earlier, provide the perfect case study for the cost 
of capital. Vaag would formalize this theory of project evaluation in his work as a 
consultant for the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), which resulted 
in the issuance of that body’s “general guidelines for the evaluation of technological-
economic costs in energy” in 1959. The guidelines contained an explicit eight-year time 
frame for the return on any capital investment that would serve as a single discount rate for 
the sector.134  
Vaag and Atlas presented a critique similar to that of the Tovarniki. They identified 
the Soviet economy’s critical problem as the dysfunction of its financial system due to the 
fact that prices did not reflect true costs. However, the “Price of Production School” 
differed by focusing on the cost of capital rather than that of labor, which they justified by 
arguing that capital reflected the cost of machinery and thus formed part of labor’s 
productivity.135  
Vaag and Atlas’ arguments were opposed by A.B. Bachurin, who was a member of 
the Ministry of Finance’s in-house research institute and later became Gosplan’s point man 
on economic reform. Speaking as representative of the Ministry of Finance, Bachurin noted 
that “practical workers engaged in price setting cannot agree that pricing must be based on 
costs when some organizations have worse productive conditions than others.” This 
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informed his doubts that profitability would serve as the most reliable indicator for the 
effective use of state investments since some technology-intensive industries were, by 
nature, not profitable, but had a high social value due to their use of the latest productive 
techniques. He blamed the tendency of some economists to think the opposite on 
“mechanically applying Marx’s statements about a capitalist economy to socialist 
production.” Bachurin instead advocated a mix of indicators amongst which profitability 
would be only one of many targets.136  
Building Whose Communism?: The New Mathematical Economics  
While conservatives like Gatovsky and Bachurin were concerned about Kronrod’s 
ideas of value through labor or Atlas’s and Vaag’s desire to factor in the opportunity cost 
of capital in production, these disputes had not prepared them for the thunderbolt that was 
coming: a school of economic theory that emphasized not only the cost of capital but also 
argued for the application of Western-style econometric analysis to the Soviet economy as 
a scientific criterion for making decisions on the distribution of goods. What would be 
called “mathematical economics” challenged the way in which the USSR’s economists 
juxtaposed socialism and capitalism by arguing that mathematics could serve as an 
ideologically neutral means of optimizing Soviet planning. Mathematical economics took 
the Cold War project to conclusion, using Western-inspired econometric analysis and 
deploying it to analyze the Soviet economy from an ostensibly scientific, constructive 
position. This meant that economics did not necessarily imply a liberal challenge to the 
USSR’s hierarchical system of governance; in fact, economists used their “neutral 
language” to prove the superiority of the Soviet system. Indeed, mathematical economics, 
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particularly in its early guises, offered a much more hierarchical, state-driven vision of a 
reformed economy than some of its more Marxism-grounded reformist counterparts.  
The emergence of mathematical economics not only as a set of techniques but also 
as a separate school of economic thought sits at the intersection of a long history of Russian 
and Soviet economic thinking, international exchange, and Cold War mobilization. 
Kantorovich and Novozhilov’s work in the 1940s developed many of the school’s 
foundational ideas, but its research agenda was controversial and thus largely suppressed. 
Significantly, Soviet research into mathematical economics was growing in parallel to 
(rather than behind) its Western counterparts. For example the leap from economic 
statistics to econometrics— whose key new assumption was that risks and future events 
can be understood as a matter of probability and thus analyzed deductively (the “ergodic 
theory” most famously described by Paul Samuelson), drew heavily on the work of the 
“Moscow School” of statistics.137 Consequently, in 1953, the newly formed International 
Econometric Society sent a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm inviting Soviet 
economists to its 1954 meeting in Uppsala to discuss how international exchanges of data 
could be organized and standardized. In a mark of the extent to which the Soviet economic 
community had become isolated from its global counterparts, the society asked if A.A. 
Konus, a leading Soviet economic statistician of the 1920s, was still alive. The embassy 
forwarded the letter to the Institute of Economics, which responded that the invitation had 
to be rejected, since “the Soviet Union did not recognize the positions of the econometric 
school.”138  
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However, by the late 1950s, attitudes surrounding econometrics gradually had 
begun to soften. Bechin’s 1958 assessment of the “usefulness” of some Western economics 
at IMEMO was affirmed by Questions of Economics, which that same year had published 
an article by I. Blumin and V. Shlapentokh arguing that econometrics should be interpreted 
as a heterogeneous movement and that Western theorists could present interesting 
contributions to the Soviet profession. The article explained that the academics in Western 
universities formed a subgroup of the bourgeoisie that believed that its work was objective 
and thus their output could be read as technocratic and not value-laden. Blumin and 
Shlapentokh were most interested in Wassily Leontief’s input-output model of the 
American economy. Leontief, an émigré who left the USSR in the 1920s due to his 
opposition to Party attacks on academic autonomy, would become not only a major 
influence on Soviet planning techniques but also an interlocutor between East and West.139  
In addition to Western literature, influences from Eastern Europe began to flow into 
the USSR. The most important Eastern European to influence Soviet mathematical 
economists was Poland’s Oscar Lange. Lange, who was born in Poland and later became a 
die-hard Communist, was also a skilled mathematician and economist who quickly took 
up the neoclassical economics which grew out of the work of late nineteenth-century 
economists like Swiss engineer Leon Walras. Walras has been associated with an anti-
Marxist tradition stemming from Bohem-Bawerk’s critique of Marx’s labor theory of value 
and the subsequent invention of marginal utility theory. However, Walras’s major 
contribution was not a critique of Marixism but the introduction of the “auctioneer 
function” and the supply and demand curves. The auctioneer solved the pesky problem of 
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proving the existence of a supply and demand equilibrium and thus the price level by acting 
as a black box that allowed prices to reach the intersection of the supply and demand curves 
without the details of real, money prices getting in the way. 140 As the “auctioneer” was a 
neutral agent, he did not need to be a market: for many European socialists, he could be a 
central planner sitting at the top of a hierarchy that absorbed information and set rate targets 
which would automatically direct the preferences of units below thereby eliminating the 
need for direct planning.141  
In 1934, Lange, along with many other European economists, came to the 
University of Chicago, where he not only worked with the Cowles Foundation, which in 
its Yale incarnation would become the leading econometric research organization in the 
world (and play an important role in this narrative), but also taught both Milton Friedman 
and Hyman Minsky, economic luminaries of the American right and left, respectively. By 
1936, he had entered a debate with Hayek—the infamous “socialist calculation debate”—
in which he proposed that a central planner armed with the correct information and 
technology could solve equilibrium equations more efficiently than a “anarchic” market. 
When WWII broke out, he became an American citizen and a consultant to the State 
Department. However, in 1945, when the Communist government came to power in 
Poland, he renounced his citizenship and became Poland’s ambassador to the United States 
and, later, the United Nations. Soon afterwards, he returned to academic life in Poland, 
where he began expanding his ideas into the dimensions of cybernetics—with the computer 
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now taking the place of the auctioneer in the idealized, planned economy.142 Lange’s 
influence on young Soviet practitioners cannot be overstated. Kantorovich, the godfather 
of Soviet mathematical economics, acknowledged that Lange was his main influence 
during his transition from applied mathematics to economics.143   
Scholars often date the birth of Soviet Mathematical Economics as a full-fledged 
“school” to the 1959 publication of Kantorovich’s The Best Use of Economic Resources. 
The book had undergone many revisions since Kantorovich had published his original 
pamphlet in 1948. With Nemchinov’s sponsorship, the book was finally published a decade 
after it had been conceived. It hit the profession like a storm and its radical methodological 
propositions provoked widespread controversy. Even Nemchinov, who wrote the 
introduction, admitted that some similarities existed between Kantorovich’s work and 
Western neoclassical economics. Nemchinov defended his colleague, stating that 
Kantorovich’s approach to value “related to objectively determined valuations, not to the 
categories of demand but to the labor theory of value.” However, he conceded “that while 
disassociating himself from the concepts of bourgeois economists, he [Kantorovich] 
nevertheless introduces into his structure, to a certain degree, a dependence on subjectively 
determined valuations of demand, though the role which this author assigns to demand 
remains unclear.”144 
Nemchinov was correct. A specter was haunting Kantorovich’s work: the specter 
of the demand curve—the key innovation of neo-classical economics. Kantorovich’s work 
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provided economists in both East and West with a powerful tool, one which would later 
win him the Nobel Prize: linear programming, an approach to determining the optimal 
distribution of resources by assigning a set of restricted algebraic conditions. In Western 
economics, particularly as practiced at MIT, linear programming models (derived 
independently) became a key step toward the of general equilibrium theory (though the 
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model would supersede linear programming with 
fixed-point style topographic equations in proving these models). Without it, neo-
Keynesian models could not unite Keynes’s short run disturbances with the with long run 
frictionless auction mechanisms of Walras’s neoclassical equilibrium theory.145  
Kantorovich’s formulation of the application of linear programming, however, did 
not explicitly mention the auction mechanism—and thus demand schedule—as economics 
in the USSR could not yet openly acknowledge that a “subjective preference” rather than 
“objective” labor determined value. Kantorovich tried to solve the problem by sneaking 
the demand function in through the back door, through “shadow pricing” (expressed 
through LaGrange Multipliers), which he referred to as “objectively determined 
valuations.” These would determine the price of a commodity (including labor) based on 
its scarcity in relation to the needs of the plan. Thus, Kantorovich snuck in the marginalist 
argument that certain goods could have a lower “use value” but higher “marginal value” 
because producing additional units of such a good (or its substitute) would fetch a higher 
price due to its scarcity relative to the demand for its use. This clearly was skirting close to 
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replacing Marx’s classical “labor theory of value” with marginal utility. Novozhilov 
introduced a weaker version of this analysis in his Applications of Mathematics in 
Economic Research, published that same year, which maintained labor as a numeraire 
rather than as a commodity.146   
Though Kantorovich took great pains avoid an explicitly politically message, his 
book came at an important political moment. 1959 was a watershed for Khrushchev. The 
January 1959 XXIst Party Congress, labeled “extraordinary” because it was not regularly 
scheduled, solidified Khrushchev’s position as sole head of the party after the elimination 
of his rivals in 1957. It was also unusual because it issued a Seven-Year Plan, rather than 
the standard Five-Year Plan. At the Congress, Khrushchev announced that the USSR was 
entering a new period of “actively constructing the basis of a Communist society.” In 
practical terms, “the building of a technical basis for a Communist society” meant 
“fulfilling the historical task of catching up with and overtaking the advanced capitalist 
economies” in order to win the peaceful competition of the two systems. Khrushchev 
defined catching up and overtaking as “the main task” of the Soviet economy in the Seven-
Year Plan.147  
On the fiscal side, this meant that the Seven-Year Plan would have “as much capital 
invested as all the previous years of Soviet power combined” to expand housing and new 
industrial construction and to move away from the manual labor that still characterized 
much of Soviet industrial practice. This work required a careful approach to the 
management of financial resources in order “to avoid what economists called 
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disproportion.”148 In his speech, Nikolai Kuzminin, the chair of Gosplan, noted that “while 
the USSR has many people employed as economists and more than enough economic 
research institutes,” “academic economists still stand outside the realm of practical 
questions,” which he believed constituted a problem for academic research.149  
In response to the Congress, the Institute of Economics began working with 
Gosplan on a long-term program for economic development that would run from 1959 to 
1975. The Institute would attempt to address how new, more intensive conditions could be 
managed through cost accounting and the “labor stimulus” it provided. The research plan 
also suggested the expansion of horizontal ties between enterprises using liquid funds.150 
These latter propositions allowed for the use of bank-issued credit financing and 
profitability measures at an enterprise level. The 1959 proposal thus contained all the 
common elements of a program that all camps of reformist economics would pursue up 
until the final years of perestroika. 
 In March 1959, a special joint meeting of the Collegium of Gosplan, the Presidium 
of the Academy of Sciences, and the Section on Law, Philosophy, and Economics began 
discussing the problems of economic research related to the issues that had emerged at the 
Congress. A commission consisting of members of the Institutes, TsSU, Gosplan, the State 
Commission on Science and Technology (GKNT), and the Commission on Cultural Ties 
with Foreign Governments was formed to discuss the question on a regular basis. At the 
March meeting, Kuzminin observed that the “main task of economic research was to 
increase the productivity of labor in all sectors and regions of the USSR.” He emphasized 
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the need for more research into “the interrelation between the development of metallurgical 
and productive industries, the circulation of goods and money, the international socialist 
division of labor, and aid to developing countries.” These interdependencies, he admitted, 
were the source of “many unanswered questions in the practice of state planning that 
require more academic research.” Furthermore, he suggested that economics move away 
from the fields of law and philosophy in the Academy of Science system and instead be 
coordinated through a freestanding “Section,” which would remain in close contact with 
Gosplan and work toward making economics an applied science.151  
 Nemchinov, speaking as the head of the section of Law, Philosophy, and 
Economics made a deeper epistemological point: “The time has come,” he declared, “for 
economics to become an exact science that gives not only qualitative but also quantitative 
assessment of phenomena.” By this, he meant the introduction of mathematical methods 
and increased use of modern computing technology. Nemchinov met with opposition from 
Varga, who represented the older school and argued that mathematics, though a useful tool, 
could not offer much to the political-economic foundations of economic research. The 
Soviet version of the “Measurement without Theory” debate had reignited.152  
Nemchinov tried to resolve the debate between the old-style “Political Economy” 
and the new “Mathematical Economics” to the mutual satisfaction of both camps in a 1959 
Questions of Economics article in which he proposed a division of labor. Mathematical 
economics would pursue applications necessary to manage the vast capital expenditures of 
the Seven-Year Plan. Political Economy, on the other hand, would treat meta-questions of 
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the trajectory and historical stages of the construction of Communism.153 Although 
Nemchinov pursued compromise, his article accepted a disconnect between Political 
Economy and Mathematical Economics. This division hardened when the USSR held its 
first national meeting on the use of mathematical methods in planning and economics on 
April 4-8, 1960 which would form the nucleus of researchers working on the development 
of mathematical economics in the USSR. 154   
The split between the Political Economists and the Mathematical Economists 
became further formalized in 1963, when, with the support of Arzoumanian, who by then 
had been promoted to chairman of the freestanding Section on Economics of the Academy 
of Sciences, Nemchinov elevated the status of his laboratory for economic-mathematical 
methods to an independent institute: the Central Economic Mathematical Institute 
(CEMI).155 The ailing Nemchinov appointed Nikolai Fedorenko, a specialist in oil and gas 
economics, as his deputy and anointed successor. This appointment rested less on 
Fedorenko’s distinguishing qualities as an economist than on his political savvy: he would 
be able to defend the institute effectively. Fedorenko proved an extremely effective and, at 
times, ruthless political operator who would assume Arzoumanian’s position as the head 
of the Section on Economics after the latter’s death.156  
While most of his prodigious publishing in the late 1960s and 1970s was 
ghostwritten by his CEMI colleagues, Fedorenko proved a brilliant publicist and organizer. 
Already in 1964 CEMI began formulating a project of moving past the “cost of production” 
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problems that had dominated the debates of the late 1950s, instead insisting that the aim of 
economic theory, and thus economic reform, should be to find “optimal solutions” to the 
organization of industrial practice in an advanced economy.157 Due to this focus, CEMI’s 
solutions were far more hierarchical than those of the Tovarniks or the Cost of Production 
theorists. Fedorenko supported the 1962 proposals of cybernetician Viktor Glushkov to 
create a vast system of computing centers to capture economic data and thus calculate the 
optimal level of wholesale prices in real time. In fact, CEMI was designated as the 
institution that would develop the macroeconomic model that would be used in Glushkov’s 
vast network.158 
Fedorenko’s paradigm-building resulted in CEMI’s signature model: the System of 
an Optimally Functioning Economy (SOFE). The SOFE model, in its late-1960s to mid-
1970s iteration, imagined the economy as a hierarchical system directed by central task at 
its apex. CEMI theorists began their work with four axioms: 1) The economy is made up 
of a set of complex systems; 2) the economy functions in conditions of incomplete 
information; 3) the economy has an inherent macroeconomic goal and limited resources 
with which to achieve it; and 4) the economy is hierarchical. Of the four axioms, the first 
two were shared by all complex economies, socialist or capitalist, while the latter two could 
only apply to socialist economies. SOFE aimed to build a framework in which the socialist 
economy could create a hierarchy of systems, to achieve the “goal,” during conditions of 
scarce resources and incomplete information.159  
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This, of course, reintroduced the problem of demand and the evaluation of values. 
The young Nikolai Petrakov, a future post-Soviet liberal who later in his career critiqued 
early SOFE models, summed up the problem as follows: “how to find the balance between 
the often contradictory demand for consumption and the needs of society as a whole to 
make investments for future growth.” Though they started with Kantorovich’s work, 
CEMI’s SOFE theorists, led by Aron Katsenelinboigen, took a different approach to 
solving the demand problem. Instead of using Kantorovich’s system of shadow prices as 
the determinants of demand, the CEMI team applied Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen’s 
approach to welfare economics (the branch of economics dealing with the macroeconomic 
effects of the microeconomic distribution of resources) to argue that the distribution of 
resources could be arranged top down, with the optimal planner manipulating a few key 
rates as policy levers to make the economy adjust automatically. If this ideal planner had 
the necessary information, he could act as Walras’s auctioneer. Thus, SOFE proposed that 
the state determine the direction of economic development rationally, and use economic 
rather than administrative tools to convince consumers and enterprises to follow along. 
SOFE solved the problem of demand, with its “subjective” multiple preferences, by 
substituting them for one “objective” preference: the state’s.160 Despite Nemchinov’s 1959 
division of labor, SOFE was becoming an alternate framework for understanding the 
elements of political economy that turned the state into large information processor. 
SOFE did not represent the entire field of Mathematical Economics in the USSR. 
CEMI itself was such a large and diverse organization, whose staff often combined 
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sympathies to the Cost of Production and Tovarnik schools with intensive mathematical 
modeling. At Abel Aganbegian’s institute in Novosibirsk, economists employed a far less 
ambitious approach to mathematical modeling through the study of regional development 
in the tradition of Wassily Leontief’s input-output analysis. Indeed, by the late 1960s, 
Novozhilov began to argue that Mathematical Economics had gone too far in ignoring 
“historical and institutional factors.”161 
A Cold War in Economics 
 SOFE’s explicit reference not only to Tinbergen’s work, but also to the fact that the 
Soviet Union’s socialist economy shared at least some features with other, market-based, 
“complex economies,” showed the extent to which economic analysis had begun to blur 
the borders between social systems. In just over a decade, the discipline had moved away 
from Stalin’s axiom that “commodity production” existed in the USSR only because the 
state sector did not (yet) dominate all forms of production, to some members of the 
profession using neo-classical analysis to the production of commodities in the USSR. 
These tensions thrust the debate over value and methodology that had persisted since the 
late 1940s into the terms of the Cold War: the debate touched on the existential question 
of what made the USSR unique vis-à-vis its adversaries.  
  Conservatives had begun grumbling over the currents of economic thought entering 
from Eastern Europe and the West as early as 1957. However, the rise of Mathematical 
Economics upped the ante. In 1960, a group of economists from the Institute of Economics, 
including Gatovsky, wrote a long letter to Suslov. The concerned conservatives argued that 
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Kantorovich’s work posed a threat to the USSR’s position in the Cold War. With the 
publication of this work, Kantorovich not only displayed a dangerous “anti-Marxist 
relativism” (by replacing Marx’s concept of the labor theory of value with valuation based 
on measures of scarcity), but also was “lowering the prestige of Soviet science around the 
world,” as the Western press pointed to Kantorovich’s work as proof that the USSR was 
moving toward the acceptance of neoclassical economic models and thus would soon 
abandon state socialism. The letter demonstrated how porous the intellectual world of 
Soviet economics had become: Western press coverage was driving traditionalists to 
classify Kantorovich and his followers as “capitalists.” The authors of the letter did not 
stop with Kantorovich; they also decried the influence of East European economists, noting 
that “it was only recently in 1957 and 1958 that Soviet economists had lent a helping hand 
to their colleagues in the GDR, Poland, and Hungary to correct ideological mistakes.” Yet 
in 1960, they lamented, Oscar Lange’s work was read across economics departments, 
spreading the notion that capitalist and socialist economies could be analyzed with the same 
set of mathematical tools, distorting the “class and party basis of economics as a historical 
science.”162  The memo was published in modified form as a Kommunist article in 1961, 
sparking a reaction among defenders of mathematical economics. Kantorovich and his 
supporters attacked Political Economists such as Gatovsky and Kronrod for failing to 
contribute to Soviet development and instead just parroting old positions and thus 
jeopardizing the “practical work” being done in mathematical economics.163 This new 
cohort, often trained in mathematics instead of economics, argued that economic 
calculation could be used to find a more objective basis for state action. Proponents of 
                                                
162  RGANI f. 5 op. 55 d. 133 ll. 130-155.  
163 “Letters to the Central Committee” in Leonid Kantorovich: chelovek i pesaniia, 189-211.  
	 94	
 
mathematical economics were not disturbed by the insinuations of treason leveled against 
them: they believed that their methods would not subvert the Soviet project, but rather help 
it develop to its full potential. Engagement with Western science was just part of this effort. 
The arguments between Mathematical Economists and their opponents 
demonstrated how the crucible of the Cold War had changed the terms of Soviet 
economics. Whereas in 1947, the debate over inferential statistics and Novozhilov’s work 
had been largely cast in domestic ideological terms, the controversy of the early 1960s 
played out in reference to an “international public sphere” of scientific exchange and 
prestige. Indeed, by 1962, Arzoumanian, who supported mathematical methods, petitioned 
the Central Committee to translate Paul Samuelson’s textbook, Economics: An 
Introduction, into Russian. Arzoumanian argued that Samuelson’s influence on the 
Kennedy administration meant that the book “could become a critical part of any scientific 
library in the USSR, if published with care.” The book would “supply ideological cadres 
and Political Economists with a primary source that described the leading system of 
thought amongst bourgeois economic theorists,” allowing the USSR to advance its 
criticism of Western economics in international forums by addressing the latest forms of 
contemporary, Keynesian economics, rather than making the same tired abstract attacks on 
Capitalism. However, Arzoumanian wanted Samuelson translated into Russian for other 
reasons. Despite its ideological distortions, if given a proper preface, the textbook could 
help introduce Soviet practitioners to “a variety of important mathematical methods.”164  
Thus to its supporters, the adoption of mathematical economics did not represent a 
Cold War surrender, but served as a practical tool to advance the main task of the economy. 
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Arzoumanian made this clear in an undated note to Khrushchev from some time in the mid-
1960s. He complained that Stalin’s legacy had “torn economics away from practical work” 
and the “needs of economic planning and management.” This left the USSR catching up to 
the United States in the employment of economists in enterprises and conglomerates with 
dire consequences for efficiency. While economics had made strides to overcome Stalin’s 
distortions, there were still not enough cadres with the post-graduate and practical training 
needed to guide the Soviet economy. These deficiencies meant that most Soviet 
organizations were still run by engineers focused on output rather than on economic 
efficiency. Arzoumanian proposed not only expanding “practical training” but also 
establishing an official “scientific council of economic advisors” to accelerate the 
implementation of economic policy necessary to build Communism and win the 
competition between the two systems.165  
In 1964, Novozhilov, Kantorovich, and Nemchinov (posthumously) were awarded 
the Lenin Prize, the Soviet Union’s highest civilian honor, for their contribution to the 
establishment of Mathematical Economics in the USSR. Mathematical Economics had 
officially earned state approval. Not everyone agreed with these. A group from the Institute 
of Economics expressed their disdain that Kantorovich was awarded the Lenin Prize at the 
same time he was being lauded in the Western press for bringing Soviet economics in line 
with its Western counterparts.166   
One of the fiercest opponents of the new mathematical trend was Yakov Kronrod. 
The economist accused of economic heresy in 1955 was now making common cause with 
his former attackers, such as Gatovsky. At a January 1965 meeting of the Section on 
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Economics to discuss the joint Lenin Prize, Kronrod expressed his grave disappointment 
that the late Nemchinov, whose own approach to economics was far more conservative 
than Kantorovich’s or Novozhilov, was awarded the prize jointly with his Leningrad 
colleagues. This claim initiated a shouting match with Fedorenko. Kronrod goaded 
Fedorenko, exclaiming that despite belonging to those that the new generation labeled “not 
mathematically literate,” he could easily see that Kantorovich was dancing around the issue 
of the labor theory of value. Kronrod then made another claim; the neo-classical 
assumptions of Kantorovich and his followers made them jump from a theory of value to 
a theory “optimal prices” without taking into account the problem of “reproduction,” or 
circulation of capital in an economy.167 Kronrod would later write that conflating price and 
value without taking account of monetary circulation meant accepting the conclusions of 
“the Austrian school.”168 Kronrod was no simple reactionary: he was presenting a critique 
of moneyless econometric analysis that post-Keynesians and, to an extent, monetarists in 
American academia, would make during the late 1970s. For Kronrod, such a schema could 
not serve as the basis of economic reform as it papered over the vital matter of 
institutions.169   
 
Conclusion: What Was Reformist Economics in the Khrushchev Era?  
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 Intellectual historians of “the thaw,” such as Vladislav Zubok and Slava Gerovitch, 
have characterized economic reformists as technical or cybernetic utopians.170 This claim 
has merit: certainly the “cyberspeak” both authors identify appeared in the dreams of 
CEMI’s optimal planners and others. However, the focus on cybernetics and on “Zhivago’s 
children” has obscured the fact that reformist economics was an incredibly intellectually 
diverse movement with roots in multiple intellectual and political contexts. While they 
often agreed on certain policy prescriptions, the schools of Soviet economics competed 
fiercely over issues of principle. Understanding how these economic doctrines played out 
and evolved within the context of Cold War state-building accords us a better 
understanding of how each of these groups would approach the problem of turning theory 
into economic practice and, as we shall see, what opportunities they would have.  
Comparing these various approaches, one can observe a strange continuum. On one 
end, the Tovarniki—steeped in the traditions of Marxism—had the least hierarchical vision 
of a reformed economy and tended towards market socialism. On the other end, the 
Mathematical Economists—especially CEMI’s Optimal Planners—the most 
internationalized of the schools, were also the most hierarchical. This presents an 
interesting parallel with scholarship on American Cold War economics, which has noted 
that practitioners most invested in the Cold War state saw their work as part of rationalizing 
the American state in an era of thermonuclear war and existential, ideological 
competition.171 Furthermore, such a continuum helps us begin to understand how these 
intellectual groups began to put down roots and create institutional bases whose practices 
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would reflect their particular understanding of the Soviet state’s economic development, 
its ideology, and its place in the larger world.  
These cleavages aside, by the late 1960s, a certain consensus-based reform program 
began to emerge; even the most conservative economists began to agree on the increased 
use of profitability in enterprises’ plan targets, a reform of wholesale prices, and more 
aggressive uses of bonuses and wage incentives. However, details of this policy’s 
implementation remained to be determined; no one yet knew which institutions would 
benefit most. Nor, most importantly, was there yet political support from those in power to 





From the Political Economy of Socialism to Economic Policy-Making: Khrushchev’s 
Balance Sheet Recession and the Domestic Deployment of Economic Thought, 1957-
1964  
The United States Congress was worried. A report presented by the staff experts of 
the Joint Economic Committee said that the US would soon be in danger of eclipse by a 
military and economic rival that, despite a still yawning margin between it and the United 
States, was experiencing remarkable rates of growth. This rival’s statistical data was not to 
be trusted but was rapidly improving in the quality of its reporting, only exacerbating the 
concerns of the report’s authors.172 To today’s reader, this fear echoes the alarmist reporting 
on China often found in the press. However, the report to Congress was written about the 
Soviet Union in 1957. Another report, issued by the National Planning Association in 1959, 
warned that the USSR would soon be able to spend more on building its national economy 
than the United States and would take Canada’s place as the world’s main exporter of 
wood, pulp, and paper goods.173  
Like contemporary China (especially in the period after 2007 when income from 
exports began to fall in relative terms), the USSR’s rapid growth was driven by massive 
state investments generated at the expense of its own population’s nominal financial 
position (while creating very significant short term gains due to a low base) and 
accompanied by a huge extension of internal debt on the balance sheets of enterprises and 
by extension local and central state budgets. This chapter will argue that it was these 
dynamics that drove the debate about economic reform from the pages of obscure, 
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specialist journals such as Questions of Economics onto the front pages of mass 
publications such as Pravda, and thus, into political discourses around which party factions 
organized. In fact, it will show that deepening mismatches on the Soviet balance sheet 
drove state officials away from the model of mobilization that anchored the coalition 
Khrushchev assembled in 1954.  This deepening fiscal crisis opened the room for a variety 
of interest groups to rally around different, more technocratic, visions of economic 
governance.  
By the end of 1963, discontent with the course of the Soviet economy’s ability to 
deliever on Khrushchev’s ambitious promises contributed to clear political divisions in 
both academic economics and the apparat. Bureaucrats in the ministries and the central 
planning agencies yearned to see central control restored to the Soviet economy, after 
Khrushchev’s decentralization. Within economics, the various camps outlined in Chapter 
1—the labor value Tovarniks, the cost of production school, and the mathematical 
economists—began to formalize their debates not just as a scholarly matter with political 
overtones but as policy positions advocated in the popular press and in policy making 
bodies. Various intellectual groupings and political factions rallied around economic ideas 
to form institutions within the party-state that could serve as bases for policymaking and 
political discussion. Such groupings testify to the fact that Khrushchev’s dual strategy of 
increased central state investments into capital projects and using mobilization as a form 
of management by driving enterprise directros to deliver more and more output was not 
just creating economic difficulties but also breeding political tensions in a party-state that 
ostensibly could not have any. The fact that the Soviet Union was designed along Lenin 
and Kautsky’s vision of the state and its economy as “one big factory,” meant that there 
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was no way to separate the economic problems of falling output and high levels of intra-
institutional debt from more fundamental, political questions of the organization and 
legitimacy of the state.174  
To tell the story of how economics was deployed in domestic, rather than academic 
politics, through what was essentially a fiscal crisis, it is necessary to outline the connection 
between debt, balance sheets and economic growth. As with the American fear of the 
USSR’s economic potential, the contemporary literature on predominantly East Asian, 
export-led, “tiger economies” is a useful starting place to build a generalized theoretical 
approach to the Soviet economy, and particularly the ties between its fiscal/financial 
system, the real-side economy, and political institutions. Like the “tigers,” the USSR was 
a backward economy that experienced rapid growth through “financial (and real) 
repression”— a term used by economists to describe  holding down the purchasing power 
of its population compared to its productivity to fund investments into industrial 
infrastructure.175 In Marxian terms, exports and collectivization served as the engines of 
“primitive capital accumulation” that was necessary for a “backward” economy to 
transition between labor intensive production, associated with a large rural population, to 
more capital intensive production and an urbanized society.176   
The term “middle-income trap” was popularized by Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun 
Park, and Kwanho Shin in a series of publications between 2011 and 2013 historicizing the 
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growth strategy of the “East Asian Tigers” and China. The team’s survey of growth rates 
and slowdowns from 1945 onward found that there was a statistically significant 
correlation between a slowdown in growth in countries with rapid “catch-up growth” and 
the moment such a country’s per-capita income reached around $17,000 in 2005 trade-
adjusted, on-shore US dollars. Such a slowdown in growth rates and an increase in per 
capita income also corresponds to the moment at which a country reaches about 57% of 
the “technological frontier” (or the global average capital-labor substitution ratio) and must 
switch from labor- to capital-intensive production to maintain a steady rate of growth. This 
is not so difficult for very small, densely populated, and open economies, such as Singapore 
and Israel, which can continue to export their way out of a slowdown without distorting 
their trading partners’ own economies. The population profiles of such economies also 
mean that they receive the maximum “bang for the buck” for investments in education.177 
Furthermore, Eichengreen, Park and Shin found that slowdowns do not happen in “big 
bangs” but rather that that they are gradual, often with two distinct peaks as the export-led 
“capital accumulation” stage is replaced by the greater use of private debt to maintain 
growth.178 
 The implications of Eichengreen, Park, and Shin present us with a useful 
framework for thinking about the long-run history of Soviet economic growth. The USSR 
was able to use its excess, underproductive, agriculturally employed labor to achieve huge 
growth rates but eventually hit a point of diminishing returns sometime in the early 1960s 
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and then had to rely on its central state balance sheet to generate sources for investment—
in other words, debt. These conclusions are similar to those drawn by Martin Weitzman in 
1970 and updated by William Easterly and Stanley Fisher in 1995 based on new, Republic 
level micro-data.179 This narrative has been criticized by Robert Allen, who claims that the 
Soviet model of growth (first presented in 1928 by G.A. Feldman)— the idea that 
investments in heavy industry, or what Soviet planners understood as “the means of 
production,” would eventually lead to growth in consumer spending and the quality of 
life—was fundamentally sound. Allen’s critique rests on the fact that when brought into 
comparison with other states that adapted a rapid, investment-heavy industrialization—
Japan in particular—there is nothing inevitable about the Soviet Union’s eventual low rate 
of capital-labor substitution. Rather, Allen suggests that the drop in Soviet economic 
performance was caused by misallocation of resources into upgrading old factories and 
into Siberian gas.180 There is something to Allen’s critique: other investment-led 
economies indeed achieved greater capital-labor elasticities than the USSR, which implies 
that a solution to the puzzle of Soviet growth has something to do with the preferences of 
central planners. Yet Allen’s account is hindered by the fact that his comparative case, 
Japan, suffered two decades of lost growth, with falling capital-labor substitution ratios, 
whose magnitude has only been softened by its extensive social welfare system, relatively 
small, concentrated, wealthy population, and flexible legislative institutions. While the 
USSR had an extensive welfare system, benefits were mostly issued at the enterprise level, 
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which meant that falling rates of economic growth could not be offset by the state’s 
increased, countercyclical investments, placing the onus of funding low productivity on the 
firm itself. Indeed, without a private sector, countercyclical spending by a welfare system 
has no effect as spending from the government’s budget would not create room for 
deleveraging by other, independent, balance sheets.  
 However, Japan’s economic history, the economic bogeyman that followed the 
USSR and preceded China in the American imagination, might give us some clues for a 
theoretical framework within which to understand Soviet economic history. Richard Koo’s 
Balance Sheet Recession shows that it was the investment-led strategy of growth that 
eventually burdened Japanese firms with credit buildups that made them maximize debt 
repayments rather than profitability. Koo thus encourages us to prioritize the financial side, 
balance-sheet structure dynamics of an economy in which “one asset is implicitly another 
person’s liability” as a cash inflow to one agent’s balance sheet must be accompanied by a 
cash outflow from another’s. This lets us conceptualize economic resources not just as a 
set of investible funds on the asset side of the ledger leading to continuous long-run growth, 
as postulated in the neo-classical growth model that underpins the studies described above, 
but also to introduce the long run impact of debts on the liability side of the ledger.181  
A similar point was made by the legendary economist and ally of John Maynard 
Keynes, Michal Kalecki, in a critique of the planning authorities of his native Poland.182 
The problem with Soviet-inspired planning practices, Kalecki explained, was that they did 
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not offset each increase in investment made at the expense of the consumer with a 
subsequent increase in consumption in the future.  This would cause a long term slow-
down in growth as aggregate demand for goods would no longer drive profits back into the 
state’s investment funds, causing a buildup of debt to the consumer sector as expressed in 
ever increasing holdings of cash by workers in their capacity as consumers. Kalecki 
understood that without consumption, the investments made by the state would just turn 
into the state’s de facto debt to the goods-starved, cash-rich consumer sector which would, 
in turn, slow the rate of returns on capital and thus lower the rate of real economic growth 
in the medium and long runs.183  
To make it clearer, differences among the above theorists stem from their 
assumptions. Eichengreen et al., Easterly and Fisher, and Allen, despite their differences, 
make the neo-classical assumption that, in the long run, the supply of savings will always 
translate into demand for investment.184 This means that the source of economic growth is 
the stock of assets—or their net sum versus liabilities. Thus, even Allen, who is sympathetic 
to the Soviet experience, argues that its main problem was the mismanagement of assets. 
This argument mirrors a teleological story told as far back as Hayek’s entry in the “Socialist 
Calculation Debate” which explains that a central planner does not have the total 
knowledge (or information) to invest effectively and would thus fall victim to exogenous 
political problems. On the other hand, Kaleckian economics (including Koo as a reader of 
Kalecki), like its Keynesian sibling, is interested in showing that the equivalence between 
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savings and investment is, at best, a very particular equilibrium solution to a system with 
many unsteady states. To understand such a complex system, Kalecki and his followers 
focus on both stocks and inter-temporal flows— or the ability of an entity to balance its 
asset inflows and liability outflows over time in gross terms. The Kaleckian world places 
private or institutional debt at the center of growth. In contemporary financial practice, this 
is the ability of an entity to roll-over its financing to “live to fight another day.” This means 
that Kaleckian economics is inherently contingent and is thus a natural ally of the historian 
interested in changes over time in economic policies and their consequences.  
Soviet-style planning did the exact opposite of what Kalecki advised. In keeping 
with G.A. Feldman’s 1928, classically founded model, it assumed that increases in 
investments in the heavy industrial sector would lead to a lagged increase in consumption 
through technological development and increased output.185 The problem was that even if 
that were true in the short run, the lack of a mechanism to assess consumer demand would 
always lead to investment cycles that could not then be “deleveraged,” or rebalanced, 
through consumer spending. This problem was picked up by Yulia Vymyatnina and 
Mikhail Pakhnin who, in a 2014 paper, argue that the Soviet economy was prone to cycles 
of over-investment that paralleled those identified by Hyman Minsky (himself a reader of 
Kalecki) in a capitalist economy. In a state-driven economy, institutional interests rather 
than the profit motive drives investment decisions.186 Thus, a serious consideration of how 
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investment cycles operated under the Soviet economy necessarily means a study of how 
various interest groups fought over the direction of the Soviet economy.  
 Using this theoretical base, this chapter will ask how the expansion of investment 
associated with the Sixth Five-Year and Seven-Year plans slowly built a need to create a 
new way of administering the economy as the return on the state’s central investments fell. 
It will tie the increasingly complex dilemmas of the Soviet fiscal state to a gradual move 
on the part of many members of the Soviet elite to advocating economic over 
administrative reform. I define administrative reform as a change in the administration of 
economic resources, and investments in particular, without a fundamental change in their 
distribution, and economic reform as a quantitative or qualitative change in the way that 
these resources are used and issued.  In the final years of Khrushchev’s reign, his preference 
for administration and mobilization began to compete with an agenda based on improving 
the economic rationality of the Soviet system through structural changes in investment. It 
was this process that caused the academic divisions discussed in the first chapter to become 
explicitly political ones associated with specific policy agendas.  
 
Mobilizing Capital: The “Honest Plan” and State Investment-Driven Socialism  
  
 What kind of economy did Stalin’s successors inherit? A September 1953 report 
from Gosplan to Khrushchev and Malenkov did not offer good news about the results of 
Soviet post-war planning. While “production in the first quarter of 1953 was up, compared 
to the first quarter of 1952,” a variety of “vital goods” ranging from paper to pipes had 
been under-produced, resulting in missed deliveries to many key sectors of the economy. 
In addition to the failure to meet output targets, average labor productivity had increased 
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over the previous period by 5% while fulfilling the overall five-year plan required an 
annual increase of 8.5%. The same was true for the cost of goods produced [sebestoimost] 
which had fallen only 3.9% whereas the plan had envisioned a decrease of 4.5%. The report 
placed the blame for the situation at the feet of industrial management cadres, explaining 
that despite the resolutions of the XVIII and XIX Party Congresses to eliminate the 
“storming practices” that led to a “lack of planning,” “many enterprise managers have not 
taken the necessary steps to eliminate ‘un-rhythmic’ production.” Underperforming 
enterprises continued to function in many branches of industry and had increased their 
proportion in the metallurgical and coal mining sectors. The construction of new plants and 
housing was in an especially dire state, with many ministries not able to deliver necessary 
equipment and technical documentation in time, causing projects to roll over into the next 
budget period and centrally issued state funds to be hoarded and wasted.187 
 Something needed to be done. As already discussed in chapter 1, Khrushchev’s 
solution to the economic problems facing the USSR in the mid-1950s relied on a 
combination of administrative reform, mobilization and large increases in centralized state 
investments. Sergei Khrushchev recalled that his father dreamed of an “honest plan”: one 
that would not have to be constantly corrected and re-written and reflected the real 
possibilities of the Soviet economy. To the elder Khrushchev, the horizons for economic 
development in the USSR were unlimited and only held back by bureaucratic over-
centralization and lazy cadres whose elimination would lead to genuine planning and 
economic democracy. There was no fundamental issue with the Soviet economic model 
and the way it distributed central funds; the problem lay in its execution—in 
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administration. Khrushchev also believed that the ministries in Moscow had little 
information about what was going on at the plant level and that inter-ministry competition 
led to overly-redundant production. Thus, better management through the mobilization of 
managing cadres achieved by administrative reform—not planning changes or economic 
reform—was at the core of Khrushchev’s economic worldview.188 
 The administrative reforms began shortly after Stalin’s death. In 1953, an effort to 
consolidate Republic-level production ministries began and almost immediately ran into 
trouble. Republican governments did not have guidance as to how to reassign their 
personnel, resulting in the replication of many of the duties. Officials temporarily removed 
from their posts also required severance payments necessitating more money from central 
funds to be spent to fund the idle cadres. A newly created Ministry of Automobile and 
Road Transport was organized and quickly ran into the problem that its existence was not 
foreseen by the annual plan for 1954 and thus it lacked access to cars and buses: again, 
more funds needed to be issued.189  
 In May 1955, following a conference on technical progress organized by 
Khrushchev,190 a second major reform was undertaken. Gosplan was split into two parts. 
A new organization, confusingly given the old name Gosplan, was established to develop 
Five-Year Plans. The old body was renamed “The State Economic Commission of the 
Council of Ministers for Ongoing Plans,” or Gosekonkomissiia for short, and given 
responsibility for annual and continuous planning. Splitting Gosplan into two would help 
create more regularity in management and allow the state to focus on Khrushchev’s dream 
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of continual growth through “technical progress” instead of Malenkov’s proposal of 
boosting investment in consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry.191 Nikolai 
Baibakov, the Minister of the Oil Industry, was promoted to head the new Gosplan. The 
person most shocked by Baibakov’s appointment was Baibakov himself, who recalled that 
when told of the appointment he recoiled at the idea due to his “complete lack of experience 
in planning.” Baibakov recalled that the Soviet leader convinced him to take the post by 
arguing that what was important was not his technical knowledge of planning and 
economics but rather his proven leadership of the oil ministry—which he had mobilized 
with great success in the Second World War.192  
 The second component of Khrushchev’s plan to accelerate growth in the USSR was 
an increase in “capital investments” in the “means of production.” In Soviet parlance, this 
meant the construction of new plants, the installation of new equipment in existing 
enterprises or in research projects. These expenditures came from the Fond Nakoplenia, 
the part of the state budget (the yearly income of the state) dedicated to the expansion of 
fixed capital and new construction. The state recouped its investment through the turnover 
tax paid on goods by the consumer or the receiving party of wholesale goods. According 
to the ideological orthodoxy, while the Capitalist economy suffered from an endemic 
tendency toward a lower return on capital, the Socialist, planned economy would not suffer 
this problem because it could make unprofitable investments based on scientific planning 
(planomernost). This meant that instead of charging interest on lent funds (giving capital a 
cost), a practice associated with Capitalism, the state would recoup its investment through 
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the continual expansion of the economy generated by the ever-growing productivity of 
labor (a view consistent with the labor theory of value). The turnover tax was justified as a 
practical expression of this theoretical postulate: it was a markup on the price of goods that 
theoretically corresponded to the surplus, or capitalist profit, M of Marx’s C+V+M 
formula.193  
 Between 1954 and 1961 Khrushchev advocated massive increases in capital 
investments from the state budget. Indeed, one of the major objections to the “Virgin 
Lands” initiative was how to find the sources for the large investments necessary to fund 
the improvement of the nutrient-poor, steppe soil. A Ministry of Finance report noted that 
adopting the program would cause budget overruns of 1.2 billion rubles just in the cost of 
wages and travel expenses for the 1954 fiscal year. These wage overruns, combined with 
the higher prices being paid for agricultural deliveries, meant that the population would 
have more cash-in-hand than had been predicted by the fiscal plan, meaning more goods 
would have to be added to market for the new demand to be satiated and the tax base (which 
was largely comprised of a turnover tax on goods sold) maintained. The report concluded 
that, because of this feedback loop, the USSR had to match its investments in agriculture, 
agricultural equipment and heavy industry with an increase of 2 billion rubles in the 
provision of marketable goods and would be required to sell 60-70 tons of gold from its 
reserves to facilitate 3 billion rubles of imports.194  
 The report illustrated the dilemma that the Soviet system of financing production 
created. As Kalecki pointed out, without adjusting the expansion of state investment in 
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production to a concurrent expansion in consumption, the state would, in effect, go into 
debt to its own population through the increased holding of unspent cash in the hands of 
the consumer.  In a capitalist economy, the existence of an extensive private sector, and of 
a private banking system —which can issue credit-based means of payment, or essentially 
privately issued cash substitutes—in particular, makes such an expansion of investment 
easier to implement by having investments from the state create future expectations of 
increased spending, thereby incentivizing private enterprises to hire, banks to expand 
balance sheets, and consumers to spend: Keynes’ “Animal Spirits.” Yet the Soviet 
economy, organized on the Lenin-Kautsky ideal of the economy as “one big factory” with 
the central state issuing orders to its various “shops,” had neither a way of insulating the 
state budget from its enterprises’ budget nor a way to translate the demand from the 
consumer sector into incentives to produce consumer goods. In effect then, the USSR’s 
consumer base would stockpile cash it could not spend on goods, which is implicitly a 
claim against the state. Today, economists call this phenomenon “financial repression.” 
Under a financially repressed economy, the state restrains the available investment 
alternatives for its population in order to channel funds toward the budget or privileged 
industries—usually to fund export-driven growth.195 Yet, with a relatively closed economy, 
the USSR could not export its demand as, for example, the East Asian Tiger economies 
did. Initially, this was not a problem as the low industrial base of the Soviet Union made 
practically any investment in heavy industry yield returns. However, as the Ministry of 
Finance report pointed out, to achieve continual returns, the state had to keep money 
flowing back into the state budget. For Malenkov, this dilemma meant that the USSR 
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would have to reallocate investment in consumer goods to take advantage of untapped 
domestic demand while simultaneously decreasing unprofitable, loss-leading, investments 
in heavy industry to rebalance the economy away from investment-driven growth. This 
meant ending the implicit subsidy the Soviet consumer paid to the heavy industrial sector 
through forced savings. For Khrushchev, future growth would come from “technical 
progress,” the advance and integration of science into production, that would create an 
ever-expanding horizon for economic growth and new investment opportunities. As 
described in chapter 1, Khrushchev’s vision won the political struggle by mobilizing the 
key interest groups in the Communist party behind it.  
 To make this dream a reality, the Sixth Five-Year Plan, launched in December 
1956, would be an “honest plan” unencumbered by the storming, mismanagement, and 
unrealistic expectations characteristic of the previous plans. The term “honesty” was 
telling: for Khrushchev, these symptoms were not inherent in the Soviet system but rather 
a result of the perversion of the pure Communist spirit. Khrushchev’s plan would see a new 
era of the Soviet economy that was accompanied by massive increases in capital 
investments.196 At the XXth Party Congress, Khrushchev promised increases in the gross 
amount of capital investments and indeed between 1956 and 1959, capital investment 
increased by 25,453 million rubles, exceeding the entirety of the previous five-year plan’s 
investments within three years.197 As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, the Sixth Five-Year Plan 
featured a rate of capital investment twice that of the plan that preceded it.  
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Source: Narodnaia Khozaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu (Moscow: Gospolitzdat, 1960)198	
 
The scope of the plan’s ambitions was evident in the Central Committee’s response 
to the proposal of the Gosekonkomissiia’s 1957 yearly capital investment plan. The Central 
Committee, dominated by Khrushchev’s allies, proposed adding 300 million rubles in new 
spending to upgrade metallurgical plants to more specialized production and to increase 
spending on the chemical industry to 670 million rubles versus the planned 330 million 
rubles. Overall, the Central Committee criticized the spending plan for being unresponsive 
to the goals set out at the XXth Party congress and advocated an increase of 8,100 billion 
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rubles in spending over the initial proposals for the Five-Year Plan presented by the state 
apparatus.199    
 Yet if the new plan would boost investment, its “honesty” would come from a new 
focus on using capital investments effectively— to mobilize Party cadres to not waste the 
state’s money. At the XXth Party Congress, Khrushchev emphasized that better 
management would allow enterprises to “increase their output” without many new 
investments if their staffs exercised “vigilance” over their use of investment funds. In 
Sergei Khrushchev’s recollections, his father was convinced that regional Party leaders, 
“like he had been himself,” knew how to use their resources better than the ministries in 
the center and were the key to maintaining the plan’s “honesty” if they were given the 
opportunity to display their Communist spirit.200  
 Khrushchev’s beliefs were the basis for his signature reform in economic 
management—the “Sovnarkhoz” reform of 1957, which abolished the central production 
ministries and replaced them with local economic councils or “Sovnarkhozes.” The 
councils were supposed to be coordinated at the center by a “Supreme Council of National 
Economy.” Gosplan and the Gosekonkommissia retained their roles in formulating the 
Five-Year Plan and the yearly plans respectively. Khrushchev’s proposals were outlined in 
a January 1957 note entitled “Some Thoughts on Improving the Management of Production 
and Construction.” The note explained that the first steps of management reform had been 
accomplished in 1955 with the reorganization of planning agencies but that this was only 
a “surface level change that did not involve any real production.” Over-centralization was 
causing the Soviet economy to be divided along ministerial lines, resulting in redundancies 
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and clannish behavior. The note explained that “talented people with good education and 
advanced skills [were] kept away from practical work,” staying in the central ministries in 
Moscow instead of being sent back to the factories and shops “that had nurtured them in 
the first place.” Khrushchev also blamed the slow pace of implementing the XXth Party’s 
commitment to radically increasing production and investment on the bad habits of the 
ministries. He justifiably complained that ministries “pil[ed] onto the Central Committee 
and the Council of Ministers [asking] for more investment every time a new plan was being 
proposed.” Finally, Khrushchev argued for establishing a State Commission on Science 
and Technology (the GKNT created later that year) to coordinate the introduction of new 
productive techniques across the regional councils and thus coordinate “technical 
progress.”201 
 Yet if Khrushchev’s January note provided the overview for his new administrative 
vision, it had very few details for how to turn it into a reality. This became obvious when 
the project was discussed at a meeting of a special commission of the Central Committee 
in February 1957. Certain members of the commission, such as Nuritdin Mukhitdinov and 
Alexander Zasiadko, insisted that the USSR’s territorial divisions were not a good basis 
for economic districts. Khrushchev dismissed these concerns, stating that, while “certain 
corrections might have to be made,” the complexity of such a reorganization would take 
away from the reform’s momentum.202 Another concern was raised by Alexei Kosygin. 
Kosygin, a former protégé of executed Gosplan chief Voznesensky and a longtime 
industrial official, insisted that the problem of the Soviet economy lay not in its 
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organization, but rather, in its “extremely low level of planning” which resulted in “huge 
losses to the economy.” The reason for this, Kosygin explained, was that there was “no 
serious economic work being done in the Gosekonkommissia.” The directives of the XXth 
Party Congress were being implemented in an unsatisfactory matter, with major unresolved 
“disproportions” within the energy, metallurgical and transportation sectors. The yearly 
plans were too rigid to properly distribute financial resources to new construction sites and 
investment projects. This led to badly designed targets and a generally slow pace of 
construction. Kosygin proposed that yearly plans be scrapped and more flexible “two year 
plans” be introduced in which capital expenditures could be judged by their returns over 
longer periods rather than rolled over year to year. Here, Khrushchev seemed taken aback, 
responding that “he had thought a lot about planning” and conceded that Kosygin was right 
about the need to reform the ways in which the timeframes for capital investments were 
set. Kosygin’s points were seconded by other agency heads, including Gosplan’s Baibakov 
and the Finance Minister Nikolai Zverev.203  
Kosygin’s speech at the meeting triggered a ministerial resistance to Khrushchev’s 
project. The most aggressive of these was Minister of Heavy Metallurgy, Alexander 
Sheremetiev, who insisted that Khrushchev’s plan would not only have disastrous 
economic effects but also threaten Soviet national security by lowering the center’s ability 
to coordinate the defense industry. In his concluding speech, Khrushchev ridiculed 
Sheremetiev by exclaiming that “in 1955 we had a little experiment; we sent Minister 
Matchkevitch to the United States and Minister Benadictov to England and no one noticed. 
Let’s send comrade Shermetiev anywhere he wants and show that nothing will change in 
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metallurgy.” Indeed, Shermetiev was soon shuffled off to the State Commission on Foreign 
Trade while Baibakov was dismissed from Gosplan and replaced by Iosif Kuzmin—one of 
the speakers at the meeting who led the charge in supporting Khrushchev’s plan.204 
 
Capital Returns: Laying the Institutional Foundations for Economic Reform 1957-
1960   
 
 In 1960, a special investigative team from the Central Committee arrived in Ryazan 
province to examine what was going on with cattle deliveries. A year earlier the province’s 
party boss, Aleksei Larionov, had promised to triple the region’s meat production. Despite 
reticence from his aides, Khrushchev seemed taken with the young, ambitious local party 
organizer—perhaps recognizing in Larionov all the qualities he himself wished to project. 
By the end of the year, Larionov had been awarded the title “Hero of Socialist Labor.” Yet, 
all was not well in Ryazan. To meet his lofty goals, Larionov had to resort to some truly 
absurd acts of fraud. At collective farms, all cattle—including breeding stock and dairy 
cows—were slaughtered. When this wasn’t enough, agents moved to purchase cattle from 
other provinces and marched them across provincial boundaries to create the illusion of 
livestock being sent outward. Taxes payable in meat were levied on individuals and 
institutions, causing Ryazan’s residents to go to state stores to purchase meat to hand it 
back to the state. Despite all this, the province delivered just one-sixth of its promised 
goods. After an investigation was announced, Larionov shot himself.205  
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The “Ryazan Incident” was more than a display of Khrushchev’s hubris or yet 
another example of the USSR’s unrealistic goals: it reflected both the systematic inability 
of the Soviet state to regulate its economic activity and the perverse incentives that came 
with the Soviet growth strategy and the Sovnarkhoz reforms. Overcoming these problems 
would stimulate the emergence of political groupings with competing plans for reforming 
the Soviet economy. As the Sovnarkhoz reform was implemented, and capital investments 
were ramped up in the Sixth Five-Year Plan—and later the “Seven-Year Plan”— problems 
like those in Ryazan forced discussions about not only how to restructure the planning 
institutions but the economics of planning itself.  
 At the heart of Kosygin’s 1957 comments was the problem of planning capital 
investments over the life of a long-term project. Even if enterprises used their budget 
allocations effectively, planning over the course of a year with no information about a 
longer horizon made any kind of long-term capital planning difficult. This insight was 
particularly important as allocations from the central budget for major new construction 
projects increased. The quest to “catch up and overtake the United States” meant that 
investments in the building of new chemical processing plants, oil extraction sites, housing 
and agriculture grew in the 1956-1960 Five-Year Plan and increased even further in the 
1959-1965 Seven-Year Plan that replaced it.206  
 Khrushchev’s note on Sovnarkhozy did not exclude the establishment of new 
central regulations. In fact, Khrushchev explicitly proposed organizing a parallel body to 
Gosplan that would be responsible for the implementation of technical upgrades and 
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scientific advances in industry. The State Commission on Science and Technology 
(GKNT) was formally established in 1957, on the foundations of the State Technological 
Commission, a smaller body with a much more limited jurisdiction. Its purview was 
upgraded to reviewing five-year plans issued by Gosplan, and yearly plans issued by 
Gosekonkomissiia and issuing its own parallel “technological plans.”  The GKNT was 
explicitly given the mandate of reviewing both domestic and international technological 
advances and “productive techniques.” In fact, it was explicitly charged with taking 
information from the “technical-informational bodies of the UN” and the State 
Commission on International Economic Cooperation and “propagandizing” them 
throughout the USSR. An important part of this new body’s responsibilities would be to 
issue guidelines on capital investments in upgrading technology and equipment used in 
production.207 Indeed, the GKNT would very quickly become involved in importing 
Western management techniques as part of its mission of raising productivity. Another new 
body established in the wake of the Sovnarkhoz reforms was the State Economic Advisory 
Commission [Gosudarstvennyi Ekonomicheskii Sovet] or Gosekonomsovet. The 
commission was meant to be a coordinating body for economic information and hired many 
of the leading economic thinkers in the USSR including L.A. Vaag . These bodies would 
become key nodes in the discussion of economic reform in the USSR.208  
 The problem of capital investments and their planning almost immediately became 
a matter of discussion amongst Soviet technical experts in the wake of the Sovnarkhoz 
reforms as the problem of implementing Khrushchev’s vision arose. V. Cheriabinsky, the 
head of the Economics Department of the State Institute for the Planning of Metallurgical 
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Factories, wrote to A.B. Aristov, the powerful First Secretary in charge of industry, about 
the need to introduce a measurement of return on capital into the planning of new 
construction. The letter echoed Kosygin’s concerns, arguing that the planning of new 
investments should be no longer be done on a yearly or even rolling basis but on a multi-
year program. Cheriabinsky went further, arguing that instead of the yearly schema of 
capital allocations that resulted in wasted resources and huge delays, planning should be 
based on an average rate of return over a longer period of time on each unit of capital 
invested: a proposition that replicated the concerns of the “cost of production school” who 
were searching for an interest rate in the context of a planned economy.209 That same year, 
the Legal Commission of the Council of Ministers began working on a draft of a “Law on 
State Enterprises” which would spell out the responsibilities and rights of individual 
industrial enterprises across various sectors and geographical organizations, establishing 
them as the basic legal units of the Soviet economy.210  
 The discussions of 1957-1958 testify to the permeability of Khrushchev’s program 
due to its very vagueness. Even if Khrushchev’s instincts pointed to solely administrative 
changes and decentralization, the state apparatus, by necessity, was grappling with 
problems of investment. Indeed, in late 1957, the Gosekonkomissia was abolished, as part 
of a drive to give more authority for day to day planning to the Republics, but Gosplan 
itself was given more authority over the issuance and planning of Republic level funds as 
a balance on regional interests.211 This coincided with a drive to start reworking the 
planning system. In September 1957, the Sixth Five-Year Plan was axed in favor of a 
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Seven-Year Plan to run between 1959 and 1965. The official reason for this decision was 
the sudden and unexpected discovery of oil in Siberia which would be an impetus for the 
long-term restructuring of the Soviet economy toward the expansion of the chemical 
industry. However, coming in the wake of the defeat of the so-called anti-Party group, the 
Seven-Year Plan reflected the priorities of Khrushchev’s rule. An expansion of consumer 
goods would be driven by the new technologies, such as plastics, stemming from the 
chemical sector rather than a shift in the proportions of investment. Outlays to the 
construction of housing were to be increased, and meat production was to be increased. 
Discussing these initiatives at the Presidium, Khrushchev accused Gosplan of “illiterately 
approaching planning” and blamed the agency for the underdevelopment of the 
petrochemical industry in the years after Stalin’s death.212  
 Khrushchev’s drive to establish a new, signature policy, was also probably 
motivated by the fact that the 1958 plan had drastically underperformed not only because 
of Gosplan’s failures, but also because the decentralization of planning to the Republics 
and administration to the Sovnarkhozes had caused coordination problems as the local 
authorities acted just like the ministries and hoarded financial and physical resources. It 
was probably this that led to Khrushchev’s criticisms of Gosplan at the XXI Party 
Congress. In Sergei Khrushchev’s recollections, one of Gosplan’s major problems was that 
its chair, Kuzminin, though an earnest Khrushchev ally and supporter of the Sovnarkhoz 
reform, had little experience running a state agency and could not coordinate the local 
interest groups that had proliferated after 1957. Indeed, the younger Khrushchev described 
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Kuzminin as “suffering Gosplan” rather than running it. A different set of hands was 
needed and they belonged to Kosygin. While not formally marking a step away from 
decentralization, as Nataliya Kibita has pointed out in her monograph, the appointment of 
a champion of improving central administration marked a turning point in Soviet economic 
administration. Indeed, by the end of 1959, the number of Sovnarkhozes was cut 
dramatically.213  
 After the XXI Party Congress, in January 1959, the Presidium of the Academy of 
Sciences established a special commission on “the calculation of cost in the Socialist 
economy.” The commission was headed by Vassily Nemchinov, who told the assembled 
group that “in the course of discussing the best way to integrate the advances of science 
into production, the question of developing criteria of economic profitability has become 
paramount.” “In discussions on the effectiveness of capital investments,” he continued, “it 
has become obvious that the existing system of prices carries no scientific basis for the 
determination of economic efficiency.” The Nemchinov Commission’s assessment was 
that the problem of “technological progress” was not one of organization and 
administration, but fundamentally an economic one of profitability and price. Nemchinov 
and his colleagues on the commission—including luminaries such as Strumilian and 
Kantorovich—argued that inaccurately determined prices were leading to the 
ineffectiveness of capital investments, thus destroying the state budget and slowing overall 
economic growth.214 As has been argued in the first chapter of this dissertation, economists 
had dreamt of participating in the policymaking process since the XXth Party Congress. 
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The Nemchinov commission was a watershed as it was an official body from the academic 
community that was recommending state policy to the Party and Council of Ministers. This 
was possible because Khrushchev’s own administrative-mobilizational campaign 
generated the need for policy advice due to the sudden increase in the rate of capital 
investment and the tasks it placed on management cadres.  
 The problem of pricing and the effectiveness of capital investments did not stay in 
the confines of the Academy of Sciences. At the July 1960 Central Committee Plenum—a 
session dedicated to the “Fulfilment of the Orders of the XXI Congress and the 
Development of Industry, Transportation and the Introduction of New Scientific Advances 
into Production”—the matter of prices was brought up. The resolution of the July Plenum 
called for “the increase in the level of economic research to improve planning indicators 
across industry and transportation.” To fulfill such a mission, the Central Committee called 
on “academic economists” to pay more attention to the “problems of economic planning; 
especially questions of improving the efficiency of capital investments, the better usage of 
main and circulating funds and other questions related to industrial practice.”  The 
resolution further demanded that Gosplan, the Academy of Sciences and the 
Gosekonomsovet prepare a report to the Council of Ministers on improving plan indicators 
to “increase the self-interest of enterprises and Sovnarkhozes in effectively using financial 
resources and to improve the production of higher quality goods” by March 1, 1961. These 
same bodies were called on to develop a new methodology for the setting of prices based 
on a scientific method in preparation for a “unification” of wholesale prices onto a “single 
basis” (in other words, replacing the variety of markups and prices set arbitrarily by 
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Gosplan’s Price Section by considering what they assumed to be the most strategic 
industries and discounting prices on the goods that they needed).215  
The July Plenum capped a process that moved economic reforms to the forefront 
of the conversation, a process that had begun almost as soon as the Sovnarkhoz reforms 
were started. While most of the Plenum was dedicated to the usual rhetoric of mobilization, 
with regional and Republican officials as the main speakers , the groundwork for the 
recentralization of administration and the introduction of economic reform had been laid. 
As the documents of the Plenum plainly showed, the problem of “the efficiency of capital 
investments” was giving the technocrats and experts a new, more prominent seat at the 
table.  
 
The Soviet Fiscal Quandary and the Rise of Economics as a Policy Science, 
1961-1962 
When Khrushchev took the stage at the XXII Party Congress in October 
1961, it looked like the General Secretary was full of vigor. The new “Third Party 
Program,” with its promises of “building Communism by 1980,” was formally 
approved. After retreating from his attacks on Stalin following the Polish and 
Hungarian uprisings, Khrushchev again fired away at his predecessor with a new 
intensity. Yet, when speaking about the Soviet economy, the problem of capital 
investments and weak cadres tempered the triumphalism. While praising the high 
rate of industrial construction and the expansion of new housing stock, Khrushchev 
berated construction managers for not matching their work to the fiscal calendar. 
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With so many new projects starting, “funds are scattered and many projects go into 
construction two or three years later than technically feasible. Funds expended are 
frozen over a long period and the state cannot get its investments back.” He 
continued:  
Is it because our desire to achieve great things militates against a 
reasonable and realistic approach? It frequently happens that 
plausible excuses for state aid are covers for parochial interests. To 
put it crudely, they are acts of hoarding on a regional, territorial and 
at times republican scale. Republican Councils of Ministers, 
economic councils, ministries and local party organs try to get funds 
to initiate the greatest number of projects possible without 
considering the necessary building material, manpower and 
equipment needed to achieve them. The planning bodies do not 
prevent these acts which contradict the interest of the state.  
 
Khrushchev singled out the Perm Regional Council for having every third enterprise in the 
region “fail to profitably fulfill the plan,” meeting their production goals but using more 
resources than those that had been assigned to them. He finished by pleading for “stricter 
financial control at all levels of production.” “Circulatory funds (or those funds used for 
settlements of enterprise payments) could be built up at the enterprises themselves” he 
suggested, seemingly taking on board much of the rhetoric that was coming from the 
economic reform discussions.216  
 Khrushchev was not wrong to be worried about the state’s finances and monetary 
issues. As Kristy Ironside points out, Khrushchev’s 1959 program to eliminate taxes from 
the population—with the exception of the turnover (sales) tax which made up the majority 
of state income, but was not formally considered a tax—had collapsed by 1961. Despite 
the small portion of the budget that came from direct taxation, these funds were dear 
                                                




enough that the attempt to eliminate them would mean losing precious central funds. 
Indeed, this, combined with the growing income of the population due to wage raises and 
tax reductions, was causing inflationary pressures to build up in the USSR’s economy. 
Without a fear of bankruptcy, the planned economic system did not respond to changes in 
increased spending power, and thus aggregate demand, by increasing production, causing 
an expanding pool of cash to chase a relatively constant set of goods: a classical inflationary 
scenario. Because of the administrative nature of the Soviet economy, these pressures were 
not reflected in higher prices (as these were set by the state) but rather in shortages of goods 
(except for collective farm market prices which did go up).217 The increasing amount of 
cash-in-hand amongst Soviet citizens meant a greater set of financial claims against the 
state. Cash is, by definition, a circulating liability of the central bank or monetary authority. 
What makes cash different from other forms of debt is that it is unredeemable for a final 
set of goods because it is the liability of the highest form of domestic authority and thus 
can be traded for any other commodity. Yet, from the point of view of the state, it is part 
of its debt.218 This had consequences for the rate of return on the state’s capital investments. 
As consumers found more and more money in their hands, they had to spend it on an 
inelastic, fixed supply of goods, or store it in state retail banks (Sverkassa), which would 
then be used as part of the state budget with the depositor receiving a low fixed-interest 
payment, or place it under their mattress, effectively causing the state’s debt to increase. 
Soviet citizens increasingly took this third option.  
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As Kronrod pointed out in his 1955 text, the priority of largely unprofitable heavy 
industry meant that it was consumer spending on light industrial goods that was subsidizing 
the former sector—the proceeds from the turnover tax and forced savings being transferred 
through the budget to the heavy industrial sector. According to orthodox Soviet theory, this 
expansion of heavy industrial production would eventually roll over into consumer 
production—an approach which had been developed by Soviet economist G.A. Feldman 
in 1928 and was re-enshrined by Khrushchev in his victory over Malenkov. However, by 
the early 1960s, whatever gains the Feldman growth model had produced were becoming 
more and more negligible as the burden of obligations between the state and the population 
began to overwhelm even the extremely financially repressed Soviet system. Most Soviet 
enterprises were in arrears to the state which in turn, through over-issuance of cash (which 
is a liability of the state through its Central Bank), was itself effectively in debt to its 
population. While a full, detailed, accounting framework for the interaction of central, 
industrial and household balance sheets is best left for Appendix A at the end of this 
dissertation, the results of this very Soviet fiscal predicament are evident in the data 
produced by the Institute of Economics in 1963 and shown in figure 2.2 below: 
Fig 2.2: Moving Average of the Rate of Return on Central Capital Investments 1950-
1962 
  Gross 
Production 
Per Ruble 
In % of 1950 % of 1955 % of 1958 % of 
previous 
year 
1950 2.19 100       
1955 2.34 106.9 100     
1958 2.23 101.8 95.3 100   
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1959 2.21 102.1 94.4 99.1 99.1 
1960 2.15 98.2 91.9 96.4 97.3 
1961 2.09 95.4 89.3 93.7 97.2 
1962 2.05 93.6 87.6 91.9 98.1 
Source: ARAN f. 1877 op. 8 d. 390 l. 55, 1964 
As the data shows, when taking 1950 as the base year, the economists found that the return 
for each ruble spent in capital investment went up until 1959, and then began to fall. When 
taking 1955, or the start of the increasing investment associated with Khrushchev, as the 
base year the results were even more dramatic with the return on investment being 87.6% 
of 1955. In other words, while one ruble invested in 1955 would yield RUB 2.34 of 
production, in 1962 it yielded RUB 2.05—not yet a full-blown recession but a trend toward 
falling returns when the promises of the XXIInd Congress demanded greater results.    
 These lowering rates of return were accompanied by an increasing amount of 
money in the hands of the population. A 1965 analysis of the previous decade by 
Gosbank concluded that “Since 1961, the yearly rate of the growth of money in 
circulation has increased. The divide between the rate of increase in the turnover of 
personal funds and sum of cash in circulation has led to the need to issue more cash and 
the slowing of the velocity of money.” This was connected to the increasing gap between 
the growth of Group A consumer products such as refrigerators and Group B producer 
products such as steel. While between 1951 and 1955 the gap in relative output between 
the two groups was 19.7%, in 1956-1961 it increased to 42% and in 1961-65 to 68% . For 
this reason, the tax returns to the state’s budget fell at an average of 2.7% per annum 
between 1961 and 1965.219 What Khrushchev was facing after 1961-2 was the problem of 
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a contemporary investment-led “tiger” economy with a large population—of shifting an 
economy whose extremely high growth was created by high investment into producer 
goods at the expense of the population to one in which consumer spending would provide 
more balanced growth, albeit at a slower nominal rate.220   
 To make matters worse, agriculture, the millstone of the Soviet economy that 
Khrushchev had attempted to reform over and over, was not doing well. Though 
expectations for the summer 1961 harvest were high, output increased by only 0.7% over 
the previous year while meat and milk production fell below the previous two years. Yet 
instead of pumping more funds into the agricultural sector, as had been his previous policy, 
Khrushchev suddenly turned into a “fiscal conservative.” Two weeks after the XXII Party 
Congress, he told an audience of agricultural workers in Tashkent: “What are we supposed 
to do now? Turn our pockets inside out and count our money? I could turn my pockets 
inside out now and show you that they are empty… I don’t have anything for you but good 
wishes.”221  
 The March 1962 Central Committee Plenum reflected the tension between 
expectations and economic reality. The first section of the Plenum, dedicated to the 
discussion of the “Third Party Program,” presented the new document as the next step of 
the economic program of the USSR that traced its roots to the GORELO plan of Lenin for 
electrifying the countryside. The development of productive forces in the USSR and “the 
construction of the material prerequisites of Communism” were “the fulfillment of our 
internationalist duty before the rest of the world.” Khrushchev exclaimed that “it was not 
by chance the imperialists of the United States are worried that our program has set the 
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task of building Communism. When the USSR and other socialist states overtake the 
economies of the leading countries of the Capitalist world, no power of imperialism could 
stop the advance of Communist ideas.” Yet, despite the usual slew of statistics about 
increased outputs of steel that touted the huge percentage of increases of Soviet production 
compared to the United States (which ignored the inconvenient facts about the USSR’s low 
relative base), things did not sound as sunny when Khrushchev got down to discussing 
agriculture. “We have to admit,” he explained, “that we have fewer heads of cattle than our 
potential.” The problem was that “the demands on agriculture were no longer the same as 
we imagined” due to increased urbanization, which meant that a “few percentages of 
increase”  in agricultural output were no longer enough to supply the population of the 
cities. While making some gestures toward a long-run increase in investments in the 
production of agricultural machinery at the plenum, he told farmers and collective farm 
managers to make do with what they had, as heavy industry and the military could not 
spare resources.222  
The strange mix of triumphalism and economic retreat evident after the XXII Party 
Congress is consistent with what other scholars have argued about the general political 
timeline of the Khrushchev era. Michael Sandl’s careful reading of ideological texts, 
including the Third Party Program, has found that while maintaining a rhetoric of hope and 
growth, many of the more fantastical political and democratic claims of the XXI Congress 
began to be tempered after 1961.223 Polly Jones has also argued that the while Khrushchev 
resumed his attacks on Stalin with a new fury at the XXIInd Congress, the ideological 
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campaign that followed was far more regulated and centralized than the events of 1956.224 
In William Taubman’s encyclopedic biography of Khrushchev and his political career, late 
1961 and 1962 appear to be a critical inflection point, marking a series of failures that 
began the road to the October 1964 Party Plenum during which Khrushchev was 
removed.225  
 Examining the economy and economic policy validates this timeline and helps 
clarifies exactly what was happening to the USSR through Khrushchev’s rule. By 1961, 
the Soviet Union was suffering a crisis of overinvestment (in Marxist parlance a crisis of 
overproduction)—ironically the very thing Marxists had believed would affect capitalist 
economies—resulting in slower growth rates. In effect, by taking markups on goods from 
its population and profitable enterprises, offering them low interest rates and constraining 
investment options, the state transferred the surplus to unprofitable industries. Consistent 
with Lenin’s vision of the economy as one large factory enterprise, the state’s consolidated 
budget functioned as a giant industrial development bank. The problem was that the loans 
were no longer performing well and society at large was calling in its margin through 
inflationary pressure. The first action available to a failing bank is to economize on its 
assets to maintain collateral. On May 17, 1962, the Council of Ministers approved price 
increases of up to 25% on milk products and 35% on meat and poultry. According to 
interviews conducted by Taubman, Khrushchev initially resisted these increases but was 
eventually persuaded by Kosygin. The price increases were “good economics”: by 
increasing the price of scarce goods, demand would fall be reduced and, as the hidden 
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inflation in the Soviet economy translated into prices rather than shortages and falling 
capital intensity. When the price increases came into effect in June 1962, a population that 
was promised abundance was shocked. Pamphlets and graffiti denouncing Khrushchev 
appeared in the major industrial cities of the USSR threatening to “ground up Khrushchev 
for sausages.” The worst of these disturbances happened in the Urals city of Novocherkassk 
where striking workers and security forces clashed, resulting in twenty-three protestors 
dying on the spot.226  
The Novocherkassk massacre appears to have left an impression on both 
Khrushchev, who was haunted by it until his death, and future Soviet officials who resisted 
any cuts to social services or price increases on consumer products for the next decades of 
Soviet power.227 More harvest failures in 1963 pressed the USSR to import grain from 
capitalist countries to avoid a repeat of 1962. In August 1963, a secret letter to local party 
officials ordered them to begin actions to “economize on bread” and increase coercive 
measures to extract grain from the collective farms.228 The Soviet Union had adopted an 
austerity program. The fact that the money supply in the Soviet Union was tightly 
controlled by the state and the state budget encompassed the entire economy just meant 
that unlike in today’s Eurozone economies like Greece, it was scarce food and consumer 
goods rather than state spending that was cut (with the welfare effects being the same). 
Much as the Euro restricted the Greek state’s ability to isolate its budget from its German 
counterparts, the Lenin-Kautsky model of the economy as one large factory gave the USSR 
less room to maneuver than a market economy issuing its own currency in which a state’s 
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balance sheet, through welfare functions and devaluation, could act as a countercyclical 
policy tool. This analogy to contemporary economics helps us understand why the USSR 
launched a currency reform in 1961. The currency reform, in which money denominations 
were adjusted at a 10:1 rate, should be understood as a devaluation to lower the value of 
the ruble vis-a-vis the USSR’s main creditor—its own population.229 
Another way that a state can respond to a fiscal crisis is to begin structural, 
economic reform to begin receiving more returns on investments. On September 9, 1962, 
Pravda ran an article by Evsei Liberman titled “Plan, Profit and Bonuses.” Liberman 
largely repeated the arguments he made in his 1955 Problems of Economics article but 
distilled them to appeal to a more general audience.230 Liberman proposed making 
profitability, rather than gross output, the central indicator for planning and allowing 
workers and managers to receive bonuses based on their profitability. Liberman’s article 
on the front page of the country’s most prominent newspaper signaled that something was 
changing in the USSR. Western observers quickly picked this up—Liberman was featured 
on the February 12, 1965 cover of Time. While Liberman was lauded in the Western press 
as the face of reformist economics in the USSR, in fact, his role was much more 
convoluted. Following the XXII Party Congress, Liberman had sent his article to Izvestiia, 
the Soviet government’s official newspaper, edited by Khrushchev’s son-in-law and close 
advisor, Alexei Adzhubei. It is likely that Liberman understood that this was a way to get 
the leader’s attention without going through convoluted official channels, and he was 
correct. Upon hearing of the article, Khrushchev took the scoop away from his son-in-law 
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and ordered that Liberman’s work be run in the more widely read Pravda.231 Liberman’s 
intervention thus came at the right place and at the right time, but it did not represent the 
vanguard of reformist economic thought in the USSR—it simply opened the public 
conversation.  
Stymied by his father-in-law’s intervention, Adzhubei searched for his own 
editorializing economist. He found one in Igor Birman (not to be confused with Alexander 
Birman) and, to a lesser extent, his co-author Vladimir Belkin: two young economists 
whose work was influenced by the cost-of-production approach to pricing and whose 
expertise was in the new field of computer modeling. The most influential article written 
by the pair was the November 1962 “Price and Profit,” which expanded on Liberman’s 
analysis of profitability and replaced the incentive mechanism from bonuses to “the 
repayment for the use of productive funds.” What Birman and Belkin imagined was that 
enterprises would pay the state back a certain percent of their total yearly profit for every 
ruble invested in their productive funds. The remainder of the profit would be kept by the 
enterprises and invested into whatever area the management thought best for profitability—
from wages, to bonuses, to increases in social services and technical improvements. The 
new schema would replace the major source of funds for the Soviet budget from the 
turnover tax to the repayment for productive investments by enterprises—in effect creating 
an interest payment for lent capital. The proposal was supposed to best serve all interests. 
The state would have its budget controlled via a stable rate of repayment for its investments 
in the enterprises. The enterprises would have greater independence over their own 
production and be governed by return on investment, or profit which they could distribute 
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to their workers. The consumer would not only be able to directly influence the economy 
through spending (thus affecting the profitability of the enterprise) but also benefit from 
differential prices on goods of different qualities. The pre-requisite for this radical new 
direction in economic management was a total reform of wholesale prices to reflect “the 
cost of production,” or the cost of capital. Birman and Belkin explicitly cited the work of 
Vaag, Atlas, and Zakharov from the debates of 1956 and 1957 in arguing that the best way 
to compose prices was through the combination of the cost of goods produced 
(sebestoimost) and the average return on capital over a moving five-year period for each 
branch of industry.232 What the duo left to the imagination was what would happen to 
unprofitable enterprises—bankruptcy and restructuring, with its associated unemployment, 
were outside the realm of acceptable discourse.  
The explosion of economic discussions in the pages of the USSR’s mass circulation 
media was not happening in a political bubble. The pressures on the state budget illustrated 
above were pushing Khrushchev the mobilizer to play, reluctantly, with becoming 
Khrushchev the technocrat. In November 1962 a Central Committee Plenum was called to 
deal with the problem of industrial policy and economic development. Addressing the 
plenum, the General Secretary acknowledged that “as many economists now propose, 
profit must play a greater role in economic management” but hedged his bets by saying 
that “while these proposals must be considered, profit cannot be the sole goal of socialist 
industry.” This same reluctance was evident in the Plenum’s priorities. While Khrushchev 
dedicated a larger portion of his speech to the Plenum to increasing the economic efficiency 
of management, the signature initiative that came of the meeting was the decision to split 
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the party’s cadres into two—those responsible for agriculture and those for industry, a 
classic act of administration.233  
Despite the establishment’s hedging, the wheels were already turning toward 
structural economic reform as a viable political position. The Liberman article opened a 
wide-ranging discussion within the Soviet press with workers, managers, engineers and 
economists writing in, to both defend and attack the positions laid out in the September 
article. The contributions and suggestions were collected by a commission chaired by 
Gatovsky with a final report written by the head of the Academy of Sciences, M.V. 
Keldesh, Gosplan head L.F. Lomako, and Pravda Editor-in-Chief P.A. Satukov. The report 
concluded that one of the main problems in Soviet economic planning was that socialist 
enterprises were laboring under too many indicators that forced them to often work at cross 
purposes. Further, there was no real definition of the rights and responsibilities of the 
enterprises and their managers. Therefore, enterprises were not using their full productive 
capacities, as doing so would often contradict orders from above. Any attempt at 
strengthening cost accounting (khozraschot) was stymied by the fact that individual 
enterprises had very limited control over the use of their own financial resources. The 
report went on to explain that “the lowered role played by profit in the Socialist economy 
compared to the Capitalist economy did not exclude its use as an indicator of quality and 
to stimulate more efficient production.”  Yet, the influence of Gatovsky and his cautious, 
conservative economics was felt throughout the report, which stressed that while the role 
of profitability needed to be increased it could not be the only, or even the most important, 
indicator of success in the Soviet economy. The report was delivered to the desk of now 
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First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kosygin, and was meant to be 
processed and passed on to Khrushchev.234 In December 1962, a commission headed by 
Lomako began working on finalizing the long-discussed Law on State Enterprises to better 
define the responsibilities and rights of enterprises and managers as a matter of statutory 
rather than ad hoc administrative law. The law’s first draft was ready to be sent for 
comment to the ministries and party commissions in February 1963.235  
Something changed in the USSR by late 1962 and early 1963. While radical 
economic reform was still not possible, the direction of thinking about the economy had 
shifted. Previously, economists had been debating on the pages of economic journals and 
monographs, and technocrats within the state apparatus focused mostly on fixing the 
problems of the various new bodies introduced by Khrushchev. Yet by the start of 1963, 
the mounting pressures and expectations of the economy, put these debates and larger 
questions about the future of the Soviet economy and central planning out in the open. 
  
From Invested Capital to Political Capital: The Economic Discussion and the 
Formation of Institutional Interest Groups   
 
The move toward to economic reform went hand in hand with the deepening of the 
crisis of Khrushchev’s tenure. As James Richter argued, the inability of the General 
Secretary to spur growth between 1962 and 1964, combined with failures abroad, was 
breaking the coalition he assembled in 1955.236 The growing dissatisfaction of various 
groups over the direction of the Soviet economy meant that the debate that had started in 
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1962 was by mid-1963 taking on a much more directly political valance as economists and 
other reformers began to try to craft specific domestic policies. Charles Maier has argued 
that economic ideas are more than simply academic positions: they reflect poles around 
which various social groups and institutions with specific economic interests can rally. In 
this sense, the outcomes of economic policy can be a “revealed preference” of certain 
interest groups in society which might benefit from certain economic results—even if they 
are at odds with the interests of society at large. This implies that a historical approach to 
“political-economy” requires an explicit focus on how certain, often abstract and academic, 
ideas are politically deployed by interested groups.237 For the USSR, with its extremely 
limited public sphere and hierarchical organization, this also means delving into 
institutional competition as institutions became the political bases of various groups and 
the nodes from which economic ideas issued.  
As Khrushchev’s polity began to fracture, the conflicts between these bases began 
to emerge in public and economic ideas became policy positions. While the power of the 
ministries was curtailed by Khrushchev’s 1957 reforms, the central apparatus still 
employed thousands of people and the Republics and Sovnarkhozes simply replicated these 
structures. The Soviet state was well designed to use Party mobilization to solve its 
problems, by reorganizing the structures from above, but economic reform—with its 
wholesale rebuilding of economic relationships—would require a vast amount of political 
capital and subtle legal techniques that the USSR did not have in its arsenal. Indeed, the 
Soviet Union was, in fact, a rather weak state with a strong Party hierarchy. Thus, economic 
reforms could take many forms as interest groups rallied to visions of change to push their 
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agendas and subsequently began to build institutions—formal and informal—that would 
serve to further their goals. 
While the public debate on economic reform began in the pages of the Soviet press 
and started to penetrate high-level discussions, economic research plowed forward. The 
Nemchinov committee organized in 1960 delivered its report to the Gosekonomsovet and 
Vladimir Belkin was tasked to use newly available computers to build a comprehensive 
model of an economy based on the new “unified” wholesale prices (prices that reflected 
the cost of capital) in January 1961. According to Belkin’s autobiography, through 1961 
and 1962 he struggled to have his results made public. The head of the Gosekonomsovet, 
Alexander Zasyiadko, insisted that the data he generated could only be published in secret 
or, at best, with the designation “for official use.” However, in September 1963, for some 
unexplained reason, the book was published for public consumption.238  
This development emboldened Belkin and his associates to lobby the government 
more aggressively. Against the advice of the experienced Nemchinov, who told them that 
“[their] mathematical and the scientific potential is great but [their] chances of practical 
success [was] low,” the team sent copies of their work to Khrushchev, who in March 1964 
forwarded it to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin, defense 
industry chief and head of the newly created All-Union Central Economic Council 
(VSNKh) Dmitry Ustinov, Gosplan Chairman Piotr Lomako, and Finance Minister Vasily 
Garbuzov. This was not the friendliest audience for economic reform. Ustinov had a long 
career in the military-industrial complex and was a firm supporter of centralization, 
administration, and the priority of heavy industry. His protégé, the preceding chairman of 
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Gosplan, Vladimir Novikov, had, since the start of the Liberman debate, been against 
rushing into economic reform. In March 1963, Ustinov had been appointed the chairman 
of the newly created VSNKh which subordinated all other economic bodies under it, 
including Gosplan and the Sovnarkhozes. Lomako was also not a supporter of reform and 
remembered as more interested in restoring order to Soviet industry after the Sovnarkhoz 
reforms of 1957 than in introducing fundamental changes. These officials, resenting 
Khrushchev’s administrative reforms which eroded their power, were also hostile to any 
economic program which could do the same through other means.239  
The results of the meeting were predictable. At a meeting of the Gosplan collegium 
and academics held on May 27-29, 1964, Lomako and his supporters attacked the 
calculations produced by Belkin as “harmful to Soviet state interests.” Further, since the 
Institute in charge of the research, the All Union Institute for Electronic Calculating 
Machinery, was, since 1963, attached to Gosplan, Lomako stated that he would not 
“tolerate such behavior” from its staff.  Speaking of Belkin specifically, Lomako reportedly 
stated that the economist was a “fanaticizer who, with his drivel, wastes the time of people 
who actually do work.” In June 1964, Lomako sent his report to Kosygin, which 
recommended rejecting all of the proposals for a general reform of prices produced by the 
academic economists as such actions would “change all of our economic values.” Instead, 
Lomako proposed that Gosplan’s own Section on Prices set the new wholesale prices 
demanded by the 1960 Plenum. Kosygin’s response to Lomako is telling. Even Belkin, 
who believed Kosygin was not a true ally to reformers, recalled that the Deputy Premier 
berated Lomako for his crude behavior toward the scientific community, warning him that 
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“such outbursts [as had occurred at the Gosplan meeting] will lead to them [academic 
economists and other scientists] to not come to us at all.” In fact, Kosygin personally 
thanked the researchers for presenting their proposals and for their active participation in 
discussions with policy makers. However, at the end of the day, Kosygin approved 
Lomako’s final report.240  
Kosygin’s role in the events of 1962-1964 was ambiguous. From all appearances, 
the Deputy Premier was an extremely intelligent man. However, he was also a member of 
a generation that had learned to be cautious and was, according to  Kremlin insiders such 
as Georgii Arbatov, a person who struggled to rectify his deep loyalty to the Communist 
Party, its ideals and hierarchy, with an active mind that understood the fundamental 
economic problems of the USSR. Gosplan economist and pioneering Soviet 
econometrician Vladimir Kossov recalled that Kosygin had a natural understanding of 
economic intuition and instantly grasped numerical data but never had the courage to push 
radical policy agendas in the Politburo. Yet, if he was not ready to defend the economic 
reform agenda outright, as we shall see, Kosygin was likely working to advance the agenda 
through more subtle means.241  
While Gosplan may have been hostile to economic reform projects, the GKNT and 
its leadership supported Belkin and his colleagues. Its director, N.K. Rudenov, was a new 
kind of Soviet economic official who moved his agency, tasked with “technical progress,” 
into promoting social science and management, believing that it was a type of technology 
and thus under his organization’s purview. Unbeknownst to the economists working on 
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price reform, the GKNT was already working on the problem of economic reform and on 
increasing the role played by computers in central planning. The GKNT’s point man in the 
effort was its Deputy Chairman, Dzherman Gvishiani. Gvishiani’s career trajectory will be 
the subject of a separate chapter of this dissertation, but it is already important to point out 
how extremely unusual his position was. Gvishiani was not an economist, mathematician 
or even an engineer—he held a Kandidatskaia (and later a Doktorskaia) in what we would 
now call the Philosophy of Science. His research interests were also unusual—the 
epistemic study of American management science, particularly in its MIT variation. It was 
because of this background that he was likely appointed the Deputy Chairman of the GKNT 
in charge of international cooperation in the areas of science and technology.242 Being 
Alexei Kosygin’s son-in-law did not hurt his meteoric rise. While in his own recollections 
Gvishiani never admitted to using his famous relative’s political clout in advancing his 
career, archival evidence (and common sense) supports the notion that it was a factor. 
During Gvishiani’s 1969 doctoral defense, a representative of the Construction Ministry 
(Gosstroi) turned his question about Taylorism into a long polemic on the orders coming 
from Kosygin, obviously counting on Gvishiani’s intercession with the Soviet Premier.243 
Thus, Kosygin’s connections with economic reform took on a personal, unofficial guise. 
Indeed, with the dissolution of the Gosekonomsovet in 1963, Vaag would be hired full-
time by the GKNT and Belkin and Birman included as some of its staffers for economic 
research. 
 In 1963, Gvishiani was appointed the head of the GKNT’s “Expert Council on 
Problems of Scientific Management in the Economy,” a body that included Fedorenko, 
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Liberman and Glushkov among its members. The program proposed by this committee was 
a decades-long reconstruction of the Soviet economy based on the introduction of 
computing and “methods of efficient economic management.” It envisioned the upcoming 
Five-Year Plan for 1965-1970 as the first “experimental stage” during which methods of 
rationalized economic management would be introduced. Between 1970 and 1980—
Khrushchev’s target for achieving Communism—the system of real-time, accurate price-
level data, calculated based on the current demand of the economy, would be widely 
implemented and the Soviet economy primed to “enter Communism.” This meant that 1964 
to 1965 would be the critical years for laying down a course of action. In conjunction with 
the Academy of Sciences and its ad hoc “Committee on Economics, Planning and 
Enterprise Organization,” the GKNT issued plans to experiment with a new type of 
industrial organization—the “combine” of multiple, supply-chain integrated factories 
operating on “full cost accounting”—in the Russian Soviet  Federative Socialist Republic’s 
paper industry. These new administrative units would be issued new, more accurate, sets 
of production costs and prices to test how a new economic system would work. Further, 
they were given a charter of rights and responsibilities designating them as “the basic unit 
of planning.” What was emerging in Gvishiani’s Commission was the cybernetic vision of 
economic reform that would soon be taken on as a mantel by CEMI and its allies.244  
 What had started as a debate on the front page of Pravda over Liberman’s article 
in 1962, had by 1963 become a matter of institutional competition with reformist 
economists emerging as a camp actively pursuing its own agenda for change over that of 
the ministries, Gosplan, and the VSNKh. Concentrating around research institutes within 
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the Academy of Sciences and the GKNT, economists and their supporters were not only 
advocating for radical reform but also establishing their own, parallel, institutional bases 
within the Soviet economic hierarchy. As the antagonism between these nodes of nascent 
economic politics erupted, their direct criticism of Soviet planning practice and 
bureaucracies intensified. In 1963, deputy director of the Institute of Economic Sciences 
of the Belarussian SSR, O.N. Pashkevich, wrote to the Central Committee to voice his 
concerns about the underutilization of economic sciences. Pashkevich was concerned that 
the planned development of the economy, the thing that “was impossible under capitalism” 
and in the USSR “established the place of each unit of the socialist society, every 
individual,” was being neglected. The reason for this was the “disconnect between 
economic research and practice.” While acknowledging the slow pace of economic 
research, he put the onus of the blame on the continuing influence of “Stalin’s Cult of 
Personality” amongst industrial managers. When economists came to analyze the work of 
enterprises and Sovnarkhozes and found “reserves that were not being used,” the managers 
and officials would stop sharing their statistical materials with them. A good manager, he 
wrote, “would be the first person interested in learning about and discovering the potential 
of his enterprise,” but the attitude of most industrial cadres showed “that perhaps it is too 
easy to become a factory manager in our country.”245  
Pashkevich was not the only economist making claims against the way things were 
being done in the USSR. In June 1964, S. Pervushin, the chief editor of Ekonomika, the 
USSR’s economics publishing house, wrote to the Central Committee to warn that the 
USSR’s economy was in dire need of change and that its weakness posed an existential 
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threat to the state. Pervushin noted that the past decade had seen many promises of reform 
and suggestions about how to do it. For example, he noted that Rumiantsev’s 1955 
suggestion (discussed in Chapter 1) to establish a measure of the rate of obsolescence had 
long been ignored. He reminded the Central Committee that the 1957 Sovnarkhoz reforms 
were supposed to be only the start of a general reconstruction of the economy which was 
blocked by entrenched interests. Meanwhile, the growing complexity of the Soviet 
economy meant that “management had become worse, not better.” Areas such as consumer 
goods, housing and services were being neglected “because a growing proportion of 
national income is being used to create increases in national income” through investments 
in heavy industry (goods and services were not considered to be part of national income in 
the USSR as they were not considered part of the “means of production.).246  
This was more than an economic problem: it was a matter of global revolutionary 
importance. Certain capitalist countries such as Italy, West Germany, and France were 
recording growth rates over the decade that were as high as the USSR’s. Meanwhile, Japan 
had achieved a growth rate two times higher than that of the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries. Such a state of affairs meant that “bourgeoisie propagandists had more 
tools in their hand with which to attack the USSR.” Even worse, the relatively low prestige 
of economics meant that the kind of propaganda that the USSR was deploying to counter 
these attacks was primitive and dogmatic. Pervushin admitted that such crude rhetoric was 
acceptable “when the socialist economy was still underdeveloped” but now that the Soviet 
Union had built “the conditions to begin overtaking the mightiest of capitalist economies—
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the USA,” such pronouncements were counterproductive. Soviet researchers and authors 
had to “share the pluses and minuses of our economy with the world.”247  
Such an honest accounting required more research in economics. The profession 
needed to begin agreeing on the “real rate of yearly growth” and Soviet propagandists 
needed to cite those instead of “fantastic figures of 40-60% found in the press.” It had to 
stop blaming individual cadres for not doing their jobs because the plans and rules were so 
badly developed that it was impossible to keep track of the responsibilities of enterprises 
and to resolve the conflicting orders that they received. Yet despite this situation, 
improvements and suggestions from economists continued to be received with hostility by 
the administrative apparatus and the academic establishment. “Typically,” Pervushin 
explained, “an economist brings a proposal to solve a problem. Then immediately, another 
group attacks him for being improperly Marxist as an excuse to not engage with and 
understand new ideas such as mathematical methods and cybernetics.” The older thinker’s 
paranoid fear of “restoring capitalism”— driven by “years of Stalinism”—killed the 
initiative of young scientific cadres. Pervushin closed his letter with a plea for the Central 
Committee, and the Politburo itself, to intervene in the ossified system by directly bringing 
on board young, reform-minded economists and forcing their ideas on the state 
apparatus.248  
Pervushin’s dual focus on the press and the Cold War as the locus of his critique 
wasn’t incidental, or simply a function of his own background as a publisher. Rather, he 
was tapping into a confluence of phenomena that were enabling economic reformers to 
raise political capital by deploying discourse from an emerging “public sphere” into the 





structures of political power. Though the use of the term “public sphere” seems somewhat 
oxymoronic in a polity with a strictly state-controlled press, Yitzhak Brudny has shown 
that during the early 1960s, “thick journals” such as Novy Mir, Oktiabr’ and Znamiia, 
became locus points for factions within the party, debating the issue of nationality and 
Russian identity.249  
Debates within the economics field were fought out in academic journals and  
publications such as Kommunist. These debates had, by 1960, already taken on a “Cold 
War” tone with opponents of mathematical economics accusing their rivals of destroying 
the labor theory of value and providing ammunition to Western propagandists, whereas the 
supporters of the new school accused the former of betraying Soviet goals of “catching up 
and overtaking capitalism” by attacking useful and innovative methods. The Liberman 
debate, which started in 1962, already showed how the pages of Pravda and Izvestiia had 
become fertile grounds for the direct deployment of economics into policy making. Yet, as 
the momentum toward economic reform accelerated, the press became a tool that 
reformers, and their supporters, self-consciously used to make the case for change as a 
matter of national and ideological survival. The curated “economic debates” in journals 
and newspapers became a way of building a direct line of communication to the high 
leadership that allowed them to balance the relative weakness of their institutional bases.  
A case in point was the debate launched by Academician V.A. Trapeznikov in 
Pravda on August 17, 1964. Trapeznikov had a social and institutional profile typical of 
many figures interested in economic reform. Starting his education in a mathematical 
lyceum in the 1920s, he earned his undergraduate and graduate degrees in electrical 
                                                
249 Yitzhak Brudy, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953- 1991 (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 33-35. 
	 149	
 
engineering, eventually joining the  faculty at the Moscow Energy Institute— the same one 
run by Malenkov’s spouse and where Vaag had begun his career. In 1951, he became 
director of the Institute of Automation and Telecommunications, placing him at the heart 
of the cybernetics community, which adopted economics as a branch of their own science. 
In 1965, he would become the First Deputy Chairman of the GKNT. Due to his expertise 
in automatization, Trapeznikov was part of a 1963 Soviet industrial delegation to Japan. 
What he saw there disturbed him: Japanese industry was far more efficient and modernized 
than its Soviet counterpart. Trapeznikov reported his findings to Kosygin, who encouraged 
him to write an article explaining his proposals for improving Soviet industrial practice and 
planning in Pravda. Kosygin planned to then pass the article to Khrushchev: perhaps 
understanding that the General Secretary would be far more sympathetic to a spontaneous 
proposal from an activist academic than a committee report, which would get bogged down 
in bureaucracy and interest group competition.250  
The article, entitled “For Flexible Management and Economic Practice,” appeared 
in Pravda on August 17, 1964, taking up most of the front page as well as the third page. 
It explained that Soviet enterprises were overwhelmed by a “wave of norms and indicators 
that do not reflect the quality of their work” and were determined by “the results of the 
previous year’s outcomes rather than any scientific criterion.” Trapeznikov proposed that 
Soviet economic planning shift its tools from quantity-based output targets to a system of 
“taxes, fines, flexible prices and other financial indicators.” Such systems were used 
successfully in the “most advanced capitalist countries, including the USA” and would be 
even more effective in Soviet conditions.  Trapeznikov was especially impressed by how 
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the Bureau of Measures and Standards regulated the quality of American products. If such 
a system worked in the West, he explained, “in our conditions, when all economic and 
financial resources are in the hands of the state, it would have even greater results.” 
Trapeznikov argued that the sole indicator of enterprise performance should be 
profitability. The prerequisite for such as system was that enterprises would be given more 
control over their “productive funds,” especially the wage fund. Trapeznikov explained 
that this meant an overhaul of Soviet fiscal mechanisms. Like Birman and Belkin, he 
advocated replacing the turnover tax with payments to the state budget for capital by 
individual enterprises. He also believed that direct capital investments had to be 
complimented with an expansion of trade credit financing from state banks which would 
allow enterprises to create more flexible, direct contracts with each other and purchase 
goods from their counterparties on credit. He concluded that arguments that “interest 
payments on capital are only a feature of capitalism were unconvincing.”251  
Trapeznikov’s article restarted the public discussion that had been opened by 
Liberman but petered out somewhat in 1963. On September 1, 1964, V. Shkatov, the 
deputy director of Gosplan’s Section on Prices, agreed with Trapeznikov’s proposal and 
expanded on it, explaining that differential payments for natural resources should  also be 
introduced.252 Leonid Leontief, one of the Soviet Union’s grand men of political 
economy—the man Stalin had charged with editing his economics textbook—supported 
Trapеznikov’s proposals and argued that they had nothing to do with capitalism or 
explicitly capitalist practice.253 Liberman responded to Trapeznikov on September 20th in 
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an article titled “Once More on Plan, Profit and Bonuses.” Here he stepped away from 
some of his more radical proclamations of 1962, arguing that while profitability was 
critically underutilized as an indicator in the USSR, it could not be the sole indicator of 
enterprises compared to the productivity of labor. While Liberman supported 
Trapeznikov’s assertion that profitability did not mean an abandonment of Marxism, he 
placed a heavier emphasis on the fact that the profitability mechanism worked by 
stimulating “the increased initiative of our labor” rather than improving the efficiency of 
capital. Thus, Liberman was skeptical of the importance of credit financing or enterprise 
payments for capital investments. 254 The disagreements between Liberman and 
Trapeznikov, though seemingly minor, were the product of a larger split in the Soviet 
economics community between the “cost of production school,” with which Trapeznikov, 
Birman and Belkin were associated, and Liberman’s “cost of labor,” Tovarnik approach, 
also associated with Yakov Kronrod and Alexander Birman. In May 1964 Nemchinov’s 
reform proposal was posthumously published in Kommunist. Nemchinov’s article shared 
the emphasis on profitability and enterprise independence but argued that price reform had 
to be conducted based on computerized information processing that considered continuous 
economic data and allowed the state and Party to incentivize their goals. These new prices 
would be the basis of “stable norms” which would be developed for the whole plan period, 
with defined long-term developmental priorities, and not randomly changed as per 
contemporary practice. Further, he integrated special “plan orders” from the government 
as a tool for the state to continue setting a base performance level for the economy. 
Enterprises would be free to sell any goods that exceeded the plan to consumers and other 
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enterprises under a contract system. Thus, Nemchinov tried to rectify the individual short-
term interests of enterprises with the long-term interest of the Communist state.255 While 
Trapeznikov and Liberman represented the “cost of production” and “labor value” schools, 
Nemchinov’s article was the first public scheme laid out by the “Mathematical 
Economists” and shared the combination of greater mathematical sophistication and 
sympathy for centralization that would subsequently be enunciated in the Socialist 
Optimally Functioning Economy (SOFE) models debuted later that year by the Central 
Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI).256 
Yet if subtle differences were emerging in the economics community’s public 
pronouncements, the blitz of publishing by reformers in the Soviet press also elicited a 
response by their opponents in the planning bodies. In 1964, the VSNKh’s research 
institute prepared a briefing on the Trapeznikov discussion. Unlike the hostile reactions of 
Lomako and Ustinov, this report tried to cut a middle path. Itacknowledged that the articles 
were a result of “a divergence between the scientific-research community and those 
involved on the practical side of planning and management.” In fact, the staff agreed that 
there were certain areas of the proposal that made sense, agreeing with Trapeznikov that 
the USSR was falling behind “the leading Capitalist states” in productivity and in the 
implementation of computing technology. Yet, the replacement of all plan indicators with 
“profitability” was a step too far and would erase the  line between the two social systems. 
It also complained that the articles in Pravda were one-sided and did not point to 
disadvantages of the proposed system, such as short-termism in enterprise behavior, or 
reference the experiences of actual enterprise managers working under new “experimental” 
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conditions being implemented by the VSNKh and the GKNT. The report also noted that 
Gosplan was already working on a set of wholesale prices that would reconcile the need 
for better efficiency with the state’s long-term interests.257  The VSNKh staff were not 
reactionaries determined to stymie reform and cut off cooperation with the more radical 
academics and their allies. Rather they were conservatives who agreed with the general 
direction of action that the reformers proposed but feared that their specific proposals went 
too far too quickly. This cautiousness would become the default position of the staffs of 
the state economic planning agencies, especially Gosplan, as they navigated between the 
hardliners in the production ministries and Sovnarkhozes, and the radical proposals of the 
academics and their allies, especially those that threatened to rob Gosplan of its ability to 
allocate resources as it saw fit.  
 
Conclusion: The Politicized Economy and the Soviet Ideological Project  
By mid-1964, the intellectual positions and institutional alignments of various 
economic reformers and their opponents were established. More than just a matter of 
simple institutional and intellectual competition, these groups and their preferences were 
evidence of a fundamental dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the USSR and its 
inability to transition from socialism to communism. The kinds of alliances and tactics that 
Khrushchev had used to build a base of support were coming undone and instead of one 
direction of development led by the Party—the Soviet ideal—very real political debates 
had begun within the Party. As the organization of the Soviet economy came into question 
                                                




so did the legitimacy of Khrushchev’s course. This, in combination with upsets in foreign 
policy, destabilized Khrushchev’s political base, ultimately paving the road to October 
1964. 
 The fact that there was something wrong with the Soviet economy was easy for all 
to see. Yet the solutions to the problems of planning, and even their causes, elicited heavy 
debate. What was certain is that by October 1964, the authority of economists as experts in 
the policymaking process was now no longer a dream, but a nascent reality. For the first 
time since Malenkov’s defeat in 1955, there was a potential for an economic rather than an 
administrative reform of the Soviet system. However, the question of what criterion of 
value to select for economic decision making remained open, even amongst the most 
radically-minded economists. As we shall see, this dilemma made reform easy to initiate 
but extremely hard to define, as so many different groups held different meanings for that 
one word.  
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Chapter 3  
Reform in Action?: The Political Contexts of the Kosygin Reforms  
On September 27, 1965, the new Soviet Premier (Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers), Alexei Kosygin, mounted the podium at a Plenum of the Central Committee. 
In his speech, Kosygin announced that “at the present stage of development in our 
economy, science, technology and culture, we need to start prioritizing economically 
rational management.” He noted that “we are not taking advantage the superiority of our 
socialist system” as Soviet growth rates were falling while those of many capitalist 
countries remained positive. The USSR could not even export its goods to its allies as “[its] 
machinery was of lower quality than that of most capitalist states.” Kosygin proposed three 
major solutions to the country’s economic problems. First, he declared that planning must 
be placed “on a more rational basis,” to more efficiently put available resources toward the 
achievement of “scientifically determined goals” based on “the general laws of socialist 
development.” Second, he proposed “a whole series of measures to increase the 
independence of enterprises” in fulfilling their assigned tasks. Third, he emphasized the 
need to “strengthen ‘cost accounting [Khozrashet]’ by increasing the priority of other 
enterprise indicators such as profitability, the expanded use of commercial credit, price 
levers, and bonuses for productivity.”258  
The process that the September 1965 plenum launched, which in Soviet parlance 
was officially called the “September 1965 Reforms,” and were later to be labeled the 
“Kosygin Reforms,” looked like they might fulfill the dreams of the most radical of 
economic thinkers. In the years running up to September 1965, international observers also 
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thought the Soviet economy might be headed for a radical change. Evsei Liberman made 
the cover of Time Magazine as a stand-in for a perceived trend in Soviet thought that 
encouraged “borrowing from the West” in economic practice.259  Yet, while Western 
Sovietologists believed that the Kosygin reform was an important event for the USSR, and 
would later write about its ultimate failure as an example of Soviet corporate politics (as 
we shall see quite accurately), since the “archival revolution” the Anglophone literature 
has barely mentioned the Kosygin reforms or what it meant for the Soviet system.260 In her 
under-cited book, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era, Natalya Chernyshova 
describes the Kosygin reforms as a crucial step in the building of a Soviet consumer culture 
but does not explore their actual content.261 Both Vladislav Zubok and Slava Gerovitch 
dismiss the reforms, and their potential, as a fantasy of the intelligentsia.262 The Russian-
language literature is not much better. Most writings on the reform have been written by 
participants and/or are polemics on the reformability, or lack thereof, of the Soviet 
system.263  
This chapter will not only fill the void in the literature by documenting the 
conditions under which the Kosygin reforms were formed but also will suggest that rather 
than debate reformability, a more productive way of discussing the reforms is to understand 
them as a key moment in the political history the post-Stalin USSR. It will argue that the 
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reforms were the result of an ideological and political opportunities in the wake of 
Khrushchev’s October 1964 ouster. In that moment, the new leadership, wracked by 
internal rivalries, had not yet defined exactly what would come after Khrushchev’s 
tumultuous decade in power, thereby creating the space for the various intellectual camps 
in Soviet economics to try to turn their ideas into policy. As well, with Khrushchev’s 
removal, the Soviet leadership could acknowledge the vast economic challenges facing the 
USSR and the fact that it was losing “the socio-economic competition” with the West. This 
political vacuum was a unique period in which every interest group saw the possibility of 
reshaping the economy. The events that followed the October Plenum marked the apogee 
of the process of economics’ transformation from a science used to justify the decisions of 
Soviet leaders to a “Cold War Science” in which economists defined themselves as experts 
advising their country’s leadership on how to improve the domestic economy in the face 
of superpower competition. By studying the drafting and then the implementation of the 
Kosygin Reforms, this research shows how deeply economic ideas were marshaled to 
create political programs advocated by distinct coalitions of schools of thought and interest 
groups.  
This chapter will also show that the programs of reform that attempted to influence 
the writing of the Kosygin Reforms were as hampered as they were aided by the politically 
fluid conditions of the mid-1960s. Without a narrative for the future of the socialist system, 
a decision was made to implement the reforms through administrative, rather than through 
statutory law, as had been envisioned during the late Khrushchev period with the discussion 
over a “Law on State Enterprises.” This re-enforced the fundamental weakness of the 
Soviet political system: the inability to openly reconcile and debate differences in the 
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process of drafting legislation. This feature of politics, spurred by the Democratic-
Centralist ideal, meant that choosing to conduct reform through a set of ad hoc, open-ended 
goals which were vulnerable to many different readings was more politically feasible than 
the drafting and implementation of a long-term program of deep economic and social 
change. As such, I argue that there was no comprehensive “Kosygin Reform,” but rather 
that the September Plenum set off a process of competition between various interest groups 
over the future of Soviet society. However, our ex-post assessment of the reforms’ ultimate 
failure should not cloud us to understanding their importance both to understanding Late-
Soviet history and to the actors involved with them. The reforms capped off a 
transformation that had begun in 1956. The competition over the Kosygin Reforms was a 
new kind of political process in which economic expertise was mobilized by various 
groupings to push their agendas—a shift in political practice that raised more questions 
than it provided answers.  
Neither Catching Up Nor Overtaking: The Post-Khrushchev Dilemmas of the Soviet 
Cold War  
On October 12, 1964, Nikita Khrushchev was vacationing in Abkhazia when he 
received a call from his subordinate, Leonid Brezhnev, about an emergency meeting of the 
Presidium that was called to address the pressing problem of agriculture. The General 
Secretary’s presence was needed. Two days later, after being grilled by his colleagues, 
Khrushchev was stripped of his offices and retired. From a certain point of view, the 
October 1964 Plenum represented a step toward the “normalization” of Soviet politics. The 
Party had just, through the initiative of its middle cadres, removed a General Secretary and 
sent him into retirement with no blood spilled or armies mobilized. Yet an examination of 
	 159	
 
the transcripts of the October Presidium meeting and subsequent Central Committee 
Plenum mark it not only as a moment of a triumphal Party ousting an increasingly 
ineffective leader, but also as a moment of profound political anxiety about the future of 
the Soviet project.  
A reading of the proceedings of the October Presidium meetings indicates just how 
central Khrushchev’s economic failures were to his removal from power.  A draft of the 
Presidium’s report to the Central Committee, to be read in the wake of Khrushchev’s 
resignation, explained that “It is no secret to anyone that we have created a myth of a ‘great 
decade’ of economic development. We are constantly told that, in the years that 
Khrushchev has been in charge, miracles have occurred in our economy.” However, “the 
truth is that in this ‘great decade’ many aspects of our economy have become worse, not 
better.” The Third Party Program was condemned for “unrealistic deadlines and 
projections” related to economic growth resulting from the fact that it was written on the 
basis of “no good economic research or accurate calculations.” These same flawed 
projections were the origin of claims of “overtaking the United States in industrial 
production,” a goal that the report, citing evidence from the Institute for Economics, 
showed was not being met. These failures were pinned on Khrushchev’s 1957 Sovnarkhoz 
reforms and his subsequent meddling in the organization of economic cadres.264  
The attacks on Khrushchev in October 1964 were conducted through the 
deployment of economic research on the state of the Soviet economy vis-a-vis the West. In 
a report to the assembled Presidium cited above, Brezhnev quoted research from the 
Institute of Economics that showed that the Soviet economy had slowed down during the 
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Seven Year Plan and that growth in several countries in Western Europe and Japan had 
accelerated in the same period.265 Ironically, the revolution in Soviet thought that 
Khrushchev had launched in 1954, by publically admitting that there was a disparity in 
consumption between Soviet and American citizens that was not closing, had come back 
to haunt him as Brezhnev broke the final taboo: explicitly noting that the USSR’s economy 
had thus far failed in its mission of “catching up and overtaking” the West. In 1965, a report 
of the Institute of Economics to the Central Committee noted that “the recent slowdown in 
economic growth in the Soviet Union comes at the time in which the capitalist states, and 
the United States, in particular, have seen some increases in output.” While the USSR was 
still beating the USA over the course of the previous decade, the recent slowdown “created 
complications for the socio-economic competition of the two systems, for the competition 
of the USSR and the USA.” The data presented by the report, and reproduced below, is 
consistent with the findings presented in the previous chapter and shows that the falling 
rate of return on central state investments, and thus the slowing of economic growth, was 
creating problems for profitability and output.266  
Table 3.1: Sources for National Income of the USSR 1959-1963 in Billions of Rubles.  
  1959 60 61 62 63 
All Industry (not counting the turn over tax) 3.52 3.21 3.48 4.01   
Turnover tax 1.39 1.06 1.45 1.08   
Agriculture -.40 .81 .51 .06   
Construction .94 1.09 .20 .38   
Trade .49 .55 .21 41   
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Transport .81 .72 .32 .28   
Structural and Safety Industries  -.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09   
Foreign Trade Balance 0.73 0.33 0.55 0.06   
Total Growth of National Income Accounts 7.4 7.7 6.7 6.0 4.5 
Source : ARAN f. 1877 o. 8 d. 451 l. 6 
This phenomenon was both cause and effect of a deep structural imbalance in the 
Soviet economy. Falling rates of “accumulation” (Marxist parlance for the rate of 
reinvestment of capital into the real economy) meant that disproportions between sectors 
A and B (heavy and light industry), as well as between all of industry and the agricultural 
sector was expanding. Therefore, citizens were increasing their hoarding cash and goods 
over the course of the last two years of the Seven Year Plan. The report pointed out that 
while the USSR had far larger national capital reserves than any capitalist country (a claim 
made based on the huge savings held by the population), its investment structures were 
causing the efficiency of capital to fall. While most Soviet investments went toward 
increasing production, two-thirds of investment in the United States went to consumption 
causing savings to rapidly circulate through the economy. The unstated implications were 
radical: the reason for the falling rate of national income and thus the slowing efficiency 
of capital was that there was a fundamental misbalance in the economy caused by the 
political priority of heavy industry.267  
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 The Institute’s assessment of Soviet backwardness was confirmed by Gosplan’s 
own, internal, Institute for Scientific Research in Economics (NII). In a report, it argued 
that “the main reason that the task of the competition of the two systems was not fulfilled 
lies in the rates of growth of the capitalist economies which were underestimated by Soviet 
economists.” Because of this miscalculation, “the period of the Seven-Year Plan coincided 
with an upswing in economic growth in capitalist countries” which had “higher growth 
than in previous economic cycles.” Further, “it was thought, that [in this period] the 
capitalist economies would have to go through an [economic] crisis” which did not happen. 
The institute concluded that there were four reasons for this capitalist success that were not 
predicted by the USSR’s economic theory: the large volume capital investments in 
industry; rapid, consumption-led economic growth: a decrease in the production of 
armaments; and finally, the restoration of global trade which forced higher capital 
efficiencies through competition. According to the institute’s calculations, while 
investments into new capital assets in the USSR were larger, overall, than in the USA, the 
American rate of return on these investments was fifty percent higher.268  
The problem of catching up and overtaking the United States was as much a 
problem of economic knowledge as it was of economic practice. In 1965, Gosplan ordered 
its various branch institutes and committees to issue reports comparing their resources 
usage and quality standards to similar sectors in the most advanced capitalist countries. 
The results were unacceptable. It was clear that the ministries and branches had neither 
knowledge of modern techniques of measuring per capita usages of raw materials and 
energy nor of contemporary international quality standards. In fact, these specialists in 
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production and engineering had very little understanding of the workings of contemporary 
capitalist economies in general. For example, Gosplan tried to compare the quality of 438 
goods made in the Moscow Oblast to global standards only to realize that it had no 
comparative data for 338 of them. The report concluded that without the filtering down of 
specialist knowledge on capitalist economies to the branches and the founding of a specific 
organization to coordinate “catch up and overtake,” “all of our proposals about reaching 
global standards of quality and investment” will just be “clouds in the air” because “no one 
knows what those standards are” in the first place.269   
The inability to accurately measure let alone analyze the comparative growth of the 
Soviet and American economies resonated deeply with elite attitudes toward Soviet 
economic policies and impacted the ability of high-ranking experts to push their agendas. 
In December 1964 Kosygin requested that the presidium of the Academy of Sciences 
produce a report “On the Means of Increasing the Economic Effectiveness of National 
Production.” The report delivered by Azumanian and applied mathematician and President 
of the Academy of Sciences, Mstislav Keldysh, was an extremely honest accounting of the 
state of the Soviet economy. The executive summary featured stark data: 
Table 3.2: Average Rates of Growth of Key Indicators in Percentages  
 1954-1958 1959-1963 1961-1963 
Total National 
Income 
11.0 6.5 5.6 
Industry 11.4 9.6 9.0 
Sector A  12.3 10.8 10.4 
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Sector B 9.3 7.2 6.5 
Agriculture  8.6 0.0 0.0 
Capital Investments  15.0 6.6 4.0 
Source: ARAN f. 1849 op. 1 d. 51 l. 1 
Further, rates of labor productivity faced a long-term decline: labor productivity in industry 
fell from a 7.4% average annual increase between 1954 and 1958 to a 5.1% p.a. increase 
in 1961-1963. The growth of output per unit of capital invested had fallen from 1% to .61% 
in the same period.270 While to a modern observer, such growth rates would seem to be 
more than exemplary, this would not be acceptable to a Soviet official of the sixties for 
several reasons. First, while maintaining high rates of growth, these were less than those 
of “capitalist economies” like Japan, West Germany and even the United States in the same 
period. Second, while the Soviet economy continued to expand, its growth rates were 
nowhere near high enough to either catch up to the United States in nominal terms or 
efficient enough to have any basis to claim progress toward that goal in real terms. The 
report pointed out that structural deficiencies in the Soviet economy had led to the 
“inefficient use of financial and technical resources, the continual use of obsolete 
technology, the insufficient integration of new forms of production into distribution 
networks, and extremely high uses of raw materials,” resulting in low quality and slow 
rates of economic development. The executive summary of the report concluded that 
“unless [yearly] growth rates in the United States fall rapidly in the next few years, the task 
of catching up and overtaking the United States in gross output will require significant 
acceleration in the growth of industrial and agricultural production.”271 It concluded that 
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“catch-up and overtake”—the bedrock of Khrushchev’s policy of “peaceful co-
existence”—had failed.   
 The body of the report explained that the “major impediments” of the Soviet 
economy were not inadequacies in heavy industry but rather the rate of growth of 
agriculture, light industry, and civil construction. This led to a situation where “the Soviet 
Union is significantly ahead of all capitalist countries in gross accumulation, especially in 
gross production [Marxist term for the expansion of financial and physical output], but 
significantly lags many of these countries in the quality of accumulation [Marxist term for 
the absolute return on investment].” The rate of return on “every monetary unit of 
accumulation was 21-23% higher in the United States than the USSR and 35% higher in 
Japan.” A major reason for increasing efficiencies in “the leading capitalist countries” was 
the larger percentage of investment going to group B, or consumer industries, than in the 
USSR or other socialist countries. Other advantages that capitalist industrial practice had 
over the USSR included greater energy efficiency, faster rates of completion in new capital 
construction, and a more motivated and educated workforce. The report thus recommended 
that Soviet authorities adjust “unrealistic plans for capital investment” and increase the 
importance of consumer industry and agriculture over that of heavy industry.  
The anxieties proliferating in the economics profession were well expressed in 
1966, at a meeting of the Academy of Sciences’ Economics Section. The venerable 
Rumiantsev lamented that Soviet economics had no answer to how socialism would prove 
its worth in an increasingly Americanized world. Addressing the meeting he asked, “does 
building the material technical-base of communism mean copying American methods of 
development? Does America have Communism? Shouldn't capitalists be jealous of 
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socialist technology, of Communist technology? It should be our task to put these demands 
on science and technology. But to do that we must first solve the problem of organizing 
production and setting its overarching tasks.”272 I.E. Malyshev, the deputy head of the 
TSsU [Central Statistical Agency] and a supporter of the Belkin and Birman price reform 
proposals, echoed these anxieties, explaining that he did not share the “optimism [of other 
speakers]” because he “believe[d] that there are too many divisions in our economic 
sciences on basic questions. We do not have agreement on such basic problems as the 
setting of prices, the establishment of profitability, the effective use of productive funds, 
the main indicators of planning and others. These are all the basics of economic theory 
without which the economy and economic science cannot develop.” These disagreements 
and internal squabbling were hurting the work of creating a program for economic reforms 
now that it was becoming increasingly obvious that the growth rates of the Soviet Union 
were steadily falling compared to those of the United States. Malyshev concluded his 
speech lamenting that “we often talk about importing leading technology from overseas 
but what we should aim for is that they import from us. But how to do this? In military 
matters, they often say that if you fall behind, you are dead. It is the same in economies but 
it just happens more slowly.”273 
Subjectivism and “Scientific” Socialism: Economics and the Post-Khrushchev 
Ideological Void  
Many of those who organized the October 1964 meeting of the Presidium and the 
subsequent Central Committee Plenum came from the camp of those figures in the Party 
who wished to restore the pre-1957 prerogatives of the central authorities. Others, 
                                                
272 ARAN f. 1877 op. 8 d. 504 ll. 25-27. 
273 ARAN f. 1877 op. 8 d. 505 ll. 52-56.  
	 167	
 
including powerful Central Committee secretaries like Alexander Shelepin and Petr 
Demichev, may have even wanted to turn the clock back to the period before 1956. In such 
an atmosphere, it would seem that the agenda for radical economic reform was as doomed 
as Khrushchev’s administrative tinkering. Yet, the agenda for radical reform came out of 
October 1964 stronger than it had been at any point since the mid-1950s.  
One of the reasons for this strength was the precarious position of the USSR in the 
Cold War competition. The other was the ideological void left in the wake of Khrushchev’s 
removal which allowed many to think that the new leadership would be more progressive 
than Khrushchev’s. Hints of why Soviet reformers could have thought this way come out 
of Mikhail Suslov’s speech to the Central Committee Plenum assembled in the wake of the 
Presidium’s removal of Khrushchev—the one that laid out an ideological critique of the 
Khrushchev era. Suslov, the man who would become the party’s chief ideologist, leveled 
two major charges against Khrushchev. The first of these was that Khrushchev had violated 
“Leninist Party Norms” by combining the positions of General Secretary, the chief party 
leadership position, and of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the highest state policy 
making position. This facilitated the second of Khrushchev’s mistakes— “subjectivism”— 
what Suslov “roughly defined” as “making decisions only from one’s own point of view” 
rather than that of the Party and unadvised by experts. As part of his evidence, Suslov 
detailed how Khrushchev had derailed Gosplan’s work on the 1966-1970 Five-Year Plan, 
by dismissing their painstaking efforts and offering his own idea of another “seven-year 
plan” or maybe even “eight-year plan.”274 Suslov’s critique was conservative but it was not 
reactionary. Its implications were not that the Soviet state should somehow abandon 
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progress, or revert to the pre-Khrushchev norm—in fact, it praised the progress made by 
the XX, XXI, XXII Congresses for expanding party democracy and setting the precedent 
for Khrushchev to be replaced. These were not the words of the “Soviet Chinese,” a term 
used by some party officials to describe the group of young hardliners that had gathered 
around Shelepin and KGB head Vladimir Semichastny.275  
Subjectivism became a rallying cry for a scientific community that was searching 
for ways to elevate its role in Soviet politics following October 1964. In 1965, hardline 
Central Committee Secretary Pyotr Demichev began working to organize a series of 
meetings to root out “subjectivism” in the social sciences and humanities. The USSR’s 
leading economists met under the direction of Trapezdnikov in May 1965 to prepare a 
report for the Central Committee. The tone of the meeting was anything but defensive or 
hardline. The fight against “subjectivism” was turned into a call to arms for reform and 
rigor in economic theory. According to one presenter, “the lack of a stable position on 
many basic questions had lowered the prestige of Soviet economists with our foreign 
colleagues.” For example, the Czech economist, Ota Sik, an eminent reformer and later a 
key figure in the Prague Spring, had told his Soviet counterparts that while they had once 
been theoretical leaders, “their inconsistency meant that they had lost their authority in the 
eyes of many people.” The blame for this turn of events was placed on “the subjectivist 
reading of Marxism-Leninism” present in the profession. Indeed, the concluding remarks 
of the meeting, read by Trapezdnikov, recommended that the final report “critique 
subjectivism and volunteerism” in economic sciences and insist that economics be judged 
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on the basis of “a deep knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the effective development of 
specific rules of socialist economic development based on those rules and actions to turn 
theory into practice.”276  
 Thus, as Vladislav Zubok pointed out for Soviet intellectuals as a whole, the 
removal of Khrushchev initially did not seem like the coming of stagnation, but rather an 
opportunity for a more mature government.277 “Liberal” Central Committee advisor and 
speechwriter, Aleksander Bovin, recalled in his memoirs that the personable Leonid 
Brezhnev seemed a welcome change over the manic Khrushchev. The relatively young and 
energetic new General Secretary was even perceived as more welcoming than the dower 
and rigid new Chairman of Council of Ministers (technically Brezhnev’s co-equal), 
Aleksey Kosygin.278 For the economics community, this optimism was complimented by 
the opportunity to continue making the critique of other cadres that, in their opinion, denied 
the usefulness of economic methods and calculation. The years following Khrushchev’s 
removal saw the profession arguing its key role in making Soviet economic practice 
“scientific” and “objective” in contrast to the earlier period’s “subjective” decision making.   
Even before Khrushchev’s removal in August 1964 Azumanian and K.B. Kozlova 
of IMEMO had written to the Council of Ministers to advocate the creation of a centralized 
institute of economics and industrial practice to coordinate and bring together research on 
industrial practices being done by the individual branch ministries. Azumanian and 
Kozlova reiterated this proposal to the new leadership in June 1965 whereupon Kosygin 
forwarded their suggestion to Gosplan and the VSNK. The reply written by VSNK 
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chairman Dimitri Ustinov suggested that while the idea had merit, there were “not yet 
enough trained cadres to staff both a new institute and the existing institutes” at a branch 
level. Ustinov, the advocate of restoring ministerial power and the head of the powerful 
Soviet military-industrial complex, did not want the ministries’ own research institutes to 
be de-staffed and a new institution headed by reformists to gain power over industrial 
policy.279  
The economics community meanwhile had some ideas about what was responsible 
for “the lack of trained cadres.” In the first presentation at the 1965 meeting on the direction 
of economic sciences, K. N. Polotnikov complained that “our country has a serious 
problem with the lack of qualified economists. It wouldn’t be an overstatement to say that 
most economists working in enterprises do not have graduate level training. Industrial 
engineering and administrative cadres do not have any training in the economic 
organization of production.” Polotnikov also pointed out that there were not enough post-
graduate economists to keep up with the need to instruct the expanding number of 
engineers being educated in the USSR and that many of the country’s engineering 
programs had dropped the economics requirements in favor of further technical 
specialization.280  
 Just as the reevaluation of the success of “catch up and overtake” had prompted the 
economics community to organize for structural, economic reform as a strategic, existential 
imperative of the Soviet state, the discussion of “subjectivity” allowed them to make a case 
that it would be central to the restoration of the party line and the regularization of 
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governance. The times seemed ripe for the many interlocking, competing schemas that had 
been germinating since 1956 to blossom.  
State Weakness, Interest Group Politics and the Crafting of the Kosygin Reforms.  
 When the new leadership of the USSR came into power in 1964, it faced very real 
economic and ideological dilemmas but it lacked a coherent schema for implementing the 
necessary reforms. While it was clear that something was wrong, various institutional and 
intellectual groups all presented competing versions of how to solve the problem, and 
indeed, what the problem was. Such issues are not unusual for a modern polity; any 
observer of the guts of policy making in a Western, liberal democracy would recognize the 
familiar battles between interest groups and their affiliated experts. Yet, what makes the 
Soviet case different is that, unlike liberal democracies, with their deliberative institutions, 
the USSR lacked the mechanisms to resolve these tensions outside the fiat of the party 
leadership. This problem of institutional arrangements and decision making was 
engendered by “the democratic-centralist” ideal. While such a conspiratorial organization 
of government was useful for a revolutionary state mobilizing for conflict and growth, it 
became ever more inconvenient as the Soviet economy grew more complex and political 
processes became “normalized.” As Harold Berman already pointed out in 1950, the 
USSR’s post-1936 legal system was stuck in a perpetual cycle between centralizing and 
decentralizing engendered by the need to balance between centralized planning and the 
contingency inherent in decentralized shop floor operations that did not fit into the 
“democratic centralist” ideal.281 Thus, the political opening that allowed for radical 
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economic reform, the October 1964 plenum, was also a moment of political indeterminacy 
in which no defined center of power had formed.   
 On the heels of the March Central Committee Plenum on agricultural reforms, 
spearheaded by Brezhnev, the politburo seems to have turned to industrial and economic 
management as their next problem area. Given his long track-record in the area and the 
mantra of collective leadership, the task of formulating this policy fell to Kosygin. The first 
step of the discussion was the status of a legacy of the Khrushchev period. Shortly before 
October 1964, a version of a “Law on State Enterprises,” the one in discussion since 1959 
and ordered by the November Plenum, was rubberstamped by the Supreme Soviet. At a 
meeting of the Council of Ministers in April 1965, it was decided that the law should be 
reviewed over the next two months before it was approved by the Party. From April through 
June, Kosygin and his staff consulted with both enterprise managers and economists at a 
series of meetings in Moscow and Leningrad, concluding that the law needed to be revised 
to simplify the structure of economic indicators and to increase enterprise independence. 
According to the protocol notes of the Council of Ministers, the central ideas that came 
from the meetings was that main plan indicators should be the volume of realized or 
commodity production in current prices (essentially a measure of goods produced in cash 
prices rather than physical gross output), a centrally determined list of vital products, the 
total wages used in production (the wage fund), total employment, and net profit.282 While 
the Council of Ministers agreed on the centrality of these indicators, there were still many 
definitional, organizational and measurement issues to be worked out. For example, if 
profit were prioritized how would it be calculated? Thus, during summer of 1965, various 
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interest groups and economic schools of thought mobilized to attempt to influence 
whatever new system would emerge out of the drafting process.  
One simple model available for the Soviet Union to follow in its economic reform 
was the GDR’s New Economic System (NES). There is some evidence that the German 
experience was seriously considered by Kosygin as part of his deliberations. Shortly after 
coming to power, perhaps already realizing the task ahead of him, Kosygin asked for 
information on the operation of the new German system from the Soviet ambassador to the 
GDR.  The report explained that the new East German system had increased the output of 
consumer goods, which in the previous year had been 6% over the target, and had improved 
the efficiency of investment by making profitability the primary target for the performance 
of individual enterprises and combines. Each enterprise’s working capital was also 
organized at the enterprise levels and by the local authorities in “production funds” rather 
than at the ministry level.283 
 Foreign experiences of economic reform and administration were certainly 
important to the discussion of what would be termed the “Kosygin Reforms,” but what was 
more significant was how domestic pressure groups filtered these, and other economic 
ideas, through their own experiences to advocate for their own interests. The ministries saw 
the reforms as a chance to get rid of the Sovnarkhoz system and to restore control of 
production back to Moscow. Ministerial pressure on Kosygin began shortly after the 
October Plenum. On December 14, 1964, P. Goremykin, the former head of the machine 
building ministry who was forcibly retired by Khrushchev due to his opposition to the 1957 
reforms, sent a letter to the Central Committee that was forwarded to Kosygin. In it, he 
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argued that the “current system of economic management does not correspond to the 
interests of the state” as the Sovnarkhozes only represented “regional interests.” Because 
of these competing interests, the indicators for plan fulfillment were distorted and were 
generally set at too general a level to be accurate. The alternative was to restore the 
economy back to the condition it was before the 1957 reforms by recentralizing 
management to strong, central branch ministries.284   
As the summer discussions intensified, the ministerial interests continued to make 
their pitch. In a July 1965 proposal sent to Kosygin’s office, VSNK head Dmitri Ustinov 
reiterated the ministerial view, placing the blame for the failures of the Seven Year Plan on 
Khrushchev’s 1957 Sovnarkhoz reforms. This, in Ustinov’s opinion, had led to the 
diffusion of key specialist knowledge and the “loss of the branch as the single basis for 
developing technical and scientific advancements,” thus stalling growth. The steps taken 
since then, including the post-1962 decisions to establish the VSNK and branch-specific 
coordinating departments in Gosplan, had failed to make a dent in the situation because 
these institutions had “neither the legal rights to give orders to the Sovnarkhozes nor the 
material means (physical and financial) to influence their actions.” An alternative system 
needed to be established that would re-concentrate production into branch specific 
organizations. Ustinov proposed restoring central ministries for branches with all-union, 
national significance and having Republican ministries for industries of regional 
significance. Notably, Ustinov said nothing about changing any economic indicators or 
made any hint of supporting a farther-reaching economic reform involving a fundamental 
change of the role of the state in the economy.285  
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 Ministerial interests were not the only advocates for recentralizing control over the 
economy. Everyone seemed to agree that the Sovnarkhozes were a terrible idea. In his 
report to Kosygin, N.K. Rudnev of the State Committee on Science and Technology 
(GKNT) wrote that the major problem of Soviet technological progress was that “large 
construction and contracting organizations” remained inefficient at completing their 
projects on time and incorporating new technologies. These organizational deficiencies 
explained why the Soviet Union remained “behind many foreign countries in the 
development of new technology even though many technical ideas were developed in this 
country.” One of the causes of this problem was that “during the reorganization of 1957, 
many questions of scientific-technical organization were not answered.” Despite the 
decisions of several party plenums between 1962 and 1963 that attempted to rectify the 
problem, no steps had been taken to further experimental arrangements because of the 
resistance of the Sovnarkhozes to transferring their enterprises to other institutions. He 
concluded that the VSNK needed to be eliminated and all its functions moved into the 
Council of Ministers and into Gosplan. Rudnev’s note also betrayed a separate set of 
concerns that were neither present in Ustinov’s note nor Goremykin’s letter. He explained 
that the Soviet economy had larger problems than its administrative organizations. 
Economic issues were at play: the main indicators used in the economy — “gross 
production, costs of goods produced, and labor productivity” — were “inadequate [tools] 
for improving the use of financial funds and stimulating more effective production 
techniques and management.” The problem was that “the questions of developing an 
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improved system of indicators and of effective cost accounting are still being discussed 
and no proposals should be made until such discussions are complete.” 286   
What discussions was Rudnev referencing? The GKNT was a vital institution for 
cultivating reformist economic thought and an especially strong base for the “cost of 
production” school—the economists interested in creating a common interest rate on 
capital, described in chapter one of this dissertation. When their former institutional base, 
the Gosekonomsovet was dissolved, much of its staff and associates including cost of 
production advocates Vaag, Belkin, Birman, and Trapezdnikov went to work for the GKNT 
either directly, or as consultants. Shortly after the publication of Trapezdnikov’s Pravda 
article in 1964, Rudnev assigned Vaag to explore its suggestions further. Following the 
October Plenum, Vaag was invited to meet Kosygin and had what his associate Igor Belkin 
would recall was a “productive conversation” that convinced him that the new leadership 
was ready to begin implementing the ideas he had been arguing for since the mid-1950s. 
Spurred into action by his meeting, Vaag changed the tenor of the report his commission 
was writing from a scientific backgrounder to a set of concrete policy proposals for 
implementing a new system of economic planning and management. In hindsight, Vaag’s 
meeting with Kosygin could be dismissed as one of the fantasies of the “intelligentsia” 
described by Zubok, but there were many reasons why a reasonable observer could think 
dramatic changes were afoot for the Soviet economy. For example, one of the Deputy 
Directors of the Chairman of the Council of Minister’s staff—the one in charge of assisting 
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Kosygin in the development of the new reform—was I. Malyshev, a supporter of Birman, 
Belkin, and Vaag’s proposals of the 1950s.287  
  The Vaag committee finished its proposals in November 1964. Its suggestions can 
only be described as astounding and truly radical. First, Vaag and his associates dismissed 
the previous discussions of economic reform as too little too late, explaining that though 
the November 1962 Plenum had ordered a report on the Liberman discussion in Pravda, 
“the document produced was not widely circulated” and “argued that only minor changes 
to the planning system were needed” because of Gatovsky’s influence on the document. 
Only Trapezdnikov’s suggestions were cited as a step that “could finally solve the problem 
of improving the system of economic methods in the economy.”  The central issue, they 
argued, was that enterprises were not given proper incentives to work effectively because 
the current system prioritized gross output and because managers had no control over the 
uses of their enterprise’s resources. These perverse incentives encouraged enterprises to 
“hide their reserves from their superiors” to maintain their autonomy and have continually 
improving output indicators. The authors concluded that “the [planner’s] inability to 
resolve the contradictory interests of individual enterprises and of society as a whole can 
be completely explained by the use of the wrong method of measuring labor costs in cost 
accounting that does not take into account the cost of capital .”288 
 To correct this problem, the commission proposed a radical solution. Following 
Tapezdnikov’s suggestion, it argued that the main source for the state budget should be a 
fixed percentage payment from each individual enterprise for each ruble invested— in 
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other words, an interest rate on funds lent by the state—rather than the “turnover tax”—the 
tax on goods sold to the population and wholesale industrial consumers—which the report 
proposed abolishing. This would be accompanied by the elevation of profitability as the 
sole criterion of enterprise performance. The question of pricing and value, the key to 
determining what is profitable, would be solved by instituting a price reform in which the 
baseline price of goods would be set by a moving average of the cost of wages and capital 
investments for the individual plant’s branch plus any markup that the enterprise believed 
was proper: in other words, a net cost of capital across a branch. Higher quality goods could 
be marked up more, and lower quality goods less, giving the consumer the flexibility and 
information to make decisions. The report concluded that “the difference between each 
price and the individual costs of each enterprise or the profitability of the enterprise will be 
the measure of its economic effectiveness. Profit is the indicator that shows all sides of an 
enterprise’s economic activity.”289 
This was a remarkable statement for an official Soviet state working group. What 
came later in the report is even more shocking. The authors suggested that new wholesale 
prices, based on the cost of capital, be introduced rapidly and overnight. In their estimation, 
this would not lead to major changes in consumer prices, and thus social disturbances, since 
light and consumer industries were already overvalued compared to heavy, producer goods 
and would have the smallest price increases. Due to the institution of payments for 
productive funds, the government budget would suffer no losses. Furthermore, the plan 
envisioned that starting in 1968, unprofitable enterprises would begin to be closed and their 
facilities, staffs, and fixed capital transferred to profitable uses.290 What the Vaag 
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commission was proposing was a variant of what would, in the 1990s, be called “structural 
reform.”  
Such a radical proposal could not help but generate a vigorous response from many 
corners of the intellectual and political world. One set of criticisms came from the 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences with Liberman at its helm. The Ukrainian report argued 
that “the committee has mostly concerned itself with the improvement of indicators” which 
“was the main problem of the report. Indicators, in and of themselves, do not address the 
problem of increasing the effectivity of production if there are no underlying changes in 
the way planning procedures work, material stimulus is undertaken, and enterprise rights 
are spelled out.” It continued, explaining that the report did not do enough to specify the 
procedures and rights of enterprises and ministries in price setting, the distribution of funds 
and the setting of wages and bonuses. Further, the Ukrainians were concerned that 
overnight price increases, the elimination of indicators other than profit, and ending the 
turnover taxes would have unforeseen economic consequences. Liberman and his 
colleagues clearly were leveraging a conservative critique, but one that came from their 
grounding in an approach based on the cost of labor rather than the cost of capital.291 
A more stridently reactionary critique came from economist M.Z. Bor. Bor accused 
the authors of the report of violating the norms of Marxism-Leninism and harming the 
socialist order. In his letter to the GKNT, he explained that “the proponents of the ‘cost of 
production school’ neglected the negative aspects of profitability.” Bor’s concern was that 
if the profitability of production became the main criterion for judging economic 
efficiency, then goods that were not profitable, but “vital to the needs of building 
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socialism” would no longer be produced, thereby reducing the USSR to the same position 
as a market economy.292 This intervention led the GKNT’s leadership to seek the counsel 
of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism, the USSR’s main academic body for the study of 
Marxist-Leninist theory. The institute responded stating that “we [the authors of the letter] 
are not experts in economic theory and its application, and can only speak in generalities, 
but we believe that Comrade Vaag and other economists proposing setting prices based on 
the ‘cost of production’ are correct.” The Institute singled out Bor as incorrect for thinking 
that price and profitability were only categories associated with capitalism.293 For now, 
Vaag and his colleagues had won the day.  
Yet if the “cost of production school” and its GKNT-issued proposals had won 
official ideological sanction and established connections with the Council of Ministers, it 
was not the only reformist economic theory that tried to sway official opinions in 1965. 
The “cost of labor school,” or the Tovarniks, not only criticized the Vaag commission but 
also forwarded their own proposals to the Council of Ministers. On January 25, 1965, the 
Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences sent a set of proposals written by a 
group chaired by Yakov Kronrod to Kosygin. Like the Vaag team, Kronrod’s proposals 
argued for the need to replace the centrality of gross production with indicators for net 
goods delivered, as measured in money rather than physical terms. In addition, the report 
emphasized the need to make “commodity-cash” relationships, based on contracts, the 
central means of regulating and operating the Soviet economy. The state would set 
production priorities and economic policy and enterprises would be left to figure out how 
to achieve them through their own financial resources: a move that implied higher levels 
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of enterprise autonomy than even Vaag’s radical proposal. This required not only price 
reform but the establishment of a banking system designed to provide commercial and 
trade credit to enterprises. The proposal was consistent with Kronrod’s argument that to 
for money to smoothly circulate in the USSR—without significant hoarding—and thus 
become a numeraire reflecting value, the production of consumer goods would have to 
increase.294 Kronrod and his colleagues differed from Vaag’s team in three areas. First, 
they placed a much greater emphasis on the institutional organization of enterprises and 
the need to establish a banking system to facilitate flexible payments. Second, while 
emphasizing the need to make profitability an important indicator, they opposed the 
elimination of other parameters for plan fulfillment. This arose from their interpretation of 
profit’s role under socialism as primarily a stimulant for labor productivity rather than 
capital investment. Even if profit could be used as a major source of the financial resources 
of an enterprise, it could not be the sole criteria of the use of financial and physical 
resources in production. Third, following from their emphasis on profit as a stimulant of 
labor productivity, Kronrod’s group believed that the cost of labor, or the wage bill, rather 
than the cost of capital, should be the basis for a price reform in 1966.295  
 A third set of proposals came from the so-called mathematical economists gathered 
around CEMI. Their report, signed by CEMI director Fedorenko, was delivered on January 
12, 1965 and was remarkable in several ways. First, it was not written in the guise of a 
report of CEMI but rather of the Academy of Sciences and forwarded with a cover letter 
from Academy President Keldysh. Keldysh’s background as an applied mathematician 
who gained prominence in the Soviet space and ICBM programs made him a natural 
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champion of CEMI and testifies to the ways that the military-scientific complex of the Cold 
War bred a mix of mathematical optimism and utopianism—what Slava Gerovitch 
described as the social network around the burgeoning cybernetics community.296  
The second element that made this memo different from those reviewed above was 
its explicit use of American corporate institutions as a model for the USSR’s new economic 
system. The report explained that in the United States, “the main unit of economic 
administration was not the individual enterprise but rather ‘the firm’ consisting of several 
interconnected factories and enterprises.” What fascinated Fedorenko and his colleagues 
about the firm was that its units were decentralized and regulated by managers with specific 
financial targets set by the corporate head office. The report was especially enthralled by 
the system of accounting control for corporate divisions developed by General Motors in 
the 1920s that became, and still is, the basis for corporate finance and decision making. In 
fact, the authors of the report included organization maps of two iconic postwar American 
“Multi-Divisional Form,” or “M-Form,” multi-branch corporations with independent 
departments—Ford Motors and DuPont—as models that Soviet industrial organization 
could follow. What most disturbed the CEMI economists was that rapid incorporation of 
computerization and data-based management was making American corporations even 
more efficient, allowing for a flexible set of rapid controls from the center and feedback 
loops from each corporate unit. 297  
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 What was to be done on the basis of these facts? While it criticized the 
Sovnarkhozes, the report did not suggest a wholesale return to the ministerial mode of 
organization. Rather than the branches being the most important unit of the economy, 
CEMI suggested that the “cost accounting based combine [Khozraschetnyi Kombinat]—a 
set of interlinked enterprises modeled on the multi-division, vertically integrated 
corporation—become the basic unit of economic management. The leadership of the 
combine would be responsible for making decisions based on internal accounting rather 
than through gross production orders. As with the other groups of economic reform 
theorists, the CEMI economists gave the profit motive a leading place for structuring the 
behavior of economic agents. However, unlike the cost of labor school, which saw profit 
as motivating productivity, and the cost of production school, which saw profit as a 
measure of capital efficiency, the mathematical economists saw price in a similar way to 
Western neo-classical economists: as a transmitter of information. This is why CEMI 
emphasized that it was prices that were important, not profitability; prices should not reflect 
the efficiency of neither capital nor labor but should be transmitters of information from 
the plan to the individual units of the economy. In CEMI’s proposal, prices would be set 
in real time by a nationwide system of computer centers that would process data and adjust 
price levels to prioritize the decisions of the party and make sure that the plan was 
“balanced,” i.e., that all resources were being effectively used toward the fulfillment of the 
set goals.298 
 The proposals put forward by the three major camps of Soviet economists reflected 
division in thinking that had emerged with the creation of Soviet economics as a Cold War 
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Science. The least internationalized of the camps of reformists, the cost of labor school, 
presented a vision of reform based on the cost of labor but also showed the most sensitivity 
to the financial structures of the Soviet economy and their potential to be used for the 
motivation of “work place collectives” toward more efficient production. The “cost of 
production school” held the middle with a focus on the efficiency of capital investment and 
its implication for the development of technology. Meanwhile, the most internationalized 
economists, the mathematical economists working at CEMI, deployed information theory 
to create a schema for economic management that was the least interested in workplace 
democracy and institutional transformation and most concerned with arming the state with 
the correct type of information and decision making systems to place central planning on 
what they viewed as a true scientific basis. 
The economists were just one fractured interest group amongst many. While they 
may have agreed that the Soviet economy’s ills were not just mechanical but fundamentally 
economic and that economists needed to be involved in policy making, they had strong 
differences of opinion on what would solve the problem of economic inefficiency. We have 
already seen that the ministries were exerting direct pressure on Kosygin and the Soviet 
leadership to simply return the USSR to the pre-1957 system of administration. Another 
group was forming in the background trying to manage the change in the economy: the 
central state planning agencies. Already, during the Council of Ministers’ discussions in 
March 1965, the Ministry of Finance warned Kosygin not to give enterprises full control 
over their productive funds and to set central controls over how much investment they 
could make per unit of delivered production in order to avoid a loss of control over the 
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budget.299 In 1965,  former Gosplan chairman, Nikolai Baibakov, was called back from his 
“exile” as the chairman of the Russian Soviet Social Republic’s Gosplan and greeted as a 
returning martyr by the new leadership for his opposition to Khrushchev’s 1957 scheme. 
He immediately retook the helm at Gosplan and began to make the agency the new center 
for state planning, hoping to consolidate other intermediaries such as the VSNK as the 
Sovnarkhoz reforms were undone.300  
The consolidating central planning agencies thus began to more actively take a 
position on reform somewhere between the hyper-conservative, perhaps even reactionary 
desires of the ministries and calls for systemic change issued by the academic economists. 
Through the course of 1965, staffers from these agencies began to make their views known. 
Writing in responses to the Vaag committee proposal, N. Fatisov, head economic specialist 
of the VSNK, complained that “the committee has not touched on the most important 
aspect of improving the economy: the improvement of the planning system and the 
development of a means of managing resources to bring the economy into balance.” Instead 
of starting from the problem of pricing Fatisov argued that first, a system of information 
and administration needed to be perfected that would then set prices. Finally, he asked, 
who under the Vaag plan: 
 would be responsible for the distribution of goods? With the proposed weakening 
of central planning, this is obviously the enterprise itself, based on its knowledge 
of its reserves. But then who will be responsible for quality control? It seems 
obvious that the answer is the interaction of the enterprise itself and the consumer—
in other words a market.  
 
He continued, sarcastically: 
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Then why doesn’t the commission follow the logic of their proposal to its end? It 
should recommend that we encourage competition, organize stock markets and 
other elements of a ‘blossoming’ system of commodity production.’ How, 
otherwise, will we be able to work out supply and demand?  
 
Fatisov’s alternative was to continue to invest and implement the integration of computing 
into production to better manage inventories and distribution. As well, he explained that 
Gosplan and the VSNK were developing their own project of wholesale price reforms that 
would be introduced gradually based on a long period of experimentation. These 
conclusions certainly showed that the staff of the central agencies had some sympathy 
toward the CEMI vision of economic reform.301   
Gosplan, however, was interested in “mathematical economics,” only as long as it 
would not take away from the agency’s privileged positon in drafting the plan and 
distributing resources. This cleavage between Gosplan’s official policy and economists, 
including its own experts, was laid bare in the following exchange of letters and memos. 
In September 1965, L.M. Dukhin, a senior scientific specialist at Gosplan and a holder of 
a Kandidat in economics, wrote to Kosygin to complain about Gosplan’s lack of interest in 
the deployment of cutting-edge economic science. He lamented the hostility of Gosplan 
staffers to the introduction of “optimal planning techniques” for the distribution of capital 
investments. These plans were prepared on a branch by branch basis rather than from the 
perspective of the needs and outcomes of the economy as a whole, the latter a critical 
element of the “optimal” approach which attempted to start from an economy wide basis. 
Gopslan’s approach encouraged poor inter-branch connections and the hoarding of scarce 
financial resources. Dukhin complained that “the author of these lines has been fighting for 
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two years for the creation of a special department within Gosplan which would be 
dedicated to the creation of concrete optimization methods and their applications to the 
calculation of the material balances of various branches and products.” Dukhin wrote that 
his proposals were answered by complaints that his ideas “were only theoretical” and could 
not be put into practice. While admitting that these models were indeed in their infancy, 
Dukhin stated that “without primitive rockets, we could not have today’s satellites.”302  
Dukhin’s intervention promoted a response from Gosplan signed by Baibakov 
himself. He (or his staffer) displayed a significant knowledge of optimal planning, 
explaining its controversial origins in Kantorovich’s work. In 1964, Baibakov testified, 
Gosplan began investigations into implementing “optimal planning techniques” in the 
formation of the 1966-1970 Five-Year Plan. The letter noted that Gosplan had considered 
seven variants of optimal planning methods, including one presented by Dukhin himself. 
The problem with implementing these and other new macroeconomic models was that 
there was simply not yet enough data to test their applicability to various, discreet planning 
problems. All of these schemes were predicated on a central plan for the entire economy 
and had not developed any branch-specific interventions. Baibakov argued that this was 
not the correct way to go about planning and that any exploration of alternative planning 
techniques would have to start with better branch planning because such smaller 
interventions could produce most of the benefits that the proponents of optimal planning 
sought without the need for unfeasible levels of data collection. Baibakov’s response 
showed that Gosplan was not against economic reform—it just wanted it on its own 
terms.303  
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Writing the Reforms  
Kosygin and his office became the nodes through which different conceptions of 
the reform were processed. Yet, the question of what steps to take was as amorphous as the 
question of power in the Soviet system in the wake of Khrushchev’s removal. Both the 
lines of authority and the new directions that the state should take were still in question. 
What legislative and legal form would the new reform take and would it simply modify 
Khrushchev’s project of a new law on state enterprises, that was ready to be passed in 
September 1964, or cancel it and starting anew? A letter by A. Goregliad, the former deputy 
chairman of the Gosekonomsovet and a Gosplan deputy chairman, warned Kosygin that 
letting Khrushchev’s September 1964 decision to pass the a law on state enterprises go 
through would weaken the effectiveness of the new, experimental “economic methods of 
management” that “we have recently begun to realize are so necessary for the economy” 
because it would force enterprises into a work regime uninformed by the results of the 
economic experiments that Gosplan and other agencies hoped to conduct.304 The sentiment 
was shared by Rudnev, who explained that “the current draft of the law reflects cost 
accounting regulations that maintain the preponderance of administrative, rather than 
economic management techniques.” Due to the deficiencies of the Khrushchev-era law and 
the fact that the “government is reviewing suggestions for a new system of management 
based on the wide use economic levers,” he noted, it would be better to rewrite the law 
“later, once we have some experience with this new system” rather than immediately 
implementing the flawed drafts of 1964.305  
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The notes seem to have had an effect. After reviewing these letters, Kosygin 
dispatched a memo to his staff ordering that the reform be approached through a decree of 
the Council of Ministers rather than through statutory law.306 This conceded the fact that 
the state was not ready to define the long-term goals and outlines of an economic reform 
and that changes in the Soviet economy would be the result of a process of negotiation 
between different political-economic visions. The dilemma revealed by the debates of 
summer 1965 was that no one had the political-capital to decide on a grand reform of the 
USSR’s economic system.  
The reforms were officially launched by Kosygin at the September 1965 Party 
Plenum. The Plenum’s decree authorized the party to begin “bringing the management of 
industrial enterprises in line with the new conditions of the economy.” At the center of 
these plans was a restoration of the “branch principle of administration” (i.e. the restoration 
of the ministries) concurrent with greater “independence for enterprises.”307 The Plenum 
gave formal party authorization for the Council of Ministers to begin developing a program 
for economic reform though proclamation. The Council of Ministers issued its decisions 
on October 4, 1965 through a set of two main interlocking proclamations. 
The first, known as Order no. 721 “On the Improvement of Management, Planning 
and Stimulation of Industrial Production,” established the modifications to the Soviet 
system of planning. Point 4 of the proclamation ordered the state and its institutions to 
“acknowledge the necessity of expanding the independence of industrial enterprises.” To 
accomplish this, it specified that “the number of plan indicators given to enterprises must 
be cut down.” “As a rule,” it continued, the most important of these indicators should be 
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“‘the general volume of realized production, priced in current wholesale prices’ and, in 
especially important categories of products, the gross volume of completed production.” 
What this meant was that, in general, enterprises would begin measuring their output of 
goods in money prices rather than the total tonnage of all goods produced. However, 
specific branches and industries whose goods were deemed especially strategically 
important would still work on the old system of measuring their output by the total tonnage. 
The order also specified that labor productivity would be defined by the “general 
expenditures of the wage fund.” The main financial indicators would be the enterprise’s 
profitability and its returns on capital investments. The order defined the main financial 
“funds” over which each enterprise had ownership: the wage and bonus fund (fond 
materialnogo porusheniia), the socio-cultural and housing fund, and the technical 
development fund. Enterprises would have the right to distribute any profits they made into 
these funds as their management saw fit. Finally, it specified that the “delivery contracts 
would be the main legal regulators for economic interactions” and specified that Gosbank 
and its branch-specific sub-banks would begin work on the issuance of commercial credit 
to allow enterprises to engage in contracted agreements.308  
The second proclamation, known as Order no. 729 “On the Role of the Socialist 
Enterprise,” established the definition of an enterprise. It confirmed that the enterprise 
would be the primary holder of property in a socialist state, including the main financial 
funds. Crucially, term holder of property distinguished from owner of property which was 
still the state and thus, in theory, the people. Thus, it specified that ministries, as the 
enterprises’ superior state body, had the right administer how these funds were “formed:” 
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in other words, ministries would set not only the initial level of these newly formed 
financial accounts but would also be able to issue transfers or subsidies over a given fiscal 
period.309   
Implementing the Kosygin Reforms 
The October 1965 joint decrees of the Council of Ministers and the Central 
Committee made little progress on the general direction of economic reform that had 
been established the previous spring. Other than eliminating the Sovnarkhozes, no long-
term goal for economic reform was specified. Instead, the decrees were treated as a 
starting point in an unspecified long-term program of economic reconstruction—one that 
in the absence of an interest group with sufficient political capital, could not be specified. 
Rather than dealing with difficult questions such as what should be the priority and 
institutional design of the USSR’s economy, it moved responsibility for such discussions 
to the agency levels, specifying that Gosplan and the ministries, in consultation with 
research and academic bodies, work out larger problems such as wholesale prices and 
economy-wide quantitative target on “the basis of experience with the new system of 
economic management” established by the 1965 decrees. Effectively, what this did was 
establish these agency committees and ministries as the loci of implementation. This 
would have dramatic consequences as the outcomes of the Kosygin reforms pushed the 
limits of what was acceptable for Soviet economic politics and left the resolution of 
specifics in the hands of state institutions.  
Ambiguities about the precise nature of steps to be taken caused problems almost 
immediately. Even before the issuance of orders 721 and 729, a Gosplan NII report 
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pointed out the difficulties encountered by an experimental clothing plant in Gorky called 
Mayak, which was to be one of the models for the new system. The report found that as 
soon as profitability and marketing were emphasized in the plant’s internal accounting, it 
had to respond to a new factor: consumer demand. Success on the consumer market 
required the plant to retool to produce greater amounts of high-quality products which, in 
turn, hurt the enterprises’ financial position as it was forced to spend its initial funds on 
expensive fixed investments. These large initial outlays required Mayak to receive 
continued external financial support from its ministry it could not produce returns on 
investment and would be, in the short run, be a loss leader. Between the first quarter of 
1964 and the first quarter of 1965, the plant saw a decrease in net profits of 18.5% due to 
its fixed capital outlays. This, in turn, had negative consequences on the bonus system 
and the labor productivity of the plant. To make up for its initial losses, Mayak, which 
was given the right to set its contracted delivery price, had to increase its markups on 
goods which became the main source of funding for the plant’s financial assets. Thus, on 
paper the plant would soon be profitable and, according to the new system, would soon 
be able to pay out incentive based bonuses to its workers based on that profitability. 
However, the plant was deriving a nominal increase in its wage and bonus fund from its 
cost markups rather than from any real increases in labor productivity. In other words, 
wages and bonuses only increased because Mayak was using its newly found flexibility 
in price setting to gain a relative advantage in a scarcity filled, seller’s market rather than 
any “objective” improvement in efficiency.310 For a Marxist state that ostensibly still 
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believed in the importance of the labor theory of value, such a method of increasing 
profitability was unacceptable.  
These initial experiences with single plants became even more complicated as 
more enterprises began to be moved onto “the new system.” At the all-Union level, light 
industrial concerns such as tobacco, tea, and sugar processing were placed on the new 
planning system and issued their initial, self-administered funds, by the end of 1966. 
These were followed by light metallurgy, lithium, and ceramics by early 1967. The 
republics began moving their own industries to the new system, which in the RSFSR 
including metals, energetics, chemistry, machine building and chemistry. Financial dis-
coordination began to rear its head almost immediately. A March 1966 report from M. 
Zotov of Gosbank’s RSFSR branch spelled out what was happening on the ground as 
enterprises and ministries began to operate with more liquid budgets. According to 
Gosbank’s surveys, the ministries had achieved good initial results: profitability had 
increased by 15% in the first year, return on investment had gone up by 9% from the 
previous year, and the cost of goods produced went down by 3%. Meanwhile labor 
productivity, as measured by average output to average capital invested, went up by 13% 
against an increase of wages of 9.7%. However, these positive headline figures obscured 
a set of underlying problems. First, the ministries were not introducing needed changes in 
planning procedures quickly enough to lock in these initial successes over the long-term. 
An enterprise’s ability to operate at profit depended on multiyear, stable norms of output 
which would allow its management to plan its expenditures accordingly. However, 
ministries continued to make up for initial planning failures with frequent changes in 
upcoming yearly production plans and throughout the yearly planning periods, in 
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violation of order 791’s explicit directives. Further, ministries were not transferring 
enough initial working capital to enterprise controlled funds and not setting the long-term 
repayment rates for that initial capital which hindered the individual enterprise’s ability to 
set multiyear financial plans. For example, the Ministry of Heavy Electrical and 
Transportation Machinery did not create a rate of repayment for issued funds until three 
weeks after its major plants had been transferred to the new system. The same was true of 
prices in milk and dairy processing plants which were not confirmed for months.311  
Zotov concluded that without establishing such prerequisites, the positive results 
of the new system would be ephemeral:   
The effectiveness of the new system is significantly lowered by the fact that 
consumer enterprises do not have the means of payment to fulfill their end of the 
contract. The reason for this are the long delays in ministries’ establishment and 
planning of direct legal and economic ties between producers and consumers. 
The situation is especially dire in the machine building and construction sectors 
where enterprise managers and ministerial officials still place orders with no 
regard to their means of payment or for profitability. 
 
To borrow the language of modern financial markets, the prevalence of such 
“incompletes” between supplier and consumer in unsecured instruments meant that the 
contracted counterparties could not guarantee future cash inflows and thus would become 
unprofitable despite doing everything correctly. The profitability indicator was also 
distorted by the fact that the ministry staffs were setting inconsistent rates of repayment 
for capital investments to privilege some enterprises over others.312  
Zotov’s note reflected the financial and economic consequences of the 
fundamental problem with 1965 proclamations—the fact that they did not specify a legal 
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set of obligations for the ministries, nor did they have a mechanism for enforcing 
consistent implementation through some third party. Essentially, by passing the buck and 
choosing to make the reforms an evolutionary process, the proclamations reified the 
institutional arrangements of the Soviet economy as much as they reformed them by 
leaving the inter-institutional financial flows largely unchanged. This situation was 
confirmed by other early evaluations of the reform. In March 1966, Gosplan’s Baibakov 
wrote to the Council of Ministers with his initial estimations of the effectiveness of the 
reforms. The early results were generally positive as enterprises transferred to the new 
system had been showing improvements in both productivity and profitability. Yet, 
Baibakov noted that there were not yet enough consistent regulations across branches in 
areas like contract enforcement, the transfers of productive funds, and remuneration 
which were holding back the overall impacts of the reforms. Baibakov was impressed by 
the expanded use of bank-issued trade credit by enterprises attempting to make deals with 
counterparties. 313 This opinion was not shared by Stroibank, the entity in charge of 
financing new construction, which wrote that in the same period addressed by Baibakov 
the lack of clear regulation had led to 248 million rubles in overdrafts. This increasing 
reliance on overdrafts to deal with the lack of rules and regulations led to 30% of 
equipment orders by construction sites being unpaid for by the customer. Further, 
enterprises were mostly drawing on long-term credit lines instead of shorter nine-month 
financing meaning that the traditional position of a bank (state or private)—borrowing 
short and lending long—was moving in the wrong direction and banks were unable to use 
their balance sheet to rollover funding and had to take losses on failed loans. In the Soviet 
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system, where bankruptcy was non-existent, this meant an ultimate loss to the state 
budget.314  
Meanwhile, on the other side of the institutional divide, ministries were 
complaining that they had no guidelines for how to implement the reforms. For example, 
the Ministry of Light Machine Building complained that Gosplan and the experts in the 
Academy of Sciences were both moving too slowly in giving them information on 
wholesale pricing. The Ministry of Oil Exploration was even more strident stating that 
without price reforms on its category of products, it could not maintain profitability and 
asked for special exceptions be made for it in amortizing their losses on replacing old 
equipment.315  
Frictions were also increasing between the now nominally independent 
enterprises and their ministries and superior organizations. These were laid bare in 1968 
when the multi-agency commission on economic reform (MGK), a special committee of 
agency staff and experts formed under Gosplan, met to discuss how to issue accounting 
regulations to the glavki, the ministerial subdivisions, to full Khozrashchot (cost 
accounting using their own funds). The meeting was divided into two days, the first to 
listen to the representatives of the enterprises and the second to listen to the heads of the 
glavki. The enterprise leaders were extremely wary of expanding the profitability 
requirement to their superiors as they feared that the glavki would begin to interfere in 
enterprises operations in ways that would advance their own bottom-line but hurt the 
enterprise’s.  A “Comrade Osivitch” of the Krasnogorsk Mechanical Plant argued that: 
We agree that the glavki need to be moved onto a cost accounting standard. 
However, we think that this transition is only possible if the rights and 
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responsibilities of these entities are strictly defined. As other comrades have 
already mentioned, we need to have a strict delineation of the ways that this 
higher standing organ will interact with its subordinate enterprises.316 
 
Furthermore, he explained that he was concerned that such steps required “strict 
monitoring and definitions of the wage and bonus funds” of the Glavki in fear that their 
workers would take profits from enterprises to remunerate themselves. Other members of 
the discussion were more straightforward about their fears. One participant, a Comrade 
Slivin, explained that if enterprise rights were not protected, his superiors, searching for 
profit, would put excessive tasks on his profitable plant “because we work well” rather 
than on the unprofitable members of his branch which could not fulfill those tasks. This, 
in turn, would mean that his enterprise would not be able to keep its profits and his own 
financial resources, and thus wages, would diminish. Another speaker feared that the 
entire matter would wind up being a “conspiracy against the rights of enterprises” and 
stated that it should not be the individual enterprise’s responsibility to give up its hard-
won profits to benefit less profitable enterprises in their glavok. Enterprises, he 
concluded, should focus on their jobs, and “the government should focus on creating new 
financial reserves.”  Finally, several enterprise managers complained about their 
superiors being generally wasteful, with one arguing that cost accounting and bonus 
structures might incentivize the staffs of these organizations to come to the factory floor 
since in their industry, it seemed no one ever came to interact with enterprise staffs.317   
 The second day of the meeting featured representatives of the glavok staffs. These 
staff members also had their own complaints to Gosplan, mostly about their own 
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superiors. A manager named Ilunin working at the Ministry of Instrument Manufacture 
argued that “the construction of long term new investments [capital construction] is not 
being done according to procedure because too many organizations, including Gosplan’s 
branch committees, are not giving us the opportunity to address our area’s problems as 
we believe fit.” A representative of the Ministry of Light Metals complained that the 
propositions being discussed had no relation to reality as “cost accounting is moving 
forward with no regard to the further planning of supply.” How then would the glavok 
staff be able to operate with profit if Gosplan was not issuing standards of the kinds of 
goods that needed to be produced or consistent prices for them?318  
 Tensions between institutions were the result of the larger problem of how to 
control the spending and flow of relatively more liquid funds. Yuri Firsov, one of 
Kosygin’s aides specializing in foreign relations and international trade, recalled one 
illustrative incident when, during the height of the reforms, Kosygin met with the director 
of the famed Red October Chocolate Factory, A.A. Grinenko. Grinenko complained that 
the regulations being issued meant that the enterprise only had the right to use 4 million 
rubles of their 176-million-ruble enterprise fund toward wages. “I ask you nothing else 
but to let us use the funds we have as we see fit,” Grinenko told the Premier. Kosygin 
replied “Look Grinenko, I know I can trust you to responsibly administer your funds as 
you see fit. But can you imagine what would happen if I gave this right to all enterprises 
and what would happen in a very far-off area like say Yakutsk? We will never figure out 
what they are doing out there!”319 The Grinenko-Kosygin exchange points to one of the 
central underlying issues of institutional distrust and competition: the distribution of 
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control of wage funds and bonuses. The challenge of ruling a vast country with diverse 
economic conditions naturally brought up the tensions between the central control of the 
state budget and enterprise independence that were inherent in the Soviet economic 
reform project. Kosygin’s instinct was to err on the side of the former. Baibakov recalled 
that while working with Kosygin, the Premier’s primary concern was to make sure that 
the five-year plans developed under his watch had considered the proportion between 
planned central expenditures and the planned growth in wages and bonuses to defend the 
state budget from over-issuing currency and to prevent shortages in contrast to his own 
preference for boosting growth.320  
The fear of losing control over the relationship between wages, investable funds, 
and enterprise profitability brings us back to the problem identified by Kalecki, discussed 
earlier in the dissertation. If the USSR maintained an economic structure that emphasized 
the production of heavy goods at the expense of the consumer, any profitable action by an 
individual enterprise would be offset by the fact that the additional wages generated by 
the bonus system would not be complimented by an equivalent, inter-temporal increase in 
the basket of available goods that a gain in productivity would otherwise engender. While 
attempting to address this problem, the reforms simply shifted the institutional channel 
through which this misbalance in the real economy expressed itself on institutional 
balance sheets from capital investments funded from the state budget to overruns of 
enterprise wage funds. Soviet economists associated with the “Tovarnik” and “Cost of 
Production” approaches understood this problem in various ways. For the Tovarniks, like 
Kronrod, the misbalance in the economy was proof of the alienation of labor from the 
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fruits of production. Workers were being paid more cash while the amount of consumer 
goods that they could purchase with that cash remained relatively constant. This meant 
the the purchasing power of the ruble reflected the worker’s relative alienation. For Vaag 
and his colleagues, the continued existence of these perennial problems were the result of 
the lack of an economy wide interest rate. Without such a benchmark, enterprises could 
not effectively price their goods and markets would not clear. The results were the same. 
The Soviet Union was still stuck in a cycle of inflation wherein the state was issuing 
more cash to chase the same volume of goods. This cash would pile up in the savings of 
households thereby not reentering the budget through taxes, resulting in an expanding set 
of liabilities on the state.  
This dilemma was implicitly understood by Gosbank which, in its June 1968 
“Quarterly Report on the Circulation of Currency in the USSR,” explained that while “in 
the conditions of a planned economy the state has the ability to regulate the volume of 
currency in circulation,” if the population is undersupplied with goods compared to its 
spending power, “a portion of the money supply remains in the hands of the population.” 
According to Gosbank’s calculations, this amounted to about 2 billion rubles in cash that 
weren’t making it back into circulation.321 If the problem of money being held by the 
population mirrored the inflationary tendencies of 1961-1963, its precise dimensions and 
institutional pathways changed due to the 1965 reforms as wage overdrafts at the 
enterprise level had replaced state budget overdrafts. In the second quarter of 1966, a 
joint report of Gosplan, Gosbank, and the Ministry of Finance to the Council of Ministers 
explained that despite a general stabilization in the issuance of rubles compared to 1961-
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3, “the lower than needed rate of growth in the production of consumer goods compared 
to the increased money gains of the population is having unhealthy effects on the 
circulation of money.” The report concluded that the bonuses being paid out to workers 
in enterprises converted to the new system in 1965 and 1966 had increased the money 
supply above the quantity of goods available on the market “despite some increase in 
consumer goods” and could present “long term difficulties for the purchasing power of 
the ruble.”322  
Gosbank pointed out that since the early 1950s, consumer production had fallen 
as a percentage of total output. In 1950, consumer goods had made up 45.5% of all Soviet 
production and 42.8% in 1955. By 1960, it was 39.8% of all production and 1965, 38.6%. 
By 1965 and 1966 “group B” consumer industries made up only 4.5% and 4.4% of new 
capital investments respectively. Meanwhile, wages were going up faster than planned, 
reducing the overall productivity of labor in monetary terms. These phenomena combined 
to lower the return on capital which in 1951-1960 had seen increases of 2.0% p.a., but 
began to fall at 1.0% p.a. between 1956 and 1960 and then at 1.5% p.a. in 1960-1965.  
What was changing after 1965 was the structural composition of the Soviet labor 
“market.” The Kosygin reforms had incentivized enterprises to change the way they were 
distributing salaries. From 1961-1965, the main source of above-planned wages was the 
over-hiring of workers. After 1965, enterprises were hiring fewer workers but the average 
salary per worker was increasing. This was causing “a disruption in the planned increases 
in labor productivity” as bonus payments were not doing their job to incentivize an 
increase in average output per worker.323   
                                                
322 Ibid., ll. 63-73.  
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While Gosbank was observing these shifts from above, an unlikely source was 
also doing so from below: the KGB. A 1966 survey of opinions and work conditions by 
the Lithuanian branch of the KGB gives us a glimpse into the on the ground conditions 
driving the phenomena observed by central economic authorities. The first thing that the 
report noted was that enterprises were suffering from the problems of institutional and 
supply chain coordination. Managers complained that their suppliers would miss 
deliveries which, in turn, would force them to both fail to complete their contracts to their 
own customers and to not fulfill the profitability targets set by their superior 
organizations. As well, they complained that their labor productivity and bonus targets 
were set on a yearly basis, rather than on the 3-5 year terms that the new system 
envisioned, constraining their enterprise’s internal planning, and that republic-level 
management institutions had become “the agents of the central ministries.” This, in turn, 
had drastic consequences for labor practices. Supply issues meant that “labor wasn’t 
being utilized at full capacity” with many workers idled due to lack of material. This 
encouraged unhealthy “storming” practices, as workers made up the lost time in bursts of 
work which stressed supply chains further. In turn, enterprises suffered from increasingly 
high rates of labor turnover. Over the period the KGB observed the Vilnius electronic 
calculator plant, 1307 out of 4407 workers had left their workplace while the plant hired 
1609 new personnel. Of those who left, the majority were line workers, most of whom, 
897, had left of their own accord. The same phenomenon was observed at the Vilnius Bus 
Depot, which despite increases in wages, saw so many of its conductors and drivers leave 
that it was facing a labor deficit. The most active, productive workers were moving to 
less demanding jobs as soon as enterprises attempted to catch up on missed production or 
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to hit more intense productivity standards—after all, given the undersupply of goods, a 
marginal increase in cash payments associated with greater productivity produced very 
little added utility. In turn, productivity was not moving at the same rate as wage 
expenditures since enterprises had to compete for these more skilled workers by offering 
drastically higher salaries and better benefits.324  
In 1969, as the Eighth Five-Year plan was coming to an end, a review of the 
reforms began both in the Central Committee and in various Soviet agencies. A report 
from the Yaroslavl Obkom noted that “all enterprises transferred to the new system had 
produced better results across a whole range of indicators than any enterprise still 
working under old conditions.” Yet, it also explained that “a whole variety of enterprises 
working on the new system have low rates of increase in the volume of production (from 
year to year) despite over fulfilling their financial plans.” Some of the reasons proposed 
by Yaroslavl were that enterprises were not installing new equipment and that capital 
investments were not being used effectively, even though enterprises now had to pay 
some of them back. Like other localities, Yaroslavl’s average enterprise’s rate of wage 
increases was not in line with its rate of labor productivity. In 1966, labor productivity 
went up 4.7% while the average wage went up by 6.5%. In 1968, this ratio was 7.6% to 
8.3%. While the disproportion was decreasing due to the “work of local party 
organizations in enforcing norms,” many “individual enterprises” were still increasing 
their wages faster than their productivity. This was compounded by the fact that “the 
                                                
324 LVOA f. K-41, ap. 1 k. 6. ll. 73-80. My infinite thanks to my friend and colleague, Alex Hazanov, who 
found and scanned this document while researching KGB surveillance in the Baltic. The role of the KGB as 
a source of economic information leaves itself open to further investigation, if and when archives become 
open. On the rapid increase of labor mobility in the late 1960s and through the l970s see David E. Powell, 
“Labor Turnover in the Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 36, no. 2 (1977): 268–85.  
	 204	
 
management and engineering staffs” received the lion’s shares of bonuses issued for plan 
fulfillment.325   
A similar pattern was observed in the report from Ukraine’s Communist Party 
Central Committee. Failures to consistently introduce financial indicators such as an 
unchanging rate for payments on state investments, and the lack of coordination in supply 
led to problems in fulfilling the plan. Newly decentralized enterprises, now extremely 
sensitive to being profitable and to potential bonuses that their staffs could receive, 
underestimated their own potential to their superiors and then over-fulfilled their plans. 
Thus, while enterprises appeared to be profitable, and to be increasing their output, they 
were operating below capacity to make sure that they would hit their targets. The 
prevalence of these, so called, “untaught” plans were a symptom of the fact that “the 
current system of fund payments and labor stimulus bonuses lead to enterprises 
perceiving no difference between intensive and un-intensive production plans.” This 
intentional under capacity on the part of the enterprises led to the major problems 
reported in other localities: wages outstripping productivity and high labor turnover.  In 
fact, it meant that very often the wage and material stimulus funds were overdrawn 
compared to production funds earmarked to purchase new fixed capital.  The preference 
for immediate returns meant that new technology was not effectively introduced to the 
factory floor. Despite a slight increase in the purchasing of new machinery, new fixed 
capital units were still far costlier than their impact on productivity to offset spending on 
bonuses. For example, while automatic looms increased the average productivity per 
worker threefold they cost eight times the amount of older, manned, mechanical looms—
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money that could be spent on salary increases now rather than improved production 
later.326  
Other factors were also interfering with the efficient implementation of the 
Kosygin reform. The original orders from 1965 specified that while the net cash price of 
goods delivered to market would be the primary indicator, gross production of goods 
would remain the primary target for unspecified key strategic sectors. The Moscow Party 
Committee reported that enterprises and ministries resisted moving to the new system and 
tried to maintain their old gross output indicators. Without the incentive to market their 
goods to make cash profits, these enterprises paid bonuses for increases in gross 
production without any change in the quality of goods produced.327 
These local reports were confirmed by a November 1969 TSsU report to the 
Central Committee. Surveying 325 sites, including workshops, production lines, and 
agricultural technical facilities, TsSU’s staff found that at 270 sites, the net production of 
goods per worker was lower than projected in the production plan and only 55 sites had 
over-fulfilled their targets for this indicator. Thus, four out of five surveyed sites had 
failed to achieve improvements in labor productivity.  As well, surveyed enterprises 
tended to not use their financial resources for investing into labor-saving technological 
improvements, meaning that the majority had under-fulfilled their targets for reducing 
their labor force. As a result, at 197 enterprises the cost of goods produced 
(sebestoimost’) had failed to fall to the level projected by their yearly production plan and 
only 36 had managed to over-fulfill their target cost reductions, causing an overrun of 
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190 million rubles across the sample.328  
The problems faced by the USSR in the wake of the first wave of the Kosygin 
reforms were summed up in a note written by CEMI veteran turned in-house economist 
to Gosplan’s section on economic reform and new computing technologies, Vladimir 
Kossov, in 1970. According to Kossov, the reforms had been relatively successful in 
shifting the onus of financing from the state’s central budget to the balance sheets of the 
enterprises and to a certain extent the  
 ministries, as shown from the data below: 
Table 3.3. Sources of Capital Investments 1965-1968 
 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Central Capital 
Investments 
(in billions of 
rubles) 




22.5 26.1 34.9 44.4 
Central Capital 
Investments as  
Percentage of 
Profit (in %) 
80 73 56 47.5 
 source: RGAE f. 4372 op. 66 d. 3962 ll. 1 
 
As the table shows, while central capital investments increased slightly, they had come 
down from being 80% of the funding of enterprise profits in 1965 to being only 47.5% in 
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1968. Clearly, enterprises were beginning to rely more on their own financial resources. 
Yet, this channel of fund outflows was being replaced by another one: the constant 
increase of wages in proportion to the national income as shown in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4: Growth in Average House Hold Wages, 1961-1968  
  1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Average Growth of 
Monthly Take Home 
Wages (in millions of 
rub) 
4.1 3.2 1.7 2.0 5.2 6.5 4.5 7.6 
National Income 
Growth (in millions of 
rub) 
6.8 5.7 4.0 9.3 6.9 8.1 8.6 7.7 
Real Rate of Income 
Growth 
.60 .56 .43 .22 .75 .80 .52 1.01  
source: RGAE f. 4372 op. 66 d. 3962 ll. 2 
Thus, while one channel for the outflow of state funds began to close, another 
began to widen, as enterprises began to remunerate their most valuable workers more in 
the face of increased labor mobility, while less valuable workers idled while continuing 
to receive wages. This situation, Kossov pointed out, was caused by the fact that Soviet 
enterprises had few rights to lay off workers in order to become more profitable and 
productive. Further, to fulfil obligations and make wage payments, enterprises stopped 
drawing on central state funds directly, and instead took out loans from Gosbank and its 
subsidiaries that they could not pay off, resulting in large overdrafts which, in turn, 
resulted in losses to the overall state budget as Gosbank had to write off its losses—after 




As enterprise accounts became more liquid, leverage flowed from the state budget 
to the enterprise wage funds, and banks, which in turn put pressure on the consumer 
goods market and then finally, onto the state budget through the over-issuance of cash 
and credit by state-owned entities. In other words, the USSR had accumulated a giant ball 
of intra-societal debt and the limited structural changes introduced by the Kosygin 
Reforms had simply succeeded in getting it to roll from one part of the state balance sheet 
to another with very little deleveraging.  
Gosbank recognized this problem. In 1970, it argued that the state had several 
ways of dealing with the changes that were emerging in the Soviet economy. The best 
option was to begin a long-term shift toward reinvesting the bulk of the state’s income 
into the consumer sector, thereby supplying the market with goods and removing excess 
cash from the population. Yet, because this would take an extremely long period of time 
to implement, it proposed that the increases in economic stimulus funds and the issuing 
of bonuses for productivity be frozen for two to three years to slow the increasing volume 
of cash being held by households. It also suggested that prices on consumer goods be 
made “more flexible” and markups on especially high demand goods, such as 
automobiles, be increased by as much as fifty percent to force households to spend their 
excess savings. As well, it argued that enterprises should get out of the business of 
providing fringe benefits such as housing and vacations—a key element of the Soviet 
welfare state model—and that those resources should be paid  for out of worker’s 
wages.330  
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What went unstated in Gosbank’s proposals was that each of these choices either 
required a political shift in the conceptualization of the relationship between the state and 
economy or an abandonment and slowing of the reforms. The economic fissures opened 
by the implementation of the 1965 reforms posed a series of political and ideological 
dilemmas for the Soviet state. Would decreasing leverage and improving capital 
efficiency mean that the USSR would have to abandon certain elements critical to its 
identity as a “socialist state?” Could the Soviet Union really abandon such core elements 
of its version of state socialism such as the enterprise-based welfare system, the priority 
of production goods, and the centrality of labor productivity to growth? Even more 
critically, these dilemmas begged the question of who had the power to make these 
choices and how could making (or not making) them be justified. These underlying 
political-economic tensions would shape the politics of institutional and intellectual 
competition over economic reform from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s.  
Conclusion: Weak State, Weak Reforms 
While they were the most far-reaching Soviet reform project since the 1957 
Sovnarkhoz reforms and offered the possibility of a radical rethinking of the economics of 
socialism, the October proclamations made little progress on the discussions of April 1965. 
With the exception of the restoration of the “branch principle of administration,” a goal 
shared by all stakeholders, the reforms had not implemented any course of action or 
strategy that had been recommended over the summer. Instead of radically changing the 
underlying institutional relationships, and most importantly, the funding priorities of the 
state, the October 1965 reforms became empty vessels for the aspirations of various groups 
who each saw them as a first step to gaining what they wanted. Thus, everyone from the 
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ministries, to Gosplan, to the most radical of reformers could remain hopeful that their 
agenda would soon be implemented. Yet, that did not make the politics of reform any less 
real or historically important. Concrete steps were being taken that, given that the reforms 
were being pitched as a long, multistep process, were obvious starting points for any of 
these agendas.  
This ambiguity was a symptom of a larger problem of Soviet state power in the 
wake of Khrushchev’s reign. The zigzags of Khrushchev’s policies led to a Soviet state 
that perceived itself as weak on an international level, having failed to reach its targets to 
“catch up and overtake the United States,” and whose government was divided between 
two or three powerful leaders with no mechanism to resolve these divisions short of 
political intrigue and backroom deals. While the 1965 reforms were a response to some of 
these problems, their lack of a concrete aim other than an abstract improvement of the 
economy were a symptom of the multi-polarity of Soviet politics and the lack of institutions 
that could forge effective legislation. The results that did emerge from this process were 
hampered by the fact that the legislation was a collection of half measures which reified 
institutional power relationships in the economy rather than reformed them.  
Yet, the problem that faced Khrushchev’s successors remained. The USSR’s 
economic success was deeply tied into the narratives that underpinned the day-to-day 
functioning of Marxist-Leninist ideology and therefore the legitimacy of the Soviet state 
itself. Like in 1955, Soviet leaders needed a way to create a new narrative of the USSR’s 
economic superiority to its capitalist rivals which legitimized both bases of the Soviet 
project: its ideological vision and its institutional practices. This task would fall not to an 




From Radical to Conservative Reform: The End of the Kosygin Reforms and the 
Politics of “Developed Socialism.”   
In 1972 Yakov Kronrod was in trouble and, unlike in 1955, he would not get out 
this one free of harm. A commission of external auditors including experts from rival 
economic research institutes and officials from the Moscow Party Organization had 
descended on the Academy of Sciences’ Institute for Economics following a proclamation 
by the Central Committee on its failures in advancing social sciences. The Commission, 
having taken its stock of the Institute’s work, removed Kronrod from his post as Deputy 
Director in charge of the Section on The Political Economy of Socialism—the Institute’s 
primary body for the development of the theory of what defined a socialist economy—and 
forced him into semi-retirement by giving him the largely powerless position of “Senior 
Scientific Associate.” Like most forced retirements in Late-Soviet academic politics, 
Kronrod’s removal wasn’t just a scientific matter: it was a coordinated strike by a set of 
academic and political groups on their rival—in this case, the Tovarniks.331  
What is especially striking about this round of academic purging is that it came 
right on the heels of a period during which the Tovarniks and other economic reformers 
believed that the implementation of their ideas was imminent. The previous chapter argued 
that the September 1965 “Kosygin Reforms” were viewed as a fundamental breakthrough 
for those, including Kronrod, who had wanted to see fundamental changes in the Soviet 
economy. Yet, between 1965 and 1972, two paradoxical shifts were happening. On the one 
hand, Soviet state officials were trumpeting a new stage in the economic reform—one that 
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would push the USSR into a new era of development marked by what they called “the 
global scientific-technical revolution.” This new period in historical development heralded 
the final victory of socialism—whose planned order was a natural fit to this looming post-
industrial era—as well as the expansion of cutting edge initiatives in the economy 
involving better management, optimal planning, and the introduction of computer driven 
productive techniques. On the other hand, the scope of what economic reform meant and 
the extent of the intellectual and institutional changes that it could entail was drastically 
curtailed. Indeed, the era that would follow would be labeled “stagnation” by the successors 
of the leader at the helm of “developed socialism”—Leonid Brezhnev. Leaving aside the 
ex-post facto assessments of Brezhnev’s successors, a close reading of “the era of 
stagnation” reveals not only the negative agenda of anti-reformism emphasized by 
Gorbachev and his allies but also a positive project into which massive amounts of political 
capital was invested.  
As we shall in this chapter, a striking amount of ideological work had to be done to 
build the conservative settlement that “stagnation” signified.  “Developed Socialism” was 
not just a set of axioms that stifled reform but also a shaped the intellectual parameters of 
those who would later critique it. Research on the “Soviet Seventies” has shed light on the 
era as an incubator for the “liberal” political reform of the late 1980s. Political Scientists 
and historians as diverse as Mark Sandal, Edward Bacon, Archie Brown and Robert 
English have traced the ideas that inspired Gorbachev’s Perestroika to the intellectual 
milieus formed during the Brezhnev period.332 However, despite the dominance of political 
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scientists in this literature, there has been surprisingly little politics involved in it. Rather, 
authors have either relied on studies of small groups in the Central Committee (calling 
them “Chamaeleon Institutions”) or on intellectual communities looking “West” to some 
ideal liberalism rather than contextualizing these figures into their own political milieus 
including their relationships with conservative opponents. By avoiding the nitty-gritty of 
Soviet economic politics, this Whigish historiography, unsurprisingly written in the late 
1990s to mid-2000s, looks to its subjects as the antecedes of triumphal post-Soviet, Russian 
liberalism. Yet, this approach means taking many of their study’s actors out of the context 
of their period. In other words, it cannot explain how an erstwhile left-liberal hero like 
Gavril Popov, the first post-Soviet mayor of Moscow and Social-Democratic economist at 
Moscow State University (MGU), would align with some of the most conservative 
elements in the USSR to oust a critic of the Soviet system like Yakov Kronrod in 1972. In 
the Russophone literature, R.G. Pikhoia and A.K. Sokolov have carefully and expertly 
cataloged the intrigues and high political shifts of the late-Soviet era, placing the start of 
“stagnation” with the end of economic reform but have not specifically focused on its 
institutional or intellectual context.333  
 A similar problem has emerged in the recent literature on Soviet economic thought. 
Coming out of sociology, science and technology studies, and anthropology, a slew of work 
has appeared in recent years looking to better understand the social and cultural 
composition of Soviet economists and related technocrats in the 1970s. Ben Peters’ 
excellent How Not to Network a Nation has used publically available information, 
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Ukrainian archives, and interviews to paint a subtle picture of Soviet cyberneticists and 
mathematical economists as both competing, if often aligned groups, but as starkly 
different from what he calls “liberal economists”—in other words Tovarniks and the 
members of the Cost of Production school.334 Adam Leed’s recent dissertation deploys 
critical theory to write an ethnography of Mathematical Economists and describe how they, 
and other members of the so-called “technical intelligentsia,” formed under the conditions 
of the 1970s and became the vanguard of Post-Soviet liberalism with its elitist 
particularities.335 Olessia Kirtchik and Ivan Boldyrev’s research group at the Higher School 
of Economics has done similar sociological research to trace how mathematical language 
allowed Soviet general equilibrium theorists to draw on the same sources as their Western 
counterparts while never being institutionally incorporated into economics as a discipline 
or indeed thinking of themselves as economists.336 Their study has done extensive work on 
the internal institutional contexts of various Soviet research institutes and CEMI in 
particular. Yet, these studies of the rise of Soviet “mathematical-economics” have the same 
thing in common: they are completely apolitical, or at least they replace policymaking and 
bureaucratic politics with cultural politics. What is lost in this cultural-institutional 
sociology of science is the sound of the grinding wheels of institutional competition, 
political coalition building, and their associated economic outcomes.  Losing these textures 
is particularly harmful to the study of the USSR which, after all, was a highly 
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bureaucratized authoritarian state and the study of modern economics which is, as these 
studies have established, a political discipline at its heart.  
 This chapter will attempt to rectify the gaps in the literature and move toward 
building a new way of understanding the period of stagnation by chronicling how the 
evolution and consolidation of Soviet economics was deeply intertwined with 
consequences of the Kosygin Reforms and the very real political and economic dangers 
that they unleashed.  It will continue the thread developed in the previous chapter by 
arguing that these challenges sharpened the divisions between interest groups with very 
different visions and agendas for what a post-reform USSR would look like. Finally, it will 
show how Brezhnev built a conservative framework for both limiting the impacts of the 
reform while keeping those elements that did not pose a political challenge. In doing so, 
Brezhnev, and those around him, developed a set of new conceptions such as “Developed 
Socialism” and “the Scientific-Technical Revolution” to keep elements of earlier policies, 
such as “peaceful co-existence,” and research into cybernetics and networking, that were 
useful while stripping them of their unpredictability and subversive content. This new 
political context allowed certain camps in economic sciences to take on their opponents, 
thereby forming much tighter, yet ultimately ill-defined borders to what were politically 
acceptable directions for economic policy. As such, this chapter will be the culmination of 
the multi-part story of the emergence and fracturing of reformist economics. It will present 
the political consequences of the end of the Kosygin Reforms as a central turning point in 
how the Soviet state was able to coopt and trim its subversive edges. This however does 
not mean that economics became a state “pseudoscience” as Gerovitch argues cybernetics 
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became. Rather, this chapter will open a longer discussion of how economic critique 
adapted itself to new political circumstances by shedding some of its Cold War guise.  
While the previous sections of this work set up the theoretical dilemmas and splits 
within Soviet economic thought and the gradual politization of these groups within the 
context of the dilemmas post-Stalin state, this chapter will show how Brezhnev’s political 
intervention into the Soviet project tamed the potentials unleashed after 1953 without 
restoring what came before it.  From this perspective, I want to begin challenging both 
conceptions of “stagnation” that I outlined above: the “Brezhnev as bad leader” and the 
“stagnation as incubator for liberalism” interpretations of the Soviet seventies. First, I will 
show that the agenda that has been termed “stagnation” was not an act of weakness and 
unoriginality on the part of Brezhnev but rather a massive project of constructing a positive 
political program which emphasized a new direction of the Soviet economy based on 
modernization. Second, I wish to start a strand of argumentation that I will continue in 
future chapters, that those intellectuals and policy entrepreneurs that informed the critique 
of stagnations were not “secret liberals” working in special institutions but were rather 
products and architects of Brezhnev’s “developed socialism” par excellence. Drawing on 
Charles Maier’s argument that economic policies, no matter their eventual unintended 
outcomes, are sets of choices that reveal the socio-political preferences of their supporters, 
it will argue that the period of “stagnation” was not a period of inaction but rather a 
coherent conservative policy agenda that attempted to use reformist methods without their 
troubling political consequences. The unintended failures of those policies were not a 
function of the weakness or incompetence of Soviet conservative leaders Rather, the 
political structure that was built in response to the Kosygin Reforms was strong enough 
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that it was able to tame the impulses behind the radical agenda and give each interest group 
around the reform process something that it wanted. Stagnation was therefore an outcome 
that may have not been desired by the USSR’s leaders but the risk of it was accepted over 
the prospect of deeper structural change.337  
Whose Reforms? Institutional Competition and the Shifting Goals of the Economic 
Reform 1966-1970 
In his memoirs, Baibakov, Gosplan’s chief, recalled a conversation he had with 
Politburo member Nikolai Podgorny in 1966 who told him, “I don’t understand why we 
need these damned reforms anyway.” Podgorny, a known arch-reactionary with ties to 
heavy industry, was a natural opponent of the Kosygin reforms. In his memoirs, Baibakov 
portrays himself as a champion of reforming the USSR’s economy against 
conservatives.338 As we shall see, this portrayal is at odds with how many of his 
contemporaries and the archival records often depicts him. However, we should not take 
Baibakov’s remembrances as entirely self-expurgatory. Rather, Baibakov was often a 
“reformer” but a conservative one. He recognized the need to reform elements of the Soviet 
economic system but feared doing so too quickly, or in a way that might delegitimize the 
fundamental institutional underpinnings of Soviet state power. While more radical 
reformers saw Baibakov as an impediment, others could see him as an ally.  
Baibakov’s, and by extension Gosplan’s, ambiguous position in the politics of 
economic reform was a function of both the reforms themselves and the nature of Soviet 
politics in the wake of the October Plenum. The Kosygin reforms were envisioned as an 
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extended administrative process rather than as a single set of structural reforms with an 
overarching ambition. As they unfolded, the problems they posed, such as rapidly rising 
wages and falling labor productivity made the discussion over the next step in reforming 
the Soviet economy a terrain in which interest groups competed and eventually, the outlines 
of a post-reform economic orthodoxy emerged. Thus, the debate over the future of the 
reforms—the process that would eventually tellingly be labeled “the improvement of 
economic management” rather than the previous, more ambitious term, “economic 
reform”— would define the contours of Late-Soviet economic organization.   
 Varying interpretations of the reform’s goals started almost as soon as the ink dried 
on the October decrees. In 1966, the Soviet Union’s economists met to discuss the results 
of the XXIII Party Congress, where the economic reforms were at the center of discussion, 
with the Party leadership trumpeting them as the next step in the construction of 
Communism. Yet already, tensions were present over the most critical question of 
economic reform: prices. Without a reform of prices, any move toward enterprise 
independence or greater efficiency through profitability would be doomed by the fact that 
current prices simply reflected the status-quo-ante’s distribution of resources. Wholesale 
price reform was not a new dilemma. It had been in the works since 1960, with the members 
of the Nemchinov commission such as Belkin sparring against Gosplan and the bureaucrats 
throughout the final years of Khrushchev’s reign. At the 1966 conference, Gosplan’s line 
on the matter was laid out by Deputy Chairman N.I. Sitinin, in charge of the Section on 
Prices, who attacked those who believed that the USSR needed a radical price increase, 
singling out Belkin’s work. Defending Gosplan’s proposals to the Council of Ministers to 
raise wholesale prices by 11-15%, he stated “that recently the Ekonomika publishing house 
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has published a brochure by Comrade Belkin advocating for a larger increase in wholesale 
prices. While I understand that Comrade Belkin is sitting here, I would like to say on the 
record that I think that publishing this material was a critical mistake.” At this point, Belkin 
interfered from the audience saying “I will answer your accusations” to which Sitinin 
answered, “I am sure you will but I will not listen to your response as it is as useless as two 
deaf people trying to talk to each other.” Belkin responded explaining that if prices were 
not immediately raised higher, then not only would some industries be given an advantage 
over other, turning profitability into an inaccurate measurement, but that the Soviet budget 
would continue to suffer losses as some sectors would continue to be heavily subsidized 
because there was no consistent pricing across different sector of the economy.  Gosplan’s 
price increase plans were piecemeal, encapsulating only certain sectors while not seeing 
how they interacted across the economy as a whole. Belkin argued that “the problem 
created by preserving prices set by various standards is not one of principle, it is a problem 
that is the basis of the entire reform itself.”339  
 Gosplan recognized the centrality of price reform and the revision of the 
methodological basis upon which prices were set when it appointed A.V. Bachurin, the 
head of the Finance Ministry’s Research Institute, and the Vaag and Atlas’ 1959 opponent, 
to be the director of the so-called “multi-agency state commission for the implementation 
of economic reform” and later “its section for new management techniques.” Bachurin’s 
statements at the 1966 meeting provides us with more insight into how Gosplan was 
planning to go about the reform. For Bachurin, “profitability, bonuses and the formation of 
wage funds” constituted “a system of indicators” each of which would “work together” to 
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not only improve the supply of goods to the population and their quality” but also “lower 
the cost of production.” As such, he distrusted the position of those such as Belkin and 
Vaag that were pressing for the priority of profitability over other targets for enterprise 
management. Bachurin also recognized the international political context of the economic 
reforms by explaining that changes to planning in other socialist countries “have 
significance for the entire socialist camp. However, each state must approach things 
differently according to its own needs. We believe that there should have a mandatory 
hierarchy, while the Czechoslovaks believe that indicators are guiding principles, that in 
practice seems to have a mandatory nature.” For Bachurin, like many in the Soviet elite, 
believed that the USSR had to be a conservative power both at home and abroad so as not 
to violate the boundaries of ideological acceptability. Therefore, he placed the onus of 
effectively implementing the economic reforms on having better control over planning 
from the center and improving local practices. The ministries “were constantly hurting the 
advancement of contract based inter-enterprise trade by interfering with the day to day 
operation of enterprises and changing production orders” he explained. Further, problems 
with enterprise level planning meant that yearly plans were constantly violated. Thus, it 
was at the level of the factory where Bachurin left the door open to importing foreign and 
even Western experience. Here he praised a Czechoslovak delegation he had met in Prague 
that had gone to France to study how accounting was done in French corporations. In 1966, 
Gosplan’s agenda was thus not to stall the reforms but to impose a rationalized form of 
planning over the ministries without giving up the priority of the “Five Year Plans.” 
Bachurin called this process “making the Five Year Plan the main guideline for planning” 
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in contrast to the system that existed before the reform which he correctly pointed out was 
ad hoc and run by the whims of the ministries or Sovnarkhozes.340  
 Gosplan’s position placed it in opposition to the GKNT, and its associated “Cost of 
Production School.” Almost immediately after the launch of the reforms, in November of 
1965, Vaag wrote to Demichev, the Central Committee Deputy Secretary responsible for 
the Department of Culture and Science, complaining about the lack of training of many of 
those working under Gosplan. Most economic cadres, he argued, did not understand that 
the price of goods produced (sebestoimost) for an individual enterprise could not be the 
basis for determining the most vital element of the reform: price. Rather, as he argued 
earlier, the USSR’s economy needed to acknowledge “the importance of variable labor” 
by which Vaag meant the opportunity cost of capital. He complained that Gosplan’s Sitinin 
refused to move beyond a “primitive, local understanding of price” and that Gosplan’s 
prices section was too interested “in working out a system of various indicators to build 
the basis of prices” rather than a “single economy-wide economic indicator” which would 
allow profitability to sort out where investements would have the greatest economic return. 
Vaag continued to argue that it was the fact that in a socialist economy, the cost of capital 
(or as he termed it the cost of production) was equivalent to the real cost of variable labor, 
rather than in a capitalist economy where it reflected the capitalist’s exploitation of labor. 
Not deploying this vital difference would forgo the USSR’ “natural” advantages over its 
rivals. For Vaag, the September Plenum marked the moment in which the work that was 
conducted by him and his colleagues, starting in 1948, and culminating in the Nemchinov 
Commission of 1959-1960, could have been turned into policy. The thing that was standing 
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in the way was the resistance of conservative economists in certain corners of academia 
and most of all in Gosplan. The solution Vaag had in mind was to take the issues of 
implementation out of Gosplan’s hands and to move it to a separate commission made up 
of his contemporaries like Atlas, Birman, Belkin and CEMI’s Petryakov. The response to 
the Central Committee about these matters was written by Gatovsky who stated that Vaag 
was a member of both Academy of Sciences’ and Gosplan’s commissions which were 
considering multiple conceptions of price formation including, Vaag’s. This was the basis 
of the response from the Central Committee which told Vaag that as he was an active 
participant in Gosplan and the Academy’s consultations and that he had every chance to 
voice his opinions.341 
 The Central Committee’s response was symptomatic of the problems that radical 
economic reformers had when facing Gosplan. First, Gosplan’s position as the agency 
tasked to implement economic changes meant that it would be the arbiter of new economic 
ideas and methods. Second, the fact that Gosplan placed itself firmly in the center of the 
debate between radical reformers and the entrenched interests of the ministries allowed it 
to portray itself as the reasonable middle. This dynamic only accelerated as the problems 
of implementation, particularly the issue of labor productivity, began to impinge on the 
initial successes of the reforms. A 1967 report from the Institute for Economics of the 
Academy of Sciences concluded that “many economists believe that the profit and 
profitability always reflects a relatively proportional growth in productivity. Profit and 
profitability are criteria of the effectiveness of production. Yet, it is important to note that 
profit and profitability are also criteria for distribution, while the productivity of labor 
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reflects deep processes reflecting the development of technology and the improvement of 
production. The relationship between productivity and profitability is not an equivalence 
and thus there are a variety of branches in which achieving the two targets simultaneously 
cannot be introduced into planning.” While the report concluded that “the introduction of 
wholesale price reform is vital to solving this problem,” it noted that the priority for 
economic growth was the introduction of new technology and that the price system should 
reflect that priority for individual enterprises.342   
 Mounting problems with productivity was a cause of existential angst for a 
Communist state whose guiding economic doctrine was the labor theory of value and the 
existence of an ever-expanding frontier for growth. Thus, by 1ate 1968 and early 1969, a 
discussion began about how to get around the problems in the original set of reforms. With 
less of the central budget being expanded on capital investments, the priority for 
improvement shifted to increasing productivity. This was reflected in a July 1969 
assessment by the Central Committee’s section for Financial and Planning Organizations 
which noted that since the 1965 reform, ministries and enterprises had been rapidly 
expanding their administrative and management cadres rather than focusing on saving on 
labor and expanding per worker output. The priority of the future reforms had to be the 
“scientific management and organization of cadres,” especially workers engaged in 
engineering and white collar labor.343  
As the reforms were being undertaken through administrative decrees from the 
Council of Ministers (of which Baibakov was First Deputy Minister), it became Gosplan’s 
job to develop the line of reasoning behind the new directives. Gosplan’s diagnosis of the 
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problem was that "while there has been some increase in the quality of work of the 
enterprises, there also have been significant problems with the increase of the productivity 
of labor envisioned by the XXIII party congress. Often enterprises increase their 
profitability and productivity by increasing the number of workers they employ." The 
solution was to apply the decisions of the 1965 decrees more rigorously to force enterprises 
and their superiors to plan for the long term. In Gosplan’s estimation “the five-year plan 
has not yet become a stable system of yearly indicators due first of all to the lack of a 
continuous plan of capital investment hurting industrial practice. This allows instability in 
norms for creating enterprise and ministry level funds of economic stimulus, the creation 
of direct enterprise ties and the calculation of material and technical supply.”344  
 The approach from Gosplan and the party acknowledged the need to improve the 
administrative implementation of the reforms without touching the fundamental elements 
of an economic reform: price and interest rates. In a 1968 note, the GKNT’s Trapezdnikov 
responded to Gosplan’s arguments noting that while they were correct that the rate of 
“technical progress” and “productivity” was slowing down, the problem was caused by the 
fact that “the rate of wage funds were often growing independently of an enterprise’s real 
profitability because they were not being compared to the profitability of the economy as 
a whole” due to the absence of a system of prices that took into account the economy-wide 
cost of capital for all branches. Thus, many obsolete, unprofitable enterprises could still 
appear to be profitable and have their wages increase without a corresponding increase in 
productivity.  Trapezdnikov suggested that the rate for repayment on capital investments 
should be set at a universal 15% in order to create a base interest rate to compare enterprises 
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from across branches and sectors.345 This position was seconded by Vaag who in 1970 
wrote an entire draft of a new declaration on improving the Kosygin Reform which held 
that technical progress was being held back because “the main indicator of the effectiveness 
of an enterprise’s production was its individual profitability rather than in comparison to 
the whole economy.” This led to perverse effects in which “the best performing enterprises 
had no incentive to invest in new technology while poorer performing ones lacked a signal 
to make effective improvements in their operations.” The main indicator for the effective 
enterprise performance would be “net profit,” or profits after tax, interest, and overhead 
payments. Finally, the proposed decree would have had the 1966-1967 price reforms 
instituted by Gosplan supplemented in favor of a steeper wholesale price increase.346  
 Obviously Gosplan could not stand for this. In a 1968 note to the Central Committee 
outlining future steps for the economic reform, Baibakov explained the need to push back 
against the position of “economists who argue about the incompatibility of central planning 
and the expansion of direct enterprise ties, central planning and enterprise autonomy; who 
wish to separate prices from the laws of socialism, replace five year plans with long-term 
forecasting and introduce bourgeoisie practices of bankruptcy.”347  In a 1970 note to 
Kosygin, Bachurin responded to the GKNT’s criticism in particular. The letter pointed out 
that Gosplan was not ignoring the problem of labor productivity and technological progress 
and was indeed taking on a “complex multifaceted approach” to these issues in its 
deliberations on a new decree on economic reform. Gosplan’s draft included “a five-year 
plan to develop the productivity of labor,” a “focus on the production of new goods in the 
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five-year plan,” “increasing the role of self-financing industrial combines in the Soviet 
economy,” “a review of prices,” and expanding the means to “improve the planning and 
funding of research into new productive techniques.”348  
These consultations had led Gosplan to determine that it was “not appropriate to 
make net profit the main indicator of enterprise performance” and instead it proposed a set 
of indicators that would judge an enterprise’s performance by “its place in the economy.” 
This meant that Soviet planners would have to accept that some production would need to 
have different criteria of effectiveness from others. This opinion was confirmed by 
Baibakov in his introduction to the final draft of what would be the new decree issued in 
September 1970. According to Baibakov: 
The draft has incorporated certain comments made on it by the members of the State 
Committee of Science and Technology. At the same time, the GKNT insists that key 
problem of economic reform is the reconstruction of the entire system of economic 
planning, stimulus and the assessment of enterprise operations based on a single 
criterion of profitability. This would overturn a variety of other important indicators 
introduced in 1965 such as repayments for capital investments, effective usages and 
issuances of credit and other important economic criteria. As such, Gosplan does not 
believe that their proposals are acceptable.349  
 
Baibakov’s position as both Chairman of Gosplan, and as First Deputy Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers meant that Gosplan would be the agency that carried out the brunt 
of the work of implementing and “improving” the reforms of 1965—especially as power 
structures began to consolidate in the wake of the October Plenum of 1964. In the 
recollections of several participants in high Soviet politics, by the late 1960s, Baibakov 
was increasingly seen as one of “Brezhnev’s men.” Reportedly, he had been given his 
position as number two on the Council of Ministers at Brezhnev’s behest to check 
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Kosygin’s influence. In his own recollections, Baibakov argued he was somewhere in 
between seen as “Brezhnev’s friend” by Kosygin’s allies and “Kosygin’s associate” by the 
Brezhnev’s camp. However, it is widely confirmed, including by Baibakov himself, that 
the two men clashed over the direction of the Ninth Five Year Plan, with Kosygin trying 
to emphasize financial balances and Baibakov trying to push on the expansion of 
productivity and increased investment into new technology.350  
 Yet if Gosplan opposed the radical proposals for a profit led economy, it was not 
the most obstructionist organization or group in the USSR. In fact, Gosplan would also act 
as an active defender of the very concept of economic reform from those who believed that 
it was diluting the Soviet Union’s socialist mission. For example, in May 1970, a journalist 
named A. Starostin wrote to Suslov complaining that the press has become inundated with 
discussions of material incentives rather than the organization and ideological motivation 
of labor. “Economists” he complained “were rejecting the directive basis of planning” for 
“the false ideals of Western propaganda.” Increases in wages for productive workers 
“would lead to more goods and less social responsibility.”351 Starostin explained that what 
was needed as “more moral rather than material stimulus.” In April 1971 V.K, Rostochkii, 
the Deputy Minister of Railroad Machine Building, wrote to the Central Committee’s 
Department of Higher Education and Science to complain that a pamphlet distributed 
IMEMO to management cadres in the ministries, entitled “Problems of Production 
Management in the Main Capitalist Countries,” had “no Marxist-Leninist critique of these 
[Western management] theories” and “in essence, supported them.” While acknowledging 
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that “the September Plenum directed us to study new methods in capitalist countries” these 
inquiries should “never forget that our socialist system is ahead of the capitalist system by 
an entire historical epoch, which means that our management methods are much more 
effective than any capitalist country’s.” For Rostochkii, IMEMO’s ideological slipup was 
the result of the difference between “practical workers and researchers” the former of 
which “may not know as much about the West but know a lot about Soviet industry.” 
Indeed, he criticized the idea that Soviet ministries could be compared to American 
corporations (a very valid point) noting that any deficit of the former in management 
compared to the latter was a matter of “the temporary backwardness of Soviet industry.” 
IMEMO’s note did not consider the great potential of Soviet industry which “was already 
the most centralized in the world [sic].”352  
Discomfort with the reforms wasn’t confined only to ministry personnel and 
journalists. V.I. Katz, a Stalin-era economist, wrote to the Central Committee objecting to 
Gosplan’s rules for measuring the acquisition of new technology. In Katz’s estimation, the 
“Price of Production School” had influenced Gosplan’s regulations too strongly as it was 
imposing a quasi-interest rate on technology by demanding that enterprises calculate their 
capital expenditure over a period of time. This was an outrageous act that denied a socialist 
economy its natural advantages: it’s lack of concern with short term profits. Indeed, Katz 
noted that even large capitalist conglomerates such as IBM and GE often made technical 
investments that brought no profitability for decades. Gosplan strongly opposed Katz’s 
argument in its reply stating that it was well understood that the state had limited resources 
and that there had to be a way of distinguishing “experimental” technologies whose effects 
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were not fully calculated from “established” new technologies that had to have a rate of 
return for expenditures made in purchasing them.353 This exchange again testifies that 
Gosplan did not oppose reform as such. Rather it wanted a conservative reform that 
changed the procedural elements of planning, strengthening its regularity, without 
challenging the underlying power structures it entailed.   
 Baibakov’s dominance in economic policy making, and thus the more conservative 
direction of the economic reform, was sealed at the December 1969 Central Committee 
Plenum. Unlike the September 1965 Plenum, the man in charge of the December 1969 
gathering was Brezhnev, who, as General Secretary, led proceedings. The main speaker 
was Baibakov, widely interpreted as a Brezhnev ally, whose report to the Central 
Committee on the next five-year plan also touched on the long-range problems facing the 
post-Kosygin reform economy. “It is impossible not to raise concerns about the gradual 
slowdown in growth rates in our economy over the past two years” Baibakov explained. 
“This is largely due to the falling rate of introduction of new productive intensity354 
compared to that envisioned in the plan, especially the productivity of labor.”  The reasons 
Baibakov gave for these problems was that ministries often lacked “resources for the 
introduction of new technologies, proper guidelines and documentation for new machinery 
and lacked the proper labor force needed for increased intensity in production.” The 
primary issue, however, was “the lack of discipline,” or the lack of responsibility in the use 
of labor resources across a variety of ministries and construction bureaus.355  
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 The guidelines approved by the December Plenum became the basis for Soviet 
economic policy in the coming, Ninth Five Year Plan as testified to by a 1970 Central 
Committee working group led by Secretaries Gostev, Petovich, Frolov, and Dimitriev. The 
report concluded that the “main goal of the reform—a significant increase in the 
effectiveness and intensity of social production—has not yet been reached” due in large 
part to the lack of growth in labor productivity underscored by the fact that the early success 
of 1966 and 1967 had “not been routinized.” “The guidelines for action” they concluded 
“were established by the December 1969 Plenum.” The priorities for the Party’s policy 
toward the economy were thus “to move toward a full system of planning,” rather than the 
contemporary system of haphazard plans often “corrected” by the ministries, which 
integrated yearly plans with the five-year plan, force the ministries to become more 
responsible for their own finances, improve the economic training of cadres, and improve 
the use of accounting standards. While all these were sensible goals, what underpinned 
them was a return to central control by the planning agencies and a slowdown in the 
movement toward real, radical economic change through deeper structural reform.356  
The Scientific-Technical Revolution, Developed Socialism, and The End of Radical 
Reform.  
 The December 1969 plenum marked more than an ascendance of a more 
conservative version of economic policy in contrast to the reactionary approach taken by 
some of the ministers and the radical economic restructuring advocated by various schools 
of economics. Yet, that was not enough to deal with some of the existential questions that 
had opened the window to some truly radical possibilities in 1964. The failure of 
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Khrushchev’s Seven Year Plan and the promise of “catch up and overtake” meant that the 
USSR’s leaders had to rethink how they would deal with the tie-up between domestic 
economic performance and the USSR’s revolutionary mission that the former General 
Secretary had established. In this section, I will argue that Brezhnev, and his supporters, 
were successful in doing this by deploying two interlocking ideological constructions that 
set the limits of Soviet economic policy: “developed socialism” and “the scientific-
technical revolution.” Developed socialism argued that the USSR was in an extended 
period in which “the material-technical basis for the construction of Communism” was still 
being laid but that the dream of a Communist society would be left to some distant future. 
Meanwhile, socialism could be enjoyed in day to day life through a greater emphasis on 
consumption, privacy, and regularity. This specific “phase” of Soviet development was 
accompanied by “the global scientific-technical revolution” which Soviet ideologists 
defined as a worldwide process in which the fruits of new technologies, such as computing, 
automatization, and petrochemicals, would herald a new age in the development of 
productive relations. The Soviet Union, with the “inherent advantages of its planned, 
socialist system,” would eventually triumph in this new phase of scientific development 
but, at the moment, it could cooperate in this new phase with various states with different 
social orders.357 In fact, what developed socialism and the scientific-technical revolution 
had in common was that they deferred progress to the future, or at least to a slow pace, 
without fundamentally challenging the idea that it would, one day, come. This brilliant 
conservative political strategy allowed Brezhnev to give something to all the groups 
involved in fighting over the future of the Soviet economy. Ministries would continue 
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having control over the day to day operations of their enterprises and not see their 
investments restricted, Gosplan and other planning agencies would continue to administer 
the Soviet Five Year Plans, and the academic reformers would be allowed to work on 
theoretical problems of economic performance and introduce piecemeal techniques of 
computerized management into industry.  
 Brezhnev’s success as a political leader was due to his mastery at playing 
ideological politics and using them to cut a middle, consensus path through various factions 
in the Central Committee. Liberals believed that, compared to Shelepin, Semichastny and 
even, at times, the dower Kosygin himself, Brezhnev was the leader that was most likely 
to preserve the “achievements of the XXth and XXII Party Congress” such as the 
condemnation of Stalinist tactics and “peaceful co-existence.” In the recollections of 
Gregory Arbatov, the director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada and a 
consummate Soviet insider, Brezhnev himself was a rather torn figure, with some of his 
confidants like S.M. Trapezdnikov (not to be confused with the economist) very much on 
the side of the extreme reactionaries while others like G.E. Chukanov, Brezhnev’s point 
man on the economy, were conservative pragmatists. Memoirists both left and right 
portrayed the Brezhnev of 1964-1967 as maneuvering against the right flank of neo-
Stalinist sympathizers.358 By 1967, he had outmaneuvered this faction, sending Shelepin 
to a less powerful, though in theory more prestigious, position as deputy chairman of the 
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Council of Ministers, and replaced Semichastny as head of the KGB with his ally, Yuri 
Andropov.359   
 Toward the end of 1967, and especially after the events of the Prague Spring, 
Brezhnev moved rightwards to secure his left flank. It is no coincidence that this right turn 
witnessed the expanding influence of Suslov and S.M. Trapeznikov as the curators of 
Soviet social science. In August 1967, the Central Committee passed a resolution on “The 
Means to Advance the Social Sciences and Further Their Role in the Construction of a 
Communist Society.” The resolution noted that while the social sciences had been placed 
on a better track since the October 1964 Plenum, many ideological questions including “the 
political economy of socialism, the expansion of national income and the implementation 
of economic policy” were still underdeveloped. Further research had not paid attention to 
“the forecasting of social development, and the integration of these forecasts into economic 
plans.” Social scientists’ and humanists’ duty to fight “bourgeoisie ideologists and 
reformist falsifiers of Marxism” was being stymied by insufficient knowledge of the 
“newest enemy ideological positions.” Economic sciences, in particular, had to begin to 
work toward “refining and better defining the categories of the socialist political economy,” 
begin research on the “integration of optimal planning methods,” and “integrate computing 
technology into research.” Gosplan, the GKNT, and the Academy of Sciences were 
charged with establishing a system of planning and financing for the social sciences.360  
 The implication of the resolution was that social sciences were to take on a 
pragmatic role: they were to become tools of the party state toward a political goal, rather 
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than establishing the goal through theoretical critique. Responding to the 1967 decree on 
the social sciences, Baibakov and Keldesh wrote to the Central Committee to explain that 
Gosplan and the Academy of Sciences would begin to take joint action to promote 
applicable economic techniques and prioritize applied, rather than the theoretical research, 
within economic institutes to explore the problems of management.361 This prioritization 
of applied research can also be gleamed from the Institute for Economics’ response to the 
directives of the XXIV Party Congress. The Institute’s report to the Central Committee 
argued that “because of delays in increasing efficiency” the time had come to create an 
infrastructure of economic research departments for each branch of industry. This would 
allow direct study of the problems of production and break the resistance of many sectors 
in introducing the 1965 reforms.362 What went unstated in these calls for “application” was 
that economists would now no longer be working on the existential questions of Soviet 
institutions and economic processes and limit themselves to applying their research to 
improving the efficiency of the existing political-economic power structure.  
While the resolution had set a criterion for what would be acceptable economic 
research, it had not yet established a Party directive for its theoretical dimension. What was 
lacking was a new analytical framework for understanding the Soviet economy’s 
relationship to the global economy, and thus its millennial revolutionary message in the 
wake of the failure of Khrushchev’s program at the XXth Party Congress. The need for 
clarity became ever direr following the “Prague Spring” of 1968. To fit the conservative 
agenda, such a program had to reconcile the tasks of preserving the structures of Soviet 
economic governance, maintain the window for gradual improvement and posit the USSR 
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as a revolutionary power on the world stage. The search for such a unifying idea culminated 
at the XXIV Party Congress which started on March 30, 1971. At his speech to the congress 
Brezhnev put a phenomenon called the “scientific-technical revolution” at the center of 
Soviet economic development stating that: 
the most important characteristic of our countries contemporary economic 
development is the rapid development of the ‘scientific technical revolution.’ 
Socialism, with its planned economy, presents us with a wide horizon for a general 
expansion of science and technology. Yet, the scientific-technical revolution 
demands serious changes to many elements of our economic processes. In other 
words, this huge potential, that socialism is poised to acquire, will be squandered.363  
 
The idea of the Scientific Technical Revolution (STR) as the guiding paradigm for 
the USSR’s economic development did not come from thin air. The term had a long history 
in Soviet discourse about science, technology and their connection to historical changes in 
the “means of production.” Discussions about the connection between science, technology, 
and social order were as old as the Soviet experience and was inherent to Marx’s theory of 
social change. Indeed, early Soviet economic thinkers, such as Alexander Bogdanov and 
Nikolai Bukharin, had stressed that the Soviet socialist order was “pregnant with technical 
potential” in their 1927 writings. The modern genealogy of the STR can be traced back to 
the work between years between 1955 and 1962. The term was first used by historians V. 
Danielevskii and G. Osipov in a series of articles written in 1956 and 1959. From 1959 to 
1965, the theory would be formalized and refined at the Academy of Sciences’ Institute for 
the History of Natural Sciences and Technology (IIEiT) by its two lead proponents, A.A. 
Zvorykin and S.V. Shukhardin who, by 1965, had argued that the STR was a new period 
in the development of technology and its introduction into the means of production that 
                                                
363 XXIV s”ezd KPSS: stenographicheskii otshot (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1971), 63.  
	 236	
 
had begun in the USSR on the eve of the Second World War (and was disrupted by the 
war) and in the capitalist world in the wake of the Korean War which forced the greater 
planning of the military-industrial process through the introduction of new cybernetic and 
economic techniques. The STR was not a “revolution” in the sense of “the industrial 
revolution” as it was not yet a change in the “mode of production.” Rather, it was a change 
in “technique” which was building the prerequisites for a future social-political change that 
would presage the revolution in the capitalist states and the movement to socialism. The 
theory had acquired enough currency by the mid-1960s that it had become included in the 
1962 Third Party Program’s assessment of the status of the world and the movement of 
history.364  
However, the conception of the STR in the 1960s was still descriptive rather than 
proscriptive, let alone programmatic, and it applied more to capitalist economies than it did 
to socialism. Tellingly, it entered economics through Gatovsky’s theorizing. At a 1965 
meeting of economists to discuss the future of Soviet economics, Gatovsky framed his 
concerns about the slowing rates of growth in socialism compared to capitalism in terms 
of a new historical moment characterized by: 
The development of the Scientific-Technical Revolution that was spreading across 
the entire world. We cannot fall behind in this and that we must be in its vanguard. 
However, this demands huge capital investments (which is generally necessary for 
socialism) accompanied by an increase in consumption. To solve these two 
problems at the same time, it is necessary to not only expand production into new 
areas but to better understand how to make it more effective through the better 
integration of new technical innovations into production. The problems of scientific 
and technical progress are thus connected with the optimization of planning and 
economic management.365  
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Gatovsky’s formulation carried with it a prescriptive tone which established the STR as 
not only a descriptive characterization of the current global situation, as deployed by IIEiT, 
but as a guiding concept for Soviet economic policy and the stage on which the 
“competition of the two systems would be fought.” This prescriptive formulation of the 
STR did not enter official parlance immediately. It’s first reported use by Brezhnev was in 
his speech to the June 1969 “World Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties.” This 
was an auspicious meeting at which to announce the STR as the centerpiece of Soviet 
ideology. First, it coincided with the 1969 discussion of how to further develop the 1965 
reforms. Second, it was a meeting that was meant to develop the party lines of Soviet-
aligned Communist Parties in the Sino-Soviet split. A major element of the Maoist 
criticism of the CP-USSR was that it was becoming too technocratic and was abandoning 
its international revolutionary élan for pursuing domestic economic growth and 
embourgeoisement. In 1969, Brezhnev responded to these attacks by arguing that 
“contemporary imperialism continues to have a powerful economic and military base” 
which is being strengthened by whatever final means that “monopoly capitalism has” 
through investment into “technological progress.” The “technical and scientific successes’ 
of socialist states were forcing the capitalist states to make “ever more concessions to their 
working classes, thus forcing monopoly capitalists to begin “reaching the limits of their 
system.” Thus, “having reached this point, we Soviet Communists believe that the 
development of the economy is the crucial front in the battle [with capitalism] which still 
requires much sacrifice.” The coming Soviet Five Year Plan would be a vital front in this 
battle as it acknowledged that “the [development] of the STR is the main area of 
competition between capitalism and socialism” which needed a “massive capital 
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investments” into science and new industries. Explicitly noting the connection between 
this “international struggle” and the reform process, Brezhnev noted that the USSR had 
been “in recent years engaged in a wide-ranging reform of economic management and 
planning.” This process would be a continual one and in the coming years would begin to 
focus on advancing the STR to make up for some of the “drawbacks” of the previous five-
year plan.366  
The importance of the 1969 meeting for the codification of a new Soviet doctrine 
was elaborated in two classified brochures written by the newly formed Institute for the 
Study of Applied Social Problems (IKSI) under the leadership Rumiantsev. The IKSI was 
formed in the wake of the 1967 decree on social sciences as the Academy of Sciences first 
formal institute for the study of sociology. The institute took the place of IIEiT as the center 
for the theory of the STR and formulated more muscular, proscriptive socio-economic 
development strategy based on the former organization’s previous work.367 In their reports 
to the Central Committee, IKSI’s researchers argued that the STR was on par with the 
Industrial Revolution of the late-18th century. The difference between the two was that 
“while the first [Industrial Revolution] was a revolution in labor, the current revolution is 
a revolution of the application of science. It is thus a scientific, rather than an industrial 
revolution. As well, it is no longer just a phenomenon of capitalism but also of socialism.” 
This had implications for the “competition of the two systems” and Soviet domestic 
politics. Thus, the report concluded, while “data shows it may be possible to reach the same 
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gross output as the USA in 1975-1977” such a victory was not enough because “the capital 
intensity of the United States is much higher than the USSR” making it “use fewer inputs 
to get the same amount of output” due to “its superior organization of labor.” The STR 
mandated that the USSR shift its resources to new areas of technology with the IKSI 
arguing that what was needed was “cybernetization [automatization] of production” that 
would be achieved by the expansion of data processing centers and Party intervention to 
rapidly introduce them into production because “efforts in this area are uncoordinated and 
lagging behind the leading bourgeois states and other socialist countries.”368  
 The XXIV Party Congress was a culmination of the previous five years of political 
and ideological work. Brezhnev artfully preserved the main elements of “peaceful 
coexistence through the socio-economic competition of the two systems,” that had been 
established by Khrushchev at the XXth Party Congress, without the excesses of the former 
leader’s mobilization program. The triumph of Soviet conservatism was secured not only 
through Brezhnev’s dispatching of his enemies left and right, but also through the creation 
of a defining doctrinal narrative. The XXIVth Party Congress affirmed that the STR was 
the defining characteristic of “the present historical conjuncture” and the key area of 
competition between socialism and capitalism. It would rectify the two goals of the Ninth 
Five Year Plans: the increase of domestic consumption and the continuing priority of heavy 
industry which not only was the “heart of the socialist society,” but also provided scientific 
advances and the ability of the USSR to defend itself. The coming five-year plan would 
advance these goals by better managing investment “to make sure that “for every unit we 
spend—either in labor, material or financial resources—we receive a consequent increase 
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in national income. The critical task for this result must be the increase in the productivity 
of labor.” Connecting this new direction of economic reform, set by the discussions of 
1969, to the party line, Brezhnev explained that the goal of Soviet society was “the 
historical task of combining the unfolding STR with the advantages of the socialist 
economic system by integrating the latest advances of science into production. This 
included “continuing the process started by the September 1965 Plenum” through the 
integration of “the advances of economic science” into the most important element of 
economic production “the remuneration of labor” which would strengthen productivity.369  
 In essence, the Brezhnev program did not reject reforms but rather turned them into 
a continual process that would make planning more efficient rather than make enterprises 
more independent and profit oriented. Such a program made sense given the conservative 
bent of the implications of the STR on the program of “developed socialism” also 
announced by the resolutions of the Congress. “Developed socialism,” like the STR, was 
also an innovation of the Late-Khrushchev period which was developed by reform-minded 
theorists like Fedor Burlatskii who tried to make the contemporary stage of socialist 
development into a more predictable and humanist period not driven by the extraordinary 
whims of the state. By the XXIV Party Congress, the term had been effectively deployed 
by Brezhnev to declare that the USSR would enter a long period of development in which 
Communism was far from coming to fruition. While the basis for the future utopia would 
continue to be “constructed” through the STR, which was assumed to automatically 
advantage the already “scientific” economy of the USSR, the fruits of socialism, including 
consumption, could already be enjoyed. Thus, “developed socialism” was a conservative 
                                                
369 XXIV s”ezd KPSS: stenograficheskii otshot, 68-82.  
	 241	
 
narrative stating that utopia would inevitably come but that the current situation would 
continue for the foreseeable future without any radical actions by the party or state. On the 
other hand, citizens would be free to enjoy their day-to-day existence without being 
constantly mobilized.370  
 The statements of the XXIV Congress were more than acts statements used to 
justify the new course of the party—they had some immediate effects on the development 
of the coming Ninth Five Year Plan and long-term economic policy. In May 1970, the 
Council of Ministers issued a proclamation ordering ministries to issue plans for moving 
their remaining enterprises working under pre-1965 regulation to the new system in light 
of the December 1969 Party Plenum. In December of 1971, Gosplan reported to the 
Council of Ministers that the plans developed by the ministries were no long relevant due 
to the new tasks issued by the XXIV Party Congress. The ministerial proposals were 
insufficient for the development of new management techniques and lacked structural 
changes that would reorganize the ministries to have more roles played by multi-branch 
and enterprise organizations and inter-branch research and development structures. 
Gosplan ordered the ministries to begin reworking their proposals. Indeed, Gosplan argued 
that the directives of the XXIV Congress meant that some delays would have to be made 
in the development of the next plan to adjust for the failure of ministries and republics in 
adjusting their plans. In 1972, the plan was changed to include larger capital investments 
into developing “Scientific-Technical Progress” and the purchasing of new technologies 
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from abroad. Another decree, issued in May 1971, determined that the priority for the ninth 
Five Year Plan would be the organization of “combines,” or networks of enterprises 
organized around an internal system of cost accounting, as the new basic unit of economic 
management.371  
 These post-1971 actions formed the course of Soviet economic action in the 
Brezhnev period. It secured an orthodoxy that though acknowledging the problems of 
returns on state investments that triggered the need for reform in the first place, resolved 
to solve them through an expansion of the production frontier without significantly 
changing the priority of investments into heavy, producer goods. This was a brilliant 
political move, as it continued the illusion of reform and change with no substantial 
political risk to Party cadres or to Brezhnev’s own personal prestige. In 1973, Brezhnev 
summed up his thinking about the politics of economic reform to his speech writers telling 
them that: 
The [1965] reforms needed to be improved. They did not do enough to boost the 
productivity of labor so we improved them. We the Party, there is no other 
authority. After, we improved in some things like the production of tractors and 
other items, but that is not important. What needs to be highlighted [in the speech 
that they were preparing]is the leading role of the Party.372  
  
The Closing of the Soviet Economic Mind: From Measurement Without Theory to 
Theory Without Reality   
Brezhnev’s ideological intervention did not just have an effect on the future course 
of Soviet economic reforms. It also brought the debate over economic value and the object 
of economics that had been raging in Soviet academia since the late 1940s to ahead. The 
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STR was a teleological program arguing that the USSR would be ready to lay the stages of 
Communism through the inexorable march of technological progress that was embedded 
within the Soviet system’s DNA. Implicit within this vision of progress was an increased 
emphasis on the use of computers in improving economic micro-economic management 
rather than the underlying institutional foundations of the economy. Indeed, the discourse 
of economic change in the 1970s shifted from “economic reform [ekonomicheskaya 
reforma] to “improving the management of the economic mechanism” [ulucheniia 
upravlenia ekonomicheskogo mekhanizma]. Against this background, the Soviet economic 
establishment, even its reformist wing, attempted to consolidate a dominant theoretical and 
programmatic approach. The casualties of this process would be the Tovarnik school and 
to a lesser extent, the Cost of Production paradigm. The Mathematical Economists would 
cross through the crucible of the end of the Kosygin reforms transformed but not defeated. 
Echoing Slava Gerovitch’s observation about cybernetics and its offshoots turning into a 
state supported “pseudoscience,” mathematical economics limited its ambitions from the 
automatizing planning and economic decentralization to providing support for and 
expanding the scope of the traditional planning process.373 In the end, the boundaries of the 
economics that emerged out of the end of the Kosygin reforms grew ever more 
sophisticated in theory yet separated from institutional realities and neutered in its political 
vision.  
Khrushchev’s’ removal and the beginning of economic reform saw economics at 
its most politically influential but also its most politically exposed. A 1965 all-Union 
scientific meeting to discuss “subjectivism” and the future direction of Soviet economics 
                                                




marked a moment in which the Central Committee not only looked to social sciences for 
ideas but also, for the first time since Stalin’s intervention, wished to codify “socialist 
political economy” in some form.  At the meeting, even Gatovsky conceded that there 
needed to be more work done on defining the basic relationships between economic theory 
and economic reality. For example, he admitted that while the problem of the oversupply 
of commodities should not, in theory, exist in a socialist society as they would in a capitalist 
economy “our mistakes in planning have created our own very own type of over supply 
problem” because “we have not developed any practical approach to connect production 
to the demand for goods.”374  What was needed was a means to connect Marxist theory to 
the problems of supply and demand in a uniquely Soviet way.  
There were several ways to answer Gatovsky’s prompt for a Marxist model of 
supply and demand. Fedorenko presented an especially positivist version of a socialist 
economics in his address to the conference. Economics, Fedorenko argued, needed to move 
beyond the dichotomy of theory and practice and begin thinking of economics as a “world 
view.” For example, he objected to the classification of problem areas like the optimal 
distribution of resources in planning and price setting as exclusively “practical problems,” 
instead stating that they should be placed at the heart of a unified theory of planning. 
Redeploying Nemchinov’s argument in the Soviet “measurement without theory” debate 
of the late 1940s (described in chapter one of this work), Fedorenko argued that economics 
had to “become an experimental science” and economists had to develop particular areas 
of technical expertise. “When we build a new airplane” he continued “we have a design 
bureau of three thousand to five thousand specialists who design the plane, or even just the 
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wings.” Yet “when it comes to management, it seems that everyone knows how to properly 
manage.” “Everyone” he continued from the “head of a shop, to the director of a factory, 
to the chairman of the VSNK, let alone to the staff of Gosplan, have their own ideas about 
how to manage.” Without transformation of economics into an experimental science, all 
economists could offer the state was to copy the experiences of “the GDR, Czechoslovakia, 
and Yugoslavia” rather than to give opinions on Soviet industrial practice. The implication 
was that instead of discussing the specifics of what a socialist economy should be, and the 
role of the market in it, as the Tovarniks and the Cost of Production School would have it, 
economists had to become more like engineers and work toward the best solutions for 
economy as it existed.375  
At the same meeting, Fedorenko’s positivism was complimented by a fierce debate 
over a more abstract topic: the economic basis of the institutional practices of socialism 
itself. The theoretical study of the “Political Economy of Socialism,” in turmoil since the 
late 1950s had, by the mid-1960s, begun to fracture into two major theoretical schools: The 
Tovarniks based in the section on economic theory of the Academy of Sciences’ Institute 
for Economics, led by Yakov Kronrod, and the Moscow State University (MGU) School 
of political-economists led by Nikolai Tsagolov.  Tsagalov’s rise as a leader in Soviet 
economic thought was slow. Despite working on the early “material balances” at the 
Gosplan of the 1920s with the likes of Strumilian, he retired from applied work after being 
arrested in the 1930s. Following his release, he made his name as a historian of economic 
thought, writing a history of Russian economic thought at the height of the anti-
cosmopolitan campaign, that, despite its nationalism, was a rigorous work and considered 
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a classic in the field, even after de-Stalinization. Tsagolov began developing a distinctive 
approach toward “The Political-Economy of Socialism” after being appointed to MGU in 
the late 1950s. Instead of studying practices through the application of inductive reasoning 
and the description of institutions, Tsagalov framed political-economy as a deductive 
science: a methodology he claimed to inherit from Marx’s Kapital which started from first 
principles and applied them to realities. In contrast, the Academy of Sciences’ Institute, 
which argued that the “law of planned development (planomernost)” emerged from the 
socialist ownership of property, Tsagalov’s deductive method postulated that socialist 
property relations, and thus socio-political processes, should follow from the laws of 
planned economic development.376 Tsagalov’s approach to the study of economics took a 
giant leap toward recognition as a dominant camp when, in 1958, he was asked by the 
deputy minister of education, N.I. Mokhkov, to submit a proposal for a new textbook on 
political economy. Tsagalov’s was one of twenty-two proposals submitted to the ministry 
and was eventually selected by the ministry as the winner and published in 1963. The 1963 
two volume textbook became the guideline for undergraduate teaching in institutions 
controlled by the Ministry of Education and thus a competitor to the revised version of the 
1954 textbook favored by the Academy of Sciences.377  
The emergence of two well-defined and institutionalized camps of political-
economy (in addition to other methodological camps) burst out at the 1965 meeting on 
subjectivism discussed earlier. Tsagolov accused inductive, institutional research of 
“adjusting the knobs on a primus” (a colloquial expression meaning wasting time and doing 
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nothing derived from a brand of pressure cooker). Without the deductive theoretical stances 
inherited from Kapital, discussions about improving the economic system through 
profitability were being corrupted by the “bourgeoisie press” since focusing on the 
operations of enterprises and Soviet budgeting was obscuring the deeper Marxist logic of 
the system. It was not that Tsagalov was against reform per say but rather that “the rejection 
of dialectics by political-economy” gave the enemy something to grab onto since the 
justifications of such ideas did not go from the a priori “theoretical” ideas of “proportional 
planned development” to the specifics of “the role of profitability” in the day-to-day 
practices of a distinctly socialist state.378 Responding to Tsagalov, G.A. Kozlov of the 
Academy of Sciences stated that the debate over whether property followed or came from 
the laws of planning was a small one explaining that “Tsagalov’s so-called opponents 
understand that his point is important.” Yet Kozlov responded that Tsagolov’s concerns 
over justifying and explaining profitability reflected a lack of analysis of the “inheritance 
that the socialist order received from state-monopoly capitalism” which create the pre-
conditions for socialist property and organization—a property-centric, institutional view 
propagated by Yakov Kronrod and his students.379  
 The debates between Kronrod and Tsagolov were more than “a pseudo-scientific 
waste of time,” as asserted by the positivist Fedorenko—they were questions about what 
made an economy socialist and, in the context of the Kosygin reforms, how far the USSR 
could deviate from the principles of central planning developed under Stalin and enshrined 
under Khrushchev.380  These dilemmas became especially pressing as the reforms began to 
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“rebalance” the Soviet economy and leverage moved from the balance sheet of the state to 
that of the enterprises and the worker/consumer.  The emergence this new structure of 
financial flows begged the question of how far could the USSR move to an economy where 
consumers and profitability would be prioritized? The answers the Tovarniks presented 
radicalized as the reforms continued. A.M. Birman, a prominent Tovarnik, wrote in a 1968 
article in Novyi Mir, that “we should [neither] fear profits” nor the rising wages and 
spending on fringe benefits as “these reflected the desires of millions of workers” and the 
“rising wealth of the nation.”381 In a 1970 article, Birman argued that the fundamental 
problem being faced by the Soviet economy was the fact that “each ruble was not 
purchasing an equivalent amount of labor time across different industries.” This was 
responsible for the slowing of productivity as workers were simply responding to the 
incentives that the system of ministry subsidies, price markups, and over-investment in 
production goods was creating. The next step of the reform would have to be a movement 
to an economy where the state would control output through adjusting the price of money 
and material targets and even a universal cost of capital, abandoned. Ministries, glavki, and 
enterprises would have to be put on “full cost accounting” and become self-financing.382 
This same sentiment was shared by Kronrod in a 1968 “official use only” pamphlet which 
argued for the rapid integration of free money transactions alongside official direct, 
command ties. Kronrod’s works from the late 1960s were starting to  explicitly argue that 
the state could not set the law of value under socialism. Rather, until the prerequisites for 
Communism had been achieved, only a socialist market—in which the state-owned 
property but did not make direct decisions on output—could reflect the “law of value” 
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under socialism. A socialist market system comprised of independent, worker administered 
enterprises could reflect the interest of the stakeholders of the socialist society—the 
working class and thus was the only legitimate source of price information under 
socialism.383  
 Yet if the Tovarniks were radicalizing, the difficulties encountered by the reforms 
gave increased support to a new, more microeconomic program of research spurred by the 
1967 resolution on social sciences. This official push toward improving management and 
focusing on microeconomic and industry-focused studies was accompanied by increased 
attacks on the Tovarniks from the most “reactionary” of apparatchiks for the heterodox, 
theoretical bent of their research. Kronrod was criticized in the pages of the newspaper 
Planovoe Khozaistava for making claims that socialist laws were objective even if the 
actions of the state were not. The authors of the article admonished him for his opposition 
to mathematical research that, the authors believed, could harmonize individual enterprise 
actions with the “laws of socialist development” through the planning process.384 In 1967, 
V.A. Golikova, a worker in the Central Committee apparat, published a book called Results 
and Perspectives on Soviet Agriculture Following the March Plenum [Itogii i perspektivy 
o sovetksoi agricultury posle martovskogo plenuma], which criticized the Academy of 
Sciences’ Institute for Economics’ leading agricultural economist, V.G. Benzher, for 
moving too far in the direction of making markets be the sole determinant of economic 
value in the Kolkhoz sector.385   
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 This environment was exploited by the crosstown rivals of the Institute of 
Economics and their Tovarnik wing: the MGU economics department run by Tsagolov. 
According to recollections published by his students, Tsagolov was keenly aware of his 
rivalry with the Institute of Economics as the central institution for developing the 
“Political Economy of Socialism.” Thus, he deliberately moved his graduates into party 
work in the Central Committee stocking it’s scientific, ideological, and cultural 
departments with adherents of his “deductive approach.” The result was the December 
1971 Central Committee directive titled “On the Work of the Party Organization of the 
Academy of Sciences’ Institute for Economics on the Central Committee Proclamation ‘On 
the Improvement of Social Sciences and their Role in the Construction of 
Communism.’”386 It is hard to ascertain the exact chain of events behind the issuance of 
the directive without a further declassification of personal files in the state archive, but the 
language of the order gave hints as to what the Central Committee thought the main crimes 
of the Institute were. The Institute was accused of not producing works related to “long-
term planning, economic forecasting or the integration of economic methods.” Its work 
was characterized as having “a descriptive tone which is for the most part very separated 
from the needs and realities of economic practice.” The Party organization was commanded 
to make improvements to direct research into the economics of developed socialism.387  
 L.V. Nikiforov, the head of the Institute of Economics’ party committee, responded 
to the directive and subsequent Pravda editorial that criticized the institute for “not 
conducting long-term, significant research into the ‘political-economy of socialism.’” 
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Nikiforov wrote directly to Brezhnev, acknowledging that “the institute must develop a 
theory of the economy based on the existence of developed socialism that derived from the 
contemporary problems and conditions.” Nikiforov explained that the reason that the 
Institute was not conducting good research was not a problem inherent to its staff but 
because it was being “flooded by requests [from other institutions] to work on specific 
problems having nothing to do with the Political-Economy of Socialism” and was isolated 
from other groups in the Academy of Sciences that were working on applied economic 
problems.388  
 This admission of guilt was not enough for the Party. In 1972, a special commission 
was dispatched to the Institute whose members included Fedorenko in his capacity as head 
of the Academy’s Section on Economics, Academy Vice-President P.N. Feedosov, 
Moscow Party Commission Y.K. Yagodkin and a series of outside academics, associated 
with the MGU department including Gavril Popov—the future liberal activist and first 
post-Soviet mayor of Moscow. Gatovsky, who was appointed the Institute’s director in 
1965, and Nikiforov were removed from their posts. All in all, sixty Institute members who 
were “not up to the new standards and requirements” were removed from their positions. 
Among those was Yakov Kronrod, who was stripped of his post as Deputy Director in 
charge of the Section on the Theory of Socialist Political Economy and given the title of 
“Senior Colleague” which entitled no administrative power. In its materials, the materials 
of the committee argued that Kronrod’s conception of the applicability of Marx’s approach 
to the social structures of capitalism to socialism (but not Communism) led to the 
conclusion that “the exploitation  of labor existed in the USSR” and “that the Soviet 
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socialist order was inherently defined by inequality.”389 Kronrod’s career was over and 
after suffering some illnesses related to the stress of the hearings, he retired, his writings 
never to see the light of day until the early 1990s. A few of his students including Nikiforov 
and, most significantly, Tatiana Zaslavskaya (whose doctoral dissertation he unofficially 
supervised) would move toward sociological analysis and reemerge in the mid-1980s.390   
 The attacks on Kronrod were as personal as they were ideological and theoretical. 
In his recollections, Popov argued that he participated in the purge of the Institute because 
he believed that the Institute’s approach was not countering the rise of mathematical 
economics, with its authoritarian bent, quickly enough.391 Yet, this is at odds with 
Kronrod’s extremely passionate attacks on CEMI and its Socialist Optimally Function 
Economy (SOFE) approach to economics. MGU’s perspective was, in fact, more palatable 
to conservatives. At the heart of the dispute between MGU and Kronrod was a 
disagreement about Marxist political economy’s role in analyzing the socialist economy—
while the former believed that the political economy of socialism should be studied “in the 
manner of Marx” in which the specific laws of socialism could be deduced from certain 
first principles and were thus different than those Marx applied to capitalism, while the 
latter believed that the tools of the Marxist criticism of capitalism could be directly applied 
to the analysis of the USSR itself. In this regard, the true subversive message that Kronrod 
and his school were moving toward was that the USSR, at the socialist stage of 
development, had more in common with Capitalism than it did with Communism. This 
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implied that labor, which for Kronrod was the base unit of value, was still exploited in the 
Soviet Union.392  
 This destruction of the Kronrod school was finalized by the appointment of Evgeny 
Kapustin, the former Deputy Director of State Committee on Labor (Goskomtrud) and 
Director of the Council of Minister’s Scientific Institute for the Study of Labor, as the 
Institute of Economics’ new Director.393 Under his guidance, in 1973, the Institute issued 
a large volume that established the new orthodox theory of socialist political economy. In 
it, monetary and commodity relationships, the Tovarnik’s central focus, were declared 
important but that:  
it was a serious theoretical mistake to look for the basis of socialist cost accounting 
and enterprise performance solely in the monetary of commodity relationships. Cost 
accounting for enterprises must be based on a complex, systemic approach. This 
means that cost accounting [and thus the values that it accounted for] must be based 
on the socialist relationships that come primarily from the planned economy of which 
monetary relationships cannot be the defining criterion. 
 
Thus, profit, “while remaining an important measure for the effectiveness of the use of 
labor and material” could not, “under developed socialism,” be “the criteria for making 
optimal economic decisions.” It continued that “in the context of the Scientific-Technical 
Revolution” the key to developing the Soviet economy was to make enterprise 
independence compliment “a more scientifically based” and “flexible system of central 
planning” which could be achieved with the introduction of “optimization methods” and 
the use of “mathematical economic models.” Thus, contra-Popov, Tsagolov’s conception 
of economic theory made it easier to bring in “Mathematical-Economics” into the USSR.394 
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Yet, while the 1973 volume was extremely good at defining what Soviet political economy 
was not, it never described what it was. 
 In his memoirs—released in 1994 to both defend SOFE and argue for its 
applicability to Russia’s turbulent nineties—even Fedorenko admitted that his program 
was a reform program that, at best, could sneak in radical concepts into the USSR without 
challenging the system’s political underpinnings. Comparing SOFE to “Euro-
Communism,” he argued that his positivist version of Soviet economics offered “a way to 
integrate aspects of the market into a complex (all be it imperfect) economic system. In the 
end, this would have been a meeting in the middle of forces coming from opposite sides. 
It gave the opportunity to change the way the ideology of ‘the land of the Soviets’ operated 
solve the problems of socialism using methods like monetary-commodity relations.” 
Fedorenko added that “this was why SOFE was such a ‘bone in the throat’ of our 
opponents: it offered a way to reach the goals of socialism through other means.”395 
Fedorneko’s statements defending SOFE betray the ease with which it could be integrated 
as the Soviet project, in contrast, the more radical critiques that, ironically, were coming 
from the Academy’s Marxists. Indeed, in a series of interviews former CEMI staffer and 
founder of the Higher School of Economics, Yevgeny Yasin, explained that his work on 
statistical programming languages between 1968 and had “mostly taken me away from 
actual economics.” In fact, Yasin also stated that many of CEMI’s doubters thought “all 
that stuff we were doing about mathematical languages was just intellectual fluff which 
they did not need. He added that “this criticism put me in a deep depression almost to the 
point I had a breakdown, probably because deep inside I understood that they were right.” 
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Whatever SOFE’s theoretical merits, its practice served to reify the political basis of the 
Soviet economy.396  
 In his monograph, Ben Peters has pointed out that by the late 1960s, some of the 
earlier, utopian energies of the early cyberneticists such as Anatoly Kitov and Victor 
Glushkov had been exhausted. Glushkov’s “All-State Automated System of Management” 
(OGAS), developed in conjunction with Fedorenko, which aimed to not only physically 
integrate the USSR’s enterprises with computers but also to provide a model for decision-
making based on real-time data was cancelled in 1970 in favor of the more conservative 
system of the Unified State Network of Computer Systems (EGSVT) which only included 
the physical infrastructure of the former. As Peters documents, this shift was orchestrated 
by the ministries to limit intrusions into their operations.397 The outcome of this shift in 
emphasis was the introduction of the Automatic System of Management (ASU) project for 
which SOFE would be the theoretical base. The ASU’s would be informational databases 
that could be manipulated and used by managers in large plants and combines to monitor 
their braches. This standardized set of data would feed into another database the Automatic 
System of Planning Decisions (ASPR) which would allow for a similar set of references 
for central planners.  
 This shift to a more microeconomic set of economic information management was 
championed by Fedorenko who argued in his memoirs that the ASU-ASPR program was 
a movement away from the “idealism” of earlier cybernetic initiatives toward a realistic 
application of mathematical-economic theory into industrial practice.398 The ASU-ASPR 
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model was enshrined as the major direction of research into applied mathematical 
economics and “optimization” in a joint Academy of Sciences-Gosplan directive issued in 
1969. The directive decreed that “all research into the integration of mathematical 
economics into economic practice will be conducted on single methodological basis” 
directed toward the creation of interlocking ASU systems. The decree specified that ASPR 
would act as a master list for a “human-machine system” in which the planner would still 
be the decision maker while the ASPR would be limited to being a source of data. 
Meanwhile, the ASU would be designed and tailored to each individual ministry due to 
their different places in the national economy which the ASPR would be able to eventually 
harmonize. These new data inputs would also serve as a basis for a long-term plan of 
development which would be approved by the Central Committee and serve as a set of 
guidelines for the five year plans to work toward.399 Thus, the interpretation of the ASU 
system provided by Gosplan was in line with its priorities to both maintain discretionary 
power over the distribution over resources and the ministry’s desires to maintain certain 
special cutouts and privileges for their particular industry.  
  Yet the question that damned the Tovarniks remained: how would the overarching 
goals of the economy be defined and what would be the dominant method of Soviet 
economics? It is within this context that we can see the formalization of SOFE from 1967 
to 1969—as an attempt by Fedorenko to install his approach to economics as the central 
organizing theory of the USSR’s academic establishment. The debate over a new 
framework for Soviet economics came to a head at a 1974 meeting of the Academy of 
Sciences Section for Economics, to discuss recommendations to the Central Committee on 
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issuing a statement on the direction of economic science. Fedorenko, who had taken the 
chairmanship of the Section from Azumanian after the latter’s death in 1971, most likely 
saw this as an opportunity to enshrine SOFE as the underlying theory of Soviet economics. 
Yet, at the meeting, he met resistance from Tirgan Khachaturov, the director of the Institute 
for Transportation Problems, and one of the founders of the Cost of Production School, 
who argued that SOFE could not serve as the basis for the basis of a socialist political 
economy. While SOFE could be used to describe problems of management it could not 
describe issues of “productive relations” and thus could not be an all-encompassing 
interpretation of Marxism. A.I. Pashkov of MGU noted that not enough has been done on 
reconstructing the theory of money-commodity relations. Despite the defeat of market 
socialist ideas, no new theory had emerged as a replacement for it. On the other hand, he 
defended the inclusion of some language about optimization since it reflected Brezhnev’s 
own words at the XXIV Party Congress. M.I. Volkov, who worked in the Central 
Committee, expressed his frustration at the situation when he declared that “we talk about 
integrating cost accounting as a priority, but we have been doing that for years. Isn’t it time 
we agree on how to do it and present the steps and time frames.” The Academy of Sciences’ 
various sections on social sciences, he concluded, “are hopeless from the point of view of 
operational work” due to their lack of clarity on definitions and programs. Fedorenko 
closed the meeting wishing that there was more support from the Central Committee on 
clearing up economic theory and policy; that they could “have someone working on these 
problems” there. In the end, SOFE was not incorporated into the body of the text.400 Soviet 
economics remained unmoored. Economists could conduct micro-research with no 
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political content or spin ambiguous yarns about Marxism. Yet, the development of an 
economically grounded critique of Soviet institutions themselves was foreclosed with the 
“taming” of the subversive elements of reformism that emerged from 1965 to 1969. 
Conclusion: Stagnation and the Soviet Project   
 Kronrod retired to his dacha after his removal from academic life. The experience 
had given him a heart attack and otherwise hurt his health in his rather advanced age. This, 
however, did not mean he stopped thinking. He wrote several tracts on political economy 
that did not pass censorship and were only published in the late 1980s and continued 
writing editorials on monetary policy in Soviet newspapers. His largest collection of post 
retirement writing, never even went to the censors and remained in his desk. Beginning as 
an essay titled “Socio-Oligarchism as the Pseudo-Socialism of the XXth Century” written 
in 1973, it would, over the course of the decade, grow into a long, disjointed manuscript 
entitled Thoughts on the Socio-Economic Development of the XXth Century. This work 
only saw the light of day in 1992 and for good reason. “Socio-Oligarchism,” and its 
subsequent expansion, did explicitly what Kronrod’s critics argued he had been doing 
implicitly in his work in the late 1960s.  In his work, he argued that in the USSR “the 
connection between the control of production by the state and the capture of that state by a 
ruling group has led to a monopolistic state which excludes all democratic institutions.” 
Yet Kronrod remained the ever-optimistic Marxist. “In the 1970s,” this “neo-exploitative 
state” like “all complex social organizations” would enter a phase in which its “original 
ideals would be totally erased” and a search for new ones would begin. In its place, Kronrod 
hoped that a new kind of socialist order would emerge based on the separation of “the 
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national economy” from the “state apparatus.” One that would be run democratically by 
worker-producers with civic rights through systems of production councils.401  
 Kronrod’s words were brutally honest and prophetic in their diagnoses of the ills of 
Soviet society. The USSR did enter a conservative phase in the “long 1970s” in which the 
socio-economic project of Soviet socialism, its core claim of being a society of a new type, 
became ill-defined. In with economics, as with other areas of life, practices fell into a kind 
of stasis. This was not a failure of Soviet ideology but a sign of its success. Stagnation, at 
least in its political-economic aspects, was a risk countenanced by Soviet leaders to relieve 
the pressures unleashed by the attempt to reform the system that had emerged in the mid-
1960s and the potential they had to challenge the underlying project propagated by Soviet 
state institutions— the very basis for the existence of the Soviet elite. Yet, the era that the 
USSR was entering into—the long 1970s, which a recent work characterized as “the shock 
of the global”— would force this conservative order to interact with other states and 
intellectual groupings attempting to preserve their order in an era of change and, in the 
process, create a very different kind of Soviet economics that would restate Kronrod’s 
critiques using other, more politically ambiguous methods that embraced the contradictions 
embedded within the “Scientific-Technical Revolution” and “Developed Socialism.”402  
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Beyond Cold War Economics: The Making of a Technocratic International and the 
Globalization of the Soviet Project  
In June 1967, McGeorge Bundy traveled to Moscow to meet the leaders of Soviet economic 
and management sciences. The President of the Ford Foundation, and Lyndon Johnson’s 
former National Security Advisor, was touring Europe to promote a presidentially 
supported project for an East-West Center to study problems of industrialized societies. In 
Moscow, Bundy had lunch with Nikolai Fedorenko, the director of the Central Economic 
Mathematical Institute (CEMI), and Bundy’s old contact, State Committee for Science and 
Technology (GKNT) Deputy Director for International Exchanges and Kosygin son-in-
law, Djerman Gvishiani. In a communique to the Department of State, Bundy reported that 
Fedorenko freely admitted that “economic reform had not gotten off the ground” and that 
“the first eighteen months were only the beginning of a long process.” Moreover, there was 
“significant disagreement” in the Soviet hierarchy about how to proceed with the reforms. 
Fedorenko complained that officials resisted the increasing use of computers in price-
setting because “they did not fully understand the implications” of the new technology and 
“perhaps had a psychological barrier to it.” Most of all, he was irritated about how much 
the Western press was paying attention to Fedorenko’s rivals, Birman and Liberman, who 
he called “publicists not economists” who did not participate in important decisions. Most 
revealing were his statements on the problems of centralization versus decentralization. He 
disliked the simplistic view that “reformers” like himself “were for centralization” and 
opponents of his vision for reform “were for decentralization.” He explained that he 
believed that “we need a pragmatic approach to this problem. Even you in the United States 
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recognize this. Some areas need more centralized control and others do not.” Finally, 
Fedorenko expressed interest in coming to the United States to visit American colleagues 
whom Bundy referred to as “the Leontiefs and such.”403   
 Bundy’s conversation with Fedorenko demonstrates how Soviet domestic reform 
intersected with international concerns and that Cold War competition could also foster the 
exchange of ideas. This chapter will show that figures who have been traditionally labeled 
as Cold War intellectuals formed networks that crossed the Iron Curtain by cooperating 
within international organizations, most prominently the United Nations, on projects of 
economic development and global planning. Tied together by a common interest in the 
application of cybernetics, econometrics, and management science to large, international 
social problems, these intellectuals and government officials (often occupying these niches 
at the same time) began to understand social orders as systems governed by common 
mathematical parameters. These networks, I will argue, were vital to the introduction of 
this “new planning” to the Soviet Union and to the generation of a socio-economic critique 
of Soviet economic practices built on the foundations of mathematical economics.  
This chapter will argue that these networks were not only areas of intellectual 
exchange but that they took on a life of their own, institutionalizing themselves in formal 
and informal organizations on the many levels on which the Cold War played out: in 
national institutes, bloc specific organizations such as COMECON and the OECD, and 
international organizations such as the International Institute for Advanced Systems 
Analysis (IIASA). In the 1970s, these networks, despite their origin in the priorities of the 
Cold War and mathematical formalism, mobilized to offer a technocratic vision of a new 
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international economic system: one that sought to reinvent planning as a global humanist 
project aimed at liberating human potential rather than directing it.   
 In documenting these networks, this chapter will make two historiographic 
interventions. First, scholarly discussion about the origins of Perestroika give feature a 
prominent role to Western ideas and their influence on Soviet elites. In writings from the 
early 2000s, Soviet reformers are described as visionary proto-liberals who, in Robert 
English’s account, began to re-conceptualize the West and Western ideas into something 
to look to for inspiration for the Soviet future.404 The same is true of Archie Brown, who 
has called reformist groupings in the Communist Party “chameleon institutions” which 
deployed liberal ideas within an illiberal environment.405 With the end of the liberal 
ascendency of the late 1990s, this same narrative has been turned on its head by Russian 
reactionaries who argue that the Soviet Union was betrayed by naïve intellectuals poisoned 
by Western ideas.406 These narratives share a fundamental problem: in seeing the reformist 
branch of the Soviet elite as either brave internal opponents or traitors, they remove 
exchanges between Soviet and Western intellectuals from their historical context. These 
party officials and intellectuals did not see a discrepancy between their work in 
international organizations and their dedication to the Soviet cause. In fact, interacting with 
Western social scientists and adopting their methods was encouraged by the Soviet 
military-industrial complex as a means of improving domestic economic performance and 
                                                
404 Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
405 Archie Brown, “Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism,” Post-Soviet Affairs 16, 
nop. 2 (2000): 177–200. 
406 A standout for actual historical research in this genre is Aleksandr Ostrovsky, Kto Postavil Gorbacheva? 
(Moscow: Eskimo, 2010).  
	 263	
 
of acquiring foreign technologies needed to wage the Cold War.407 As well, these presentist 
readings also leave Western liberalism un-problematized, portraying it as a monolithic 
agenda unaffected by shifts in the international political economy. In fact, as we shall see, 
the highpoint of Soviet-Western cooperation in economics and social science came during 
a crisis of “embedded liberalism.”  
Soviet economic theorists and their Western interlocutors attempted to adapt 
national industrial planning to the conditions of global financial interdependence that were 
emerging in the 1970s and to establish an intellectual agenda that would counter other 
alternative economic doctrines emerging from the West and the Global South. As such, 
this “technocratic international” argued that global planning should be the alternative to 
both the “neo-liberal” deregulation of international capital mobility and the New Economic 
International Order’s (NIEO) advocacy of the restructuring of the global terms of trade. 
The networks built by Cold War intellectuals were the culmination of the Soviet Union’s 
attempt to marry its domestic industrial politics with an international mission that started 
with the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” and to keep that agenda relevant as the 
accomplishments of early Soviet heavy industrialization were being quickly overshadowed 
by the emergence of a “post-industrial economy” dominated by the information industry, 
lean manufacturing, and aggressive export driven growth in the East Asian “tiger 
economies.”   
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 An examination of the East-West exchange of economic ideas also contributes to 
the new historiography of détente. Much of earlier writing on this period of international 
relations has focused on the machinations of the superpowers such as the “triangle 
diplomacy” practiced by Nixon and the incentives nuclear parity created for Soviet-
American attempts to regulate the arms race. A newer strand of literature has broken out 
of this mold by focusing on “European Détente” and particularly examining Willie 
Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” as its own political agenda that not only had a more permanent 
political impact that the collapsing superpower détente but also was the incubator for new 
areas of political engagement such as “human rights” and the greater integration of Eastern 
Europe into Western European financial and economic networks.408  Yet, the Soviet 
experience has been overlooked, with Russian-speaking actors appearing either as 
negotiating partners, or only in the context of the Helsinki Accords. Even the rare book 
that pays attention to the social contexts of international exchange in the Soviet Union, 
Jeremy Suri’s Power and Protest, is based on few Russian primary sources.409 In fact, a 
more detailed look at the social context of Soviet economic thought shows that Suri’s 
interpretation of détente as a conservative backlash against the humanist rebellions of the 
1960s does not hold. Rather, Soviet social scientists engaged in the détente project believed 
it to be a way of taking the ideals that emerged after 1956 to their logical conclusion—the 
triumph of a humanist version of the Soviet project that secured world peace.  
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 The reader of this chapter should keep in mind its role in the larger project. In 
documenting the interaction between international technocratic networks and domestic 
politics in the USSR, I show that while radical, market socialist, radical Tovarnik, 
reformism of the mid-1960s was eliminated by Brezhnev’s agenda of a “global scientific-
technical revolution,” the term allowed those thinkers that were left to integrate their 
thinking into a global context, forcing once depoliticized mathematical research to expand 
its horizons to larger institutional and social issues. Through the efforts of Djerman 
Gvishiani, in particular, Soviet mathematical economics was integrated into the larger 
discipline of “systems analysis” and forced to deal with societal problems on both a 
national and global scale.   
 
Econometrics, International Organizations, Development Economics and 
Multilateral Science  
In 1962, Jan Tinbergen, the Dutch “father” of econometrics, published Shaping the World 
Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy under imprint of the 
Twentieth Century Fund, the venerable New York-based progressive institution. Shaping 
presented an agenda for curing the “disease” of underdevelopment in newly decolonized 
countries through active state intervention in the economy guided by latest in 
mathematically derived planning techniques. This “medicine” would bring newly 
decolonized countries out of poverty and into modernity. The “doctors” who held the cure 
were the major industrialized powers: the USSR and the United States. These “two 
doctors,” as Tinbergen called them, pedaled different formulations of a medicine but if 
applied with proper dosage guided by scientific research—mathematical economics—each 
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could be as effective a cure as the other. Tinbergen was no outsider or radical—his work 
was widely respected by the leading economic theorists of both superpowers and is the 
groundwork of modern economic theory. Indeed, from the perspective the early 1960s, 
there was nothing strange about what Tinbergen was writing. Development theorists in the 
West took some form of government industrial planning as given, often drawing upon their 
own experience in the “New Deal” or the formulation of the “European Economic 
Community.” Meanwhile, theorists from the East increasingly thought that a transition that 
kept certain market elements in place in newly liberated states was needed before central 
planning fully took over. What united both sides of this debate was not only the idea of an 
inexorable march of history toward some kind of ideal—either of embedded liberalism or 
of socialism—but that these ideals could be implemented around the world using the same 
mathematically driven planning techniques.410  Western theorists of “the industrial society” 
freely spoke about how technocratic dominance in state socialist societies could resemble 
the West and how Western societies would be more planned. Their Soviet counterparts, 
though abhorring the idea of “convergence,” could opine how more state planning in the 
West was inevitable as capitalism reached its monopoly stage, thus foreshadowing the 
ultimate Soviet triumph.411  
 Tinbergen’s text represented a culminating moment in a long history of the 
integration of “econometrics,”—the use of formal mathematical methods to construct 
economic models —and international development. Soviet scientists were no outsiders to 
this longer history. Econometrics was born in the context of a late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth-century international scientific community in Russian theorists were active. The 
story of econometrics begins in the “marginal revolution” of the late nineteenth century 
when Carl Menger, Leon Walras, William Stanly Jeavons, and Alfred Marshall all, 
independently, formalized the concept of “demand” in addition to “supply” based on the 
economic subject who maximizes “marginal utility,” the personal satisfaction a consumer 
gets from consuming one more item of a good or the profit the producer gains from 
producing one more good over the previous good produced. For the purposes of our story, 
the most important of these was Walras, a French engineer teaching at the University of 
Lausanne who along with his colleague, Italian engineer Wilfredo Pareto, established an 
interpretation of supply and demand built explicitly on the foundations of the mathematics 
of thermodynamics.  What was remarkable about the Lausanne interpretation of the 
marginal revolution was not only its Pan-European origin—in contrast to the very English, 
Ricardian tradition of Jevons and Marshall and the distinctly Austro-German legal tradition 
of Manger—but that, because of its mathematical origins, it was normatively neutral. In 
the Walras—Pareto world, the optimal level of supply and demand and the consequent 
distribution of goods was not a matter of particular institutions or practices. Either state or 
market could determine this ideal outcome.412 
 Though mostly engaged with Austrian theory, Russian thinkers were active 
participants in the marginal revolution. Manger’s lectures were the basis of Petr Struve’s 
“legal” Marxism which substituted the labor theory of value with marginal utility. Struve’s 
comrade Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, a trained mathematician, built one of the first 
                                                
412 Philip Mirowski, “Physics and the ‘Marginalist Revolution,’” Cambridge Journal of Economics 8, nop. 
4 (December 1, 1984): 361–79; Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing 
Origins of Neoliberalism (Stanford University Press, 2011).  
	 268	
 
mathematical models of a business cycle to meld Marx’s critique of capitalism with 
Manger’s “subjective” approach to behavior. The affinity of Russian socialists for 
marginalism, even its least mathematically sophisticated Austrian variant, should not be 
surprising. The marginalists were all dedicated social reformers who believe their research 
had applications to state projects that would advance social justice. Indeed, socialist 
intellectuals and parties across Northern Europe and Scandinavia embraced marginalism 
to make Marxism “work.”413 
 The early years of the twentieth century fueled innovations that formed the bridge 
between marginalism and econometrics. The First World War had led to advances in the 
use of applied, inferential statistics which motivated economists to begin filling out the 
abstract, thermodynamic supply and demand system invented by Walras with concrete 
statistical information on real economies and markets. Moscow was an especially 
important site of this move as it was one of the leading centers of the world for research 
into the key element of mathematics needed to make economics a “science:” probability 
theory. A.A. Konus developed the first calculation of the cost of living. Eugen Slutsky’s 
seminal 1915 paper developed a technique for the measurement of substitution effects and 
in 1927 he would provide the basis for a stochastic theory of the business cycle.414 Indeed, 
at Gosplan, economists such as Wassily Leontief, G.A. Feldman, and Viktor Novozhilov 
were at work developing “material balances,” which would be the beginning of a research 
program that led to Leontief’s Nobel Prize. Russian émigré economists such as former 
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Tarek Socialist Republic, Menshevik official Jacob Marshak, Simon Kuznetz, and later 
Wassily Leontief, entered institutes in Europe and the United States to lay down the 
foundations of mathematical economics.415  
The world that these Russian émigrés entered was one of transatlantic and trans-
European networks anchored by new international institutions. At the heart of this 
connection was the friendship between the grand old man of marginalism in the United 
States, Irving Fisher, and a young Norwegian economist dedicated to give empirical 
backing marginalism’s theoretical prescriptions with statistical study of real economic 
phenomenon, Ragnar Frisch. With support from Fisher, Frisch received funding from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to travel the United States and lecture on the subject he called 
“econometrics.” Frisch’s movement would get a boost from the sponsorship of a Colorado 
businessman, Alfred Cowles, who would finance the publication of the official journal of 
the Econometric society, Econometrica, and establish a research center, the Cowles 
Commission, which became the nucleus for research in mathematical economics in the 
postwar era. This American connection helped inject the new sub-discipline into a project 
at the League of Nations on the contours of the new consumption-driven economy that was 
emerging in the wake of the First World War. The unlikely start of these efforts was the 
League of Nation’s International Labor Organization (ILO) study on “the cost of living” 
sponsored by the Ford Corporation to price their wages and the price of their products in 
Europe and to show the superiority of the American system of labor management. The Ford 
                                                
415 Robert Leeson, “‘The Ghosts I Called I Can’t Get Rid of Now’: The Keynes-Tinbergen-Friedman-
Phillips Critique of Keynesian Macroeconometrics,” History of Political Economy 30, no. 1 (March 20, 
1998): 51–94,; Francisco Louçã, The Years of High Econometrics: A Short History of the Generation That 
Reinvented Economics, (New York: Routledge, 2012); Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The 
Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
	 270	
 
project required the development of statistical indices for the measurement costs across 
markets and consumer preferences.416  
This work, which required the construction of detailed statistical indices, was 
followed by a more ambitious set of projects funded by the Rockefeller Foundation: a 
survey of the literature on business cycle research, completed in 1937 by Austrian 
economist Gottfried Haberler. However, Haberler’s traditional Austrian business cycle 
model was being thrown into question by the persistence of the Great Depression. In 
contrast to the theories of self-equilibrating markets, John Maynard Keynes used simple, 
non-statistical logic417 to show that markets could be inefficient. The League’s response to 
Keynes was written by Dutch econometrician Jan Tinbergen; who’s interest in 
mathematical economics came from his belief in its use as a means to scientifically direct 
social reform. Following his PhD research, he worked in the Dutch statistical bureau where 
he was responsible for building the first national economic model. This experience sent 
Tinbergen to Geneva to develop the League’s in-house econometric model of the business 
cycle. The model followed the political cues of Frisch who believed that the future of the 
economy had to be a finance-less, directly administered, planned system. This belief in 
planning as a panacea for the problems of modernity by the early econometricians 
contrasted with the Keynesians who were prone to less direct intervention and who 
accepted the permanence of financial markets in capitalism, which they, unlike many early 
econometricians, believed to be part and parcel of any modern economic system.418 
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The early integration of econometrics into the League of Nations and the networks 
built by the Rockefeller Foundation meant it was deeply intertwined with the birth of 
international development. Both organizations were deeply involved in efforts to 
modernize agriculture in Eastern Europe. With the Soviet alliance during WWII, many of 
the leading members of this organization looked forward to the day when they could restore 
their contacts with their Soviet counterparts whose scientific activity had been severely 
limited under Stalin. Later, much of the League’s staff and networks continued into the 
newly founded United Nations. The expectation of Soviet participation in a global 
international project is evidenced by the early deliberations of the Economic Commission 
on Europe (ECE)—the first of the UN’s regional economic commissions. Headed by 
Swedish Social Democrat and future Nobel Prize winning economist, Gunnar Myrdal, the 
ECE, from its inception, saw itself as an East-West Institution—even if in practice, Soviet 
social scientists did not participate in the commission’s work when it formed in 1947. 
Indeed, almost immediately the ECE assigned a staff economist, Russian-born socialist 
Eugen Chussodowsky, to begin working out means for incorporating Soviet data into the 
ECE’s work on economic modeling and forecasting. The problem, Chussodowksy and his 
superiors pointed out, was that most Soviet data was inaccessible, leaving the ECE to work 
with only published materials of limited usefulness and leftover data from the League of 
Nation’s ILO, of which the USSR was a member before the war. In addition to gathering 
a catalogue for statistics, Chussodowsky also established a list of leading Soviet economists 
who could be invited to work with the ECE once diplomatic issues had been resolved.419 
Myrdal, who as Minister of Commerce negotiated the controversial Swedish-Soviet trade 
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treaty in 1946, insisted that the ECE have a Soviet deputy director of his choice which he 
got in the form of career diplomat Nikolai Petrovich Kotomov. This emphasis on including 
the USSR and Eastern Europe in the functions of the UN’s first specifically economic body 
increased as it styled itself the only “neutral actor” fighting for European economic unity 
following the USSR’s withdrawal from the Marshal Plan negotiations in 1947. Yet despite 
this outreach, while Soviet diplomats participated in plenary sessions of the ECE, using 
them mostly to attack the Marshal Plan, Soviet economists declined to work in the body’s 
more important expert commissions.420 
Things began to change drastically following Stalin’s death. The 1954 Geneva 
Conference was the USSR’s first foray into postwar multi-lateral diplomacy. This was 
followed by Khrushchev and Bulganin’s whirlwind 1955 tour of Asia. This trip marked a 
change in Soviet policy that was formally announced at the XXth Party Congress. 
Decolonization was declared a major part of the anti-Imperialist struggle and the major 
front on which the socio-economic competition of the two systems would be fought. 
Indeed, Khrushchev argued that industrializing countries could take the “non-capitalist 
path to development”—a position that by 1960 would be codified as official Soviet policy 
toward newly liberated states. According to the new thinking, colonialism had left 
developing countries as largely agricultural states with small working classes. This meant 
that socialist movements had to ally themselves in a “wide front” with the nationalist 
bourgeoisie and the peasantry to establish the basis of national growth which would lead 
to a mixed economy that eventually would evolved into socialism. Keeping with this 
analysis, Soviet theorists envisioned a specifically Marxist model of economic aid that 
                                                




would be focused on exporting readily made heavy industry to newly decolonized states in 
hopes of fostering national economic independence from imperialists and to build the basis 
for a working class that would form the vanguard for socio-economic progress. Central to 
this development strategy was the export of planning techniques. Development experts 
explicitly used the industrialization of Soviet Central Asia as the ur-model for economic 
growth in newly decolonized states.421  
The Soviet vision of planning as the paradigm of economic development was not 
out of line with the thinking in the halls of the United Nations. In 1952, the United Nations 
adopted Trinidadian-American economist W. Arthur Lewis’s “Two-Sector Growth 
Model” as the intellectual foundation of its approach to development economics. The two-
sector model used the same “classical assumptions” as the foundational 1928 Feldman 
model of Soviet economics with both economists assuming the elasticity of capital and 
labor. Like Feldman, Lewis, and later Indian economist Parshanta Chandra Mahailnobis, 
assumed there was a need to shift labor from the countryside in which it was 
“underemployed” by subsistence agriculture (thus the term “hidden unemployment” used 
in this class of models) into the making of producer goods which, in the long run, would 
allow for the initial accumulation of capital needed to shift the economy toward more 
investment in consumer goods and general prosperity. In the absence of the financial 
system that developed states used to marshal capital, newly decolonized states had to turn 
to central planning to spur the accumulation of capital.422  
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With Khrushchev’s Thaw, the Soviet economics field and the Soviet government 
became ever more interested in working with international organizations and their staff. In 
1956, Myrdal was invited to Moscow to discuss both the ECE and scientific cooperation 
between Soviet and European economists. In private conversations during his visit, Myrdal 
expressed hope that Soviet economists and statisticians could take an “active role” in the 
work of the ECE in compiling all-European statistics for use in continental development 
projects and proposed that the USSR participate in a “conference of European economists.” 
As well as private conversations on scientific plans, Myrdal’s visit to Moscow featured a 
lecture at Moscow State University (MGU) to an audience of five hundred people. This 
was not just an academic affair, as the Soviet side made major efforts not only to include 
members of the country’s leading social science institutes on the invitation list but to 
explicitly invite embassy personnel from the west and the developing world in a show of 
Moscow’s new openness. Myrdal’s speech was also a blend of economic science and 
political agenda. Discussing how the EEC was creating a new statistical basis for 
understanding Europe’s economies, Myrdal emphasized that the USSR, by making its 
statistics public and standardized, would not only have salutatory effects for international 
economic research but also encourage the expansion of trade between the socialist and 
capitalist states of Europe which, in turn, would spur peace and integration across the 
continent.423  
 The USSR’s opening toward international cooperation in economic research and 
expert participation in international bodies plugged its burgeoning economics profession 
into networks of left-leaning economists around the world, at a time when the profession 
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was dominated by the left. Economists of East European and Russian heritage were key 
intermediaries in integrating Soviet specialists into this technocratic network. For example, 
at a 1957 UN conference on disarmament, Polish econometrician and former UN 
ambassador, Oscar Lange, introduced IMEMO’s Deputy Director Vladimir Aboltin to 
Prof. Meadows of Rutgers who attempted to recruit Aboltin into founding a new journal 
called Coexistence. The journal’s editors would be legendary left-Keynesian economist 
Joan Robinson and legal-economic comparativist Rudolf Schlesinger—both of whom had 
joined Lange in his polemics with the traditional anti-marginalist Marxist students of 
Morris Dobbs. In his report of the meeting, Aboltin acknowledged that while he believed 
his collaboration with this group might bring about positive results, he thought that some 
members of the editorial board were unacceptable—one member that particularly troubled 
was Wassily Leontief.424  
It is not surprising that Leontief raised concerns for Aboltin. Leontief had started 
his life and career in the USSR and had been one of the economists engaged in early 
planning discussions in the 1920s. However, he was not a supporter of the Soviet regime, 
having sided with his professor, Pritim Sorokin, in a dispute with Soviet authorities in 1922 
over academic freedom (both would meet again at Harvard where Sorokin helped found 
the sociology department and Leontief the econometrics research program) and was 
arrested several times. After a false diagnosis of a late-stage sarcoma, Leontief was allowed 
to leave the country in 1925 after which he continued his research at the University of 
Berlin and at Keil’s Institute of the World Economy, where he conducted pioneering 
research into the statistical measurement of supply and demand. In 1931, he came to the 
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National Bureau of Economic Research in New York and a year later became a faculty 
member at Harvard. It was there that Leontief made his main contribution to economics—
the development of the “Input-Output” (IO) methodology which measured how the 
products of one industry were consumed by other sectors of the economy through a matrix 
of partial equilibria linear systems published as The Structure of the American Economy 
1919-1929 in 1941.425  
With such a background, it was no wonder Leontief would be a problematic figure. 
However, this would not last long. When Nemchinov founded his laboratory for 
mathematical economics in 1958, he and his students used two texts—Leontief’s 
Structures and Kantorovich’s 1948 pamphlet on optimization.426 Nemchinov’s admiration 
seemed to be enough to have Leontief invited to the USSR in 1959 as part of a delegation 
from Harvard sent to establish an academic exchange program with Leningrad State 
University (LGU). From Leontief’s report to the Ford Foundation, his visit was less an 
administrative mission than a chance to meet with and informally train the USSR’s young 
economists.  He was greeted by Nemchniov and Kantorovich and held an impromptu 
seminar for fifteen graduate students who had been working on mastering input-output 
models. These students, he reported, were going to Siberia to become the basis of an 
applied economics institute there—the core of what would become Abel Agambegian’s 
Institute of Economics and Applied Industrial Engineering.  Another economist of note 
encountered by Leontief included V.D. Belkin, who he noted had the “odious task of 
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communicating between the computing and economics community.” 427 Following his 
visit, Leontief sent translations of new research on mathematical programming in 
economics conducted at MIT and the RAND Institute to leading Soviet researchers 
including Nemchinov, Tsagolov, and Kantorovich.428  
Leontief’s visit to Moscow and his interest in Soviet input-output research were not 
simply apolitical acts of a scholar excited to share his work with his home country. 
Leontief, despite his opposition to the Soviet government, was a passionate proponent of 
planning, believing that it was the future of the American economy. Leontief used the 
Soviet interest in input-output to plead his case for more funding and government 
investment in assembling the data needed to introduce more planning to the United States. 
In his report from Moscow he warned that the “failure of the United States Government to 
maintain its input-output tables” meant that the Soviet Union could soon overtake the 
United States in the effectiveness of its economic system. The politics were clear. A 
Rockefeller Foundation assessment of Leontief’s claims noted that “many in the business 
community see this [Leontief’s advocacy] as jamming government planning down our 
throat.” A second reason that Leontief presented for increased funding was his need to 
organize funds for the first International “Input-Output” Conference in Geneva, 1961 
which would feature work from Gunnar Myrdal, Jan Tinbergen, and Nicholas Kaldor. 
Nemchinov would attend as the official observer from the USSR.429  
 If planning was facing pushback in some Western domestic venues, it had support 
from leaders on an international level. The United Nation’s “First Development Decade,” 
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launched by President John F. Kennedy and UN General Secretary U Thant in 1960, 
emphasized the importance of “development planning” in mobilizing resources for 
economic growth in underdeveloped countries lacking market institutions.430 This 
program, derived from the assumptions of the Lewis model, was perfectly compatible with 
the Soviet program of socio-economic development through industrialization and fit within 
the agenda of the “competition of the two systems.”  
This international environment was extremely hospitable to the introduction of 
Soviet specialists into global circuits of development expertise. In 1959, Parshanta Chandra 
Mahailnobis, director of the Indian Statistical Institute and architect of India’s Second Five 
Year Plan (focused on shock industrialization), came to Moscow to encourage IMEMO to 
cooperate in the creation of a volume called Industrializing Underdeveloped Countries. 
The work would be co-edited by IMEMO founder, Anoushavan Azumanian, and would 
include, amongst others, contributors from the UK, Iraq, and Guinea. This proposal was 
viewed extremely positively by the Central Committee’s Department of Science and 
Higher Education, whose report noted that “amongst Western specialists, it has become 
common to address the development of newly decolonized states within the current 
international division of labor” and for “economists from developing countries 
[themselves] to write about economic development without addressing the need for social 
[class] change.” The mission of Soviet economic advisers was to demonstrate “that 
complex problems of developing economies can only be addressed through wholesale 
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industrialization and the transformation of the agrarian order” which would entail the 
creation of a progressive working class.431  
 At the heart of East-West engagement on development economics was the tension 
between capitalism and socialism and a basic agreement on the usefulness of planning 
techniques. For example, a 1962 conference on “development planning” organized by 
General Secretary U Thant in Geneva divided its participants divided into three sections: 
capitalist countries, socialist countries and developing countries. The final report entitled 
Economic Planning for Development was approved by all members of the committee with 
the exception of the Soviet representative, M.Z. Bor—the same Bor who would go on to 
challenge the Vaag report on economic reform of 1965. Bor’s addendum emphasized the 
superiority of Soviet-style planning over that of either capitalist states or “the mixed 
economies” found in the developing world.432  
While traditionalists like Bor still emphasized the divide between socialist and 
capitalist planning, economists working with the “mathematical-economics” paradigm saw 
no problems separating the matter of planning techniques from issues of social order. 
Indeed, such an approach wasn’t at odds with Soviet policy. Lectures such as Fedorenko’s 
1966 presentation on long-term forecasting and industrial planning at the Denmark meeting 
of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), were supposed to 
help boost the prestige of Soviet science.433 Leontief used a 1966 UNIDO Moscow 
conference on the economics of metallurgy for developing nations to expand his contacts 
and encourage his colleagues to attend international professional conferences as scientists 
                                                
431 RGANI f. 5 op. 35 f. 115 ll. 62-66. 
432 M.Z. Boz “Planning in the Soviet Union” in Planning for Economic Development (New York: The 
United Nations, 1962), 125-145. 
433 RGAE f. 9480 op. 7 d. 953 l. 165-175. 
	 280	
 
as much as Soviet representatives.434 United Nations organizations thus formed an 
important site of professional contact in which Soviet and Western economists began to 
work as fellow experts in multilateral rather than bilateral contexts. 
By the mid-1960s, Soviet participation in international organizations was allowing 
experts to begin understanding themselves as members of an international professional 
society associated with development and econometrics. In 1966, Tinbergen lobbied the 
Dutch government to donate six million dollars to the United Nations to fund the operations 
of a permanent commission called the “Committee on Development Planning (CDP).” 
Indeed, while both the British and Soviet diplomatic attaches to the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) agreed that the “United Nations had no idea of 
what to do with this committee,” the Dutch side and ECOSOC secretariat insisted that it 
be staffed with mathematically trained economic experts. Tinbergen recommended the 
Soviets send the Director of Gosplan’s Scientific Institute (NII), A.N. Efimov, to be their 
representative to this supposedly ideologically neutral expert committee. While Efimov did 
not become a permanent member of this committee, his deputy and successor, Andrei 
Kirilenko, was appointed to the committee where he would serve through the 1980s.435  
The trends that had emerged through the 1950s and 1960s were summed up in a 
1969 GKNT report on the future of Soviet technical support to developing nations. Its 
authors suggested that to keep up with advancements in the West, the USSR should send 
graduate students from CEMI to Tinbergen’s research center in Rotterdam to both improve 
the ability of Soviet specialists to participate in the formulation of industrial plans for the 
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developing countries and to import modern planning techniques from the West into the 
Soviet Union itself. The need for better training in and contacts with the cutting edge of 
Western econometric theory was dire since foreign aid and technical assistance would most 
likely become “more multilateral” in the coming decade “which was at odds” with Soviet 
practice.436   
Forging a Technocratic International  
In 1969, a Soviet delegation attended a conference called “The Crisis of Planning” 
at the British National Center for the Study of Development in Brighton. Though ostensibly 
aimed at the problems of planning in developing countries, the Soviet delegation concluded 
that it was actually a meeting to defend the concept of planning itself in the wake of the 
failure of Harold Wilson’s “Plan for the Development of the British Economy.” The 
failures of this plan and the French Five Year Plan, as well as development plans around 
the world, were providing ammunition to rightwing critics of planning who, after being on 
the fringes of the Western economics profession, were coming back to afore. The purpose 
of the Brighton meeting was to show that it was not planning that was failing, but rather 
there was a greater crisis in the global economy that had foiled these plans. After their 
attendance, the USSR’s delegation suggested that to counter this worldwide attack on 
planning, the Soviet Union make the training of Soviet development cadres replicate those 
of their Western counterparts by expanding on the teaching of theoretical economics and 
to send graduate students to train at Western European university’s development 
economics programs.437 The Soviet delegation’s report from Brighton summed up the 
transformation of the relationship between the USSR’s experts and their sympathetic 
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Western counterparts. The increasing fluidity between domestic planning and international 
development was driving Soviet economists to see the battles fought by their Western 
friends as part and parcel of an international discussion over the future of not only planning 
but the international order itself.  
Scholars have argued that the technocratic optimism of the 1950s and 1960s 
collapsed during the late-1970s. True though this maybe, the global technocratic networks 
did not surrender without a fight. Rather, the technocrats of the 1950s and 1960s moved 
the center of their movement from the United Nations to new institutions designed to 
produce an explicitly new, global, and, in their opinion, humane version of planning. New 
organizations, most prominently, “The Club of Rome,” and the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) tried to promote an updated “new planning” as a 
response to the global crisis of the 1970s. Soviet officials and scholars played key roles in 
the formation of these organizations and hoped to use them not only to intervene in the 
crisis of embedded liberalism but to establish an alternative to traditional economic 
planning to advance the course of a humane socialism in both the East and the West.438 
The story of these new institutions, formal and informal, can almost all be told 
through the biography of one man—Dzhermen Gvishiani. Aspects of Gvishiani’s 
remarkable career have been already discussed in other chapters of this dissertation but 
parts of his early life and career bear some repeating. Gvishiani was born to Soviet political 
royalty and his trajectory reflects the transformation of the country’s elite from mass 
murders to academics. His father, M.M. Gvishiani, a high-ranking Georgian KGB officer 
and close ally of Lavrenti Beria, was responsible for the deportation of the Chechens in 
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1944, amongst other horrible crimes. His son’s name was an anagram of the names 
Dzerzhinsky and Menzhinsky. The younger Gvishiani took on less bloody pursuits. He 
entered the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO)—the incubator 
of the Soviet diplomatic elite—in 1951, where he met and married Ludmila Alexeievna 
Kosygina, Alexei Kosygin’s daughter. After military service in Vienna, where he was a 
protocol officer in the Danube Flotilla, he did his graduate work in the philosophy of 
science at MGU. Gvishiani’s research was atypical for a graduate student in philosophy—
the sociology and methodology of American management science.439 His interests and 
expertise, as well as his family and oft rumored KGB connections, led to his appointment 
as Deputy Director for International Outreach at the GKNT. In 1963, he also headed up the 
GKNT’s ad hoc committee on the introduction of cybernetics and modern management 
techniques into the Soviet economy, where he worked with Fedorenko on early versions of 
what would become CEMI’s SOFE theory. In its first meeting committee immediately 
established a program to import western books on management theory, econometrics, and 
decision sciences.440 Gvishiani’s interests, as well has his institutional and political clout, 
meant that he was uniquely positioned to become the conduit to give shape to the Soviet 
side of the “technocratic international.” 
Gvishiani’s role in assembling the “technocratic international” began in 1963 
during his participation in the UN sponsored Conference on Science and Transfer for the 
Benefit of Less Developed Countries and the subsequent UN Advisory Committee on The 
Application of Science and Technology for Development (ACAST) established at that 
conference. It was there that he met his first Western contact—MIT management professor 
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Carroll Wilson.  Wilson, like Gvishiani, was not an economist but a management theorist. 
Wilson received his B.S. in Engineering from MIT in 1932 and had spent most of his career 
as a government and business administrator. In 1946, he was a moving force for the ill-
fated United States proposal to transfer its nuclear weapons to the UN and, following its 
failure, became the first director of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. After 
resigning from the Commission and spending time in the uranium mining business, he 
accepted a post at MIT’s Sloan School of Management in 1959 and quickly took an interest 
in economic development, establishing MIT’s African Management Fellowship program 
that same year.441  
It was this belief in the potential of science and technology to create social change 
that made him quickly recognize Gvishiani as an intellectual and political ally when they 
met in Geneva in 1963. The problems that they were addressing for the United Nations—
technology transfer and its applicability to developing economies—were inherently 
economic questions of the optimal technology mix for newly industrializing economies. 
Thus, it is not surprising that Wilson and Gvishiani quickly began to speak about MIT’s 
leadership in “operations research”—later called “systems analysis” when applied to 
larger, multivariable processes and management problems.442 Indeed, a Soviet assessment 
of ACAST’s work in 1964 noted that the committee was developing an American-style 
“cost benefit model” for evaluating technology transfer and use which would be not only 
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be applicable for developing countries but also should be studied by Soviet specialists for 
domestic use.443 ACAST also became a way for Gvishiani to make contacts with the 
OECD, whose scientific director, the famed British chemist Alexander King, believed 
Wilson and Gvishiani could become the core organizers of an OECD-GKNT joint agenda 
on economic development.444 In 1964, Wilson had invited Gvishiani to drive to MIT with 
him after the 1964 ACAST meeting in New York to meet the Institute’s leading 
management theorists.445  
Though the MIT meeting had to be cancelled, Gvishiani’s relationship with Wilson 
continued to blossom. In 1965, they co-authored an article on behalf of the members of 
ACAST on superpower cooperation and technology transfer for Scientific American.446 A 
year later they would develop an international exchange program where two young Soviet 
specialists, nominated by the GKNT, would be sent to MIT’s Sloan School of Business to 
study operations research while two graduate students from Sloan would be sent to the 
Moscow Institute for Engineering.447 In 1966, UN Undersecretary for Economic 
Development, Phillip De Seynes, explained to a Soviet secretariat member that any 
opposition to technical cooperation on development issues between the OECD and CMEA 
by Western political appointees could be overcome through “informal channels” that had 
been developed between the scientific staff of these organizations such as “the Wilson-
Gvishiani channel.”448  
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Wilson was not the only person in Cambridge interested in the young Soviet official 
whose State Department profile described him as “one of the nucleus pragmatists” in the 
GKNT “who favor adopting some Western management practices in order to solve 
problems in the Soviet economy as well as to reach a technological profile comparable 
with the West.”449 Leontief had the chance to meet with Gvishiani in the summer of 1965 
to discuss his idea for “an agency in Vienna—modeled after the International Atomic 
Commission— which would advance and sponsor, under the auspices of the United 
Nations, research on the application of mathematical-quantitative methods [for the] 
solution of economic problems in both developed and developing countries.”450  Leontief’s 
proposals to Gvishiani explained that: 
The experience of recent years has amply demonstrated that countries with quite 
different social and political systems still face similar, if not identical fundamental 
technical problems of the rational organization of productive processes, of the efficient 
distribution of economic activities, etc. It is now also widely recognized that the same 
basic scientific approaches can be efficiently applied to the solution of these problems 
in highly industrialized and economically less advanced countries.451 
 
What Leontief was proposing was the establishment of a technocratic international 
organization that would operate above ideology, replacing it with mathematical accuracy. 
Gvishiani passed along these proposals to Fedorenko, who responded positively but noted 
that a first step should be the organization of some smaller conferences that would allow 
Soviet and American experts to meet and establish the rapport necessary for the creation 
of such a center.452  
 While Leontief hoped for a mathematical de-politicization of the Cold War, he was 
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operating in an extremely political context. The United States was mired in the Vietnam 
war.  Soviet-American negotiations on major issues that had started in the months prior to 
Kennedy’s assassination had broken down. The Johnson administration, wishing to 
extricate itself from the mess in Vietnam, wanted to tie together these problems to restore 
trust with the USSR and to get Soviet assistance to bring the North Vietnamese to the 
negotiating table. National Security Action Memo (NSAM) no. 352 was issued in July of 
1966 asking Federal agencies to provide proposals for bridge-building initiatives to rebuild 
trust between the two powers. Amongst the measures proposed by staff members under the 
heading “Multilateral Economic Initiatives” was “the establishment of an East-West 
Research Center or University.”453  
The task of organizing this initiative fell to Johnson’s outgoing National Security 
Advisor, McGeorge Bundy. Bundy left the Whitehouse to head the Ford Foundation in 
1966. In December 1966, he announced that he would be pursuing the establishment of an 
international East-West center to study “the problems of industrialized societies” as a 
private “special project” on the personal suggestion of the President but that was not an 
official United States government position.454 As part of a tour of Europe promoting the 
idea to intellectuals and business and political leaders, Bundy arrived in Moscow in May 
1967. McBundy met with Gvishiani to advertise the project as an organization dedicated 
to the study of scientific method in general rather than of ideologically loaded issues of 
implementation. Bundy’s staff was rightly concerned that the freeze in Soviet-American 
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relations created by the Vietnam War and question of German-German relations would 
make negotiations difficult.455 On that trip to Moscow, Bundy and Gvishiani agreed that 
more details had to be presented and that the center needed to be organized along lines that 
would let it be neutral and independent of any government to solve the issues surrounding 
the two Germanys. The German problem continued to be a headache in official 
negotiations in June 1967 when the Soviet delegation was forced to withdraw from a 
multilateral conference discussing the center held at the University of Sussex due to the 
lack of an East German presence.456  
These issues were solved through the deployment of the international technocratic 
networks that had been developed over the past decade. First, unknown to the Americans, 
Gvishiani had serious personal interests in the establishment of the center proposed by 
Bundy—a fact he made known to his father-in-law, Alexei Kosygin who, as reported in 
Gvishiani’s memoirs, was also a keen enthusiast of the idea. Thus, shortly after the failure 
of the USSR’s delegation to arrive at Sussex, Kosygin and Johnson met at Glassboro, NJ 
after the latter’s visit to the UN general assembly. There Johnson “gave a little push” for 
the project to a Kosygin who was already fully briefed by Gvishiani. The “Spirit of 
Glassboro” opened possibilities not only for Soviet assistance in advancing the Paris peace 
process but also to other projects of mutual interest such as a nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty and the East-West center.457  
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However, like most of the other initiatives of the emerging détente era, completing 
the institutions of the international technocracy needed a European intervention. As part of 
his effort to drum up publicity for his project, Bundy reached out not only to Soviet officials 
but to business leaders in the United States and Europe. One of these was former FIAT 
executive and chairman of Italian consulting firm, Olivetti, Aurellio Peccei. Peccei’s 
corporate career sent him around the world including to Moscow and Latin America. 
Peccei’s limited knowledge of Russian and his past as an anti-Fascist partisan (he had 
probably once been a Communist sympathizer) meant that he was ideally positioned to be 
FIAT’s representative to Moscow during negotiations on a joint project with the USSR (the 
future “Lada”), where he first met Gvishiani. In Latin America, Peccei worked in an Italian-
US joint government backed venture called Adela, designed to provide consulting to Latin 
American governments interested industrialization. Adela had powerful supporters in the 
form of progressive Senators Jacob Javits and Hubert Humphrey, who hoped that Adela 
would assist Latin American governments in both jettisoning protectionism and in 
establishing policies that would help craft policies that would let Western firms invest in 
long-term, risky projects with socially progressive goals. In 1966, as part of his promotion 
of this endeavor, Peccei delivered a speech in Washington entitled “The Challenge of the 
1970s for the World Today.”458 Peccei’s speech focused on the “progress of techno-
science” and its impact on societies East, West and South—a change that meant human 
beings were facing a new era of development which “like the processes of living organisms, 
needs a regulator.” The regulator envisioned by Peccei was a united Euro-American world 
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which would “expand the area of prosperity” to the developing world through “a global 
plan.” Peccei’s conception of Europe explicitly included the USSR and the socialist states. 
Once this united “area of prosperity” could be achieved, the fruits of prosperity could be 
better exported to the developing world through planned technological transfer.459  
This speech independently got the attention of White House official Dean Rusk, 
Alexander King, and Gvishiani who all worked to introduce Peccei to Wilson and Bundy. 
Gvishiani was so impressed with the speech that he invited Peccei to give it again in 
Akademgorodok in 1967.460 Peccei acted as middleman between Gvishiani and Bundy 
arranging for a meeting between the two in Vienna in 1968 to restart negotiations over the 
East-West center following the breakthrough at Glassboro.461 The Vienna conference 
secured Soviet interest and cooperation on the project. However, negotiations on the 
specifics of topics and financing continued. There was still a great deal of disagreement 
between some American and Western European scientists, who believed that a research 
institute must work on specific problems, and the Soviets who, for obvious reasons, insisted 
that the program would have to be only methodological. To bridge this gap, both sides 
adopted Fedorkenko’s proposal for a Soviet-American seminar on management science to 
serve as a dress rehearsal for direct, multilateral cooperation. The venue for the first of 
these conferences, held in 1969, was the International Labor Organization (ILO) in Turin. 
Though the seminar was funded by the Ford Foundation and coordinated by the GKNT 
and CEMI, Soviet officials insisted that it be officially administered by the ILO so as not 
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to establish any official government positions while negotiations on the center were 
ongoing. Another seminar was scheduled for 1971, this time to be held in Moscow, which 
would expand the discussion from a bilateral United States-USSR affair to a fully 
multilateral discussion with academics from Europeans and the developing world.462 On 
October 4, 1972 the treaty that led to the creation of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA), the official name for Johnson’s center, was signed and the 
institute began operations at its headquarters in Laxemburg, Austria in 1973. Gvishiani was 
appointed chairman of the Institute’s Board and Peccei as a board member.463 
Peccei’s organizational energies were not limited to founding IIASA. In 1967, he 
gathered his collaborators, including King and Wilson, at the Academia de Lincei in Rome 
to form an international scientific and political discussion circle that the attendants called 
“the Club of Rome.” The Soviet position in the Club of Rome was ambiguous. On one 
hand, it was labeled a “fascist club” by propagandists who objected to its most famous, and 
controversial publication— The Limits to Growth which used modelling techniques 
developed out of systems analysis to warn about the problem of overpopulation and 
proposed the regulation of fertility. However, Gvishiani was present at the initial meeting 
and attended others as an unofficial observer, bringing along leading Soviet researchers 
such as Agambegian and O.T. Bomolov.464 Thus, through Gvishiani’s efforts, by 1972, the 
Soviet Union and its technocratic elite were enmeshed in a series of multilateral institutions 
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dedicated to the advancement of rational governance through the application of planning 
sciences to global economic processes. 
These programs had direct consequences for the domestic organization of Soviet 
social sciences. Initially, the organization of the Soviet delegations to IIASA was organized 
via an ad hoc committee of the Academy of Sciences. In 1976, this system was reorganized 
into a new institute called the All Union Institute for Systems Analysis (VSNIISI) was be 
explicitly designed to interface with IIASA. It was a special institute, founded by 
Gvishiani, whose work remains, for the most part, classified. Because it was run as a joint 
project of the GKNT and the Academy of Sciences, the VSNIISI had an amorphous 
oversight structure which made it an extremely independent institution and gave Gvishiani 
the leeway to do whatever he wanted with its research agenda and staffing. However, what 
really made the VSNIISI different was that it was explicitly designed to be a bridge 
between international research in economic and applied social sciences and the domestic 
economy. In fact, its charter specified that the institute had to prioritize “multi-disciplinary 
research” and “apply the practices and results of global science to the domestic problems 
of the Soviet economy.”465 Gvishiani used institute’s status as a conduit for important 
advances to sell his vision for an independent multidisciplinary institution. In a note to 
Ustinov, advocating for the creation of his new institute, Gvishiani explained projects 
undertaken by IIASA were “chosen with the input the Soviet delegation with the goal of 
having the most benefit to our economy.” Areas that IIASA was working on of special 
interest to the USSR included energy systems, regional planning, and natural resource 
usage. Gvishiani suggested to Ustinov that, not only should the powerful Minister of 
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Defense Industries and main voice of the ministerial interests, support the further expansion 
of Soviet contacts with global social sciences but that he should encourage the production 
ministries to coordinate with the soon to be founded VSNIISI to better represent Soviet 
economic interests at IIASA and use the international organization to attract foreign 
expertise to the formulation of specific Soviet domestic projects.466  
In addition to founding VSNIISI and IISA, Gvishiani was active in establishing the 
CMEA sponsored International Institute for the Study of the Problems of Economic 
Management (MNIPU) in 1975. MNIPU was also an organization governed jointly by the 
Academy of Sciences and the GKNT, and in practice, MNIPU and VNIISI often had 
intersecting staffs and research projects. By the mid-1970s, a network of technocratic 
institutions, working on various levels, had been established.467 At the global level, IIASA 
and the Club of Rome formed the venues for the formulation of a project to revitalize 
international planning in the conditions of the 1970s. At the bloc level, the research arms 
of the OECD and MNIPU served as organizing bodies for social scientific research. 
Meanwhile, at a national level, VSNIISI and the network of management theorists that had 
emerged from MIT’s Sloan School conducted on-the-ground research.  
Soldiers of the Scientific-Technical Revolution between Soviet Planning and 
International Humanism.  
 
Even before Kosygin explicitly said so at the September Plenum, Soviet officials 
looked to the United States for new innovations in planning techniques.  Since the 1950s, 
Soviet social scientists had been especially impressed by the increasing use of operations 
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research and its descendants—cybernetics and systems theory—in the planning 
departments of large American firms and in the military-industrial complex. In 1962, after 
a trip to the United States, V.A. Trapezdinkov reported with wonder, and some worry, 
about the advanced state of American military industrial planning to the Central 
Committee. Since 1958, Trapezdnikov explained, American academia, with the support of 
the military, has been developing “the management sciences” which has resulted in the 
expansion of operations research into large multistep projects. This culminated in creation 
of the U.S. Navy’s Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT)—a computer 
implemented project management method used to find the optimal arrangement of 
activities in a large engineering projects based on their average estimated time and cost. 
The use of such methods, Trapezdnikov noted, was not only compatible with Soviet 
ideology but in his opinion was predicted in Lenin’s writings about the simplification of 
the management of the economy. In Trapezdnikov’s opinion, the United States was ahead 
of the USSR in the use of digital computing in production management and this “gap” 
needed to be closed.468  
Through the 1960s and 1970s, the fascination with American management and its 
potential to improve the Soviet economy only grew. Kosygin’s 1965 call to look to foreign 
experience found itself reflected in CEMI’s proposals for the “Kosygin Reforms”—the 
establishment of a “combine” system of enterprises linked together into a corporate 
structure explicitly modeled on large multi-branch American corporations such as Ford and 
DuPont. For the Soviet observer, the genius of the cybernetics-infused American 
management theory of the 1960s was that it solved the problem of simultaneously allowing 
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individual units of a system to work autonomously while also allowing the center to set 
goals and priorities, thereby creating a road map for a practical implementation of 
democratic centralism. This obsession with computerization also had the benefit of 
papering over fundamental critiques of Soviet institutions that began to arise in the 1960s 
by pointing to the ways that modern management techniques could make these institutions 
work as intended. Therefore, it is not surprising that rhetoric about the need to introduce 
“electronic computing technology” into management was at the center of Brezhnev’s 
discussion of the “Scientific-Technical Revolution” (STR).469  
The global nature of the STR and its status as both a social and technological 
process meant that the Soviet Union not only had to look to the West to better understand 
the physical development of computers but also how computing could be integrated into 
larger economic processes. What Soviet social scientists of the early seventies were finding 
troubling was that the “computing gap” was not contracting but rather expanding. The 
problem was not that the Soviet Union lacked the theoretical knowhow. A 1972 report from 
a Soviet delegation to IBM argued that “while USSR’s ideology of integrating computing 
was at a world-class level, the actual practices are lacking” as the USSR’s low productive 
capacity continued to delay the integration and production of hardware. As an alternative, 
the group suggested trying to buy licenses from Western firms which had already solved 
many of their production problems—a decision that was eventually taken and significantly 
retarded the growth of domestic computer development. 470 What this and other reports 
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show is that Soviet theorists saw computers not as just hardware but rather as instruments 
of fundamental social change. 
The entanglement between global and social at the heart of the STR meant that it 
could be deployed to ask some fundamental questions about the postulates of economic 
theory. In 1969, IMEMO launched a working group to study the Western management 
experience in the context of the STR and apply it to the USSR. In its first meeting, IMEMO 
economist, Revold Entov, noted that in the past several years’ new questions had emerged 
in Western theories of economic growth, and therefore, management. Entov was 
specifically interested in Edward Dennison’s research, which argued that it was difficult to 
separate the contribution of technology to growth from “social goods” such as education 
and overall measures of “well-being.”  Unlike the old models of growth from the 1950s, 
this new research was emphasized the human factor as an element of growth. Thus, Entov 
argued, Soviet economists needed to think more about these questions of social provision 
and human behavior just as much as they thought about the optimal allocation of capital 
and labor resources.471  
This interest in the social implications of American management theory expanded 
as Soviet-US relations thawed during the détente era. In 1971, Robert Ash, the director of 
US defense contractor Litton Industries and advisor on the management and public policy 
to President Nixon, traveled to Moscow to deliver a speech to the GKNT’s scientific 
collegium. Ash, who made insinuations that his firm was lobbying the US government to 
allow it to work in the Soviet market, came in a selling mood and talked up “the 
management revolution in the United States.” The crux of this revolution was that “where 
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once labor and material were the key factors of production, today it is technology and the 
investment of capital.” The goal of modern management was to adapt organizations to 
rapidly changing technology by applying scientific analysis to decision making. Ash’s 
speech did not promote laissez faire as a solution to the new era. In fact, “the main 
challenge” to technical progress and its management was not competition. “Any idiot can 
lower prices to compete,” he explained, but real, “long term” progress depended on “the 
ability to predict demand” and adjust the company’s operation to fulfilling the needs of the 
future. Ash’s speech emphasized the changes that management theorists East and West 
were both observing: the increasing importance of technology and human initiative in 
economic decision making over the traditional factors such as labor time and raw material. 
In other words, Ash was explaining what was becoming known to management theorists 
in the West as a “post-industrial” economy.472  
The importance of the American example for Soviet management theory meant that 
the leading research group for the subject was initially housed not CEMI or Gosplan’s NII 
but in Gregory Arbatov’s “Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada” (ISKAN). The 
team, formed in 1969 and headed by Boris Milner, had, through Arbatov’s extensive 
connections in the Politburo, not only the purview of studying developments in American 
“management science” but also to comment on domestic socio-economic issues.473 In 
September 1970, they issued recommendations to the Central Committee entitled “On 
Some Timely Questions Related to the Science of Management.” Milner and his colleagues 
found earlier American attempts to use computing as the sole method to regulate 
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management ineffective. Instead, the Americans were moving toward the adaptation of “a 
systems approach” to industrial planning. Rather than being relegated to pure management 
theory this new approach to took “each large decision as an intervention into a complex 
system of sub-decisions which could affect constituencies in different ways.” 
Consequently, planning in the capitalist world was moving from short-term business 
planning to long-term macro-planning. The Soviet economy which was “ever more 
complicated” could learn from this experience. Five year plans could start to be constructed 
on a “sliding basis” in which each year is projected based on a macro-economic model and 
then adjusted based on previous performance toward a goal established in the context of a 
long term, decade or multi-decade growth forecast. Moreover, the creation of a “systems 
approach” to central planning, would allow for the integration of socio-economic issues 
into the plans rather than just problems of industrial production.474  
In 1977, Milner’s group was moved from ISKAN to Gvishiani’s VSNIISI. At 
VSNIISI, the laboratory found a more appropriate fit as Gvishiani was turning his 
organization into the locus of management research in the USSR.475 VSNIISI’s 
independence meant that Milner was not the only prominent economist to flee his previous 
institution for its more liberal atmosphere. In 1976, following a Party investigation into 
CEMI triggered by the immigration of many of its Jewish cadres, which found many 
“problems” with the institute’s “ideological health,” and very legitimate problems with the 
training of graduate students, Stanislav Shatalin was removed from his post as Institute’s 
Deputy Director.476 Within a few months, he was made laboratory leader at VSNIISI.477 
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VSNIISI’s alumni included many of the luminaries of the post-Soviet era including Petr 
Aven, Egor Gaidar, and Boris Berezovsky. Gaidar remembered his years in the Institute as 
an important formative experience and noted that its liberal atmosphere allowed him to 
read economic literature from around the world.478  
However, Gvishiani and his associates were not closet “liberals” (in the classical 
sense). Rather, they were participants in a global project in which technocrats wished to 
tackle the problems of global economic development through a humanist alternative to both 
strict central planning and laisse-fare capitalism based on the latest research in management 
sciences and systems analysis. As such, Gvishiani’s participation in the “technocratic 
international” and his creation of its Soviet node was the natural development of the 
discourse of “scientific technical revolution” and a Soviet response to the changes that were 
rocking industrialized societies and the international political economy in the 1970s.  
Intellectuals from around the world were dealing with new concerns over the future 
viability and social consequences of economic growth. Growth had, in the 1950s and 
1960s, been thought of as cure all, inspired by the perpetual faith in the salutary effects of 
the advancement of technology was now in doubt. The failures of global development 
projects, the inflation and energy crises, and the environmental costs of industrialization 
were straining the belief that growth would naturally guarantee prosperity for all. This 
intellectual turmoil provides the context understanding how the network built by Gvishiani 
was instrumental in moving Soviet technocratic thought toward an embrace of a 
technocratic-humanism determined to change central planning both at home and abroad. 
The project of reinventing planning and technocratic-led development in more complicated 
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times was undertaken on by Aurellio Peccei and his Club of Rome in a statement called 
The Problematique.479 The basis for The Problematique was formally developed at the 
Club’s founding conference at the Academia de Lincei by Austrian systems scientist Erich 
Jantsch in a paper titled “A Tentative Framework for Initiating System-Wide Planning on 
a World Scope”—a proposal to adapt the structures of the post-war national economic 
governance to a world that was rapidly globalizing and an intellectual climate that was 
rejecting regimentation for creativity. The paper argued that states in the developed world 
must begin cooperating to establish a system of “future planning” based on the systems 
modeling techniques developed in the US military and the RAND corporation. This 
approach would differ from earlier “econometric modeling” by incorporating social and 
ecological variables as well working toward “multiple, changing futures” rather than 
planning for specific outcomes like in traditional central plans. Jantsch hoped that such a 
framework for planning could avoid the problems of top down control and allow the 
preservation of individual agency in a time where ever scarcer resources would require 
greater social coordination.480 
 Jantsch’s vision was expanded on at Alexander King’s 1969 OECD “Symposium 
on Long Term Forecasting and Planning” held in Bellagio, Italy. At this seminar, Jantsch’s 
original ideas were given a firmer shape by Turkish-American planning and management 
theorist, Hasan Ozbekhan, who was president of the RAND spin-off, the System 
Development Corporation (and later a professor at the Wharton School). Ozbekhan painted 
the picture of a modern society torn between its increasing hierarchical complexity and the 
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liberation of the individual which led to an “loss of the sense of continuity, logical order, 
and causal relationships” in the industrialized world. Ozbekhan noted that the upheavals of 
the 1960s presaged the rise of a new era whose complexity required a new, conscious 
approach to the planning of social life: one that not only focused on the relationship of 
technological change to social order and the closing of a “technology gap” around the 
world but also spurred the participation of the individual and society in the formulation of 
goals and actions. He contrasted this “human action model” of social planning with the old 
“mechanistic model” by the fact that instead of goals “set from outside” the new planner 
would set goals from “the dynamics of the plan itself” allowing it to be self-adapting to the 
shifting needs of a complex society and to capture individual preferences.  For example, 
the ideal plan would respond to trends that would “double the population of Southern 
California in the next decade” not by automatically investing in more schools and housing 
in that area but first ask if there could be a more beneficial effect to having the population 
move to Northern California, and, if so, determine actions that could be undertaken to make 
Northern California respond to the preferences that were driving people south. This type 
of planning required continuous long term projections and the construction of multiple 
scenarios by governments and international bodies, reminiscent of Milner’s 
recommendations to the Soviet government.481  
Ozbekhan’s framework became the central ideological statement of the Club of 
Rome’s first decade of activity and a manifesto for the emerging field of “systems 
dynamics” and “global modelling” that would also be called “the new planning.” Peccei 
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called this program “revolutionary humanism” hoping that the greater social awareness of 
“man’s ranking as protector and moderator of all life on earth” would lay the groundwork 
for a global institutional transformation in which societies began to understand the impact 
of new technologies and social structures on health and ecology lest “man resign himself 
to push his numbers back and his quality of life fall to a level it was centuries before.” So 
far, new technical horizons had “left man disoriented and imbalanced with the human 
system in a state of disorder.” A new global society tied down by world-wide deliberative 
planning could forge the world into “a oneness of mankind” united by a “sense of globality, 
love of justice, and abhorrence of violence.”482  
This same ethos related to planning was reflected in Gvishiani’s speech to the 
International Management Association in 1978. Gvishiani’s speech emphasized “the 
impact of the Scientific Technical Revolution” on all levels of production but also its 
negative side effects—a lack of resources to sustain an ever-increasing population and the 
“interdependence of man and the biosphere which has never of such a concern as it has 
been in the past twenty-five years.” These “global problems required new analytical 
methods,” for societies to be able to make decisions about long term economic and 
technical development—a method Gvishiani identified as “systems analysis.” The systems 
approach advocated by Gvishiani offered a chance to solve the “complex problems” 
presented by the STR to the “benefit of improving ecology, economy, society, and culture.” 
The key tool of the Gvishiani’s “system’s analyst” was “global modeling” by which 
Gvishiani meant a “mathematical description of global systems” and various paths in the 
future development of variables. As such, the model itself would be able to provide 
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endogenous choices to policy makers and establish a framework for the “management of 
technical progress.”483 
Bringing the Scientific Technical Revolution Home: The Technocratic International 
Between Interdependence and the Soviet Project  
 Mounting the podium at XXV Party Congress in 1976, Brezhnev could justifiably 
see his tenure as a success. Consumption was improving and the economic disruptions of 
the mid-1960s had been overcome. In international affairs, relations between the USSR 
and the West were “moving from the conditions of ‘Cold War’ due to a change in the 
correlation of power in the international arena.” This changing atmosphere “expanded the 
possibilities of scientific and cultural cooperation” between the socialist and capitalist 
worlds.  “Trade between the East and West is finally building the material basis for peaceful 
relations.” In addition to bilateral trade Brezhnev looked forward to “complex commercial 
agreements” between the USSR and multinational enterprises or blocs. Brezhnev went to 
explain that, “there exist broader aspects of international affairs” than just trade or 
individual exchanges. “Global problems,” such as “the oil and energy crisis, the 
degradation of the environment, the regulation of oceans and space,” were emerging as a 
consequence of the “global scientific technical revolution” which demanded new kinds of 
multilateral solutions that socialist states should forge in the “interests of all humanity.”484  
The General Secretary had, at least rhetorically, accepted many of the tropes that 
were being generated by East-West technocratic discourse in the era of détente. His 
highlighting of energy and ecology as problems that could not be solved within the borders 
of the nation state, or even within a bilateral framework, could have come straight from 
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Gvishiani’s mouth. As Daniel Sargent has shown in his recent work, the term 
“interdependence” began to appear in the work of Western, particularly American, social 
scientists in the mid-1970s to signify that an economy could no longer be understood as 
only existing within its borders. Issues such as the increasing internationalization of 
finance, dependence of industrialized states on imported primary sources from the global 
south, exploding populations, and environmental degradation required global rather than 
national solutions. National economies were therefore integrated into a larger global 
economy and sovereigns could no longer make domestic economic decisions without 
understanding how these actions would be effected by larger global forces.485 The 
discussion of the “global” STR and its effects inside the USSR were Soviet analogue to the 
debate over interdependence in the West. New Soviet elites working within the networks 
established by technocratic internationalism were uniquely aware of the challenges posed 
by this new phenomenon. However, as with previous attempts by newly empowered 
experts to adapt the Soviet economy to the world of the “Cold War,” the attempt to adapt 
the USSR to a globalizing world had to reckon with the powerful, old institutions of a state 
that were designed in the autarkic crucible of the interwar period.  
The area in which questions of the extent to which the USSR was integrated into 
the global economy were most pressing and obvious was in the country’s vast energy and 
raw materials industry. Much ink has been spilled on the issue of Soviet oil and gas and its 
export to both the West and Eastern Europe. Indeed, Yegor Gaidar has blamed the 
economy’s dependence on revenues from exports on the inability of the USSR to complete 
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Gorbachev’s reforms.486 However, the question of the USSR’s engagement in energy 
markets is much more complicated. As early as 1965, the Azumanian and Keldesh report 
on the state of the Soviet economy and the “competition of the two systems” (discussed in 
detail in chapter four) noted that 35% of the USSR’s central capital investments went to 
extractive industries while the sector comprised only 5.7% of the economy. Despite the 
“huge outlays” spent on the industry, it was not providing financial returns to the state and 
this high opportunity cost was hurting the expansion of value added industries. The report 
suggested several steps for alleviating the situation using internal means, including 
studying American approaches to increasing the productivity of workers and moving away 
from coal to natural gas, but concluded that “the USSR’s internal resources would not be 
enough to solve the problem.” Thus, “it is necessary to acknowledge the need for the USSR 
to establish import-export relations with the developing world to obtain ores, energy 
resources, and primary goods” while also “encouraging the USSR and COMECON states 
to work together to conserve the use of raw materials in the production of new goods.”487  
Concerns about the USSR’s integration into global markets for energy and raw 
materials preoccupied the country’s leading researchers on international economics 
working in O.T Bogomolov’s Institute for the Study of the World Socialist System 
(IMESS). The Institute was founded in the wake of Khrushchev’s proposal for a “socialist 
international division of labor” in 1962 and was taken over by Bogomolov in 1969 after a 
stint in Gosplan’s NII with such colleagues Shatalin and Aleksandr Anchishkin. IMESS’ 
mission was to examine how socialist countries, and COMECON members in particular, 
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could integrate their economies and to advance research into “the international socialist 
division of labor.” Bogomolov was, in many ways, a classical Tovarnik less interested in 
high mathematical theory than in the real functioning of economic relations. His work on 
socialist trade, which began appearing in 1965, argued that there were inevitably market 
forces at play within any socialist integration due to the continued presence of commodity 
relations in the international sphere because all countries had separate planning bodies and 
different market needs.488 Indeed, a 1978 consultative note sent from IMESS to the Central 
Committee’s Department for Science and Higher Education explained that Marx’s labor 
theory of value could not be a practical, day to day guide for understanding trade between 
different countries, socialist and capitalist, since the cost of labor in various states was 
priced differently due to currency effects and because there was no way to isolate socialist 
economies from the “speculative” world market for goods. Thus, interstate prices were still 
effected by “subjective factors” created by the financial workings of the “capitalist world 
system.”489  
One of Bogomolov’s chief concerns was how the USSR’s domestic economy was 
shaped by its energy trade with COMECON states. In a 1971 note to the Soviet ambassador 
to the COMECON council, IMESS raised concerns about how the export of raw materials 
and energy to Eastern Europe was both “insufficient to satisfy the increasing demand of 
raw materials therefore forcing [Eastern European Communist states] to go to the capitalist 
market” for their needs and “retarding the development of internal sources of primary 
inputs in COMECON countries.” For the USSR, the problem this created was that “while 
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Soviet energy resources are taking on a more and more international character, the capital 
invested into developing these resources comes from only one country.” Some of the 
solutions proposed by the institute included the expand the issuance of trade credits to the 
USSR by its counterparties to restore the terms of trade and to establish jointly operated, 
internationally funded enterprises in highly resource intensive industries on Soviet soil. 
This would create a flow of capital back into the USSR from the COMECON states that 
were the consumers of Soviet energy. These solutions required the replacement of ad hoc 
barter contracts and unconvertible “transferable rubles”490 with a multilateral currency 
clearing system within COMECON. Another suggestion developed by IMESS was to 
develop multilateral economic contacts between COMECON and emerging countries in 
order to help the Soviet bloc supplement its supplies of raw materials and energy so as to 
relieve the burden on the Soviet Union’s extractive industries. An additional benefit of such 
an arrangement, would be that oil rich “developing states” could be convinced to open 
accounts at COMECON’s International Investment Bank (IIB)—an institution founded to 
finance joint projects for integration—providing the bloc with much needed hard currency. 
The final goal of a successfully integrated COMECON would be the creation of a market 
with prices that “while not dependent on the capitalist market are not divorced from the 
world economy either.”491  
In 1980, a ten-year projection delivered to the Central Committee by a joint team 
from IMESS and the GKNT warned that the increasing integration of the Soviet Union into 
the global economy was not going according to plan. The problem of Eastern Europe’s 
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dependence on Soviet oil had only increased during the previous decade. The fact that 
energy prices were increasing in the world market meant that CMEA states were not only 
ever more dependent on Soviet resources but also that the unequal arrangement was 
depriving the USSR of capital. If the USSR were to meet its partners’ growing demands, 
“the resources we would have to invest in the extractive industries would impossible for 
our country to sustain by 1990.” Moreover, the increasing indebtedness of CMEA countries 
to Western markets and the expansion of Western trade into Eastern Europe meant that the 
USSR was essentially subsidizing their allies’ deficits and trade with the West. All this 
meant that the USSR was wasting its capital by investing into low value added extractive 
industries rather into high returning industries such as machine building. The projected, 
increasing price of oil was slowly importing the global inflation of the 1970s into the USSR 
via the budget deficits that resulted. If the USSR were to protect its budget it would have 
to increase the price of energy at home and abroad, or it would be forced to continue to use 
its own capital to pay the implicit spread between the global market prices and domestic, 
administered prices.492 
The energy problem described by Bogomolov and his colleagues was a symptom 
of a larger problem of modernizing the Soviet economy in an evolving global context. One 
response was to apply the techniques of long-term modelling to the Soviet economy. Since 
the 1965 September Plenum, the idea of long-term planning and forecasting in the Soviet 
economy was being floated as part of a larger overhaul of central planning. The way in 
which this would be done, however, was not uncontroversial. As Fedorenko explained to 
Bundy during his visit, Soviet economists and technocrats believed that long-term planning 
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could be used to be used to reconcile the need to centralize disparate yearly plans with the 
five-year plans while also maintaining the initiative and independence of the individual 
enterprise. Therefore, any long-term plan meant undermining the power of the production 
ministries. Non-the-less in August 1972, the Central Committee and the Council of 
Ministers issued a proclamation on “The Development of Five Year (1976-1980) and Long 
Term Plans for the Development of the Economy of the USSR.”493  
The 1972 proclamation was the result of lobbying by Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers and Chairman of the GKNT, Vladimir Kirillin. Kirillin was an 
unusual member of the party elite as he had come from a background in physics and became 
a vice-president of the Academy of Sciences before entering state politics—indeed, he 
would be the only person in the history of the USSR to voluntarily resign his high position 
and return to a career in science. This made him a natural supporter for the work being 
done by mathematical-economists and cyberneticists of the technocratic international. For 
Kirillin, and his allies such as Gvishiani, the “complex program for the development of 
scientific-technical progress (KP NTK)” that the resolution established would preserve the 
1965 reform agenda by adapting the rhetoric of the “STR” to the questions of what socio-
economic changes were needed for the USSR to use the “natural advantages of socialism” 
in an era of accelerating technical change. The KP NTR spurred a multi-disciplinary 
collaboration across Soviet social sciences including economists, sociologists, and public 
health experts from the Academy of Medical Sciences. The core staff of the project were 
all veterans of Gosplan’s Scientific Institute of Economics (NII) who had begun their work 
on mathematical forecasting in the late 1950s and often later moved into CEMI. The project 
                                                
493 N.P. Fedorenko, Vospaminau proshloe, zagliadyvau v budushie (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 369-370.   
	 310	
 
was led by Aleksandr Anchishkin who based himself out of CEMI. His close collaborator 
and co-editor was Shatalin, formerly of Gosplan NII and CEMI who now lead a research 
group on the economics of social well-being at Gvishiani’s ISA. Other economists who 
began their career at Gosplan NII involved with the KP NTP included Bogomolov and 
Agambegian, who developed the project’s sections on trade and regional development 
respectively.494  
The project served as one of the means through which technocratic concerns of 
about social change and global interdependence began to enter domestic political dialog. 
In developing the 1972 proclamation and its aims, Soviet scientific and government 
officials explicitly formulated the KP NTR as a tool in a larger project of aligning 
COMECON’s economies to larger common goals in order to adapt the bloc to rapidly 
changing international conditions.495 Speaking at the International Economic Association’s 
1976 Budapest conference on comparative integration, Bogomolov presented the CMEA 
wide trend of future planning as a means of integrating planning and market relationships 
in the region and presented the bloc-wide effort as a first step to building an alternative 
form of regional integration to the laisse faire approach taken by the European Economic 
Community (ECE).496 One of the common themes of the KP NTR was its focus on using 
expanded foreign trade to restructure and introduce new technologies into the domestic 
economy. In 1971, as the KP NTR was being first formulated, Yu. S. Shiraev, a specialist 
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in economic integration and trade, proposed that the USSR begin to restructure its trade 
relations to let international competition force domestic producers to more effectively use 
their resources and produce higher quality goods. This recommendation for the program 
was removed by more conservative members of the committee who believed that such a 
move would “destroy the state’s monopoly of trade” and countered with the argument that 
if “domestic products were better” there would be no problem in trade in the first place.497 
These same concerns came back in 1976 when the Academy of Sciences Economics 
Section discussed the next stage of the KP NTR. Yevgeny Primakov, the future post-Soviet 
Prime Minister and then Deputy Director or IMEMO, proposed that the KP NTR take into 
consideration Japan’s experience in using foreign trade to stimulate the “technically 
leading branches of the economy” suggested that it encourage plans to attract investment 
from resource rich developing countries. ISKAN’s Arbatov seconded this by noting that 
the United States was no longer producing most of its cameras and televisions domestically 
and instead looked to international trade to stimulate work in more promising sectors. 
Arbatov argued that “it was not an accident” that the United States was giving up on these 
industries as “even a country like America cannot be at the forefront of all technologies.” 
Investment “in these areas are being given up” in favor of areas in which the United States 
could produce new innovations more efficiently. Thus, Arbatov argued, the USSR should 
follow America’s example and shift its understanding of the role of trade in technical 
progress by “buying licenses for foreign technology” for areas in which it was lagging and 
channeling capital to areas in which the USSR could most efficiently compete in.498  
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 The KP NTR also served as a means for trends being developed in venues such as 
the Club of Rome and the IIASA entered domestic discourse. The program was envisioned 
as a response to the forecasting research being conducted in the West. In his memoirs, 
Fedorenko explicitly states that CEMI had begun considering the formulation of a long-
term forecasting program in 1968 in response to the work being conducted by the Club of 
Rome. As such, he claims “he did not come [to Kirillin] with empty hands” when the latter 
began making inquiries about work on scientific forecasting.499  Indeed, Evgeni Yasin, who 
was one of the junior researchers working on the program recalls that at the end of 1968, 
with the winding down of the Kosygin Reforms, he had left economics for apolitical 
“cybernetics” and “information studies” but that engaging with Western modelling 
literature, as part of the KP NTR, instantly led to “questions of an institutional nature.”500 
Shatalin recalled that as the editor of the program’s volume of on socio-economic 
development, he “and [his] colleagues began to develop a research program into the theory 
of social goods” as a factor of economic growth for the USSR.501 The KP NTR thus marks 
an important moment in which the “mathematical-economists,” the camp of reformists that 
survived the 1960s with the most clout, followed their international interlocutors in 
breaking free of a mechanistic conception of central planning, represented by such 
theoretical formulations such as Fedorenko’s Socialist Optimally Functioning Economy 
(SOFE), to a more holistic, socially rooted critique of economic practices. In the 
introduction to the 1983 volume of the KP NTR for 1986-2005 period, Shatalin and his 
collaborators explained that: 
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The complex problems of cultural and social development have, to this day, not been 
taken into account in central planning. Issues of the mismatch between 
contemporary and future consumption, of operative and long term social strategy, 
have been ignored. A program of social development has not been developed and 
the key task of socio-economic development—the development of social, cultural, 
and labor resources to their full potential, in other words the intensification of all 
social elements of economic activity—has not been studied by planning bodies. This 
intensification is the critical element of the further evolution of the developed 
socialist order and its movement toward communism, as well as a more intensive 
and efficient use of economic resources.502  
The embrace of “the new planning” by the KP NTR’s author’s had a political subtext. If 
taken to its conclusion the KP NTR’s program meant that instead of the Party, the plan’s 
goals would be determined scientifically, from within the plan itself using the KP NTR 
itself and its rolling evaluation of “social goods” to set the feedback loop between society 
and the economy.  
 The KP NTR was just one component in a larger program that many Soviet 
intellectuals and officials hoped would revise Soviet planning to deal with issues of 
interdependence and lay the groundwork for a peaceful transition to global socialism. In a 
1976 forum on “Global Socio-Economic Problems” in Mirovaia Ekonomika i 
Mezhdunarodnoe Otnosheni, Gvishiani argued for a specifically Soviet approach to global 
modelling that would “move beyond the focus of Western models [the Club of Rome 
Models] on human survival and establish models of international economic and ecological 
processes that engage in building mechanisms of human cooperation” which could lead to 
“action.” Action, Gvishiani explained, meant increasing the power “of the socialist world” 
and pushing for collective solutions that would weaken the power of the capitalist 
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market.503 The venerable dean of Soviet Geophysics and IIASA supporter, Academician 
Yevgeny Fedorov, was even more explicit in his assessment that the final aim of the kinds 
of calls for a multilateral planning system—such as Jan Tinbergen’s Reshaping the Global 
Order, presented to the Club of Rome in 1977—would logically end in socialism’s 
triumph.504 These authors were the inheritors of Khrushchev’s 1956 optimism that 
socialism would triumph of its own natural superiority but adapted  it to the circumstances 
of détente and multilateral economic integration.   
 Yet, this utopian vision clashed with the actual practices of the Soviet state. A prime 
example was Gvishiani’s attempt to use systems analysis and the tools being produced in 
IIASA to solve the problem of the Soviet “Fuel-Energy Complex” and its exposure to the 
forces of the international economy pointed out by Bogomolov. Research in the problems 
of energy at IIASA began in the late-1970s eventually becoming its permanent “World 
Energy Program” in 1981. In 1976, the GKNT reported that Soviet scientists and 
economists working at IIASA’s Austrian campus were working with the Soviet developed 
IMPACT model for energy system construction and cost planning. The goal of this work 
was to integrate the IMPACT model with larger American designed macro-economic 
models such, as the Bechtel Corporation’s Energy Supply Model (ESM) and to use these 
to build the basis of the IIASA-Soviet developed INTERLINK model. These models, the 
report pointed out, were of high importance to the Soviet economy.505  
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 While Soviet researchers were at the forefront of both of these large international 
macro-economic projects, their problem was bringing them home. In 1977, when meeting 
with Dartmouth’s Denis Meadows, ISA researchers noted that the energy models he was 
building for the United States were explicitly normative with policy prescriptions, which 
“would provide the President and his advisors a roadmap of decisions that they can make 
in the context of increasing global energy prices.” Meadows emphasized to his Soviet 
colleagues that “the best model is one in which specialist in modelling and [political] 
decision makers are involved in its designs.” This must have sounded like music to the ears 
of Soviet scientists who idealized this American practice (which itself was mostly an 
idealized version of reality) in reports to their political superiors.506 In a 1981 letter to the 
Central Committee, Gvishiani outlined the “Global 2000 Report to the President” ordered 
by the Carter administration to predict global environmental, energy, and economic trends 
into the year 2000. “While overall, a useful report,” Gvishiani concluded, “parts of it carry 
a propagandistic or ideological purpose. It is the reaction of the leading capitalist country 
to the global environmental crisis and the retreat of its leadership, profits, and economic 
dominance.” Gvishiani also listed the many institutes in the USSR working on versions to 
this type of model, encouraging the Central Committee staffers to begin thinking about 
creating a Soviet answer to the presidential report that would be as wide reaching and as 
integrated into government as the American version.507  
The feeling of abandonment by that the technocrats felt from high officials can be 
encapsulated in one incident. In 1978, the Academy of Sciences and the GKNT established 
a special board called the “Committee on Systems Analysis” to coordinate efforts to 
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transfer useful data collected in collaborations with Western scientists to relevant research 
institutes in the USSR. This had some notable success such as a collaboration on regional 
development models between Agambegian’s team in Siberia and researchers working at 
the Tennessee Valley Authority. However, while data flowed one way, it did not flow the 
other. In 1978, Kirillin and Academy of Sciences President, Anatoly Aleksandrov, wrote a 
memo to the Central Committee pleading for Soviet specialists to be able to share closed 
energy data with their Western counterparts at IIASA. Without such data, Soviet specialists 
would not be able to fully participate in the project and the domestic economy would not 
be able to derive much benefit from this work. “If the Soviet side does not participate in 
this project” it continued “the section on the Soviet economy will be constructed using 
foreign experts and data which could result in inaccuracies and slanders.”  The support of 
even such highly placed officials could not break the deadlock surrounding official secrecy 
as the recommendations to share data were thoroughly rejected.508  
Losing the World: Global Planning V.S. Globalization  
The trend of Soviet economics to embrace the global modelling turn was deeply 
embedded in the larger international discussion on the future of the international order. The 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the increasing power of developing world states, 
especially energy producers, turned the 1970s into a period of contestation around the 
global economic order.  Moreover, the optimistic promises of the first development decade 
had, by the early 1970s, had failed to make an impact in the disparities between the 
developed and underdeveloped world. Into this void stepped the Group of 77, and its 
project for the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO’s agenda was, in 
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many ways, sympathetic to the Soviet cause. It emphasized the rights of sovereigns to 
regulate and expropriate the property of multinational corporations, a greater role for the 
state in making domestic decisions, and support for elements of planning. However, other 
elements of the NIEO left Soviet theorists baffled. They were uncomfortable with the fact 
that the G77 and the NIEO had divided the world into developed and underdeveloped 
countries which grouped COMECON countries with the industrialized West. Further, the 
NEIO’s insistence on producer cartels to regulate prices on primary goods clashed with the 
Soviet belief that industrialization was the only means to gain independence from the 
capitalist world system.509 As such, while the USSR aligned with the NIEO’s goals in 
political pronouncements, the analysis of Soviet intellectuals, such O.T. Bogomolov, 
remained skeptical. In Bogomolov’s work on the movement titled Socialism and the 
Reconstruction of International Economic Relations [Sochialism i perestroika 
mezhundarodnih ekonomicheskih otnoshenii] he remained skeptical of developing world 
claims on the division of the between industrialized and under-industrialized states arguing 
that the socialist system was a natural ally of the developing world and “not to be conflated 
with the capitalist world system.”510 Soviet specialists were particularly perplexed by the 
NIEO’s demand for the indexation of primary goods to the cost of finished, industrial goods 
which they believed impossible in the kind of open, trade based economy that NEIO 
theorists wished to establish. Soviet authors admonished the program for not having any 
specific model in mind to establish a set of prices tied to planned goals for development.511 
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What the Soviet Union’s authors were much more comfortable with was the argument 
presented by Jan Tinbergen in his report to the Club of Rome, Reshaping the Global Order. 
Tinbergen and his expert committee recommended that the only way to solve global 
inequality while also preventing the depletion of the world’s natural resources was 
strengthening international organizations to coordinate national development plans.512 
 Given this preference, it is natural that the Soviet Union was much more 
comfortable working with the United Nations Industrialization Organization (UNIDO) 
than it was with The United Nations Trade and Development Conference (UNCTAD) were 
most of the debate on the NIEO was focused.  Even in UNIDO however, the USSR found 
its position to be tenuous. The Soviet delegation to the 1968 UNIDO meeting on investment 
in foreign countries reported that the gathering was dominated by “American specialists 
and reflected the interests and practice of American private financial companies.” To their 
chagrin, they found that “there was no disagreement between developing countries and 
Western financial firms.” The two sides “agreed that there needed to be an information 
service established to present investors with projects in the developing world.” The division 
that did exist was that investors emphasized immediate returns while developing countries 
emphasized longer term projects. The delegation thus recommended that the Soviet Union 
not oppose these meetings as they were “popular with developing countries” and that these 
agreements would happen with or without UN involvement. In fact, they even admitted 
that under controlled conditions, Western capital could be useful for industrial 
development.513 What they did recommend was that: 
Our politics should focus on preventing international investments from hurting the 
economic and social development of developing countries, and not tether their 
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politics to the interests of Western monopolies. We must develop this program 
which would receive support from developing countries. 514 
 
The proposed program would push UNIDO to become more involved in guaranteeing that 
the agreements between Western lenders and emerging markets “guarantee the priority of 
the national interest in the distribution of profit.” As well, the suggested that UNIDO could 
be an area to “propagandize” the differences between Soviet and Western aid. In fact, they 
recommended that Soviet specialists be encouraged to produce materials evaluating these 
differences and consult developing countries on their interaction with Western financial 
firms.515  
 These experiences reflected a larger dilemma faced by the theorists of the 1950s 
and the 1960s as they struggled to adapt the development planning framework to the 
failures of the UN development decade and the effects of increasingly liberalized inter-
state capital flows. One attempt at solving this problem was Leontief’s The Future of the 
World Economy, published in 1977. The study was the result of a long-term UN sponsored 
project on creating an economic forecasting model designed to correct the failures of the 
first UN development decade by establishing clearer targets and possibilities. The report 
was commissioned by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 
conjunction with the Government of the Netherlands, suggesting the sponsorship of 
Tinbergen, and was developed in cooperation with Soviet economist and UN official, 
Stanislav Menshikov, who, before his stint in New York, had spent time at IMEMO and 
Agambegian’s institute.516 The results of the model indicated that even though commodities 
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would most likely increase their prices into the 1990s and 2000s the increases would be 
too slow and too unevenly distributed to for most developing states to achieve the goals 
envisioned by the NIEO’s goals by 2000. Following the development of the first Leontief 
model, a research team at NYU began working with it to help it provide various scenarios 
to achieve UNIDO’s 1975 “Lima Goals” of having twenty-five percent of industrial 
production to come out of developing countries by 2000.  The Leontief model was not yet 
capable of developing alternative scenarios and needed to be adjusted for this new project. 
In 1976, ECOSOC asked IEiOPP to send staff to UN headquarters in New York to assist 
in calibrating the input output model. Menshikov, who was directing the project in the 
ECOSOC secretariat, requested the institute send A.G. Gramberg, the Soviet Union’s 
foremost expert in input-output modelling and regional development. Gramberg worked 
with the model through 1978 to expand its regional variations. Its results showed that even 
if the prices of primary goods increased, most countries would not benefit from these price 
increases as the investments needed to extract those new resources would take away from 
investments that could go to value added industries.517 
There were other people evaluating the Leontief model. In 1980, Leontief had asked 
for additional funding from the Ford Foundation and the foundation began speaking to the 
leaders of the field about Leontief’s research. One of those the Foundation interviewed was 
Dr. Nicholas Carter, the chief economist at the World Bank. Carter thought little about 
Leontief’s model “as it did not focus on the monetary and specifically debt side of 
developing markets.” Moreover, Carter mentioned that in recent years “a Russian” had 
been “plugging away at the model.” Carter thought that this Russian was “a straight 
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forward econometrician and knew nothing of the world economy.” The big problem, Carter 
argued was that “the model has little to say on the monetary and specifically the debt side 
of developing markets.”518 Carter’s skepticism reflected a structural change in the global 
economy and its institutional centers of power. As postwar capital controls began to fall, 
the nature of investment changed too. The kind of direct investments that UNIDO had been 
working to encourage in the 1960s were being replaced by portfolio flows which invested 
in short term instruments to make the spread on “carries” between interest rates in different 
states. This complimented by the inflow of “petrodollars”—money invested in Western 
banks by oil exporting nations—meant that borrowing was cheap for many developing 
countries. By 1980, this borrowing binge had turned into a worldwide sovereign debt crisis 
which defused the hopes for radical change issued by both the NIEO and the global 
planning. The power of the UN was reduced as institutions like the IMF and World Bank 
became more important in regulating the fluid, debt dominated world economy.519  
Soviet responses to these tendencies were halfhearted. In acknowledging the new 
realities and its impacts on the USSR, the GKNT established a commission to study issues 
related to the study Soviet foreign economic and scientific technical ties, the study of 
foreign countries, and the international credit-monetary relations. Chaired by Gvishiani and 
IMEMO’s director, Nikolai Iznomentsev, the commission also had representatives from 
every major economics institute and the ministries of finance and foreign trades. The goal 
of the commission was study the new “conjuncture in international economic relations” 
and its impact on the Soviet economy. The materials of this commission are not in the 
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archive and are most likely classified.520 One indication of what might have been contained 
in these minutes can be gleaned from an IMEMO report to the Central Committee on the 
results of a 1979 expert meeting on “New Tendencies in the Monetary and Financial 
Spheres of the Capitalist System.” The report concluded that floating exchange rates “will 
negatively affect the socialist bloc” as they would make it more difficult to use planning 
techniques for foreign trade and make the debts of Eastern European states harder to roll 
over. The report concluded that while the Soviet Union was heavily involved in the 
international programs on planning and real-side economic relations, it would have little 
influence over the increasingly important financial and monetary issues. The USSR could 
move to have a limited internationalization of the ruble and expand CMEA-IMF 
cooperation with the caveat that this would further open the domestic economy to the 
fluctuations of the capitalist market.521  
Conclusion: What kind of Soviet economy? What kind of Soviet economics? 
 When Gramberg returned home from New York, his report to the GKNT explained 
that the “Lima model had significant domestic uses for the USSR” as it could inform 
tradeoffs between the export of raw materials and the production of finished, value added 
goods. In the ideal scenario, the USSR’s oil exports were cut by two and its production of 
value added goods increased by 60% by 2000. Gramberg’s findings testify to the extent 
that concerns about the efficiency of the domestic economy had taken on a global tone by 
the late 1970s. The slowdown in the Soviet economy was no longer an international 
problem because it boded badly in the competition of the two systems—the Soviet 
economy was now conceptualized as integrated into a global economy that it could not 
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fully control. In the minds of many of the USSR’s reformist elites, the two systems of the 
1950s and 1960s were being replaced by an integrated global economic system.522   
 In a testament to the increasing international entanglements of what Soviet theorists 
called the national economy [narodnaya khozaistva], in 1983 Gosplan began to seriously 
consider proposals to use world market prices for energy to improve the efficiency of 
Soviet enterprises and to stem the vast amount of investments going into extracting oil and 
gas.523 This proposal was just one of many that would be considered as domestic reform 
agendas began to radicalize again. As in 1954-1956 and 1965-1969, the start of the 1980s 
began to see a domestic debate over the future of the Soviet economy interact with the need 
to rethink what the Soviet Union’s role in the world would be. Again, a new leader was 
needed to synthesize these ideas. The intellectual legacy that Mikhail Gorbachev would 
eventually inherit would thus be a new kind of ideological vision—one that understood the 
Soviet economy as being a part of the world economy, which dictated the need for a 
transnational politics.   
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Reform Amidst Stagnation: The Rise and Fall of Conservative Economic Politics in 
the Brezhnev Era  
In 1982, a special commission entered Brezhnev’s office in the Central Committee 
building on the Old Square. The General Secretary had died just a few days earlier, and it 
was time to clean out his desk. Inside a locked drawer, they found a rather remarkable 
document— a 1968 letter from then KGB chief and now Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri 
Andropov, addressed to Brezhnev and the Politburo “on the state of the Party and the major 
challenges of governing that it will face in the near future.” Andropov explicitly argued 
that the solutions to the problems that emerged between October 1964 and 1968 were short-
term bandages covering long-term concerns. “The economists,” he explained, “are arguing 
that improved yearly growth rates have not yet translated into general wellbeing.” Problems 
such as the lack of consumer goods, low levels of innovation, and highly inefficient 
production were leading to social issues such as dissent in the intelligentsia and lethargy 
amongst the youth. The root of the problem was a continuing lack of “political 
organization” in the party. Andropov was disturbed by the fact that “the United States is 
pushing ahead of its socialist rivals in economic organization and the integration of new 
technological innovations” which “cannot be ignored in the development of our economy 
and long-run plans.” While “we condemned Khrushchev” for “trying to beat the Americans 
with slogans,” Andropov continued, no work was being done to address the technological 
and management gap. Andropov recommended that the Politburo appoint a commission of 
Kosygin, Ustinov, Smolentev, and Mazurova along with advisors from the Academy of 
Sciences to prepare for more radical steps to improve the economy. In Andropov’s opinion, 
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efforts to improve the economy went hand-in-hand with bettering the education and 
upbringing of Soviet youth and an expansion of the mobilizing role of “democratic 
institutions” such as the Soviet Council of Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Andropov 
lamented the fact that the deputies of the Supreme Soviet had little contact with their 
supposed constituents and that the supposed fountainhead of Soviet power was not 
involved in the drafting of “the solutions to the country’s social and economic 
problems.”524  
What Andropov suggested was that the Soviet order needed serious revamping if it 
were to continue to function as an efficient political and economic entity. Andropov’s 
warnings echo the popular image of the future General Secretary as a conservative reformer 
struggling to establish an ordered Soviet state. Brezhnev himself understood that the way 
in which the USSR’s government operated needed change. The instability of the 
Khrushchev years and the unorganized manner in which the Kosygin reforms had been 
launched testified to a greater weakness in Soviet policy processes and Brezhnev believed 
that to rectify this the USSR needed a stronger legal basis for its policy making process. In 
1970, the Council of Ministers passed a decree on the “Improvement of Legal Work in the 
Economy” which directed Soviet state organizations to base their administrative processes 
on existing laws, rather than over issue regulations.  A year later Brezhnev forwarded a 
letter written to him by Academy of Sciences Vice-President for Social and Humanitarian 
Sciences, F.N. Fedoseev to the preparatory of the XXIV Party Congress encouraging the 
body to take into consideration its contents. Fedoseev’s note explained that despite “the 
provisions of the 1936 Constitution” which led to “regular elections” to the country’s 
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Soviets the presence of these “elected bodies” was “weak in economic and social life.” 
This meant that “state organs are not accountable before the Deputies” and that “party 
officials were increasingly taking on more direct roles in economic management,” leading 
to excessive control from above and irregularities in industrial operations.525 However, the 
initiatives of the 1970 proclamation foundered. In 1974, the Institute for State and Law 
explained to the Council of Ministers that the Ministry of Justice was not cooperating with 
it in reviewing the economic legal code. The same Fedoseev warned the Ministry of Justice 
about the dire state of Soviet economic and industrial regulation: “the USSR did not have 
legal framework for the economy for ten years.”526  
In this chapter, I will argue that the political strategy of the Brezhnev era, the high 
point of what would be called stagnation, was an attempt to build a “conservative” political 
program for the Soviet economy. By conservative, I mean that while they distanced 
themselves from the radical restructuring proposed by supporters of the first wave of the 
“Kosygin Reforms” they did not see desire that Soviet economic practices be stuck in a 
stasis. In fact, they recognized that there were many problems for the USSR’s economic 
practices. However, the way to solve them was not radical institutional reconstruction but 
rather gradual, legally grounded, improvements in administrative practices. This was not, 
I would argue, out of line with how even the reformist wing of the Soviet economic 
profession understood the horizons of possibility in the mid-1970s. Tied together by a 
common belief in the “scientific technical revolution” and its transformative power, Soviet 
economists tried to work within this conservative framework while gradually expanding 
its possibilities. I argue that this conformity, driven by a combination of complacency and 
                                                
525 RGANI f. 5 op. 63 d. 4 ll. 9-10.    
526 ARAN f. 2 op. 1 d. 55 ll. 67-78. 
	 327	
 
powerlessness, was shattered in 1979, when the culmination of the economic policies of 
the late 1970s—a law some called “the second Kosygin reform”527—collapsed almost 
immediately following its adoption. The failure of this law due to resistance from ministries 
and central planning agencies which had no incentives to fully comply with the law, 
undermined the entire strategy of gradually “improving the economic mechanism” through 
administrative changes grounded in regularized legal procedure.   
This instance of a failure to build the Soviet Rechtstaat, a state which rules through 
law but is not necessarily under law, was symptomatic of the Brezhnev era.  The persistence 
of ad-hoc “administrative methods” undermined progress in establishing a regularized 
legal basis for the five-year plan based on non-direct, “economic methods” which aspired 
to use self-interest and incentives to control enterprise behavior.  This problem was 
embedded within the democratic centralist model—there was no power outside of the party 
which could independently construct a basis for law. It was this that caused the generation 
of economists who emerged in the wake of the “Kosygin Reforms” to lose faith in the 
ability of the Soviet state and Communist Party in its current form to implement economic 
reform. Despite its apparent “taming,” mathematical economics began regaining its critical 
edge as a new generation of thinkers, raised in systems analysis, came of age in the 1970s. 
Understanding the economy as a “system” that could be optimized, created space for 
theorists to begin thinking of it as a “natural,” self-regulating sphere which as opposed to 
ad-hoc organs of the party-state. I will argue that the failure of conservative reform drove 
the “social” critique that the previous chapter described as implicit in the new “systems 
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theory” to acquire an explicitly “political” edge. By the early 1980s, the economic critique 
of Soviet institutions that had been suppressed since the destruction of the Kronrod wing 
of political-economy had re-emerged. However, instead of Marxism, its language would 
be mathematized social science. The failure conservative reform drove the alignment of 
critical voices in Soviet economics with Andropov and his young protégés who had made 
their careers in the regional party apparat—including one Mikhail Gorbachev—who were 
themselves determined to crush the inertia they encountered at the center.   
This tension between a state that was immune to law and the desire for legal rule 
has been present in research on the Imperial era. Much has been written about Imperial 
Russia’s “enlighten bureaucrats” and the origins of the Great Reforms. Works by historians 
such as Bruce Lincoln, Richard Wortman, and Nikolai Khristoforov have revealed that 
imperial officialdom, shaped within the pan-European traditions of cameralism and the 
Rechtstaat, were a the architects of the reforms of the 1860s.528 Moreover, they viewed 
autocratic power not as an impediment but as a tool which could set the ball rolling on 
breaking the resistance of the landed gentry and creating a new law-based society centered 
on the Czar as sovereign. Consequently, these figures and the institutions they were 
embedded in, such as the Ministry of Finance, struggled against both reactionary groups—
such as the Ministry of Interior—and the contradiction at the heart of their project: to force 
a lawless state to rule through law. These works of Imperial history are useful for 
understanding how to study similar processes within USSR and the warring branches of 
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the Soviet party-state.529 Following their lead, this chapter will engage in a legislative 
history of attempts to reform and improve Soviet economic practice from 1972 to 1986, 
focusing on how each successive failure gradually radicalized political discourse and broke 
the consensus that Brezhnev built between 1969 and 1971. In doing so, it will show that, 
despite Gorbachev’s claims of a break, there was a basic continuity between the final years 
Brezhnev’s rule and the first stage of Perestroika, not only in the realm of ideas, but also 
in the acceptance of the need for a radical break from the preceding decade. Instead of a 
break, the solutions of 1985-1988 reflected a radicalization of pervious approaches without 
a change in their underlying content.  
It might be controversial to speak about “legislation” in the USSR. After all, the 
Soviet Union was in many ways a “lawless state,” in that its own laws did not apply to its 
government. Even though it was no longer slaughtering its own people on a mass-scale, it 
was still not a state bound by law. Even the mundane minutia of Brezhnev’s “Little Deal” 
with the population, the willful blind eye turned to the shadow economy and corruption, 
was based on selective enforcement of laws (not to mention the forced institutionalization 
of dissidents).530 However, the “lawlessness” of the state formed the dilemma of the Soviet 
leadership of the 1970s: how can one build an economic policy based on gradual, 
legislative change when the object of the law was the state-owned economy. In other 
words, how could this unrestrained sovereign rule itself through law without building a 
barrier between itself and the property it technically owned. This critical contradiction 
between desires for a Rechstaat and the economic vision of the Leninist economy as “one 
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big factory” managed by a democratic centralist party drove the contradictions of 
Brezhnev-era politics. Even the organization of state archives bears out the fact that the 
Council of Ministers attempted to have some order to their discussions—compared to the 
ad hoc attempts of the 1950s and 1960s. Attempts at drafting proclamations displayed a 
uniform system of consultation and filing which is reflected in the orderly and predictable 
composition and organization of archival material from the period. The problem was not 
with drafting, it was making a system of institutions designed for mobilization and 
industrialization, what Alessandro Stanziani referred to as “achieving the Second Industrial 
Revolution through the methods of the First Industrial Revolution,” comply with the 
process of legislation and function through regular, legally codified processes.531 Such 
contradictions only intensified as these same institutions were pressed into action to move 
the USSR into a postindustrial age.   
The Outlines of Conservative Reform 
In 1974, the major, often squabbling, factions of Soviet economic sciences came 
together to draft a letter to Brezhnev. In the letter, Kapustin of the Institute of Economics, 
Fedorenko of CEMI, Aganbegian of IEOPP, and Bogomolov of IMESS warned Brezhnev 
that the slow pace of economic reform had created a situation in which the growth of gross 
industrial output had fallen from 10% per annum in 1968 to 6.5% in 1971. The chiefs of 
the Academy of Sciences’ main economic institutes suggested that the USSR move away 
from its usual system of five-year plans and instead move to a “goal-directed planning” in 
which planners would first establish certain economy-wide outcomes based on a technical 
forecast and then begin establishing indicators and targets to reach those goals with no 
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arbitrary “five year” planning horizon. This new system would require a significant 
reconstruction of the planning procedure. Instead of dealing with individual branches, 
Gosplan would have to begin working on “technical systems.” For example, instead of 
planning oil, gas, and coal as separate industries, Gosplan would have to begin integrating 
their development as a function of a long-term energy use plan for the Soviet economy. 
This new approach to planning would have to integrate the “most modern scientific 
methods such as systems analysis, optimization theory, and computer aided mathematical-
economic modeling.” Administrative cadres would be reduced and replaced with smaller, 
more educated staffs. The letter suggested that Gosplan would have to be “liberated” from 
day to day planning and its many divisions reduced and those tasks delegated to various 
other committees of the Council of Ministers including new organizations dedicated to 
“multi-branch economic complexes” such as energy and the agro-industrial complex. The 
letter recommended that the creation of “self-financing combines,” large multi-branch 
production complexes created from multiple units, be accelerated, and given more 
independence from any production ministry. Most of all, the leaders of the Soviet 
economics profession begged Brezhnev to intervene personally to clear the logjams of the 
Soviet policy-making process. “As it stands,” they wrote, “all questions related to the 
improvement of the national economy are assigned to the ‘multi-branch state commission’ 
(MVK) under Gosplan which consists of a variety of representatives of large industrial 
branches. Therefore, questions related to the implementation of specific measures are 
solved by compromise. Thus, it is not surprising that many of the measures taken by the 
September 1965 Plenum and subsequent decisions of the Central Committee and the 
Council of Ministries are not fulfilled adequately.” The USSR needed to follow the 
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example of some East European states and take the matter out of the hands of interest 
groups and place it into the hands of a special body within the Politburo led by at least a 
Central Committee Secretary.532  
In response to the letter to Brezhnev, Gosplan wrote a report to Kosygin which 
outlined its disagreements with the academics’ position. Gosplan, the note explained, “had 
taken steps to include their recommendations in the development of the Tenth Five-Year 
Plan (1976-1980)” and had began work on the Perspective Plan on the Long Term 
Development of Scientific-Technical Progress. However, some positions are 
“controversial or unacceptable.” For example, “the use of systems analysis,” though an 
important “step in improving planning,” could “not be the only method used” and should 
be combined with other more “normative techniques” which also needed to be improved. 
Gosplan also objected to stepping away from price-setting, fearing it would create 
instability in deliveries and the prioritization of more profitable goods. As well, Gosplan 
agreed that the increased use of “self-financing combines” [Khozhraschetnye 
ob’’edineniia] which reported directly to ministries instead of intermediate bodies was 
important but “could not be implemented in all branches of industry.” Finally, Gosplan 
defended the MVK and its decisions as effective and “as a rule, implemented 
immediately.”533  
Gosplan’s clash with the scientific establishment demonstrates that the debate 
between these two centers of power in the Soviet economy continued after the “radical” 
phase of the Kosygin Reforms. However, it also shows that the terrain on which this battle 
was fought was shifting. The ideas expressed in the letter represented the consensus of the 
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Soviet economics establishment after the defeat of the radical Tovarnik camp in 1972. It 
was not ideologically radical—no one was calling for Council Communism, the Yugoslav 
model, or sending a greater role for markets and interest rates on capital. Moreover, many 
of the positions that they advocated were broadly acceptable to Gosplan. As early as 1970, 
Gosplan had been complaining about the fact that it was too involved in day-to-day 
operations related to enterprise and ministry planning. It wanted the Council of Ministers 
to take steps to let ministries and enterprises make their own decisions related to supply 
and establish direct inter-ministry delivery contracts rather than going through Gosplan, 
allowing the agency to focus on long-term planning and macroeconomic considerations.534 
However, what one does detect is a difference between the two camps on more fundamental 
issues related to planning and the direness of the Soviet situation. The surviving reformist 
camps of Soviet economics were quickly adopting the discourse of systems analysis and 
goal-directed planning that was inspired by larger, transnational discourses on the future 
of planning in a world increasingly dominated by complex, postindustrial manufacturing 
processes.  
As argued earlier in this dissertation, the 1969 December Plenum and the XXIV 
Party Congress did not end attempts to change the process of central planning in the USSR. 
Rather, “economic reform” was replaced with a much less politicized term— “the 
improvement of the management of the economy.” It implied that the prerequisites of the 
reforms had been established and what was left was to introduce them on a larger scale. In 
the conditions of “scientific-technical revolution” (STR), this also meant that the state had 
to begin investing in high end technology. Aganbegian laid out a vision of how to adapt 
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the process of economic reform to the post-1969 environment. In a note entitled “On the 
Project of the Main Directions of the Development of the Economy of the USSR for 1971-
1975,” sent to the Central Committee’s Department of Science and Higher Education, he 
explained that the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) needed improvements in four areas: 
steps to arrest the falling rates of growth observed in 1968-9, to “accelerate the scientific 
technical revolution,” increase the wellbeing of the population, and to further “improve the 
system of planning.” The STR had shifted the terrain of competition between the world’s 
two socio-economic systems. While the gap between the United States and the USSR had 
been closing in the 1950s, the slowing of growth in the second half of the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan was a bad portent given the United States’ rapid adaptation of more efficient 
production techniques. Moreover, it was not the United States that was the leading 
technological edge of capitalist production but “the countries of Europe and Japan, which 
Gosplan does not even mention in their reports.” Aganbegian was especially interested in 
the efficiency of Japanese enterprises which were on track to complete the “national 
development plan” a decade early, in 1975 rather than the planned 1985. The USSR, 
meanwhile, was using ever more budgetary and physical resources to just maintain its gross 
output level. To reach the kinds of efficiencies found in West European and Japanese 
companies, the USSR would need to cut its spending by 5% while increasing its growth by 
7% over the next plan period. More importantly, to accomplish this the USSR needed to 
readjust how its industry was organized and push for the introduction of “self-financed 
combines.” This would allow the introduction of the same kind of long-term “financial 
planning” that was common in Japanese, American, and West European firms, ultimately 
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allowing the USSR to more effectively invest in new, labor-saving technology and thus 
reduce the cost of labor - the fundamental building bloc of value in a socialist society.535  
The introduction of the “combine” became a priority area for Soviet economic 
reform in the early 1970s—a short term goal that both Gosplan and the Academic reformers 
could both agree was necessary as a first step to any future reform. The October 1965 
proclamations had made provisions for the self-financing combine of various smaller 
enterprises the cornerstone of Soviet industrial organization. The move promised to 
establish more powerful, self-standing entities that could plan their own, internal resource 
uses and not require the outside interference of the production ministries. In 1965, 
Fedorenko had explicitly stated that this new structure would allow for the introduction of 
modern computer-based management, so popular in Western corporations, into the Soviet 
economy. The organization of combines from previously self-standing, small and medium 
enterprises was an uncontroversial step in the wake of the XXIV Congress. They offered a 
way of furthering the cause of enterprise self-financing and independence without 
threatening the interests of Gosplan, while theoretically shifting the emphasis of industrial 
policy to the efficient introduction of new productive technologies. Bachurin, Gosplan’s 
point man on economic reform, broadly supported Aganbegian’s position on combines and 
noted that their development would be at the center of the new five-year plan.536  
The imperative to expand the number of combines in Soviet industry accelerated 
after the XXIV Party Congress’ declaration that scientific and technical progress were the 
state’s priorities for economic development.. In a 1972 briefing to the Central Committee 
on projected growth rates from 1976 to 1990, the Institute for Economics’ N.I. Notkin 
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argued that improved management and productive techniques fostered by “the reserves 
created by the STR” would allow the USSR to overcome the slowdown that was expected 
in the 1971-1975 Five-Year Plan. Indeed, the initial steps taken during the 1965-1969 
economic reform “had arrested some of the declines in the growth of national income that 
had been observed in the 1964-1966 period.” This all meant that the USSR was not destined 
for a slowdown in growth due to its overdevelopment as some bourgeoisie theorists had 
been suggesting. Indeed, Japan’s miraculous expansion confirmed that technology meant 
that “slowing rates of growth was not destiny” [sic].537 The Institute’s 1972 programmatic 
statement on the future of the Soviet economy concluded that “the main thrust of improving 
the organizational structures of economic management now should be the gradual 
transition from the individual factory as primary unit of management to the self-standing 
combine composed of multiple technologically interlocking productive and research 
entities.”  Under this scheme, the ministries would become “strategic entities” rather than 
day-to-day managers.538 Indeed, in materials prepared for Kosygin on the next stage of 
economic reform, Gosplan noted that “small factories do not effectively introduce new 
technologies” and “hinder the improvement of planning, technical progress, and the 
establishment of direct contracted ties.” These entities also wasted manpower and financial 
resources as they often replicated each other’s functions and contributed to the 
unnecessarily high levels of management staff and misallocation of specialist labor across 
the USSR.539  
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Despite agreement across the spectrum on the need to expand the number of 
combines, the old problem of ministerial resistance reared its head almost immediately. 
The very same report to Kosygin explained that “ministries had not taken sufficient steps 
to reorganize their factories into combines.” Moreover, the ones that did often simply 
divided old factories into their existing shops and then relabeled them “combines.”540 In 
1970, the Ministry of Finance concluded that even though combines were successfully 
reducing costs and finding efficient synergies, “many ministries were not only not taking 
steps to improve their management but also actively trying to disassemble existing 
combines.” Moreover, “individual factory and plant managers” resisted losing their 
independence as part of their integration into larger administrative units.541 In 1971, 
Baibakov informed Kosygin that most ministries were simply not ready to move toward 
any of the new priorities defined by the plenum and the subsequent XXIV Party 
Congress.542 A year later Baibakov and Finance Minister Valery Garbuzov informed the 
Premier that the ministries were trying “to weaken the government’s position on the 
establishment of combines by maintaining their [the combines’] dependence on the 
ministries” rather than expanding their independent financial decision-making powers.  
The problem was acute enough that, in May 1972, the Politburo tasked the Council 
of Ministers with developing a proclamation to accelerate the formation of combines and 
the reduction of small factory enterprises.543 In January 1973, the Politburo approved the 
draft of two proclamations that were eventually issued in March.544 Combined, the two 
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documents specified that converting single standing enterprises into combines would be 
the priority of Soviet economic policy, directing the ministry to have plans ready in six 
months to move to the “new two- and three-level system of management.” The matter was 
brought up again at the December 1973 Party Plenum held to approve the yearly plan and 
budget. Unlike other plenums of this type, Brezhnev did not leave the comments to 
Baibakov and Garbuzov, intervening in the matter himself. Brezhnev berated the ministries 
for approaching the process of forming combines “in a purely formal manner” and admitted 
that “our economic mechanism” does not yet “correspond to all the tasks we must 
accomplish.”545 
The December Plenum debate about why combines were not forming and what to 
do about that quickly turned to larger criticisms of Soviet economic politics as a whole. In 
1974 Kapustin wrote to the Central Committee to explain that the problem of combines 
was a symptom of a larger problem of most proposals being “purely formal” without 
considerations of larger economic issues that incentivized against efficient 
implementation.546 Kapustin expanded on this in a speech to the Moscow City Party 
organization. Since the September 1965 Plenum, “the basic character of industrial 
management had not changed,” he lamented. “The principles of economic reform had not 
been incorporated into the Ninth Five-Year Plan.” As a result, “misbalances” continued in 
planning, resulting in shortages and the “expansion rather than the limiting of plan 
indicators.” Planners “still view the economy as a series of individual plants and branches 
rather than as a set of interlocking productive complexes.” If these attitudes did not change, 
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“the formation of combines would not have positive results on enterprise financing and 
labor efficiency.”547 The Institute’s 1975 briefing to Kirilenko in preparation for the XXV 
Party Conference concluded: “There are a variety of factors that show that the creation of 
combines is not creating the desired economic effects.” In 1969, the average rate of labor 
productivity was 3-4 times higher in combines than in the rest of the economy. By 1972, 
however, these rates had grown only by .2% which was the same as that of the rest of the 
economy. The loss of the effects of the initial reforms was not just a problem of “the 
combines themselves,” but because of "external" factors which were “rooted in the 
organization of production [planning] itself which is incompatible with today's trend 
toward specialization.”548  
The mounting inability of the Soviet political system to implement the widely-
shared goal of making the combines the bedrock of industrial organization showcased how 
conservative reform could quickly disillusion its supporters and politicize what started out 
as technocratic discourse. These frustrations quickly spilled out onto the pages of mass 
circulation “thick journals.” Despite the cooling of the “Thaw,” economists continued to 
use mass circulation, popular journals to pursue economic politics. Novyi mir, for example, 
kept its reputation for being a forum for new ideas that skirted the ideological line by 
publishing CEMI economist Nikolai Petryakov’s 1970 article “The Management of the 
Economy and Economic Interests.” In that piece, Petryakov broke with the CEMI line on 
cybernetic socialism and emphasized the role of private initiative and contracts as the key 
management innovation needed for the Soviet Union. Citing the NEP, Pretryakov wrote 
that “Lenin understood the economy to be a series of individual initiatives that are brought 
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to life through social actions.” For Lenin of the NEP era, “the struggle of the state to 
regulate financial and commercial ties, including through market means, was part and 
parcel of the struggle for socialism.” The changes in the Soviet economy that had occurred 
since the Second World War, particularly the expanded role of consumption, meant that 
the use price increases to break the producer monopoly on private goods while drawing 
down the cash holdings of the population was an increasingly important tool of planning. 
Yet, the “psychology of management” did not yet make room for individual interests or 
their reflection in money and prices that reflected consumer demand.549 Petryakov, though 
later a proponent of radical market reform, did not use the terminology “market” but rather 
explained these levers as “social systems” which did not exclude the fact that this system 
could be planned using the tools of “the new planning” popular in the international 
economic discourses of the early 1970s.550 The same year, Novyi mir published 
Fedorenko’s manifesto, “Management and the Scientific Technical Revolution,” which 
postulated the orthodox version of CEMI’s program. The STR, in Fedorenko’s assessment, 
signified a society in which “the flow of information was increasing many-fold.” This new 
volume of information required a rethinking of how the Soviet state would “manage the 
labor of society” as choices multiplied and the rate of economic activity accelerated. This 
was stressing the old price system as it was designed to maximize the production of certain 
goods and could not capture the new economic dynamic. A new system of prices based on 
real-time inputs managed by computers was needed. The barrier was not just technical but 
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also political. Fedorenko noted the success of CEMI’s case study in the Main Moscow 
Transportation Organization (Glavmosk), which it had equipped with a computing facility 
to calculate expected costs and plan their rates accordingly. “Plan goals from higher 
standing organizations were still constantly changing and the organizations were too 
overwhelmed by a multiplicity of often contradicting plan indicators. “The experiment was 
cancelled” in Moscow—a symptom of the ways in which unresolved institutional interests 
hurt policy making.551   
Fedorenko and Petryakov’s two broadsides showed that CEMI’s mathematical 
economics, though now a dominant strand in reformist thought, was coming apart at the 
edges as it ran into political barriers. Younger economists like Petryakov understood that 
the optimality theorems developed by Kantorovich, which were the basis of Soviet 
mathematical-economics, were, in Petryakov lab member Yevgeny Yasin’s words, “a 
special case of general equilibrium.”552  Indeed, by the early 1970s, this connection 
between CEMI’s SOFE model and a “general equilibrium model,” or a vision of the 
economy in which optimal outcomes come from agent interactions rather than set goals, 
was being formalized at the Institute by Viktor Polterovich in a series of 1973 papers. 553 
However, what makes these two articles politically salient is that, despite the growing 
theoretical divide between CEMI’s director and its leading young theorist, the politics of 
the two pieces was the same. With the kind of market reform that Petryakov would later be 
associated with off the table, both sides could agree that the influence of the economics 
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profession was to be directed against Gosplan and its approach to planning as a centrally 
directed activity dependent on traditional divisions of industry by branch.  
The inability of the USSR to implement a combine system was also being covered 
by Pravda. At the 1976 XXV Party Congress, Brezhnev called for a neew effort to 
“improve the management of the economy.”554 A new generation of economic journalists 
writing for the major Soviet dailies took up this call. One of the most dogged of them was 
V.D. Valavoi. Valavoi held a Doktorskaia in economics and, during the 1960s, was deputy 
editor of Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, which began its life as the house newspaper of the 
reformist State Committee on Science and Technology (GKNT), before coming under the 
auspices of the Central Committee. In 1976, he moved to Pravda where he became the new 
deputy editor in charge of economics. Valavoi began his career at the Soviet Union’s 
flagship daily with a bang, publishing an editorial titled “On the Further Development of 
the System of Indicators.” Behind the bland title was a scathing critique of the actions of 
planning bodies and ministries for continuing to maintain gross production indicator, 
whether measured physical output or total cash sales. With no incentive to save capital and 
labor, the mantra of enterprise managers was “the more expensive, the better.” He blasted 
Gosplan’s drafts for the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan for talking about making the cost of 
delivered goods an important indicator but not making it the universal indicator “enshrined 
in legal code.” Neither had Gosplan taken on board the results of many experimental 
enterprises which put profit and remuneration ahead of gross output.555 Valavoi returned 
in 1977 with a three-part piece entitled “Improving the System of Economic Management” 
in which he continued his assault on Gosplan. He slammed the agency for constantly 
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delaying its standards for evaluating enterprise compliance with direct contracts from 1974 
to 1978. As they stood in draft form, these directives included neither the cost of production 
nor its quality in evaluating whether an enterprise did, indeed, fulfill its obligations to its 
counterpart. All this meant that “despite the objective conditions” of “a shrinking labor 
supply” nothing was being done to increase the productivity of laborers, therefore, sapping 
both growth rates and the wealth of society.556 
Gosplan did not sit by idly in the face of press attacks. In 1974, its public journal, 
Planovoe khoziaistvo, published an attack on Fedorenko for “undermining the institutions 
of central planning” by critiquing Gosplan and therefore giving ammunition to Western 
critics of the Soviet system, such as Sovietologists Vladimir Tremel, Barry Konstinksy, 
and Dimitry Gallik. Their book Perspectives for the Soviet Economy in the 1970s cited his 
critiques of Gosplan favorably and argued that he was expressing attitudes toward Soviet-
style planning amongst the intelligentsia. Fedorenko fired back in a complaint to the 
Central Committee calling this article slander and noting that his work was done in 
conjunction with the directives of the party to improve the economy through the greater 
use of economic methods. Planovoe Khozajstvo stuck by its guns, accusing CEMI of 
replicating the position of “Bogdanov and Bukharin, that Lenin had critiqued in his 
writings” and citing many of SOFE’s critiques to prove that it was providing ammunition 
to bourgeois critics. The editorial board concluded that “it was imperative to render 
judgment” on Fedorenko’s activities, “intentional or not.” This assessment was joined by 
the head of Gosplan’s Department for Ideology, who stated that Fedorenko and CEMI were 
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“leading mathematical economics astray” and creating a backdoor “for theories of 
economic self-regulation through market mechanisms.” The Central Committee’s Section 
on Science and Higher Education calmed the debate, clearing Fedorenko’s name and 
asking that he write a clarifying piece in Gosplan’s journal condemning “the misuse” of 
his research by Western critics of the Soviet Union. This was not the end of Gosplan’s 
attempts to push back on its public critics.557 In 1977, an internal Gosplan memo advised 
that “officials” of the agency needed to publish more in the press. The authors of the memo 
pointed out Valovoi’s work as especially concerning, since Gosplan believed that “many 
of the suggestions made in the articles [written by Valovoi] were unacceptable and 
harmful.” What Gosplan’s leaders needed to do was respond to these accusations by 
publishing in the press and showing examples of how the agency “was fulfilling the 
directives of the XXV Party Congress.”  A press strategy would allow Gosplan’s collegium 
“to express the agency’s point of view on a variety of issues.”558  
By 1976, what had begun as an administrative change of Soviet industrial 
organization had erupted into a public political debate between at least two well defined 
camps. Despite its seeming hegemony, the conservative consensus that Brezhnev had 
crafted at the XXIV Party Congress was fraying at its edges. These political battles would 
only become sharper as the scope of the legislation being proposed by the Council of 
Ministers expanded.  
Drafting the Conservative Economic Reform  
In 1976, the Council of Ministers was going back to the drawing board. Records of the 
1971-2 ministry reports to Gosplan on fulfilling the tasks of the XXIV Party Congress were 
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pulled out of the State archive and then reviewed to assess what changes had happened in 
those years as part of an effort to prepare a new set of proclamations that would then 
address the directives of the XXV Congress. Something had gone wrong in the intervening 
years. The body’s return to the documents of 1971 indicates an interest not only in 
formalizing its legislative procedure but also in actively using regularized processes to 
create change. Indeed, the engagement of the Council of Ministers’ staff and the XXIV and 
XXV Party Congresses testifies to how Soviet Party and State institutions were attempting 
to function in a legislative manner. The Council of Ministers, as the highest operational 
organ of state power, would be tasked with bringing to life the directives of the highest 
organ of the Party—the Party Congress. What the Congress, and larger economic 
discussions, had concluded was that the path laid down in 1971 was not working.559 The 
new system of combines was not introducing more self-financing, greater computer 
networking, direct contracts, nor the improved introduction of new production techniques. 
Between 1975 and 1979, the very public failure of the combine system created the 
conditions for an attempt at a larger overhaul of central planning which became the stage 
for legislative battles between the post-1965 reformers and the institutions of the Soviet 
state. This attempt to legislate “conservative reform” showed both the possibilities and the 
limits of the Soviet state in its most institutionalized period and ultimately became an 
inflection point for economic policy as its many failures began to create coalitions of actors 
interested in disrupting the status quo.   
  Discussions in the Council of Ministers on a new proclamation began in 1975 as 
the failure of the Ninth Five-Year Plan’s initiatives on economic organization became 
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clear. Early that year, Gosplan submitted a proposal for steps to “Improve Planning and the 
Stimulation of Economic Activity,” which suggested a devolution of day-to-day planning 
to the ministries with Gosplan being assigned only large-scale planning across the Five 
Year Plan. Further, Gosplan placed an emphasis on “investing capital in upgrading old 
plants” rather “building plants from the ground up.” Gosplan’s note was rather narrow as 
evidenced by a criticism sent by Gosbank which argued that even if new investments were 
undertaken, these ignored the central problem of “the purchasing power of the ruble.” 
Gosbank suggested that enterprises be forced to create reserves of goods in a proportion of 
two percent to their liquid funds to make sure that there was excess supply when the 
population’s desire for products increased, thereby balancing the Soviet money supply. 
Further, Gosbank advocated for branch-specific and regional sub-banks to be allowed to 
make their own credit decisions rather than rely on the directives set by the plan for 
monetary emission. Gosbank would level these criticisms into 1976, explaining to the 
Council of Ministers that the drafts that they were working with ignored the oversupply of 
circulating cash in the Soviet economy making all indicators measured in money, such as 
productivity and profit, meaningless.560 
 The XXV Congress also served to mobilize the economics profession and 
particularly those elements of it interested in introducing the new “systems approach” to 
economic planning. Fedorenko responded to the Central Committee’s various 
proclamations on improving the planning of combines with a note to Gosplan’s Bachurin 
emphasizing the need to establish a system of planning in which “indicators of performance 
are brought into line across planning horizons, in Five-Year Plans, yearly plans, and longer-
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term programs of national economic development.” He proposed that the Complex 
Program for Scientific and Technical Progress (KP NTR) be adapted as a basis for a 
wholesale program of long-term planning, updated every five years, which would set the 
goals of the Five-Year Plan itself, and thus, supersede it legally.561 In 1976, the XXV 
Congress approved the KP NTP, and Fedorenko and his allies began working on a draft of 
the Academy of Sciences Section on Economics’ program for improving the Soviet 
economy. In his directives on the results of the Congress, Fedorenko explicitly argued the 
need for a new program which considered the NTR’s impact on “the global order,” 
international markets, and the ways that long-term forecasting and mathematical planning 
could improve the Soviet economy in these conditions. The draft proposal’s text 
demonstrated how concepts of long-term planning and systems science had entered Soviet 
domestic planning discourse and the increased importance that considerations about 
international markets were entering the leading edge of economics. The draft praised the 
increasing use of long-term forecasting in Western economies, including the United States, 
as a response to challenges posed by the “scientific technical revolution.” The proposal 
recommended a redrafting of Soviet law to “define the roles and interactions of long-term 
forecasting plans and more immediate planning” through the drafting of a “law on state 
planning.” One goal of this new system would be to establish reserves of goods and raw 
materials to counter fluctuations in price which might interfere with the long-term 
development plans of the USSR. Several sections later, the draft explained that such 
fluctuations might come from “changes on the international markets” such as that for oil 
“which necessitated an increase in Soviet domestic prices.” Another theme running through 
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the proposal was the need to calculate labor productivity based on value added, or in Soviet 
parlance, Normativ Chistyj Pribili (NNO), which not only included the marketed price but 
the cost of raw materials, wages, and amortization. Such a target would prevent enterprises 
and ministries from meeting profitability goals simply by increasing the price of their 
marketed goods without introducing cost savings. Finally, the draft proposed a major 
restructuring of power in Soviet industrial practice through the reorganization of Gosplan 
along “goal directed lines” rather than its traditional branch divisions and the integration 
of the Academy of Sciences and other experts directly into the planning process.562  
 The proposal’s radicalism was highlighted at a plenary meeting of the Section on 
Economics. O.I. Volkov critiqued the program for trying to create yet more committees to 
oversee economic reform which resulted in an interjection from the floor by a frustrated 
colleague saying “we have so many other programs [from other groups such as Gosplan] 
that just redistribute resource or responsibilities. There are a lot of proposals but no one is 
willing to implement them.” Kapustin was particularly frustrated by the constant reference 
to the United States as “the measuring stick” for modern Soviet economic practice. After 
all, he explained, “we have other goals than the Americans—the building of the material 
basis for Communism.” 563 Kapustin and Volkov’s outbursts summed up the key problems 
of Soviet economic science and its relationship to reform policies. The state remained too 
weak to fully address the structural problems of the USSR’s economy and instead relied 
on a series of unenforceable half-measures which were ignored on the shop floor. Stuck 
with such an inert system, the place that Soviet theorists looked to more and more for 
advice on planning was not the USSR but rather the work coming out of the West.  
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Into this morass, stepped Leonid Abalkin who Kosygin tapped as head of his own 
group of advisors. Abalkin was a revealing choice for the Chairman’s committee testifying 
to the limits of political-economic theory in the USSR of the mid-to-late 1970s. Trained as 
a “political economist,” his work was conservative in the true sense of the word, advocating 
gradual improvements without challenging orthodoxy.564 Abalkin’s 1970 book, Political 
Economy and Economic Politics [Politicheskaia ekonomika i ekonomicheskaia politika], 
became a “textbook” on the relationship between the state and the economy under the 
conditions of “developed socialism.” In it, he defined a socialist economy as having two 
elements, first “a large mechanized and developed division of labor,” guided by planned 
processes—something it shared with the most developed capitalist economies. Second, it 
“brings in line economic relations with the socialization of the society as a whole,” 
therefore “eliminating atomization and allowing the economy to work on a plan-directed 
basis [planomernost].” Unlike capitalist planning, socialist planning was not restricted by 
the contradictions embedded in private property giving it scientific, rational characteristics. 
This meant that Soviet planning not only “eliminated the market mechanism” but that its 
contents changed as the society moved toward Communism. What Abalkin’s writings of 
the 1970s implied was that changes in economic arrangements could be justified through 
the evolution of society as the USSR passed through the Marxist “stages” of development. 
He vigorously opposed Kronrod’s argument that the state is an entity “not engaged in 
production” and his suggestion that the basis of economic politics should “the aggregate 
interests of all workers” represented by the engagement of these workers in the goals of 
the plans. Rather, for Abalkin the existence of the Socialist state, the “dictatorship of the 
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proletariat,” and its policies was what allowed heterogeneous individual workers’ interests 
and economic arrangements (including cash and contracted relationships) to coexist in 
fulfilling a single, directed goal. Therefore, the dichotomy between state-directed planning 
and markets wasn’t important to him: in the end, it was the socialist state that directed all 
activity through law as the resolver of “all economic interests.”565 The Abalkin of the 1970s 
was thus the perfect spokesman for the strategy of conservative economic reform which, 
while accepting criticisms of planning processes, did not challenge central planning in-
and-of itself. 
  His work caught the attention of Kosygin’s Chief of Staff, Anatoly Karpov, and, 
in 1972, Abalkin was asked to help ghostwrite Kosygin’s article for Kommunist. He later 
helped write part of Kosygin’s speech to the XXV Party Congress. Abalkin’s relationship 
with Kosygin helps explain how Abalkin moved from the Plekhanov Moscow Academy 
of Economics to the more politicized Central Committee Academy for Social Sciences 
(AON)—the USSR’s highest standing “party school” dedicated to the education of the 
Party’s most senior activists—where he also received support from Academy director and 
future Gorbachev Politburo member V.D. Medvedev who defended him against Suslov’s 
powerful allies.566 AON was brought in early to consult on the development of economic 
reforms in the wake of the 1973 and 1974 Plenums. It produced a thirty-page set of 
recommendations whose practical was lowing the number of plan indicators, bringing in 
longer planning horizons, and placing more stress on indicators associated with quality 
control and value-added indicators rather than gross output. However, unlike Fedorenko’s 
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draft issued by the Academy of Sciences, AON’s program self-consciously refrained from 
talking about structural issues “associated with the integration of modern scientific 
technical progress” into the economy and limited its recommendations to specific elements 
of industrial practice.567 
 A draft of the proclamation of an overhaul of Soviet planning was first issued to 
the Council of Ministers in June of 1976 and was written by staffers from Gosplan. It read 
that despite some accomplishments the XXIV Congress’ orders on “the stimulation and 
modernization of production and its planning are being fulfilled more slowly than expected. 
In practice, the introduction of economic methods into planning is not being done in a 
manner that corresponds to the tasks related to the intensification of production and the 
improvement of its effectiveness.” The Council of Ministers rejected this version for 
having language that was too critical. Instead, a commission headed by Nikolai Tikhonov 
was formed to rewrite the draft which, in September, produced a report written by 
Gosplan’s Bachurin with less critical language. This draft was sent to a review for another 
commission headed by Baibakov.568  
 In contrast to Gosplan’s cautious statements, Abalkin’s advisory group tried to push 
for a more ambitious agenda to push the planned legislation into a more radical direction. 
It completely rejected any gross production indicators, replacing them with a universal 
indicator of “net normative production” (a measurement of value added, rather than 
produced goods), an indicator of labor productivity that connected any bonus payments to 
savings in material used, and subtracting profits into the state budget based on a long-term 
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repayment plan across branches rather than arbitrary arrangements across industries—
virtually the same as Fedorenko’s earlier suggestion. The expert group criticized Gosplan’s 
drafts for not offering consistency between indicators in yearly plans, which remained in 
gross output, and Five-Year Plans which would be in marketed output. None of the old 
indicators were eliminated, just de-emphasized. Further, Gosplan’s draft did not ban 
outright changes to the enterprises’ payments into the budget outside of the five-year plan 
period. These problems insured that despite “claiming to be dedicated to increasing the role 
of long-term planning, Gosplan’s actual steps would ensure that the practice of yearly 
corrections to plans continues unabated.”569  
 Yet Abalkin did not go as far enough as the Academy of Sciencess economists in 
criticizing the role of Gosplan in the drafts. Using Fedorenko and Fedoseev as their 
conduits to the committee drafting the reform, headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers, Valdimir Novikov these groups called for an expansion of their role in the 
drafting of the plan. Writing to committee member Fedoseev in June 1977, Fedorenko 
suggested that the commission should focus the thrust of its work on including the research 
institutes of the Academy of Sciences system, in particular, CEMI, as stakeholders in the 
formulation of the Five-Year Plans. This meant that research in all the Institutes of the 
Section on Economics be moved onto the basis of “goal-directed planning” which would 
determine output based on the goals of the Five-Year Plan, which in turn would be set by 
a rolling fifteen-year development plan.570 In further recommendations, Fedorenko 
suggested that all planning be done using a mathematical macro-economic model which 
could act as a road map to coordinate the relationship between yearly plans and the larger 
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five-year plan. Fedorenko explained that the lack of such an initiative in the drafts of the 
proclamation meant that there were not yet enough guarantees that the “financial plans” 
and the “productive plans” could be brought into line, therefore having negative 
consequences for the state budget and the enterprises’ return on equity.571 Gosplan 
responded to these criticisms arguing that “the Academy of Sciences was going far beyond 
the remit” of the proposed proclamation. The Academy Gosplan continued, “seems to think 
profit should be the only regulator of enterprise behavior.” Nevertheless, the report noted 
that these divides were not unbridgeable as both sides were “in agreement about the main 
goal of economic reform—the need to move branches onto a new system of industrial 
management as soon as they are ready, and, on this basis, integrate cost accounting and 
self-financing in the most developed sectors.”572  
Bachurin filed a final report to Kosygin on behalf of Novikov on September 27, 
1977, which combined many of the elements of the Gosplan and Abalkin proposals. The 
main recommendation of the group was to “change the way that plans are reviewed by 
replacing the current practice of reconstructing all indicators on a yearly basis” to one in 
which “indicators are set for a five-year period.” This would be backed up with a more 
regularized legal framework in which the Supreme Soviet would be routinely informed of 
the progress of the five-year plans but would not have to re-vote on a yearly plan every 
year. Bachurin included text about integrating more financial indicators into planning and 
agreed with the academics that there had to be a re-working of wholesale prices and a 
greater consideration for the prices of natural resources and raw materials.573 In October 
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1977 Kosygin approved the draft but asked Novikov to continue working to incorporate 
language from that month’s Central Committee Plenum on the new Soviet constitution into 
a final report.574 That report, delivered on December 24, 1977, indeed had more language 
specifying the role of the Supreme Soviet in confirming the five-year plan and the role of 
the Council of Ministers as the legal agent executing and presenting the plan to the Supreme 
Soviet. Gosplan was conceptualized as the agency in charge of developing plans while 
separate proclamations were envisioned to confirm the rights and roles of ministries and 
Republican governments in the planning process and in relation to Gosplan. 575 This report 
was sent to the Central Committee in January of 1978 and then to the ministries and 
research institutes for a “comment period.”576  
 The excruciatingly slow pace of the drafting process of the overhaul, and its 
emphasis on accommodating the interests of the ministries and Gosplan irked the 
economists in the Academy’s institutes who believed the drafts as only re-enforced the 
status quo. During the comment period, Gvishiani and his team at VSNIISI laid out a 
substantive critique of the draft based on a reading of it that emphasized the need “to create 
a system of planning that had its ‘hierarchical’ elements interlaced with ‘horizontal 
elements’—or spontaneous direct ties between enterprises.” Despite progress over the past 
drafts, “the proclamation had not reached a level of development which would allow for 
the satisfactory implementation of its goals.” First, it did not have a strict explanation of 
the difference between Five-Year Plans and long-term planning “over a fifteen-year 
horizon.” While the working group’s materials emphasized the importance of long-term 
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planning, there was no legal framework for defining its interaction with the five-year plans. 
In the opinion of the VSNIISI and its systems theorists, it was the “long-term plan,” in 
other words the KP NTR being developed at VSNIISI and CEMI, that should be the most 
important plan, and set the goals of the individual five-year plans within its planning 
horizons. Gvishiani and his team suggested that the very idea of discrete Five-Year Plans 
be rejected in favor of “continuous planning based on interlocking long-term assessments 
of large scale social goals and available financial, physical, and labor resources.” Rejecting 
the working groups emphasis on price stability, VSNIISI argued that enterprises should be 
allowed to set their own prices to “compensate for [the] risk” they took in introducing 
innovative methods, thereby helping Soviet economy modernize industrial practice and 
increase productivity.577  What was left unsaid in the VSNIISI reaction to the draft was that 
if the long term plan would set the goals of the Soviet economy and prices be allowed to 
float, neither the Party nor the planning agencies would be needed—the economy, though 
directed would be a self-enclosed system. Fedorenko chimed in several months later with 
complaints that the draft did not have any language on how the goals of the five-year plans 
would be set, the reflection of these goals in wholesale prices, or the interaction of five-
year planning with the KP NTR. Fedorenko also suggested that all plans be drafted in 
conjunction with a “general financial plan” which would integrate both enterprise and 
household money balances into a general long-term investment schema.578 This point of 
view was not however shared by the ministries and agencies. For example, Ministry of 
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Finance resisted any long-term integration of financial and productive plans as it believed 
“that this would both eliminate its flexibility and would be too complicated.”579  
The growing between the agencies, ministries and the academic institutes testified 
to the fact that underneath the façade of orderly decision making tensions were increasing 
and, as ever, there was mechanism to resolve them. Instead, a morass set in which only 
irked the reformers more.  Indeed, the review process took all of 1978 with a draft that 
included all inputs from ministries and institutes ready in May 1979. It would take another 
month for the Council of Ministers to agree on exactly how to adjust prices.580 The 
document that was finally approved in 1979, known officially as Joint Proclamation 
Number 695, “On the Improvement of Planning and The Improvement of Economic 
Measures to Increase Industrial Effectiveness and Quality.” Proclamation 695 was a 
massive document totaling sixty-five points most with several sub-points. It finally 
acknowledged the concept of “value added,” which had been debated since the 1950s. The 
new central indicator was indeed the Normativ Chistyj Pribili (NNO) suggested by 
Fedorenko and Abalkin, which enshrined the practice that enterprise profitability would be 
calculated using a conception of value that included not only the wage bill, but also 
expenditure on capital goods (through guidelines on amortization) and raw materials.581 
However, many issues remained unresolved. For example, the language of the 
proclamation did not specify how strategic goods, whose output remained set in gross terms 
rather than valued added terms, would be determined and whether the calculation of labor 
productivity in those enterprises would be calculated in gross output or NNO per worker. 
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Neither was the issue of pricing resolved, making NNO an indicator that could not carry 
accurate information about the needs of the Soviet “market.” Moreover, the sheer 
complexity of the USSR’s economy required administrative action in setting average 
branch standards for NNO and NNO per worker, a task which would simply overwhelm 
agencies. Proclamation 695, the apex of the conservative project of “improving the 
economic system.”582 It integrated many of the critiques of Soviet planning, earning praise 
from commentators such as Valovoi, who believes to this day that had it not been derailed 
in the 1980s by Gorbachev, it would have worked. 583 However, it did not change the 
underlying power relationships of the Soviet economy. The failure or success of this 
bargain would determine the legacy of the Brezhnev period’s economic program. 
Epic Fail: Order 695 and the Collapse of the Conservative Economic Program 
In October 1980, Baibakov addressed the Central Committee about the course of the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan. Following the standard formula of presenting a brief triumphal account of 
positive results, the Gosplan Chair moved onto the crux of the plenum’s business: the fact 
that “many goals that have been set out in the five-year plan have not been achieved.” The 
growth of national income over the past year had been 2.7% vs. the planned 3.5% and 17% 
over the five-year period instead of the planned 25%. This was the result of the “misuse of 
financial and physical resources.” Repayments to the state budget for capital investments 
for 1980 were below target, meaning that the state budget had lost 33 billion rubles in 
income. The supply of raw materials was a particularly pressing issue. Misuses and over-
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ordering of resources meant that “because of a lack of raw materials, the chemical industry 
was underperforming, leaving agriculture without fertilizer.”584  
 Baibakov’s report on the final year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan was part of a wave 
of anxiety that swept the USSR’s elite in the early 1980s due to the consequences of Order 
695 and the fate of the previous plan. The failure of both initiatives to modernize the Soviet 
economy and move it from extensive to intensive production placed a capstone on an era. 
At the XXVI Party Congress of 1981, Brezhnev admitted that “the years since the XXV 
Congress have been difficult ones in both international and domestic affairs.” Moreover, 
Brezhnev explicitly framed “the Seventies” as a period of transformation which saw the 
demographic, technological, and geographical center of the Soviet economy shifting to 
Siberia and the Urals due to the increased weight of the petro-chemical complex and the 
importance of energy conservation. Despite the supposed success in “re-organizing the 
economy and improving planning” there were still serious issues “of disproportions of the 
economy” due to the “failures of individual ministries and party organs in oversight and 
the adaptation of new measures.” The powers of “inertia, tradition, and habits” were the 
greatest obstacle to change and it was the Party’s mission in the new plan period to root 
out these habits.585  
Brezhnev’s speech at the Congress can be read as a moment in which mobilization 
returned to the forefront of Soviet political-economic thought. Indeed, it is difficult to 
separate the soon to be dead General Secretary’s words from his successor Andropov, and 
the early period of Gorbachev’s term in office. To understand this shift from the politics of 
conservative reform to mobilization one must look at the implementation process of Order 
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695. In hindsight, the most consequential step of the proclamation was to create a body, 
under the Council of Ministers instead of Gosplan, to review the implementation of the 
order which was headed by Novikov. In December 1979, the commission delivered its first 
report, and the news was not good. “Individual ministries and Republican Councils of 
Ministers [were] proceeding extremely slowly in their preparatory work for the reform.” 
Most disturbingly, the two ministries that were going to have the most impact on the 
planned intensification of the Soviet economy, the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of 
Transportation Machinery, “had not, as of December 18th, developed any plans to fulfill 
the measures of the June proclamation.” The Ministry of Light Food Production, a key 
organization for improving output in group B industries, had “inadequate programs for 
long-term planning and the improvement of production quality.” Inspections revealed that 
the Ministry’s enterprises were still being forced to change their production plans mid-
stream with little warning or explanation. Meanwhile, Gosplan and Gossnab (the state 
supply agency) had both missed the October deadline for developing guidelines on new 
technology integration, delivery, and amortization. One of the problems was that the 
ministries were still resisting any changes from the center. For example, Novikov’s 
committee explained that “guidelines on credit and interest rates were objected to by forty 
ministries causing them to be delayed in review.” This had the effect of delaying the 
introduction of the combine and “two-level management” even further. In 1979, only 
46.8% of production in the USSR was being done by enterprises organized in combines.586  
The news did not get better by the following year. Gosplan began a series of 
inspections of Ministerial compliance with the order and found that the Ministry of Milk 
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and Meat Production had not taken steps to “mobilize its productive reserves” by 
encouraging direct, horizontal delivery agreements between its enterprises, or taking steps 
to eliminate manual labor with new technology. The same was true of the Ukrainian 
Republican Ministry of Heavy Construction where measures to improve labor productivity 
had failed to take hold with the rate growing by only 8.1% versus a 31.8% planned increase 
for the 1976-1980 period. Return on investment had fallen from 13.6% to 9.2% over the 
same timeframe. Larger issues of planning also troubled the Soviet leadership.587 In 1980, 
a Poliburo commission on drafting the Eleventh Five-Year Plan had concluded that one of 
the main reasons that the USSR, “despite having the largest complex of lathes and metal 
presses in the world,” had less output than the United States, Japan or major Western 
European economies was because “global experience shows that it is inefficient to build a 
new plant every time there is a new model or item that needs to be reproduced.” Soviet 
industry needed to stop constantly expanding and focus on re-equipping existing plants for 
flexible manufacturing.588  However, Gosplan reported in 1981 that because of the short 
time between the issuance of Order 695 and the new directives for the Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan, it did not have time to fully develop new guidelines for the next plan period. The 
materials presented to them by the Ministries during the “counter planning process” for 
establishing plan targets “reflected the continued dominance of old methods and did not 
reflect the need to move to greater intensification.” This meant that both sides needed to 
go back to the drawing board “greatly shortening the time for the development of the new 
plan.” Thus, Gosplan did not have the opportunity to “fully develop the measures of 
Proclamation 695 in improving capital construction [the construction of new production 
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sites requiring investments from the state budget].” Moreover, “the directives of the XXVI 
Congress on reducing the number of new enterprises and increasing the rate of re-
equipment rates of existing factories” were being ignored by many Ministries. According 
to Gosplan’s received ministerial production plans, between 1983 and 1985, there would 
be three thousand new plants built costing three billion rubles which was more than the 
expenditures on new capital construction for the entire period of Tenth Five-Year Plans.589  
The problems encountered by Proclamation 695 required a higher-level explanation 
from the academic economics community which now sharpened its critique of the Soviet 
planning. In 1982, the Academy of Sciences’ Institute for Economics argued that the 
proclamation had not dealt with the Achilles Heel of the planning system—prices. The 
order “was correct to try to make price an important lever for planning” but continued the 
old method of price-setting in which prices were calculated via previous average 
expenditures, meaning that enterprises could claim high profitability by boosting their 
expenditures in one period and lowering them in subsequent ones, rather than consistently 
saving on labor, financial, and raw resources.590 Nikolai Petryakov chimed in on the 
problems of Proclamation 695. In a note to Gosplan, he argued that the order did not create 
the conditions in which economic decisions could be made to prioritize investment or to 
force enterprises to conserve resources in production therefore continuing USSR’s falling 
return on equity. Future economic reform had to prioritize effective returns to counter the 
declining growth that Petryakov saw as the dominant trend in the Soviet economy from 
1960 onward. The heart of the problem was that Soviet policy makers were “attempting to 
use organizational changes in individual branches to get better productivity and plan 
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balance.” This erroneously assumed that “individual sectors were self-standing rather than 
considering the complex inter-sectoral ties that exist in the economy.” Despite repeated 
warnings by economists, nothing was being done “because of the inertia of the economic 
system and the inadequate theoretical approach to economic policy making.” Policymakers 
needed to accept that their plan norms needed to “reflect the subjective nature of the 
internal market”—in other words flexible prices set by demand, or a marginal theory of 
value.591 
The critique leveled by the economics community was part of a larger wave of 
reflection by Soviet elites about the policy failures of the 1970s.  The battle against “the 
power of inertia” that Brezhnev called for at the XXVI Congress heated up after the 
General Secretary’s death in 1982. His successor, Yuri Andropov, was a very different kind 
of politician. While Brezhnev was a consensus builder with a background in the Party 
apparat, Andropov built his career as an enforcer for Soviet influence in allied Communist 
Parties and then as head of the KGB. Unlike Brezhnev, whose emphasis on “the stability 
of cadres” after Khrushchev’s tumultuous reign foreclosed major changes to the power 
structures of the USSR and allowed important interests to throttle both economic reforms 
and the careers of the reformers, Andropov was a man who believed in the need to break 
these interests through the enforcement of discipline both from above and from below.592 
This approach to economic policy came across in Andropov’s first speech to the Central 
Committee upon being “elected” to the post of General Secretary. Andropov freely 
admitted that “for many important indicators, the plan has not been fulfilled.” The problem 
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Andropov noted was that “there are still many managers who, while quoting Leonid Illyich 
[Brezhnev’s] maxim that ‘the economy should be economical’ do nothing toward 
accomplishing this task.” In a clear reference to the series of reforms and proclamations on 
the Soviet economy of the past decade, Andropov added that “new decisions are taken 
without old orders being fulfilled.”593  
 Andropov’s call for action coincided with a larger campaign by his allies, with the 
KGB and young regional party secretaries at its forefront, to clamp down on corruption 
and waste that had been proliferating in the Soviet elite as Brezhnev’s health and influence 
was collapsing.594 The press, which had been critiquing the ministries and agencies since 
the mid-1970s, was a key site for this new politics, extending Andropov’s call for discipline 
to one of mass action.  In October 1982, Izvestiia published a front-page editorial entitled 
“The Economy Must be Economical” which praised “enterprises that took measures to 
conserve raw materials, fuel, electricity, and other physical inputs” and encouraged 
activists to “lead a mass movement for the encouragement of thrift in production.”595 The 
same issue contained a feature by “economic correspondent” E. Spiridonov entitled “The 
Right to Decide: Or What We Can Learn from the Practices of the Skorokhod Shoe 
Combine.” Spiridonov noted that though Skorokhod was one of the premier Soviet shoe 
production complexes, it was not always the most efficient one. “Smaller enterprises often 
responded more effectively to the demands of the consumer market and changes in 
fashion.” The problem was not with the enterprises’ workers but rather because the 
ministry forced the plant to “plan to an abstract consumer rather than the really existing 
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tastes of the Soviet public.” Thus, the more efficient combine could not use its “might” to 
satisfy the Soviet consumer as he/she really existed because instead it had to “fulfill 200 
obligations from the ministry a day.” Instead of helping, the initiatives set by Proclamation 
695 were just making the situation worse as ministries were using “reviews of new 
indicators” to interfere in the operations of their enterprises and combines. The indicators 
for which Skorokhod was responsible had thus increased by three times because of this 
process. Unfortunately, the article concluded, “the market is not interested in the ‘abstract 
consumer’ envisioned by the ministry in their decrees but rather the real shifting taste of 
the Soviet customer.” Only letting the enterprise have more freedom to choose its own 
actions, rather than fulfilling the proclivities of the Russian Republic Ministry of Footwear 
Production and its managers would allow the Soviet enterprise to work efficiently.596 
Spiridonov’s article made an impression on Soviet officials. Aleksandr Tikhonov, who 
succeed Kosygin as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers following the latter’s 
resignation and then death in 1980, ordered a review of the situation described in the article. 
The reply to the inquiry recommended that the Ministry of Light Industry begin looking 
into the allegations of the report, which it did in January 1982, noting that the ministry was 
busy developing new procedures to avoid the kinds of practices that Izvestiia outlined.597  
 Izvestiia’s report was not the only one to catch the attention of the Council of 
Ministers that testified to the role of the press in pushing for an attack on the conservative 
practices of state institutions. In February 1983 Tikhonov reviewed the transcripts of a 
Valovoi led a debate in Pravda’s in-house “discussion club” on the failure of Proclamation 
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695. Valovoi critiqued the original resolution for not going far enough in eliminating the 
problems of gross output. Regional production complexes (an institution the act created) 
were still supposed to calculate their output in gross terms but branches were shifting to 
quantitative, norm-based indicators. This meant that many enterprises continued to 
prioritize gross rather than marketed output as their primary target. Because of this, “48% 
of the enterprises that have been surveyed have failed to meet their contract obligations to 
other enterprises.” The market for consumer goods was not being fulfilled and the 
population was hoarding cash. “This is not just an economic problem,” Valovoi explained 
“but a political one” as it testified to the pent-up consumer demand of an unsatisfied 
population that would lose its faith in the state. Valovoi then asked, “what is Gosplan doing 
to better fulfill the Proclamation 695” and improve the Soviet consumer market? One 
representative of Gosplan, a staffer noted as a Comrade Illiin, responded in a depressed 
manner that while rank-in-file Gosplan officials try to enforce contracted deliveries of 
consumer goods, any attempt to solve the problem by low-ranking cadres gets shutdown 
by their supperiors. Illiin described the attitude of Gosplan’s leaders as more interested in 
appearances than results. “They say what is this? The Soviet Union is not producing the 
right kinds of goods for the economy and not satisfying consumer demand? This is not 
correct, we cannot say that.” When problems with deliveries are brought to, “for example 
First Deputy Chair [of Gosplan] Voronin” he will say “let’s do it this way. We’ll judge the 
performance of enterprises and combines on marketed goods, ministries and territorial 
production complexes on realized, gross cash flow.” This scheme made the numbers look 
better but the plan indicators would not work with one another and only exacerbate the 
bottlenecks in the consumer goods market. Illiin concluded that to better deal with these 
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issues, the entire order should be rewritten with clearer instructions and without the 
opportunity for agencies and ministries to play with the numbers. In answer to an inquiry 
by Tikhonov on the discussion, the Council of Ministers’ Commission on Implementing 
Proclamation 695 responded by acknowledging the order’s problems. The order’s “initial 
principles as well as its implementation,” the letter read “was carried through without 
thought to consequences. The order did not create a legal basis for expanding the 
independence of enterprises and their standing, leading to a reform that was simply issuing 
new orders, if the agencies and ministries issued anything new at all.”598  
 The new urgency surrounding the failure of economic reform helped launch a much 
more assertive language from economic reformers which blamed poor economic policy for 
a social and cultural morass.  The ever savvy and loquacious Fedorenko immediately fired 
off a letter to Andropov entitled “On Developing a Complex Program for the Improvement 
of Economic Management.” Fedorenko’s central suggestion was that after a series of 
piecemeal reforms brought in by Proclamation 695, “the time had come for a wholesale, 
unitary program for the reconstruction of the entire economic system.” The lack of such a 
reform, Fedorenko continued, was responsible for a culture of waste which caused “a lack 
of prestige of the socialist planned economy and hurts the social and moral values of our 
societies and thus political-educational Party work.”599 Similar sentiments were expressed 
by NII’s Kirilenko in a January 1984 letter to the Andropov’s protégé and newly appointed 
Politburo member, Mikhail Gorbachev. Kirilenko argued that the main technical problems 
behind improving the Soviet economy and accelerating technological change had been 
worked out and understood but the problem that remained was “the improvement of the 
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general social climate” which was leading to the inability to implement changes to the 
economy. The introduction of “socialism as a way of life and a social system” which 
acknowledged that members of society had different interests and that individuals should 
be rewarded for their contributions to society. This meant emphasizing personal 
responsibility. “Socialism,” Kirilenko wrote, “is not a people’s welfare line” in which 
citizens get rewarded for not working at their highest capacity. Efforts needed to be taken 
to increase labor productivity through the introduction of automation, increases in social 
spending to take certain groups such as new mothers out of the labor market, and the strict 
enforcement of rules tying enterprise and worker pay to the quality of goods produced and 
their final sale. Finally, Kirilenko proposed a 1946-style monetary reform to re-value the 
ruble and force Soviet households and workers to respond to economic incentives.600  
 It is in this context of the discussion on the incentives of Soviet institutions and 
culture following the failure of Proclamation 695 that we should understand the famous 
“Novosibirsk Report” written by Tatyana Zaslavsakaya which was leaked to the Western 
Press in 1983, despite its “for official use” designation. Zaslavsakaya, who was trained in 
part by Yakov Kronrod, based her attack on the social dimensions of Soviet economic 
mismanagement on her fieldwork with Siberian collective farmers during her time in 
IEOPP. For Zaslavaskaya, the institutions of the Soviet economic system had grown out of 
touch with the social realities of the USSR. In the 1930s, when the planning system was 
established, workers had “a limited choice of economic behaviors” due to the relative 
backwardness of the country. However, in subsequent decades the Soviet worker’s 
“education, culture, general information, and awareness of his rights have grown 
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incomparably,” leading to the need for a new socio-economic structure that would be able 
to capture the interests of a more mobile and complex workforce. This did not mean, 
however, that the state could retreat: 
The tenacity of workers’ social attitudes does not remove the necessity for their 
purposeful formation by socialist society, first and foremost by way of perfecting the 
social mechanism of development. For although this mechanism is not capable of 
changing the existing type of workers as is necessary for the short term, the results 
achieved in the long run would have significant influence on the development of 
society as a whole.601  
 
 Zaslavskaya, like Petraykov and Kirilenko, was conceptualizing economic reform 
not only as a piecemeal improvement of management but a fundamental social program 
which would eliminate the institutional blockages that had prevented action from the mid-
1960s onward through a rejuvenation of the Soviet subject as one that responded to the 
incentives of a more humane, modern economic system. The prominence of the social 
factor in Soviet economic inefficiency not only testified to the well-known demographic 
concerns of low birthrates, alcoholism, and absenteeism faced by the USSR by 1983 but 
also to the way in which the “systems approach,” or the “new economic planning” had 
penetrated all branches of Soviet economic reformism and allowed for a reintroduction of 
wholesale critique of Soviet social and institutional practices. Indeed, Zaslavaskaya’s 
concern with the economic implications of a more educated and complex workforce 
coexisting with an economy dominated by administrative methods that incentivized 
manual labor was part-and-parcel of the kinds of studies that STR-related discourse had 
inspired in Soviet economic science. As shown in earlier chapters, Soviet socio-economic 
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theorists were more and more concerned with “the human factor” understood as unleashing 
creativity and efficiency in the context of new, more advanced forms of production 
sweeping the global economy. As early as 1972, projections for the USSR’s economic 
growth noted the growing importance of education as an input into economic activity and 
the challenges that a more educated workforce would present to central planning. As the 
STR unfolded, Soviet economic policy would have to shift to emphasizing higher 
technology, highly automated industries that required an educated workforce. New kinds 
of management techniques were needed to plan for this kind of economy.602  
This same concern about the future of the Soviet economy in the context of a 
changing socio-economic structure was present in Gvishiani’s ISA. Speaking to the 
Institute, the director of the GKNT, G.I. Marchuk, pleaded that “the Institute had taken 
aboard work on the KP NTP but we have not yet achieved results: economists, including 
at this Institute, have shown that our growth figures are far below those projected by 
Gosplan due to our inefficient labor practices.” The Institute had to take the KP NTP and 
develop the next steps for economic reform. He pointed to a study done by Gvishiani and 
Boris Milner on “the factors of intensification in the Japanese economy” which had been 
“well received in the Council of Ministers” and had “uses in certain aspects of our own 
economy.”603 This kind of knowledge needed to be deployed in the next five-year plan. 
Gvishiani concluded the meeting of the Institute by saying: 
We must deeply analyze the global problems of our present, the experience of the 
developed capitalist countries, analyze their economic macro-models, and without 
complete imitation, apply them to the problems of our economy. We must begin 
to use foreign experience in interactive planning and on global modeling.604  
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 The failure of Proclamation 695 and the subsequent recriminations over 
responsibility had done two things. First, it put mobilization back on the table for the first 
time since Khrushchev’s removal as Andropov took the reins of government. Second, it 
restored the political prominence of economics as a science of the state guided by 
international experience and the embeddedness of the USSR in larger global processes. By 
late 1983, an alliance between academic economists trained to understand the economy as 
a socio-economic system and younger Soviet political elites brought in by Andropov from 
the regional Party organization had formed.605 Both sides were ready to use whatever 
means necessary to break through the institutional morass that had delayed and neutered 
earlier economic reforms.  
Conclusion: Using the Tools of the First Industrial Revolution to Prepare for the 
Postindustrial World?   
Brezhnev’s death in 1982 punctuated the end of an era in which the Soviet state tried to 
base its legitimacy on predictability and private security. Indeed, with Andropov’s new 
regime came new campaigns against corruption, and with them, arrests of once high-
standing Party officials including Brezhnev’s infamously corrupt immediate family. The 
contradiction between the desire to build a state based on rules and predictability and the 
actual reality of how this predictability was practiced—the systematic avoidance of the 
enforcement of rules and mass corruption—stymied the efforts of conservative reformers. 
The dualism in political norms was more than hypocrisy—it testified to the weakness of 
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the USSR as a state. Soviet law was not capable of enforcing change without direct, mass 
coercion of the elite—judicial or extrajudicial. For the first time since the October 1964 
Plenum with its condemnations of Khrushchev’s “subjectivism,” the specter of not only 
reform but reform that would shake the foundations of Brezhnev’s political compromise 
was suddenly on the table.  
However, the failure of the legislative elements of the Brezhnev agenda did not 
destroy the ideological elements of Soviet economic reform. Rather it accelerated the 
prominence of an economic theorist who had different conception of the USSR’s place in 
the world than his (and it was usually a him, given the Soviet Union’s gendered hierarchy) 
Cold War predecessor.  The USSR was not just fighting to prove the superiority of its 
socio-economic system; it was part of a larger global set of transformations—the “scientific 
technical revolution” that promised a future of post-industrial automatization that would 
“build the foundations of Communism.” What this meant was that the USSR wasn’t just 
directly fighting Capitalism but dealing with a world-wide reorganization of “productive 
relations.”  
Unlike the first generation of economic theorists engaging with Western economic 
theory as a tool to strengthen existing Soviet institutions, this new generation shaped within 
“systems theory” was beginning to ask questions about the relationship between 
institutional arrangement, not just particular practice, and economic growth. The 
experience of attempting to work within a conservative framework during the late 1970s 
and failing laid the foundation for an alliance between them and regional Party bosses like 
Gorbachev and Ligachev who were eager not only to deal with the failures they were seeing 
in day-to-day management but also to replace the geriatric leadership at the top of the party. 
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The problem that remained, however, was that if institutional structures, the very basis of 
Soviet governance, were to be changed, what would be the basis of socialism in the USSR? 
What new political narrative would be needed for the Soviet Union to undertake a 
fundamental reform of the economy in a multilateral world? This problem would be 
particularly vexing as the economists that were pushing for a restructuring of the Soviet 
economy for it to be more flexible and open to advance it into the new postindustrial era 
and the new generation of Party leaders wanted to restore discipline through mass action. 




Building a Ruin: Cold War Political Economy and the Post-Soviet Experience in the 
Soviet Mirror 
Stepping out of the Moscow Metro at Yugozapadnaia station, one is greeted with a strange 
sight—a glass skyscraper of the type one would find containing the offices of an insurance 
company in a medium-sized Midwestern American city, with its glass panes all broken, as 
if one is looking at the set of a post-apocalyptic movie brought to life. This building, known 
to locals as the “blue tooth” due to the hue of its remaining glass panels and its shape, 
stands next to the campus of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and 
Public Administration (RANEPA), where the author was a visiting scholar while 
conducting research for this dissertation. RANEPA itself was founded in 1977 as the 
Russian Republican Government’s Academy for the National Economy, meant to train 
industrial cadres in the latest advancements of management science during the height of 
the Brezhnev era’s obsession with the curative powers of the “Scientific-Technical 
Revolution.” In 1989, the Academy’s rector, the ever-ubiquitous Abel Aganbegian, began 
planning a new program to teach international business and its associated practices to 
managers of the future Soviet, market economy—a modern MBA course. The campus for 
this Soviet Wharton School was meant to be a new kind of institution which contained both 
educational and commercial facilities working in synergy. Such a grand project required a 
campus that was just as radical a break from Soviet architecture as the new business 
curriculum would be from contemporary Soviet education. The new campus, a modern 
glass tower, would be a marked contrast with the concrete Soviet buildings that made up 
RANEPA’s existing facilities, thereby signaling the new era of management education and 
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the birth of a new, “modern” elite. Problems began immediately. As the Soviet Union 
collapsed and the new institution was spun off and privatized, a dispute arose over the 
ownership of the underlying land. With the loss of state budget support, delays in 
determining property ownership, and rapid fluctuations in the price of the ruble, the Italian 
firm contracted to do the construction was not getting paid and abandoned the half-finished 
project. Meanwhile, in the chaos of the 1990s, it became a hotspot for squatters and its 
windows a source of target practice for Moscow’s youth. In 2007, the land finally reverted 
to the Russian Federal Government and in 2017 rumors of the structure being soon being 
finished were reported in the Russian press.606  
The saga of the “Blue Tooth,” a literal ruin, encapsulates many of the issues that 
Post-Soviet Russia faced because of the Soviet legacy and the mix of ad hoc measures and 
hope with which it entered the market. It is fitting that, with the advent of today’s Putinist 
system, the structure reverted to state control in 2007, as did much of the Russian economy, 
which recent estimates say is 70% indirectly or directly owned by the state or state 
associated figures.607 Indeed, the line between state and private ownership of medium and 
large enterprises has been virtually erased with most ostensibly non-state enterprises being 
owned by political figures as the very ownership of significant Russian businesses has 
become a political act. There are several theories on how Russia arrived at this state of 
affairs. From the right, critics like Anders Aslund have argued that it was the failure of the 
USSR to “lustrate” state institutions, and the security services, in particular, that was 
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responsible for the reversion to repressive patterns of economic control.608 From the left, 
critics of “shock therapy,” such as Boris Kagarlitsky, have argued that Putinism was an 
inevitable outcome of a “neo-liberal” looting of Russia in the 1990s which both 
consolidated a new oligarchic elite and gave it the tools to discredit democracy.609  
It is not the place of this dissertation to confirm or deny either of these explanations 
or present a detailed alternative to these theories of post-Soviet political economy. 
However, in this conclusion, I would like to present some paths for further research that 
can help shed light on these issues through the understanding of the rise and fall of “Cold 
War Economics.” I will suggest that one of the problems that emerged in of the failure of 
“conservative reform” in the mid-1980s was a fundamental inability to articulate the place 
of the USSR’s economy in a new “post-industrial” world and that this inability to reinvent 
the economic basis of state power also influenced a deinstitutionalization of the post-Soviet 
state as official agencies, institutes, and other organizations were replaced by personalities 
as rallying points for political interests. The inability of the Cold War paradigm and its 
descendants to move beyond a debate over planning and its discontents made questions of 
institutions and financing secondary to questions of markets in the abstract. As such, 
modern Russia entered capitalism with none of the financial infrastructure needed to 
effectively launch a market economy. The result was the increased influence of state and 
semi-state financing pools which reduced private property to a fiction and created what 
Neil Robinson has called “a patrimonial capitalism”—or a system of property relations in 
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which non-liberal actors use liberal techniques to maintain their power and ownership of 
the economy’s assets.610 
 A revealing exchange on the role of actual markets in Soviet economic thinking 
occurred at a 1985 meeting of the Council of Ministers’ Commission on Improving the 
Economic Mechanism. Boris Katchura, Chairman of the Central Committee of the 
Ukrainian Republican branch of the Communist Party, told Chairman Nikolai Ryzkhov, 
“the general direction of the scientists is for more autonomy [for enterprise finances and 
decision making] but when I meet with them individually and say, ‘ok we have more 
autonomy for the enterprises, what do we do next?’ they seem to have no answer.” Ryzhkov 
responded, “I have read through what they are saying and they have an answer. They are 
not saying it but what they are really proposing is an open path to the free market.”611 The 
exchange between the two officials, both with roots in the management of heavy industry, 
encapsulated the dilemmas of radical economic reform. By 1985, when Gorbachev had 
taken over the post of General Secretary, a new generation of Communist Party officials 
had forced out earlier conservatives like Baibakov and Tikhonov. The priority of these new 
officials was to remobilize the population to make it work again. Following the April 1985 
Party Plenum, Mikhail Gorbachev told an assembled group of reporters “I am getting 
letters from common workers every day talking about corruption and waste. The people 
demand I be merciless.”612 However, the thinking that that the new leadership engaged 
with to understand the future of the economy did not go beyond that of the program of 
conservative economic reformers.  
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This is evident when one examines the program of Uskorenie, literally acceleration, 
which has been largely blamed for some of the later failures of Gorbachev’s economic 
reform. Later critics, and contemporaries, especially those in Gosplan, argued that the boost 
of investment that accompanied Uskorenie for burdening the Soviet budget with wasteful 
investment into heavy industry, rather than eliminating inefficiency. Recently, Chris Miller 
has attempted to explain why, despite ample knowledge on the part of Gorbachev and those 
intellectuals around him of the fiscal and institutional constraints on the efficiency of new 
investment, economic reform started with a boost in investment into heavy industry rather 
than a reform of agriculture or a drive for economic efficiency. Miller argues that 
Gorbachev believed that reinvesting in heavy industry was the path of political least 
resistance which would then allow him to engage in more fundamental reforms later.613 
While Miller is correct that the politics of Soviet interest groups precluded an agriculture-
first strategy or one focusing on budget deficits, this purely political calculus does not 
address the larger ideological conundrum that Gorbachev found himself in.  
In 1983, following Andropov’s ascent, discussion began on a revision to the Party 
Program. A draft of its section on economics came across Gorbachev’s desk that same year. 
The document argued that the Party’s goals should be “to increase the productivity of labor 
by 25% in the 10-15-year horizon” through the introduction of new, more productive 
technologies. The key to this was to improve the “machine-building complex,”—the 
branches of industry responsible for building fixed capital inputs, and the establishment of 
“an energy program.”  In the context of increased scarcity of both raw material and labor, 
this program was supposed to build the technological basis for an intensification of the 
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Soviet economy in which fewer resources would be spent on output. Increased enterprise 
independence was formulated as an adjunct goal to efficiency in order to encourage the 
“interest of workers’ collectives” in conserving resources.614  
The impulse toward efficiency did not just come from a mobilizing streak in the 
Andropov leadership but also an analytical framework baked deep into the Soviet 
worldview. The STR—an assessment of the “objective conditions” of the world economy 
-  acted as a common reference point and catalyst for all factions of Soviet economic policy-
making. The 1983 focus on “Machine Building” and the “Energy Complex” had a long 
precedence in discussions about “intensification” that had been most prominently 
discussed at the XXV and XXVI Party plenums. As noted earlier in this dissertation, the 
STR was implicitly a global phenomenon on which “the competition of the two systems” 
was now projected and thus became the means through which discussions of 
“postindustrial” labor conditions entered the USSR’s political discourse. This intellectual 
context is critical to understanding the first steps of Gorbachev’s program. Even though 
many of those around the new General Secretary reportedly had more expansive views of 
the future of the economy, their priority was to move to invest into new branches of 
industry. This strategy was outlined in a 1985 report from the Academy of Sciences Section 
on Economics that was received by Gorbachev’s office, entitled “The Main Directions on 
the Improvement of Industrial Organization” by S.A. Kheiman. The note argued that “only 
scientific and technical progress could create the material conditions for the improvement 
of industrial organization.” Enterprise independence and efficient management required 
the use of “micro-computers” (desktop processors) and “flexible production” that could 
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switch production on and off and retool quickly. This re-equipment of Soviet industry was 
a necessary precursor to having direct contracts take over from planned supply as the major 
engine of the economy. The re-tooling of American plants during the 1970s, it argued, was 
the reason that the United States’ economy continued to grow while Soviet output was 
stagnating in the era of the STR. This was especially true in the critical area of machine 
building where Soviet enterprises were under-specialized, often had redundant functions, 
and often still relied on outdated technologies and manual labor.615  In 1986, Aganbegian, 
often credited as a major intellectual force behind Gorbachev’s policies, wrote that in a 
period of diminishing natural and labor resources, the USSR both had to boost its 
investments in new technologies while at the same time beginning steps to “restructure the 
economic mechanism.”616  
By 1987 these efforts had failed to produce results. While experimental enterprises, 
that had been working under “normative plans” and were self-financing since 1984, had 
shown good results in increasing labor productivity in the first year, these gains were 
disappearing in the second year of their operations. This was because of problems in their 
initial conditions such as the fact that credit and financing rules were not overhauled and 
because of this, results were mostly related to the supply priorities of enterprises rather than 
better financial practices or investments in more technology-intensive production 
processes. Gosplan’s new Deputy Director, Doctor of Economic Sciences S.A. Sitraiian, 
pointed out that “enterprises had not yet moved to full internal cost accounting” as 
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“ministries still stick their head into their business.” The next phase of the reform had to 
move to installing a “system-wide” approach to cost accounting and financing rather than 
focusing on the processes of individual branches and enterprises.617 In November 1986, the 
Council of Ministers concluded that “inspections have shown that there have been 
significant inadequacies in the preparations of various ministries in the steps they have 
taken to move their enterprise onto a cost-accounting and self-financing system and that 
many are approaching the question of enterprise independence only formally.”618 
In April 1986, a frustrated Gorbachev exclaimed to a meeting of the Politburo 
“remember back in 1947 we had a law about socialist property. If you took a loaf of bread, 
you got five years in prison. Today, everyone just takes things and why not, the 
management steals so why shouldn’t the workers. We need to create a law that defends 
socialist property but through economic means.”619 Gorbachev’s outburst testified to the 
larger problem of legality and state capacity at the heart of economic reform. Since 
Khrushchev’s failed attempt at establishing a legal basis for Soviet enterprises’ rights, the 
question of “state property” and its final owner, so central to the very conception of the 
Soviet economic system as “a mechanism” had never been resolved. In the absence of such 
a law, economic reform was carried out under the power of administrative decrees from 
the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. This left the question of the “rights” 
of the enterprise open and required the implementation of economic reform to move on a 
case-by-case, ministry-by-ministry basis. The lack of an economic code, which had once 
bothered Brezhnev, was now coming to haunt Gorbachev. 
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The work on a Law on State Enterprise began to accelerate in late 1986. At a 
meeting of the Politburo that September, Gorbachev specifically stated “that the people are 
awaiting a law” on enterprise autonomy that would move enterprises “to full cost 
accounting.”620 In October, Gorbachev went further, explaining to the Politburo that in his 
view of enterprise reform, enterprises would be able to sue their suppliers in court and seize 
the property and capital of their counterparties for failed delivery or loan payments. 
Anatoly Dobrynin was shocked: “Are we going to create a new form of property now? Is 
this now ‘a threat to socialism?’ We need to ask ourselves how these new practices will 
begin to have an impact on our theoretical understandings of what a socialist society is. 
This is something we need to speak to the Academy of Sciences about.” Gorbachev agreed: 
“This is a fair question and the logic of self-financing will bring up many issues. We may 
even have to begin talking about bankruptcy. This is something we should put to the 
[Academy of Sciences].”621  
Dobrynin’s question encapsulated the existential questions of political economy 
that re-emerged once the Soviet state began to try to codify its system into law. The 
presence of these new concerns meant that the technocratic impulse that had dominated the 
post-Tovarnik economic sciences began to recede into deeper questions of social 
organization. The law that emerged in March 1987 was complex and ambiguous. 
Commenting on the draft, the Academy of Sciences Institute on State and Law concluded 
that “as it stands, many of the positions outlined in the law are either formulated as 
economic demands or general principles. The draft lacks detail on the realization of this 
idea.”  The law needed “a stricter definition of the rights of the enterprise” which could 
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form a basis for “guaranteeing their interests and coordinating their actions with other 
enterprises.” The lawyers warned that “this law must just be just one of the stars in the 
legal universe.” “The experience of the 1960s,” they continued, “had shown that without 
other acts that would change the functions of the ministries, Gosplan, Gossnab, and other 
higher standing organs, the law would not function.”622  
This opening led to a far more open discussion of options available for the USSR’s 
economic system. For example, a 1986 report by Petryakov and his colleagues at CEMI, 
entitled “Steps to Create a New Economic Mechanism,” argued for a wholesale 
reorganization of planning under which the primary instrument for state economic policy 
would be the twenty-year plan for technical and scientific progress. Ministries would be 
eliminated and turned into organizations working on integrating new technology rather 
than directly planning and organizing industrial and enterprise practice. Moreover, 
enterprise independence should be accompanied by a major overhaul in the credit system 
and an expansion in the use of bank loans to finance new investment, rather than direct 
infusions from the state budget. Under these conditions, Gosbank needed to step away from 
its role in directly issuing funds and become “a bank of banks”—in other words, a Western-
style central bank. This would mean that an economic reform was not just a matter of 
enterprise independence but a “reform of the state budget” to exclude bank reserves from 
the total budget line, allowing them to operate as an independent source of funding.623 This 
same sentiment was shared by Abalkin when he forwarded a note to the Central 
Committee’s Department on Economics and Planning, advocating the advantages of the 
creation of “commercial credit”—a system of banks that would issue profit-based loans—
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as the underlying necessary step for the establishment of enterprise independence and self-
financing.624  
Just how quickly things were changing was on display with the 1988 “Law on 
Cooperatives,” which effectively legislated the right of citizens to form “cooperatives” or 
essentially, private small businesses. The terms on which leading Soviet economists spoke 
about this decision is revealing about how they thought about the existence of private 
enterprise. Writing in the introduction to a 1989 book called The Individual Cooperative 
Sector: Perspectives for Development [Individual’no kooperativnyi sektor: prespektivy 
razvitiia], Aganbegian noted:  
The cooperative movement and 'small business' play an important role in developed 
economies. They also have a strong social significance. The flexible response of 
cooperatives and small businesses to changes in the economy, in other words, 
changes in demand gives them very good economic results. In many sectors, in both 
socialist and capitalist economies, they respond to consumer demand much more 
effectively than state enterprises or large firms. The foreign experience shows that 
small businesses not only adopt new technology faster than large companies but also 
play a major role in innovation. 
 
A co-author continued that, “large corporations (in the USA, Japan, and Western Europe) 
do not destroy small businesses but rather work with them in a single system of production. 
“Many countries,” it continued, “have developed a national system of financially 
stimulating the development of small business. Such programs provide small businesses 
with tax breaks, provide them with credit at lowered rates and with direct financial aid. For 
example, in Great Britain, the government pays 30-35% of the expenses associated with 
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the creation of new jobs by small businesses.” While capturing some of the surface 
necessities of a system of private business, it never argued how to adjust the concept of a 
“national economy”—the economy as one big factory—would integrate the existence of 
these new entities. The authors assumed that these new institutions would simply integrate 
into the Soviet financial and banking system rather than create inertias and pressures of 
their own.625 
 Yet, things did not go so smoothly. An example of how these problems played out 
came in the form of a report from the Ministry of Finance:  
Fig 7.1: Planned and Unexpected Sources of Income to the Population for 1988 in 




Expected actual sum 
From 1988 
Difference 
from Planned  
Wage Fund  11 22.5 11.5 
 Unplanned uses of Central Funds    6 6 
Bonuses for Increasing Labor 
Productivity  6.9 11.6 4.7 
Monetary Incomes from Kolkhoz 
Sales of Ag. Products 2.3 3 0.7 
Income   from Financial Assets  0.7 2.7 2 
Other Incomes Including those that 
cannot be captured in balances -0.98 5 5.98 
Source: GARF f. 5446 op. 150 d. 1 l. 58 
 The Ministry of Finance reported that three areas were most responsible for unexpected 
overruns in the money gained by the Soviet population—increases in paid wages, incomes 
                                                
625 Abel Agambeygian et. al., Individua’lno kooperativnyi sektor: perspekivy razvitiia (Moscow: 
Ekonomika, 1989) 27-52.  
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from financial assets, and incomes unaccounted in surveys—were tied to both the perennial 
problems of economic reform but also to qualitative change unleashed by the economic 
reforms. Half of the unplanned increases in the wage fund were related to the old problem 
of enterprises rewarding their workers for increased profitability caused by their ability to 
increase prices while not changing their overall productivity. What was new, however, was 
that a significant portion of this (3.2 billion rubles) was linked to the growth of the 
cooperative sector which was deriving its profits by purchasing goods from wholesale 
markets, often using non-circulating enterprise script currency, and selling them for 
circulating rubles on the consumer market. This meant that claims in non-circulating 
currency were now redeemable in circulating state currency, appearing as a debit on the 
government’s balance sheet. The spread between these currencies was not important 
throughout the postwar period as Gosbank was very good at preventing seepages from one 
unit of account to another making them a largely fungible and thus maintaining a uniform 
money supply. However, with new intermediate institutions now legislated into law, these 
spillovers began to have an effect, creating arbitrage opportunities and therefore an increase 
in the issuance of liabilities non-state liabilities redeemable in state currency. Acts to 
liberalize bank lending were backfiring as consumers took out bank loans to finance the 
purchases of consumer goods rather than to force the expansion of private housing 
construction, as had been intended. Given these changes, the ministry admitted that five 
billion rubles of these accounts were coming from sources that could not be captured by 
their accounting methods due to the emergence of new kinds of financial practices.626  
                                                
626 GARF f. 5446 o. 148 d. 1 l. 55-57. 
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 A report issued later that year further detailed what was happening. “Measures to 
increase the independence of enterprises” had created “an inflow of means of payments” 
that “were outstripping the total value of goods on the markets.” Enterprises were taking 
advantage of their monopolies by increasing prices and thereby worsening the situation. 
As a result, the population was holding more and more of its savings in cash, which as a 
liability of the state, was increasing the budget deficit. The situation was complicated by 
the fact that the Law on Cooperatives had allowed privately run “cooperatives” to access 
enterprise script currency and convert it to circulating currency. This channel of monetary 
expansion was estimated to be at three billion rubles over the course of 1988.627 In the 
period from January to May 1989, this sum had reached six billion. The problem, Gosbank 
reported in a 1989 summary of household finances, was that the five-year plan had not 
expected the added volume of money supply coming from the cooperatives.628  
 During this crisis of the fiscal state, Aganbegian admitted that Soviet economics 
did not have the answer to these problems. Unfortunately, the newly appointed head of the 
Section on Economics said, the “transition to the new system in 1988 was not going well.” 
The problem was Soviet economists and policy makers were “taking one step back for 
every step we take forward.” Rather than “having a real financing system” based on 
banking and credit for example, Aganbegian noted, “we have a new system of 
redistributing the state budget.” Bogomolov expressed his frustration by saying that “we 
now acknowledge that markets are a part of our socialist economy but things still somehow 
                                                
627 RGAE f. 1562 o. 41 d. 3262 l. 9-22.  
628 RGAE f. 2324 o. 33 d. 741 l. 54–58. 
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don’t advance. Markets are still associated with something alien to our ideology. This is a 
significant brake on our economics.”629  
 The emergence of a greater role for markets through enterprise self-financing and 
cooperative activity eventually brought in social questions about the future of the Soviet 
state. How would an institutional infrastructure designed under Stalinist industrialization, 
whose contours guided the process of state power in the USSR, transition to any kind of 
market society? In 1989-1990 two officials presented ideas for a future Soviet political 
economy. One, written by Gorbachev’s advisor, Georgii Shakhnazarov, wrote his boss a 
note arguing that the government needed a new social base of support: the managers of 
large industries and cooperatives. This group, Shakhnazarov argued, was “awakening to 
its influence” and could become the backbone that supported Gorbachev’s policies of 
transition to a market economy—the Soviet Union’s own capitalists.630 Another was 
written by Sitraiian of Gosplan, who proposed a new system for organizing industry outside 
the traditional institutions of the Soviet state while maintaining political stability and the 
power of the government as the prime mover of economic life. The most “strategic” areas 
of production, such as gas, oil, nickel, and agro-chemicals, would be converted into quasi 
state-owned enterprises with market monopolies. These companies would be the “financial 
and economic bedrock of state power” with the equity and assets of the company held 
hands of politically loyal managers and government approved private figures. This would 
allow the government of the USSR to regulate the economy through “direct distribution 
rather than the free market” while still taking advantages of market efficiencies in other, 
                                                
629 Ibid.  
 630 The Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation f. 5 o.1 d. 529. 
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“non-strategic” areas.631 Sitraiian’s note was prescient. Russia’s economy indeed became 
a system dominated by insiders whose access to the fruits of private property became 
determined by the state while a consumer market has indeed come into being. 
 Does this mean that the economic reformers failed? Perhaps, as critics of Yeltsin-
era reforms argue, the most radical agenda and the shock privatization of the 1990s were 
an overreach that spurred a response in which the population accepted a slow retreat into 
authoritarianism in exchange for the delivery of consumer goods. Perhaps embedded 
security interests did subvert the liberal moment, as defenders of shock therapy have 
argued. However, a tantalizing possibility is that contemporary Russia is the ultimate 
fulfillment of Soviet economic reform as it came to be conceptualized in the 1970s. It is a 
state-run economy that ultimately gains some efficiencies from markets and does not 
depend on direct orders from the state. Control over state enterprises and the larger 
economy is indeed transmitted through financial systems rather than through gross targets. 
Following Charles Maier’s dictum that we treat economic ideas as informed by the power 
of interest groups, we can begin to understand the failure of the liberal experiment in Russia 
and the post-Soviet space as at least partially determined by the fact that it was being 
implemented by illiberal actors whose interests were structured by the Soviet institutional 
system, stripped of its ideological context.632 In other words, Russia’s contemporary 
illiberal political economy was baked into the very “liberal” economic ideas that dominated 
the post-Soviet space in the wake of the USSR’ s collapse. Indeed, a telling feature of post-
Soviet economic discourse is the continuing absence of a viable financial-institutionalist 
                                                
631 GARF f. 5446 o. 162 d. 2 l. 63-64. 
632 Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 6–7. 
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approach to economics of the type championed by Yakov Kronrod. Answering the exact 
processes of how and why these processes occurred, however, requires further research.  
These questions testify to the ongoing importance of the many permutations of the 
Soviet legacy for understanding what came after it. Over the course of the Post-Stalin 
period, the Soviet state worked to incorporate new ways of conducting economic policy 
without undercutting the institutional practices that were becoming indistinguishable from 
Marxist-Leninist ideology itself. Faced with a changing global order that increasingly 
emphasized the importance of prosperity and economic development, Soviet leaders, for a 
time, successfully changed the narrative of the USSR’s competition with the West to 
accommodate openings for innovative thinking and promoting stability. The Soviet Union 
would now beat the West—particularly its leader—the United States at its own game, 
prosperity, thereby showing the world the superiority of the socialist planned economy. 
This, however, opened rifts between the institutions created under Stalinism to industrialize 
the Soviet Union through the mass mobilization of material and people—the production 
ministries and the planning agencies—and new organizations staffed by second generation 
Socialist intellectuals dedicated to transforming the Soviet order to win the “peaceful socio-
economic competition” with the West. This fracture over economic policy was difficult to 
resolve as the Soviet Union lacked a legislative apparatus which would allow these tensions 
to be resolved in the drafting of policy. Thus, the practice of economic policy making in 
the USSR turned into a carousel of initiatives that were never carried out as widening fault 
lines between factions within the elite throttled attempts to radically rethink the practices 
of central planning and to stymie the implementation of those limited reforms that were 
attempted. The result wasn’t just economic stagnation but an increasingly weak state whose 
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formal institutions lacked depth forcing it to rely on ad-hoc, informal arrangements rather 
than statutory law.  
This framework allows us to insert the Soviet Union into the larger history of the Euro-
American political-economy following the Second World War. While not a participant in 
the Bretton Woods system or the financial globalization that followed its collapse, it had 
its own, parallel issues. The Soviet Union tried to use its particular economic institutions 
to try to create an analogue to post-war embedded liberalism and then to tackle the 
problems of a postindustrial society. The USSR’s failure at some, though not all, of these 
goals should not exclude it from being a central part of this larger history. Indeed, hindsight 
has obscured just how potent the USSR’s economy looked at its height and how popular 
ideas of an updated, humanized planned economy was on both sides of the Iron Curtain. 
While a global history of economic planning remains to be written, the lens of political 
economy lets us see that the international dimensions of Soviet history must be taken 




APPENDIX A: Consolidated Income Statements of Major Economic Sectors  
 
*Standard T accounts with assets on the left hand side and liabilities on the right 
 
Figure 8.1: Pre-1965 Income Statements  
 


























































































































Figure 8.3 Post-1988 Income Statement with Cooperative and the Private Sector 
 
 
Italics: Nenalichnye or enterprise script money. 





APPENDIX B: Circular Flow and Decision Diagram of Soviet Fiscal Institutions 
 




APPENDIX C: Household Cash Holdings and Consumer Spending  
 
Figure 8.5 Cash Holding by Soviet Household 1961-1990 in Billions of 1961 Rubles 
 
 
Source: Iu. Kashin et. al. Denezhnyie doxody i razhody naseleniia 1924-1990 (Moscow: 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2006), Author’s Calculations. 
 
Figure 8.6 Cash Holdings by Soviet Households in Percent Change from Previous Year 
 
 
Source: Iu. Kashin et. al. Denezhnyie doxody i razhody naseleniia 1924-1990 (Moscow: 
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